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PUBLIC BANKS MATTER 
AT A TIME OF COVID-19
Covid-19 has had a devastating impact on lives and liveli-hoods around the world. Lockdowns and public health measures have decimated the economies of most coun-
tries, leading to dramatic state interventions to stem the fallout. 
Governments have been on the frontline of this economic de-
fence, as have public banks. Nobody expected the private sector 
to take the lead. Corporate shareholders took no proactive stance 
towards bailing out struggling businesses, households or govern-
ments. Rather, governments and public banks have charted the 
path to recovery. There are good reasons for this, and the future of 
stable, sustainable and equitable societies will depend on building 
on the lessons now being learned.
This book focuses on the role that public banks have played 
in managing the economic crises of Covid-19 to date. Researched 
and written between May and October of 2020, it is a ‘rapid re-
sponse’ effort to document and critically reflect upon public bank 
actions and policies in the initial stages of Covid-19 in different 
parts of the world. Working with researchers on every continent, 
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the book is the most ambitious effort to date to explore and docu-
ment the ways in which public banks have responded to Covid-19. 
It sheds light on public bank policies and actions and assesses the 
challenges they face. We make a preliminary assessment of their 
effectiveness in achieving their goals and stemming the economic 
impacts of the pandemic. 
This has been no easy task, as the ground was constantly shift-
ing: programmes announced were not always put in place directly; 
some seemingly “new” programmes were really just being fast-for-
warded; bold new policies were surpassed just weeks later by even 
bolder ones, and so on. Nevertheless, the chapters provide a useful 
snapshot of a tumultuous time. Based on desktop analysis of bank 
media statements and reports, financial databases and government 
news releases, as well as interviews with leading bank personnel 
(carried out virtually), the book provides a unique perspective of 
what some are calling the most damaging global crisis in more than 
a century. The lessons learned from these contributions should 
contribute to a better understanding – both theoretical and empir-
ical – of how public banks can be better supported for the future 
and how they can help to ensure that this pandemic does not lead to 
another “lost decade” (UNCTAD 2020).
Two other contextual factors are important to help gain an un-
derstanding of the contributions of these chapters. The first is that 
Covid-19 did not strike upon a world economy that was otherwise 
stable and in good shape. On the contrary, many have long been 
worried that the last few decades of excessive de-regulation, hy-
per-financialization, privatization and globalization had left the 
world economy in an unbalanced, inequitable and precarious state. 
Covid-19 served to pull back the curtains and shine a light on this 
fragility, but it did not create it. Second, the coronavirus is widely 
believed to be related to global warming and climate change, as it 
was caused by a zoonotic transmission that emerged in the inten-
sifying clash between humans and our environment. Further hu-
man-made disasters can therefore be expected, all of which must 
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be addressed through just processes and with more equitable out-
comes. This future makes it all the more important to learn the les-
sons from the experiences of Covid-19.
Our introductory chapter begins by tracing the path of coro-
navirus and its concomitant economic impacts, highlighting the 
liquidity blockages and fractures created in the flow of money 
that necessitated such a rapid and special response from public 
banks. Next, it draws on our contributors’ findings to highlight five 
promising lessons of how public banks responded to the Covid-19 
emergency. It then turns to the underlying question of ‘why pub-
lic banks’, exploring what is important and distinct about them. 
We conclude by considering the potential of public banks to ‘build 
forward better for people and the planet’ and how to deal with 
the coming backlash against rising public debt and a premature 
return to an obsession with austerity.
FROM HEALTH CRISIS TO A FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS
When Covid-19 struck, for most governments the only response 
was either ‘gradual stop’ or ‘sudden stop’ through policies of social 
distancing and eventual lockdown. If economies can be thought of 
as supertankers – charting a course across oceans involving mil-
lions of moving parts and requiring time, distance and technical 
expertise to change course – it was as if these massive boats had 
hit an iceberg. Within days of turning off the engines, consumer 
demand and supply dried up simultaneously, even in countries that 
did not lock down their economies. This sparked record flows of 
capital in and out of equities and foreign exchange markets and in-
terrupted productive processes and employment everywhere (Aum 
et al. 2020; Anderson et al. 2020; Correia et al. 2020). No country was 
spared the economic effect of the contagion, even if they had no 
confirmed cases of the virus (such as in the Pacific islands).
Ideally, in such times, governments lead the way with respons-
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es that are rapid, bold, generous and crisis-facing. Political will 
is essential, as is the fiscal space or economic capacity to finance 
the blockages in the flow of finance, to fund increased health sec-
tor bills and unemployment benefits, and to underwrite the firms, 
households, public services, local authorities and even banks that 
are reeling as the flow of money is interrupted. What individual 
countries did varied according to their fiscal resources and the con-
texts of their unique political economies. Even as late into the crisis 
as October 2020, when this chapter was finalized, it is notable that 
the poorest countries of the world were struggling as they had less 
capacity to face Covid-19 than their wealthy counterparts. While 
rich countries could devote tens of billions of dollars (equalling as 
much as 50% of Gross Domestic Product – GDP) on their fiscal and 
monetary packages, many poor countries could spend amounts 
worth only a few per cent of GDP. By August 2020, Japan had spent 
as much as 52.6% of its GDP on a variety of fiscal and monetary 
packages; Germany had spent 38.5%, Canada 30% and the United 
States 27.5%, while even the large and higher income developing 
countries had spent only a fraction of this (UNCTAD 2020).
Some country differences in the financial scale and type of re-
sponse also reflect the extent to which societies would comply with 
the measures of social distancing and lockdown; but even in those 
countries where compliance was highest, additional finances still 
needed to be directed to the Covid-19 effort (for example, China 
spent almost 18% of GDP on a variety of fiscal and monetary policies 
alongside high levels of social compliance). While the international 
financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank augmented their resources and scaled up their 
capacities to help, many have criticized their responses for being too 
little, too conditional and unevenly distributed (Kentikelenis 2020). 
These international financial institutions (IFIs) are not the fo-
cus of this volume, however. Instead, the book highlights the role of 
national and regional public banks, which are too often overlooked 
and under-studied despite their extremely significant roles in de-
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velopment, in supporting government policies, and in providing 
public financial capacity. Here we focus on how they functioned to 
‘keep the ship afloat’ amidst a global pandemic wave, and what les-
sons we need to draw from this as we think forward.
FIVE PROMISING LESSONS OF PUBLIC BANKS FACING COVID-19
The contributions to this book make one thing clear: Public banks 
have not stood idle in response to the economic and social dam-
age wrought by the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic. Rather, pub-
lic banks have emerged as dynamic financial institutions capable 
of responding to the needs of their societies. Five overarching and 
promising lessons stand out: public banks have the potential to 
respond rapidly; to fulfill their public purpose mandates; to act 
boldly; to mobilize their existing institutional capacity; and to 
build on ‘public-public’ solidarity. In short, public banks are help-
ing us navigate the tidal wave of Covid-19 at the same time as private 
lenders are turning away.
These promising lessons are drawn from the case studies in this 
volume, but this is not to say that every public bank responded in the 
same way or to the same extent. For some, it is more about the poten-
tial of positive actions than actual practice. Nonetheless, the lessons 
remain real, and are visible across a diverse public bank landscape. 
Rapid responses: In bank after bank, country after country, one 
thing stands out: public banks responded rapidly to the onset of the 
Covid-19 pandemic and to the sudden stop in economic activity. The 
significance of this must not be under-emphasized. Because public 
banks are within the public sphere, they can work with public au-
thorities at times of crisis and react quickly as a matter of policy. 
Public purpose mandates: Where the mandates of public banks 
reflect a clear public purpose, these banks were able to fulfill their 
mandates in responding to the Covid-19 crisis. The most promising 
cases are where their mandate is unambiguously supported by the 
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political authorities. Where political authority support was ambig-
uous, fractured or even hostile to public banks, the responses have 
been much less effective. 
Bold, generous and crisis-facing action: In many cases, public 
banks have responded to the challenge of Covid-19 with bold and 
generous actions that faced the crisis head-on. Central banks have 
pumped hundreds of billions of dollars into the economy to provide 
financial liquidity, relax financial regulations and support national 
financial responses. Public banks have crafted unprecedented re-
sponses to allow micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises (MS-
MEs), large businesses, public entities, governing authorities and 
households time to breathe, time to adjust and time to overcome 
the worst of the crisis. Typically, this meant offering liquidity with 
generously reduced rates of interest, preferential repayment terms 
and eased conditions of repayment. For the most vulnerable in so-
ciety, public banks offered non-repayable grants.
Existing institutional capacity and historical legacies: Public 
banks took advantage of having built-up expertise, capacity to co-
ordinate with others and existing lines of communication and de-
cision-making systems. In many cases, these capacities fit within a 
long historical legacy of the public bank working with and in soci-
ety in vital and credible ways. These historical legacies cannot be 
created suddenly at times of crisis. Where they already exist, it has 
tended to be advantageous to Covid-19 responses, placing govern-
ments in a stronger position. This is most evident in public banks 
with clear and accountable public mandates.
Public-public solidarity: Be they in the global north or south, 
public bank responses to the Covid-19 pandemic demonstrated the 
advantages of non-competitive public-public solidarity among pub-
lic financial institutions (PFIs) – between public banks and other 
public entities and governing authorities. Public-public solidarity 
can be guided by political direction and it can occur as a result of al-
ready existing institutional linkages and collaborative public sphere 
legacies. While we see notable central bank and public bank coop-
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eration in most cases, there is evidence of public solidarity extend-
ing to the responses of sovereign wealth funds and public pension 
funds, as well as among national public banks and between public 
banks in different countries.
Finally, we have witnessed a broad range of tools and instru-
ments that public banks have used to carry out their roles, depend-
ing on their mandated function, their position within the overall 
financial system, the level of political support and the depth of their 
pockets. Table 1.1 provides a rough summary of what is possible in 
the face of Covid-19.
Table 1.1: Public bank functions and 




Liquidity •	Public banks, notably central and multilateral banks, have 
created new flows of finance to channel them into cash-
strapped households, economic sectors and governments
Lending •	 Increased lending to public and private clients, as well as to 
national and sub-national governments
•	Emergency lending programmes
•	Reduced and concessional interest rates
•	 Increased or unlimited credit ceilings
•	 Fast processing
•	Broader client base
•	Repayment holidays and deferrals
Grants •	Non-repayable financial resources provided to poorer 
countries, communities and public service providers
Loan 
guarantees
•	Governments backing public bank lending




•	Central banks and governments re-regulating financial rules 
to support increased lending and to support public and 
private banks’ balance sheets





•	Deferred payments on loans
•	Debt forgiveness
•	Grants
•	 International development programme support
Advisory 
services
•	 Information and advice to clients about the crisis
•	Assistance with the development of government policy
•	Provision of technical expertise for debt restructuring






•	Provision of income support and transfer payments
•	Emergency personal loans
•	Easing of eligibility criteria
•	Concessionary loans and grants
•	 Support and subsidies for essential services
Retail banking 
services
•	Enhanced online services and digitalization services
•	Reduced service fees
•	Mortgage and personal loan holidays and deferred payment 
options
•	Dissemination and application of public health and safety 
protocols







•	 Syndicated and solidarity public-public financing
•	Loan guarantees and on-lending support programmes
•	Bond purchases by public financial institutions
•	Mandated sharing of capital resources and deposits among 
public banks
•	Cross-subsidies to cover concessional services










•	Enacting support and financial aid programmes announced 
by governments
•	Provision of technical expertise
•	Offering emergency response coordination assistance 
nationally and internationally
Source: Compiled by authors.
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WHY BANKS?
The promising lessons and specific actions undertaken by public 
banks in response to the Covid-19 pandemic underscore the im-
portance of banks in general. This is because banks are themselves 
unique financial institutions that specialize in creating money, as 
well as managing it. Banks have acquired the political right to cre-
ate and circulate new money as credit within the economy and in 
society. This is an incredibly powerful function – by managing mon-
ey to make credit, banks can create money itself, and they can cre-
ate money through credits well in excess of the actual money held 
in their reserves (McLeay et al. 2014; Pettifor 2016). 
In other words, banks are financial intermediaries that can mag-
nify existing money resources (Spratt 2009). This is a function that 
governments cannot perform. Governments must acquire money 
resources before spending them. This can be done via taxation, re-
ceipts from public enterprises or from money raised in borrowing 
from others. But this is at a ratio of 1:1. The money governments 
raise (from taxes, enterprises and borrowing) equates to the money 
they spend. Banks, on the other hand, can magnify money resourc-
es three- to thirty-fold via ‘fractional reserve’ banking where institu-
tions need only hold onto a portion of the money lent out. 
WHY PUBLIC BANKS?
Because banks can magnify existing money resources, they have 
become one of the most important institutions in society. It is also 
one of the historical reasons why governments founded public 
banks and why public banks persist as credible financial institu-
tions. A public bank is a bank that can be understood as located in 
the ‘public sphere’. This can happen in different ways. A bank can 
be owned publicly – that is, by a government, public authority or 
Diana Barrowclough, Thomas Marois and David A. McDonald
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public enterprise; or it can be controlled publicly – that is, governed 
according to a legally binding public interest mandate, or according 
to public law, or by meaningful public representation on the gov-
erning board, or by some combination of these governance factors. 
Either or both situate a bank within the public sphere and as a pub-
lic financial institution (Schmit et al. 2011; OMFIF 2017). 
Can public banks function differently from private banks?
Being located within the public sphere opens up the potential for 
public banks to function differently from private banks. Private 
corporate banks are directly exposed to competitive market imper-
atives and to the short-term profit-maximizing horizons of share-
holders. Public banks need not follow these imperatives. The public 
sphere can shield public banks from ‘the market’. They are not nec-
essarily shielded – some public banks compete with private banks 
and governments mandate them to be profit-maximizing – but they 
can be as a matter of political will, and they can have a mandate that 
is complementary to, rather than competitive with, private banks. 
Consequently, public banks can offer loans, credits and grants in 
ways that are otherwise impossible for private, profit-seeking banks. 
In turn, public banks can and do operate according to a much wider 
variety of logics than private ones. Contributions to this book from 
the regional public bank associations are evidence of this, as are 
the ‘social’ mandates of the Council of Europe Development Bank 
(CEB) and the small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME)-focus of 
public banks in Argentina, China, Italy and others described in this 
volume. Yet other banks focus on supporting local governmental in-
stitutions as well as business.
How are public banks made accountable?
Public banks can also function differently because they can be 
democratically governed. That is, control over the bank need 
not be limited to shareholders alone but can extend to include 
societal representatives, as is done in the German development 
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bank, KfW. In turn, decision-making can be rendered transpar-
ent and accountable via publicly accessible debate and available 
documentation. There is no causal link, however. Just as public 
banks can be made democratic, so too can they be made less-
than representative, undemocratic or even authoritarian. In this 
respect, Covid-19 has also exposed less than ideal public bank-
ing and governing authority practices, notably in the cases of 
Turkey and India, where a long history of public banking has 
been turned in a different direction by government, as well as 
in Mexico. This strength or weakness of public bank governance 
ultimately depends on social forces in time- and place-bound 
historical contexts. What public banks do and how they evolve 
are the results of recurrent power struggles among and between 
contending public and private interests within capitalism (Ma-
rois and Güngen 2016). In fact, far from being meant to finance 
market development or being destined to fall victim to political 
corruption, public banks are much more ‘dynamic’ and indeter-
minant institutions whose functions are shaped and reshaped by 
class-divided social forces in the shadow of contemporary finan-
cialized capitalism (Marois forthcoming).
Aren’t public banks minor players?
Public banks continue to comprise a large and diverse part of the 
global financial sector to a degree that often surprises people. As of 
mid-2020, there were 910 public development, commercial/retail and 
universal banks worldwide with nearly US$49 trillion in combined as-
sets (McDonald et al. 2020). As we see in China, there are many mas-
sive ‘commercial’ public banks tasked with responding to Covid-19. 
Likewise, with Argentina’s Banco de la Nación. In Brazil, too, there is 
a widespread public banking sector that includes all types of public 
banks: commercial, universal and development. 
Recent research indicates that, if we include public central banks 
and multilateral banks, then institutional numbers reach 1,160 
and combined assets exceed US$66 trillion. Going one step further 
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to include public pension and investment funds, there are some 
1,651 public financial institutions commanding just under US$82 
trillion in public financial assets (Marois forthcoming). Other esti-
mates similarly show that public banks are much more significant 
in number and scale than previously recognized (Xu et al. 2019).
This underscores the enormous existing capacity of financial 
institutions within the public sphere. But it also exposes the pau-
city of existing research and debate. Some World Bank and Unit-
ed Nations documents have systematically underestimated global 
public banking capacity at somewhere between US$2 and $5 tril-
lion in assets (see de Luna-Martínez and Vicente 2012; UN IATF 
2019, 143). Other researchers prefer only to focus on public devel-
opment banks, with estimated institutional numbers in the range 
of 400 to 500 globally, with combined assets of just over US$11 tril-
lion (Xu et al. 2019; FiC 2020). 
It is worth emphasizing, too, that the Covid-19 crisis has led to 
a general increase in public banking activity and assets held. For 
some contributors to this book, this crisis moment is an opportuni-
ty to create new public banking institutions and local alternatives 
focused on supporting community development and more equita-
ble economic opportunities (both in the global north, particularly 
in the USA, and in the global south).
What’s the difference between types of public banks?
Public banks come in many different institutional types. In this book 
we mostly focus on development, commercial/retail and universal 
types of public banks, but we also include central banks and mul-
tilateral/regional banks. While they are all public financial institu-
tions, there are some distinguishing features and functions. Central 
banks are positioned at the zenith of national financial systems and 
are unique for issuing currency, holding national reserves, setting 
base interest rates, having regulatory and supervisory control over 
other domestic banks, and for acting as a lender of last resort to 
other banks. The chapter on central banks in this volume details the 
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extent to which Covid-19 has contributed to a sea-change in their 
actions, with operations, if not mandates, becoming much more di-
rectly supportive of government policy needs. 
Multilateral banks are owned by a group of countries to raise 
capital, lend capital, plan investments, provide expertise for mem-
bers, and, sometimes, play a lender-of-last resort role at times of 
crisis. In addition to the Council of Europe Development Bank, this 
volume also describes the different experiences and orientations 
of Covid-19 interventions of the European Investment Bank (EIB), 
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the Commonwealth 
Development Corporation.
Central and multilateral public banks often work closely with 
national and sub-national level development, commercial/retail 
and universal public banks. Development banks, also known as in-
vestment, promotional, policy, or as second tier banks, tend to fo-
cus on providing long-term, ‘patient’ finance for economic and so-
cial development purposes and will have considerable specialized 
knowledge on sectors like infrastructure, rural development, MS-
MEs, corporate finance, exports, public services and so on. These 
banks will often ‘on-lend’ to other commercial/retail and local de-
velopment banks as well as directly to governments, large industry 
and non-profit organizations. 
Commercial banks, also known as retail or first tier banks, 
accept short-term deposits from individuals, households, small 
businesses, corporations and public sector agencies for use as 
loanable capital. These banks provide retail financial services, 
from savings to insurance, chequing to investments, mortgages 
to car loans, and do so via sometimes quite local and sometimes 
quite extensive national and international branch networks. Oth-
er types of public banks that provide similar retail services in-
clude savings banks and postal banks. Finally, universal banks 
take what both development and commercial banks do and com-
bine them into a single institution to offer retail and develop-
ment/investment services.
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Where do public banks get capital to make loans?
Different sources of capital, as well as size, shape what public banks 
can do. Most public banks are usually ‘capitalized’ by governing au-
thorities, which provide the bank’s initial paid-in equity and ‘call-
able’ capital (the latter being a government’s promise to pay if and 
when the bank calls for additional capital). To grow and expand 
operations, public banks must access new and recurrent sources 
of capital. Some public commercial and universal banks do this by 
accepting savings and deposits from society at large (as in Turkey, 
Argentina, Brazil and China). Public development and multilateral 
banks will often raise new capital by issuing bonds in domestic and 
international bond markets (as in Germany and with the EIB, IADB 
and CEB). For all types of public banks, governments can direct-
ly inject new capital to boost lending capacity. Often, government 
contributions are made to support mandated lending to MSMEs, 
farmers, green transitions and so on. Financial regulations may 
require state, municipal and local authorities to make financial 
contributions or to deposit their receipts with public banks, both 
of which boost lending capacity (keeping in mind for every dollar 
deposited banks can lend multiples more). 
Like all banks, public banks borrow from other banks – public 
and private, domestically and internationally, including from the 
central bank – to meet their financial commitments. Other public 
financial institutions like sovereign wealth funds, insurance provid-
ers and pension funds will also channel money capital into pub-
lic banks, potentially constituting a form of public-public financial 
solidarity (Barrowclough and Gottschalk 2018). There is strong ev-
idence of public sphere collaboration in response to the Covid-19 
pandemic, with pension funds and central banks supporting devel-
opment banks, and development banks in turn supporting public 
commercial banks, health authorities, municipalities and so on 
(Marois forthcoming). 
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Are public banks naturally better at responding 
to crises like Covid-19?
Public banks are not naturally better or worse at responding to 
crises than private banks. However, because they exist within the 
public sphere, public banks do not need to function according to 
market-based and profit-maximizing imperatives. This opens up 
a world of possibilities. As a consequence, many public banks op-
erate very differently from private ones. As noted above, this has 
contributed to rapid and directed interventions at times of crisis, 
such as with Covid-19. The ability of banks to create credit means 
that money can be invested before it has been saved (McLeay et al. 
2014). Another way of looking at it is that banks, be they public or 
private, can make money available now to be repaid in the future, 
thus commanding “a power to make available time” (Konings 2018, 
79). But only through the public sphere can banks command time 
and money in the public interest in ways that can be transparent 
and accountable. The Eurodad contribution to this book reinforces 
this message and challenges us to rethink and reclaim public banks 
for a sustainable and socially equitable future beyond Covid-19.
BUILD FORWARD BETTER FOR PEOPLE AND PLANET
Public banks of all types are actively engaged in the question of how 
to build back better, even if the crisis of Covid-19 has meant many 
are concentrating on immediate recovery. Central banks have been 
behaving in ways that would have been unthinkable in recent de-
cades, harking back to their former role when they were an essential 
partner in support of national development goals. Even those that 
are evolving the least are nonetheless revising their financial mod-
els and regulatory approaches to include health and environmental 
stress-testing and risk disclosure. Sustainability criteria for public 
banking has passed from niche debate to increasingly mainstream 
action across the globe, in low-income countries just as much as in 
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wealthy ones (UNCTAD 2019; Barrowclough 2020). 
This is happening across the spectrum of financial institutions: 
just as central banks are showing renewed interest in their financial 
capacity to create and guide flows of money towards greener activ-
ities and away from fossil fuels, so too are other public banks and 
funds. National and sub-national public development, retail/com-
mercial and universal banks are, in many cases, already advanced 
towards greener and more just transitions. Over the last 10 to 15 
years, public banks have integrated green mandates and are acting 
to fund explicit decarbonization activities and environmental sus-
tainability (Marois forthcoming). The United Nations’ Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) have provided a global narrative and 
orientation for these lending activities and many public banks are 
actively reappraising their mandates and work programmes to bet-
ter align with them (for example, the Islamic Development Bank 
insists the SDGs should guide both their lending programmes and 
technical assistance to member countries). 
There is a risk, however, that the more market-oriented and neo-
liberal orientations of the IFIs and some multilateral development 
banks (notably the World Bank) could undermine the policy space 
and credibility of national and sub-national public banks to effect 
pro-public and socially-equitable alternative transformation. Also, 
as public institutions have necessarily taken on increased debt to 
combat Covid-19, there is the threat of an austerity backlash, with 
critics dusting off their timeless criticisms of what they argue to 
be the inherent inefficiencies of public banks (La Porta et al. 2002; 
Barth et al. 2006; Cull et al 2017). They will likely raise the spectre of 
the politicization of public banks, arguing that public banks follow 
political mandates (ignoring that this constitutes a foundation of ef-
fectiveness in cases like Germany’s KfW). All this will be resurrect-
ed not to suggest ways to make public banking better, or for them 
to more effectively catalyze a green and just transition, but rather 
as a bludgeon to force through bank privatizations that will further 
concentrate financial capacity in the private sector.
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To argue that public banks should lead efforts to build forward 
better for people and the planet is not, however, to naively sug-
gest that a bank is necessarily better by virtue of being publicly 
owned. There is no innate purpose or essential policy orientation 
that is common to all public banks. This is because public banks 
are contested and pulled between contending public and private 
interests. They are also just one element within the landscape of 
all financial institutions, which is nested within a global environ-
ment that is created by national and international economic and 
political forces. 
To ensure a pro-public orientation of public banks, many things 
and social forces need to be aligned – or at the least not actively 
misaligned (Eurodad 2017). If public banks are to make a significant 
contribution to the post-Covid world, they can be most effective 
when they are part of a pro-public and socially just development 
articulation, with democratic central banks at the apex, supported 
by a diverse mixture of financial institutions with differentiated and 
distinctive roles. This in turn needs to be positively integrated with 
broader government policies and national development goals that 
are subject to substantive democratic structures. 
To support public banks in the wake of Covid-19, three broad 
organizing strategies are needed within banks themselves and in 
the wider political economic landscape in which they exist. They 
include definancialization, decarbonization and democratization 
(Marois forthcoming; UNCTAD 2019,143-177). We outline each of 
these in turn.
First, public banks offer a potential path towards definancializa-
tion; that is, a path away from the short-term, speculative and of-
ten predatory practices of the hyper-financialized hyper-globalized 
world that emerged from the 1980s, as financial markets were lib-
eralized and cross-border capital flows were completely unregulat-
ed. The global financial crisis revealed the waste and damage that 
excessively financialized markets can generate, and many countries 
established new public banks and funds or strengthened existing 
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ones in recognition that private banking had failed to do enough 
for development. 
Ideally, the entire financial system would be re-regulated so 
as to be less highly concentrated, more competitive and less vul-
nerable to banks that are ‘too big to fail’, but even without this 
public banks can be a bastion for change. They can be shielded 
by the public sphere so they need not operate only in narrowly 
financial terms and can do more to provide catalytic and ‘patient 
finance’ that provides long-term public benefits in the public in-
terest (UNCTAD 2019; Macfarlane and Mazzucato2018). Instead 
of short-term profit-maximization, solidarity-driven public banks 
can help each other to coordinate lending to reduce the cost of 
borrowing and generate cost savings for governing authorities 
(ALIDE 2018). Through the use of a fractional reserve system, 
public banks can also offer a powerful fiscal advantage to state 
authorities (von Mettenheim 2010). This can help to reduce de-
pendencies on foreign, private, market-based finance and the 
monopoly control of private bankers over public policy (Scherrer 
2017; Marshall and Rochon 2019). 
Second, public banks offer a potential path towards decarbon-
ization, the urgency of which has not diminished with the Covid-19 
crisis. Widespread agreement around the failure of private banks to 
respond to the financing needs for mitigating global warming has 
made room for the potentially catalytic role of public banks to re-
spond in new and innovative ways (Campiglio et al. 2017; Carney 
2015; Scott et al. 2017; UNCTAD 2019). There is now a very long list 
of central banks, public banks and public financial institutions that 
have taken on board the need to restructure and reorient them-
selves in line with the decarbonization challenge (Dikau and Volz 
2020; Mazzucato and Semieniuk 2017; FiC 2020; Marois forthcom-
ing; UNCTAD 2019). Empirical evidence suggests that public inves-
tors are the main reason that renewable energy finance grew at all 
in the years following the global financial crisis (Mazzucato and 
Semieniuk, 2018).
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Finally, public banks offer a potential path towards democrati-
zation; that is, for society to have a meaningful say over how finan-
cial resources are deployed (Epstein 2010; Block 2014). Democrati-
zation of bank governance and decision-making is a process that 
can, among other things, drive innovation alongside social inclu-
sion and equity through internalizing the public interest and mo-
bilizing towards identified societal priorities. The democratization 
of finance is a central and recurrent demand made by academics 
and community groups critical of financialized capitalism. At the 
same time, public banks cannot exist as an island of democratic 
governance within a broader sea that follows other, non-democrat-
ic principles and this is a challenge that needs to be addressed going 
forward if public banks are to be able to contribute effectively in the 
Covid-19 building forward better phase.
FUTURE RESEARCH
This book is the first study of public bank responses to Covid-19 and 
raises as many questions as it answers, highlighting the need for 
further case study and empirical work. How effective have their pol-
icies been? Who benefitted and why? What can make their policies 
and actions more equitable and democratic? 
Research will need to systematically identify where the mon-
ey came from that enabled public banks to respond rapidly and at 
scale. Capital markets played a role, but it is not evident that they 
played a dominant role. Where else did monetary resources come 
from? What role did different private and public sources play? Im-
portantly, did these different sources of finance differentially affect 
how public banks could respond to the Covid-19 crisis? 
It is also not clear that Covid-19 financial responses have been 
able to underwrite a ‘green’ recovery. If not, why not? Moreover, 
what can be done to ensure future responses to crises deliver sus-
tainable and just recoveries? Related to this, public services have 
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been on the Covid-19 pandemic frontlines, notably in the health, 
water, sanitation, transportation and education sectors. Have pub-
lic bank emergency responses provided effective and appropriate 
support for these essential public services? 
The Covid-19 crisis has also shone a light on otherwise hid-
den public bank coordination networks and collaborative prac-
tices. These public-public networks need to be better understood 
and expanded, with knowledge sharing and capacity support 
building being critical to a more sustainable global public bank-
ing network. 
One of the biggest black holes in our understanding of public 
banks is around representative governance structures. There is an 
urgent need to examine and rethink public banks’ accountabili-
ty and transparency practices. As global ambitions mount over 
the future role of public banks funding green transitions, so too 
must our demands to democratize the processes of financing such 
structural change. At the same time, we need to come to grips with 
the coming economic and political implications of ramped up 
public bank Covid-19 lending. There is no avoiding future losses 
and a heavy strain of the balance sheets of public banks. This will 
have political ramifications. How can we prepare public banks for 
this as well as their government shareholders and affected com-
munities, both in terms of dealing with the economic losses and 
the political fallout?
Finally, there is an opportunity to rethink public banks as 
dynamic and contested institutions. This means finding alter-
native means of pro-public assessment. It is unacceptable that 
private sector performance indicators (such as profitability as a 
proxy for efficiency) are grafted onto public banks that function 
according to very different operational mandates (for a parallel 
argument in the water sector see McDonald (2016)). Determin-
ing and implementing appropriate alternative criteria may well 
prove the difference between public banks functioning in the 
public or private interest.
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LAYOUT OF THE BOOK
When we initially reached out to potential contributors in April 
2020, shortly after the declaration of a global pandemic, it was not 
clear who would be able to participate and what kind of information 
they would be able to collect. We provided authors with a standard-
ized list of questions to investigate in their locale – including back-
ground information on the bank, a summary of the pandemic out-
break in the study location, key actions taken by the bank to respond 
to Covid-19 and their intended beneficiaries, the effectiveness of these 
bank actions, collaboration with other public service providers and 
public banks, and the impact of Covid-19 on longer-term operations. 
However, the constantly shifting nature of the crisis, combined with 
very different personal and geographical contexts of the researchers, 
made consistency across the chapters difficult. 
But it is perhaps the eclectic nature of this book that is its great-
est strength, illustrating both a universality of public bank expe-
riences as well as their diverse realities. Collectively, they offer a 
set of insights that must be fully sampled to appreciate the overall 
flavour. In this respect we encourage readers to review a broad se-
lection of chapters, from different locations and different perspec-
tives. We have therefore intentionally placed the case studies in this 
book in random order to promote geographical and institutional ex-
ploration (with the exception of the chapters written by the public 
bank and development finance institution associations, which are 
clustered together).
Lastly, we want to remind readers that this is a ‘rapid response’ 
project, which means that the authors and the editors were working 
under very tight timelines to release the findings, as were the copy-
editors and designers. We therefore ask our more diligent readers 
to forgive us any minor formatting, citation or typographical errors. 
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DEVELOPMENT BANKS TO 
FINANCE A SUSTAINABLE 
AND EQUITABLE RECOVERY 
POST COVID-19
Public development banks (PDBs) are in a unique and power-ful position to play a key role in the post Covid-19 recovery. Following efforts to frame policy responses to the Covid-19 
pandemic under a ‘building back better’ approach, this paper aims 
to contribute to a debate that focuses on reclaiming public banking 
for the public good. It presents the challenges that most PDBs face, 
including the fact that their operations have been skewed toward 
private interests over and above the public interest. 
This chapter also details the key features that PDBs, at different 
levels, need to possess to maximize development results for the 
most vulnerable members of society. This includes delivering on 
the climate crisis and contributing to the fight against inequalities, 
especially gender inequalities. As a whole, this chapter makes a 
strong case in support of pro-public and accountable institutions 




The Covid-19 pandemic has the potential to seriously undermine 
developing countries’ progress toward achieving the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) (United Nations 2020). The health, 
economic and social crises triggered by the Covid-19 pandemic 
have magnified pre-existing structural problems and vulnerabili-
ties, exposing – and even intensifying – inequality at all levels and 
across all spheres (Furceri et al. 2020). All this comes on top of 
the ecological crisis that the world was already facing before the 
pandemic struck. 
Developing countries are in urgent need of more and ‘better’ 
development finance. According to the World Bank, the additional 
financing needs for developing countries arising from the crisis 
will be exceptionally high and are likely to persist over the me-
dium term (World Bank Group 2020). In March 2020, the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) called 
for a US$2.5 trillion package for developing countries (UNCTAD 
2020a), which followed a 2019 call for financing a Global Green 
New Deal (UNCTAD 2019). 
With efforts to frame policy responses to the Covid-19 pan-
demic under a ‘building back better’ approach in mind, it is key 
to learn lessons from the problematic aspects of the prevailing 
development model, and to call for a rethink of the institutions 
that have played a dominant role in channelling development fi-
nance up to this point. It is imperative to reclaim public banking 
for the public good. The pandemic has shown the important role 
that the state plays when directing and guiding public policies and 
finance in the public interest. The ‘right’ type of finance needs to 
flow through the ‘right’ type of institutions. The private commer-
cial financial sector alone is unlikely to provide the finance need-
ed to help developing countries emerge from the current crisis, in 
a way that matches the challenge of inequalities and of financing 
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environmentally sustainable development. 
In 2017, Eurodad and partners published the discussion paper 
Public development banks: towards a better model (Eurodad 2017). This 
proposes a framework to assess existing institutions, and the gov-
ernments backing them, to get better at supporting development, 
becoming more accountable and learning from past mistakes. This 
current chapter builds on arguments put forward in the 2017 dis-
cussion paper and aims to further contribute to the debate on the 
types of institutions needed to finance a sustainable and equitable 
recovery in the context of Covid-19. 
This chapter focuses on the mandate, policies, business mod-
el and governance that public development banks need to have in 
order to serve the public good in an accountable and transparent 
way. To start with, we describe what public development banks are 
and explain the challenges that they face, including the challenges 
posed by the Covid-19 pandemic. Then we argue why we need pub-
lic development banks and make a strong case in favour of pro-pub-
lic and accountable institutions working at different levels in a com-
plementary way. 
We also detail the key features that public development banks 
need to have to maximize development results for the most vulner-
able people in society, including delivering on the climate crisis 
and contributing to the fight against inequalities, especially gender 
inequalities. If governments are serious about financing an equita-
ble recovery after Covid-19, public development banks should be 
reclaimed to serve the public good. 
WHAT ARE PUBLIC DEVELOPMENT BANKS?
Public development banks (PDBs) are state-owned financial in-
stitutions that aim to deliver on public policy objectives to sup-
port economic development in a country or region. Although 
PDBs are concerned with financial returns, profit is not the 
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overall goal of their activities. This makes them different from 
private commercial banks and some other kinds of state-owned 
financial institutions, such as state-owned commercial banks or 
insurance companies. 
PDBs are run at different levels, which can be grouped into three 
categories:
• National: including sub-national institutions such as local or 
municipal PDBs, and provincial or state-level PDBs.
• Regional: including both continent-wide PDBs, and those fo-
cusing on a sub-region.
• Global: including institutions with a world-wide scope of 
operations.
Regional and global PDBs, owned by a group of countries, are 
known as multilateral development banks (MDBs). Examples in-
clude the African Development Bank or the World Bank Group 
(WBG), among others. Meanwhile, governments’ PDBs operating 
in developing countries are commonly known as development fi-
nance institutions (DFIs).1 These institutions are typically organized 
in different associations – for instance, the Association of Bilateral 
European Development Finance Institutions (EDFI), or the Associ-
ation of Development Financing Institutions in Asia and the Pacific 
(ADFIAP). Examples include the German’s DEG – a subsidiary of the 
German development bank KfW – or France’s PROPARCO – a sub-
sidiary of the AFD. DFIs are dedicated to supporting private sector 
companies, public enterprises and services as well as municipal, 
state and national governments.  
Over the last decade, PDBs have seen a resurgence, particularly 
given the important role they have played in providing countercy-
clical financing when private capital is in short supply. Although 
much of the emphasis has been placed on the role of the existing 
MDBs, national development banks (NDBs) are relevant players in 
1  Other authors, such as Macfarlane (2018), prefer the term ‘state investment bank’ 
(SIBs) to differentiate from ‘development finance institutions’. SIBs are active both in 
the developing and developed countries.
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providing finance to sectors and regions that private financial in-
stitutions do not serve sufficiently. They were major players in the 
financial sector of many economies as they developed (for example, 
in Germany, India, Turkey and Brazil), and they continue to play an 
important role today, particularly in emerging countries.  
A 2012 survey by the World Bank estimated that state-financed 
institutions accounted for “25% of total assets in banking sys-
tems around the world” (Luna-Martínez and Vicente 2012). More 
recent research by Marois (2019) indicates that, by 2017-18, na-
tional public banks plus multilateral banks numbered more than 
700 institutions and controlled over US$40 trillion in assets. The 
figures have continued to grow, with new NDBs recently created 
in both developed and developing countries (World Bank Group 
2018). The Development Bank of Nigeria started its operations in 
2017 and the FinDev in Canada in 2018. In Ghana, conversations 
are currently ongoing to set up the Development Bank Ghana with 
the support of global and European institutions (Business Ghana 
2020). In India, similar discussions are focused on setting up an 
NDB to finance both social and economic infrastructure projects 
(Indian Express 2020).  
At the regional level, new multilateral institutions have also 
been recently established. In 2016, two new Southern-led insti-
tutions started their operations: the BRICS’ [Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa] New Development Bank and China-led 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Although these in-
stitutions might replicate other multilateral banks, particularly 
in terms of portfolio, and environmental and social standards, 
their creation can be understood as a coordinated political re-
sponse to the discontent of emerging countries with the lack of 
representation and the slow pace of governance reform, as well 
as frustration with the policy conditions and advice received 
from the World Bank (Horta 2019; Bond 2016; Barone and Spratt 
2015; Schablitzki 2014).
In 2019, the European Union started discussions to rethink its 
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financial architecture for development. A High-Level Group of Wise 
Persons on the European financial architecture for development 
was created and developed options to create a new EU Development 
Bank (Wieser et al. 2019). This discussion is likely to continue in the 
coming years, now energized with the need for additional financing 
to support the recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic.  
In recent years some global and the regional multilateral devel-
opment banks have substantially increased their capital to expand 
their business operations, for instance, the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank (in 2012), the World Bank Group (in 2018) and the 
African Development Bank (in 2019), while others are currently in 
the process of discussing doing so (for example, a capital increase 
for the Islamic Development Bank is being considered) (Islamic 
Development Bank 2019). At the European level, the European In-
vestment Bank (EIB) as the ‘EU Bank’ has also increased its role. 
The Juncker Plan – which aimed to promote growth and create jobs 
– was centred around the EIB, which in practice meant putting to-
gether a guarantee fund for the EIB. 
CHALLENGES FACING MOST PDBS
PDBs are very diverse and not all PDBs succeed. They are institu-
tions with different sizes, development objectives, business mod-
els, funding arrangements, financial performance and governance 
practices. While some have contributed positively to development 
outcomes, we have also seen that PDBs – the most scrutinised being 
the multilateral development banks – can have considerable neg-
ative development impacts. Moreover, the potential role of most 
PDBs is being skewed towards providing for private interests over 
and above the public interest. 
The development model promoted by major MDBs has been at 
odds with delivering on their development mandate (Brunswijck 
2019; ITUC 2020). In some cases, we have seen that PDBs’ policies 
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and operations result in major negative development impacts, in-
cluding human rights and environmental impacts (see Eurodad 
2010 and 2012, among others). There is limited evidence to support 
the financial and development additionality of DFIs’ interventions. 
For instance, research by Dreher et al (2019) points out that World 
Bank Group (WBG)’s International Finance Corporation lending 
tends to favour companies from major WBG shareholders. Com-
pelling figures released by the Center for Global Development also 
indicate how marginal DFI operations are in terms of volumes and 
development impact (Kenny 2019). Concerns have also been raised 
in relation to the lack of transparency and poor accountability of 
DFIs’ operations (SOMO et al. 2015). 
Before Covid-19, most discussions on development finance were 
focused on using public money and institutions to leverage private 
finance. The dominant policy paradigm has argued that public in-
terventions are better used if directed to de-risk private finance and 
to create markets (World Bank Group et al. 2015). The WBG’s ‘Max-
imising Finance for Development’ approach is perhaps the best-
known illustration of this drive (World Bank, N.D.). The objective 
has been to mobilize the trillions of dollars managed by private in-
stitutional investors to help finance the UN 2030 SDGs. ‘De-risking’ 
private finance is central to this approach and implies changing the 
investment climate and using financing instruments like guaran-
tees, equities or public-private partnerships (PPPs) to underwrite 
private returns. As part of this, we have also seen an increased fi-
nancialization of development lending, which implies the creation 
of financial products out of bundled loans, ostensibly to diversify 
risk, which can then be traded. 
This private finance-led approach to close a so-called ‘financ-
ing gap’ has shown its limitations. Despite the rhetoric in support 
of an increased role of DFIs as development actors, recent figures 
have been a reality check to the highly anticipated leveraging 
potential of DFIs. In April 2019, research by Attridge and Engen 
(2019), from the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) revealed 
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that “each US$1 of MDB and DFI invested mobilises on average 
US$0.75 of private finance for developing countries, but this falls 
to US$0.37 for low income countries.” Existing evidence also refers 
to the geographical concentration – in favour of middle-income 
countries – of publicly-backed private finance, while DFIs face se-
rious challenges to broaden their activities in the least-developed 
countries (Kenny et al. 2020a). 
WHAT HAPPENS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC?
The Covid-19 pandemic has resulted in highly volatile private cap-
ital (UNCTAD 2020b) and the disruption of global supply chains, 
with food and essential medical supplies suffering the most. The 
solution has focused on finding large-scale counter-cyclical fund-
ing to help maintain economic activity, and especially jobs. Equal 
if not more efforts in some cases have been focused on channel-
ling money into the health sector, local authorities and national 
governments to help purchase the supplies needed and to support 
the health crisis. All this has increased the demand for support 
from DFIs and MDBs for public authorities and private sector 
companies in an unprecedented way. In some cases, this has led to 
the capitalization of DFIs (i.e. capital injection from governments, 
which in the case of donor governments can be reported as official 
development assistance). 
DFIs and MDBs have been at the centre of the financial re-
sponse to the crisis. From early March 2020 onwards, most DFIs 
and MDBs announced emergency packages to support the health, 
economic and social crises. Bilateral DFIs are strengthening their 
collaboration so they can share risk across their balance sheets 
and are sharing due-diligence processes and pipelines. A DFI Alli-
ance, made up of 16 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) DFIs, has agreed to work together to ensure 
a central role for DFIs post-Covid-19 (EDFI 2020a). They have also 
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joined the Response, Recovery and Resilience Investment Coali-
tion (‘R3 Coalition’), which aims to link DFIs with impact investors 
and philanthropic networks (GIIN 2020). In the case of the WBG, 
the pandemic has pushed the World Bank to respond in a speedy 
way as developing countries’ demand for support saw a dramatic 
increase. Most resources were channelled through the WBG’s pri-
vate sector arm – the International Finance Corporation (World 
Bank 2020). 
However, some of the challenges presented above have not 
gone away with the crisis, and might even have been intensified 
(Coalition for Human Rights in Development 2020). On the one 
hand, DFIs’ business models seem unsuited to responding to cri-
ses, as they are not ready to take much risk in their operations. If 
they rely on private sources of capital – for instance, selling bonds 
in the private capital market – they are likely to be strongly in-
fluenced by those financing sources, as they need to make sure 
they maintain good scores from credit ratings agencies. This has 
an impact, for example, on their risk appetite and potentially on 
the sectors they might invest in. On the other hand, the speed 
of the response has led, in most cases, to a focus on existing cli-
ents – leaving little space to shift portfolios to where they are 
most needed or to sectors that are most strategic in a context of 
a sustainable and equitable recovery. It has also tended to bypass 
practices that ensure high standards in terms of accountability, 
and social and environmental impact (Oxfam International 2020; 
Bank Information Center 2020). Moreover, in the case of the WBG 
there has been a persistent prioritization of private over public 
interests, and there seems to be no prospect of any immediate re-
orientation away from the ‘Maximizing Finance for Development’ 
approach. On the contrary, the current WBG stance, compounded 
by the limited fiscal space that developing countries will face in 
the post-Covid-19 context, might indicate that the WBG’s approach 




THE NEED TO RECLAIM PUBLIC DEVELOPMENT BANKS 
The Covid-19 pandemic has led to calls to re-focus the state as an 
agent with the capacity to enact public policies and to direct finance 
toward the public interest. In June 2020, the World Bank estimated 
that the additional financing needs for developing countries arising 
from the crisis will be exceptionally high and is likely to persist over 
the medium term (WBG 2020). Pandemic-related external financing 
gaps for low-income countries could be in the range of US$25 bil-
lion to US$100 billion per year – assuming that incremental financ-
ing needs arising from the crisis are in the range of 2.5 to 10 per 
cent of Gross Domestic Product per year and that only half of these 
can be met internally. For middle-income countries, the equivalent 
range is US$150 billion to US$600 billion annually. 
However, in the post Covid-19 context, it is imperative that the 
‘right’ type of finance flows through the ‘right’ type of institutions 
(Chadwick 2020). The private commercial financial sector alone is 
unlikely to provide the finance needed to support the sustainable 
and equitable recovery that is so urgently needed. Before the pan-
demic, it was clear that private investors failed to provide stable 
and sufficient levels of long-term financing for sustainable infra-
structure, making evident the need to provide and ensure climate 
finance (Griffith-Jones et al. 2020). 
Tackling the crisis and paving the way for a sustainable and eq-
uitable recovery requires a strong public sector commitment at all 
levels. We are calling on all PDBs to step up their game and play a 
greater role in the development process to maximize development 
results for local people, including strengthening public health sys-
tems, delivering on the climate crisis and contributing to the fight 
against poverty and inequality. 
While some have called for a greater role for Northern-led DFIs, 
with specific demands to rethink their business models as a result of 
getting increased capital, others have argued that national PDBs are 
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better placed to support essential public services and the local private 
sector (Griffith-Jones and te Velde 2020; EDFI 2020b; Chadwick 2020; 
Kenny et al. 2020b). We argue that, given the specific level of activity 
of different institutions, it is important to achieve greater coordina-
tion and better integration, in order to build complementarities and 
avoid unnecessary competition. A strong case can be made – under 
the principle of subsidiarity2 – for seeing national PDBs as the primary 
tools for implementing development plans. This includes support for 
health systems, sustainable infrastructure and the local private sec-
tor, among other key tasks. Regional and global PDBs can contribute 
by supporting these national institutions, where they exist, or helping 
to build them, if not. Importantly, this requires strengthening of the 
policies, procedures and governance system of NDBs and a substan-
tive change in the way that most regional and global multilateral PDBs 
currently channel their finance (Kenny et al. 2020b).
By working through national public institutions – rather than 
private sector companies directly – national stakeholders, includ-
ing national and local governments, as well as local public and pri-
vate sector actors and workers’ cooperatives, are more likely to be 
empowered to drive their development path, and to hold PDBs to 
account (for more analysis on this discussion see Kring et al. 2019, 
Gallagher and Studart 2016, and Marois 2019).
In order to understand the potential of PDBs, it is worth detail-
ing their five main functions:
• To direct finance – or provide it on better-than-market 
terms – to sectors or regions that are important for a na-
tional development plan, in line with human rights and an 
equitable transition.
• To build the financial sector, either by filling gaps in the 
supply of credit (lending to households or businesses that 
2  For instance, at the European Union, the principle of subsidiarity is defined in Ar-
ticle 5 of the Treaty on European Union. It is the principle whereby the EU does not 
act (except in the areas that fall within its exclusive competence), unless it is more 
effective than action taken at national, regional or local level.
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cannot access credit from commercial banks) or by helping 
to create demand (helping businesses or other customers to 
develop bankable projects). Particular attention has to be 
paid to equity considerations and to prevent further finan-
cialization of our economies.
• To promote economic stability, by playing a countercyclical 
role, to ensure a supply of credit when a financial or econom-
ic crisis causes the commercial financial sector to freeze.
• To improve standards, by insisting on, for example, human 
rights safeguards in the projects or institutions they finance.
• To encourage innovation, structural transformation and 
promote environmental sustainability. 
If the institutions are to perform all of these functions to the 
highest standard, a holistic approach is essential to upgrade current 
policies and practices at all levels. 
A REFORM AGENDA FOR PUBLIC DEVELOPMENT BANKS 
The need for a greater role of PDBs calls for a discussion on the 
key characteristics of these institutions to deliver for the public 
good. How can PDBs be improved so they can realize their full po-
tential to support sustainable and equitable development? What are 
the governance arrangements and mechanisms that would prevent 
the risks of over-reliance on private finance? 
We suggest key features of PDBs should be developed around 
four main pillars. We present the rationale behind the pillars below, 
while the key features are summarized in Table 2.1.
A. Mandate and role
Mandate and role are derived from the explicit policy objective of the 
institution, linked to development outcomes, and in line with inter-
national commitments, which include the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs), the Paris Agreement, international human rights law 
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and gender equality commitments. The mandate and role drive PDBs’ 
activities and clearly focus their investment decisions, such as clients 
and sectors to target. They also allow stakeholders, including civil soci-
ety groups, to hold banks and management to account, particularly for 
the human rights and environmental outcomes of all their activities.
B. Operational strategy 
The business model of a PDB drives the processes that enable the in-
stitution to fulfil its core mandate of financing development projects. 
It refers to how PDBs raise money, including identifying the right mix 
of public and private funding, and their investment methods, as both 
have an impact on the ability of the institution to deliver positive de-
velopment outcomes. It also refers to the internal systems developed 
to focus, assess and monitor the outcomes of the operations.  
C. Financial sustainability
The long-term financial sustainability of PDBs is key to delivering 
their development mandate in the longer term. This does not mean, 
however, maximizing commercial profitability. It means ensuring 
sufficient cost recovery and surplus to remain institutionally viable, 
while focusing on delivering development outcomes. The long-term 
financial sustainability of a PDB should not undermine its ability to 
invest in higher risk areas, or projects where development returns 
are high but profitability may be low. 
D. Good governance 
The governance of PDBs refers to who makes decisions, and how 
decision-makers are held accountable. It includes provisions to en-
sure insulation from undue political influence and corporate pres-
sure, and to ensure democratic accountability. Accountability has 
to be understood in its broadest sense, which means downwards 
accountability (towards citizens and affected communities) and up-
wards accountability (towards national parliaments, governments 
and courts of auditors).
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Table 2.1: Core features of a model public development banks
Core features & 
key components
Explanation/Detail




The mandate of PDBs is to deliver sustainable development 
outcomes, in line with the agreed SDGs, avoiding vague 
or dual mandates. For instance, this means a focus on 
reducing poverty and inequalities, and encouraging 
domestic resource mobilization.
ii. Targeting 
finance where it 
is needed most 
PDBs target regions, sectors or clients that are most in 
need, or that have the highest development pay out, 
and not only a high level of return for the PDB. Special 






PDBs take responsibility for the social and environmental 
outcomes of all their activities, including human rights, 
labour rights, climate and gender impacts. The PDB aligns 
its policies and operations with the Paris Agreement and 
actively contributes to the fight against climate change, 
for instance, by pursing a truly carbon-free strategy. The 
PDB ensures that companies they work with, as clients or 




The PDBs’ responsibility to gender equality and women’s 
rights is embedded in a policy addressing gender and 
development. As a result, PDBs: promote gender equality 
and women’s rights, where possible make its programmes 
and projects more gender-inclusive avoid gender bias and 
minimize gender-related vulnerabilities and risks
v. Stable, long-
term perspective
The focus of PDBs is on long-term, sustainable, predictable 
and counter-cyclical funding to help bolster financial 
stability and support the sustainable transformation 




PDBs align their activities to democratically determined 
national plans, to ensure that they help improve the 
financial sector, steering these toward a more sustainable, 
just and long-term path. 
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B: OPERATIONAL STRATEGY
i. Right mix 
of public and 
private funding
PDBs receive some public funding, so they are not purely 
commercial institutions. 
ii. Careful choice 
of methods of 
investing
PDBs invest in ways that ensure their development 







PDBs have the internal capacity to assess and 
systematically show the impacts of their policies and 
investment decisions (ex-ante and ex-post comprehensive 
impact assessments analysis are conducted regularly), 
and have effective human rights, environmental, gender-
sensitive and fiscal due diligence procedures, accompanied 





PDBs ensure development outcomes take precedence over 
profitability.
ii. Reinvest any 
profits
PDBs reinvest any profits to support the development focus 
of their institution.  
iii. Take care with 
public grants
Strong public accountability must be in place if PDB 
operations are subsidized by official development 
assistance beyond initial capital injections. 
iv. Incentivize 
staff to deliver for 
the public good
PDBs draw on their development focus to recruit and 
motivate staff, explicitly avoiding the bloated salary and 




i. Equal borrower 
representation at 
multilateral PDBs
Multilateral PDBs have a governance structure that gives, 





on the right to 
information
PDBs have a strong and carefully implemented 
transparency policy based on: the right of access to 
information across stakeholders, including civil society 
organizations; automatic disclosure of information with 
limited exceptions; the right to request information across 
stakeholders, including civil society organizations; and 
public access to decision-making, across stakeholders 
including civil society organizations.
iii. Active 
participation of 
civil society and 
bank employees
PDBs have open channels for the meaningful participation 
of civil society groups, including trade unions, feminist and 
women’s rights organizations, and bank employee unions, 






PDBs have specific governance arrangements in place that 
protect them from undue political influence and corporate 
pressure that might be contrary to the bank’s mandated 
purpose. This will ensure that the public mission of the 





PDBs have well-implemented accountability systems, 
including independent evaluations; parliamentary 
scrutiny; meaningful participation of external 
stakeholders, including a broad range of civil society 
organizations; and effective and user-friendly independent 
complaints mechanisms.
PDBs can be challenged in front of courts, as immunity of 
banks undermines their accountability.
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CONCLUSION  
The Covid-19 pandemic has confronted us with critical challenges. 
Public development banks are in a unique and powerful position to 
play a key role in the post Covid-19 recovery. They can – and should – 
play a very significant role in the development process as a whole to 
maximize development results for local people, including strength-
ening public health systems, delivering on the climate crisis and 
contributing to the fight against poverty and inequalities. 
As this chapter shows, PDBs can direct finance to important sec-
tors or regions, build and steer the financial sector into a more sus-
tainable and equitable path, promote economic stability, improve 
standards – for example, through environmental, social or human 
rights safeguards – encourage structural transformation and pro-
mote environmental sustainability. 
However, PDBs face considerable challenges when it comes to 
performing their roles, and some of them have been rightly ques-
tioned about the negative impacts of the development model pro-
moted and their operations. Most of their challenges have not gone 
away with the Covid-19 pandemic, and some might even be intensi-
fied. Importantly, the potential role of most PDBs has been skewed 
toward private interests over and above the public interest. This has 
to change.
This chapter makes a strong case in support of pro-public and 
accountable institutions working at different levels in a comple-
mentary way. National development banks can be the primary tools 
to implement development plans, while regional and global PDBs 
can support these national institutions where they exist, or help to 
build them if they do not exist. This is not free of challenges either, 
but it would ensure a development path that is more rooted in na-
tional needs. 
This chapter also presents key features that public development 
banks need to possess to maximize development results for the 
María José Romero
44 
most vulnerable members of society, including delivering on the 
climate crisis and contributing to the fight against inequalities, es-
pecially gender inequalities. 
In the months and years to come, civil society organizations have 
the opportunity to actively contribute to the debate on the types of 
institutions needed to finance a sustainable and equitable recovery 
post Covid-19. The Finance in Common Summit taking place on 12 
November 2020 will be just one opportunity to further advance this 
debate. The Summit is being organized by the World Federation of 
Development Finance Institutions and aims to bring together the 
whole development bank community along with other key stake-
holders, such as governments and representatives from the private 
sector, civil society, think tanks and academia. We call on civil soci-
ety and academics to reclaim public development banks and engage 
in a public debate on this matter.  
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THE COVID-19 CRISIS AS 
AN OPPORTUNITY TO BREAK 
WITH THE FAILING GLOBAL 
MICROCREDIT INDUSTRY
The Covid-19 crisis is putting the future of the global micro-credit industry at serious risk. Among other factors, this is because the poor are increasingly unable to repay the large 
volumes of microcredit that they have accessed in recent years. 
Since the international development community believes that the 
microcredit model has made a hugely positive impact in address-
ing poverty and can do so going forward, the global microcredit in-
dustry has begun to receive significant financial support in order to 
continue to operate. However, with even mainstream economists 
now accepting that the microcredit model has in fact failed to ad-
dress global poverty, this article argues that these emerging bailout 
efforts will amount to nothing more than “throwing good money 
after bad.” There is now an opportunity to plot a new trajectory 
towards community-owned and controlled local financial institu-
tions. Economic history shows that these alternatives have a vastly 
better track record of addressing poverty, economic development 
and inequality, as well as usefully promoting greater democracy 
and participation in society. I illustrate my argument by pointing 
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to just one of the several appropriate models for all to learn from 
and adapt to the current Covid-19 crisis conditions: the New Deal 
reconstruction of the rural financial system in the US that arose as a 
response to the Great Depression. If the Covid-19 crisis is to be suc-
cessfully addressed in the Global South, a similarly radical all-en-
compassing approach to the restructuring of local financial systems 
urgently needs to take centre stage. 
INTRODUCTION
The microcredit model is a financial innovation that, since the 
1980s, has been widely promoted in the Global South to combat ris-
ing poverty, joblessness, inequality and gender disempowerment. 
Defined as tiny loans – microloans – that are used to establish or 
expand an informal microenterprise or self-employment venture, 
the mainstream belief since the 1980s is that microcredit has been 
very successful in its assigned mission. However, the Covid-19 cri-
sis has now created an unprecedented worldwide crisis, and the 
global microcredit industry is likely to be one of its many institu-
tional victims. The incomes of the global poor are in free fall right 
across the Global South. The poor will likely be unable, and perhaps 
also unwilling, to repay the very large quantity of microcredit they 
have racked up with the world's microcredit institutions (hereafter 
MCIs).1 As a result, many MCIs have been quickly plunged into seri-
ous difficulty. Accordingly, rescuing the global microcredit industry 
has become one of the paramount objectives of the international 
development community as it responds to the rapidly deteriorating 
situation in the Global South. Financial and other forms of support 
are already arriving not only to  assist many of world's MCIs directly, 
but also to support the commercial banks and global investors that 
1  As of 2018, it was estimated that the volume of microcredit debt held by formal 
MCIs was around $US124 billion spread over 140 million borrowers (Microfinance 
Barometer 2019).
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finance their operations. If, as is now expected, the Covid-19 crisis 
extends well beyond 2020, considerably more financial support is 
also to be expected. If all goes according to plan, the vitally import-
ant global microcredit industry will be saved from collapse. It will 
then be able to play a central role in helping the poor cope for the 
duration of the Covid-19 crisis, and then in rebuilding their lives 
and communities in its long aftermath. 
The entire effort to rescue the global microcredit industry is 
based on the unshakeable belief that microcredit has been a very 
successful anti-poverty intervention to date. It therefore seems en-
tirely logical in these difficult times to want to continue to provide 
microcredit to the global poor. Summing up this very widely held 
feeling was the UK's Economist magazine, which proclaimed “nurs-
ing the (microcredit) industry back to health will give a big bang for 
the buck” (Economist 2020a). It also follows that there is no sense 
in making any major changes to the structure and operations of 
the global microcredit industry. Why tinker with what is widely be-
lieved to be a winning formula? 
But what if the long-standing belief in the power and impact of 
microcredit is misplaced, and microcredit, in fact, doesn't actually 
work? This would undermine the rationale for wanting to rescue 
the global microcredit industry. Sadly, this is indeed the sour reality 
that has emerged in recent years. Today, even one-time leading mi-
crocredit advocates now accept that microcredit has essentially had 
zero impact on global poverty. Even worse, a growing number of 
economists working in the heterodox tradition have demonstrated 
that the microcredit model has quite seriously frustrated the fight 
against poverty in the Global South. Rescuing the global microcre-
dit industry today is, therefore, not a straightforward issue at all. 
Bailing out a major financial institution that has actually failed in 
its assigned mission to date would surely be the textbook definition 
of “throwing good money after bad.” 
In the context of the most serious economic and social calamity 
since the Great Depression, I argue that propping up the existing 
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global microcredit industry is the very worst way to assist the global 
poor. What is urgently needed instead is a radical new approach to 
local finance. This approach involves an effort to begin to rebuild 
local finance in the Global South through the programmed conver-
sion of historically ineffective and now-failing MCIs into a variety 
of community-owned and controlled financial institutions. Specifi-
cally, I argue for the conversion of MCIs into one of three formats: 
credit unions, financial cooperatives or community development 
banks (CBDs). Unlike in the case of microcredit, these three local 
financial institutions have amassed a very impressive track record 
of successfully addressing poverty and promoting sustainable and 
equitable development everywhere in the world. Importantly, this 
success has very often been achieved against a background of eco-
nomic and social crisis not dissimilar to the current situation. A 
key reason for this historic success is because of the aim of such 
community-owned and controlled financial institutions. Rather 
than operating to extract wealth from the community to be enjoyed 
by a narrow financial elite (one that is increasingly located abroad 
in “tax-efficient” or low-regulation jurisdictions),2 most communi-
ty-owned and controlled financial institutions exist to recycle wealth 
back into the community to be used and invested by successive gen-
erations. In addition, being built on principles of democracy and 
participation, it is important to note that community-owned and 
controlled financial institutions have historically played an import-
ant role in consolidating and extending democracy into the wider 
fabric of the local community. 
In very practical terms, I would argue that we should look for 
practical inspiration to the great US President, Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
In the context of the devastation of the Great Depression, Roosevelt 
saw the enormous damage being inflicted upon America's rural poor 
and he understood that the only way to really assist them into the 
2  In Cambodia's large and hugely profitable microcredit sector, for instance, all of 
the top ten MCIs are now either fully or mainly owned by wealthy foreign banks, 
investment bodies and the international development agencies (Bateman 2020).  
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longer term was to restructure the rural financial system almost en-
tirely. Accordingly, beginning in 1933, the Roosevelt administration 
put into place a new farmer-owned and managed rural financial sys-
tem. This not only proved successful in quickly addressing pover-
ty in the large number of rural communities left devastated by the 
Great Depression; it also went on to play a major role in creating an 
efficient agricultural system in the USA. If the Covid-19 crisis is to be 
effectively addressed in the Global South today, then an equally bold 
move should be a priority of the very highest order. 
ADDRESSING THE “COLD TURKEY” PROBLEM 
Quite clearly it is not feasible to do nothing and allow the global 
microcredit industry to crash. Forcing the global poor to have their 
current access to microcredit immediately cut off – for poor com-
munities to go “cold turkey” – would in the short term inflict serious 
damage. For example, many millions of informal microenterprises 
and self-employment ventures engaged in simple trading activities 
would encounter real problems without a daily source of working 
capital with which to restock their tiny businesses. This is what Mi-
chael Schlein, the CEO of one of the world's most influential micro-
credit advocacy and investment bodies, the Boston-based ACCION, 
is referring to when warning that, “The financial engine for half the 
world's jobs will… seize up” if the microcredit sector is allowed to 
collapse (quoted in the Economist 2020b). Moreover, an immediate 
absence of microcredit would inflict pain on those using microcre-
dit simply to try to cope with the effects of poverty, many of whom 
were struggling even before the Covid-19 crisis. Further restricting 
the ability of the poor to purchase healthcare services, medicine 
and personal protective equipment (PPE), could also quickly be-
come a life-or-death issue. 
In the early stages of the Covid-19 crisis (April-May 2020), people 
realized that a whole host of financial support measures were ur-
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gently needed to allow the global microcredit industry to continue 
to function (Carstens 2020, Ogden and Bull 2020, Rozas 2020, Zetterli 
2020). Leading microcredit advocates Liebermann and DiLeo (2020) 
were fairly typical in what they advocated: repayment holidays of 
up to 90 days, emergency funds to inject liquidity into MCIs and to 
take bad loans off the books, government and international donor 
bailouts to protect the largest MCIs, and measures to protect global 
investors. Importantly, Liebermann and DiLeo saw nothing funda-
mentally wrong with the global microcredit industry that might be 
usefully addressed through the application of the rescue package 
they were advocating. 
By June-July 2020, however, it became clear that the Covid-19 
crisis was not going to be over in a short time period but was likely 
to deepen and extend much further into the future. This deterio-
rating situation was reflected in the growing number of reports of 
delayed repayments, savings accounts being depleted fast, outright 
defaults beginning to grow, and investors starting to run for cover. 
To preserve their own liquidity, many MCIs also began to avoid fur-
ther lending, while pushing and even threatening clients to contin-
ue to repay their microloans regardless of the huge problems they 
were now facing. In India, for example, many MCIs were found to 
be ignoring pleas for a moratorium on repayment and were instead 
demanding that clients, especially women clients, continue to re-
pay (Guérin et al. 2020). A similar situation was reported in Pakistan 
(Rhyne 2020). Many other MCIs accepted a three-month or more 
repayment holiday, but simply rolled up the missed interest and 
capital payments into a larger microloan that has to be fully repaid 
when the Covid-19 crisis eases (Joseph et al. 2020). 
At time of writing (August 2020), it is now clear that the global 
microcredit industry is facing a potential catastrophe. The debate 
within the international development community has therefore 
shifted away from introducing temporary support measures to-
wards a discussion of the design of financial bailout programs that 
would be large enough to ensure a significant part of the current 
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global microcredit infrastructure remains intact. Still, however, 
there has been no real debate as to whether a fundamental restruc-
turing of the global microcredit industry itself is also required as 
a way of better dealing with the unprecedented threat that the 
Covid-19 crisis represents to the global poor.3
ADDRESSING THE “ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM” PROBLEM
As with any financial transaction, before using scarce funds to re-
vive the microcredit model, it would seem sensible to do all the nec-
essary due diligence. In other words, we must be absolutely con-
vinced that microcredit has really worked in the past so that we can 
be confident that it will work going forward to help those negatively 
affected by the Covid-19 crisis. It is especially important to be cer-
tain that microcredit will do no harm. It would also help if we had 
an idea of what the alternatives to “more microcredit” are and if 
supporting them might not be a better strategy. 
We are therefore presented with a very serious dilemma: in 
practice, the microcredit model has not worked to date in the man-
ner it is supposed to have done, so it cannot therefore be concluded 
that it will work going forward. Given the almost universal celebra-
tion of the microcredit model's supposed effectiveness ever since 
it arrived on the development scene in the 1980s, for many this 
will be a simply stunning statement. After nearly 40 years of rapid 
growth, how can it possibly be true that the global microcredit 
industry does not work?  
In the 1980s, the microcredit model represented a major finan-
cial innovation that, it was widely predicted, would robustly address 
the problem of global poverty and deprivation. As is well known, 
3  Even those analysts supportive of microcredit that appear to have highlighted the 
need for a 'reform' of the current global microcredit industry, such as Malik et al. 
(2020), actually recommend only a few minor operational changes that the global 
microcredit industry might wish to consider. 
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these claims began with the US-trained Bangladeshi economist and 
future (in 2006) Nobel Peace Prize recipient, Dr. Muhammad Yunus, 
who famously claimed at the time that the microcredit model would 
“eradicate poverty in a generation.” As the supply of microcredit 
rapidly grew in the 1990s and into the 2000s, the international de-
velopment community began to believe its own publicity that the 
microcredit model was indeed succeeding. The global poor were 
accessing more microcredit than ever, so the common-sense feel-
ing was that it simply must be helping them; otherwise why would 
they want so much of it? 
More scientific evidence to confirm the belief that “microcre-
dit worked” then appeared in the form of a number of influential 
impact evaluations and studies (Pitt and Khandker 1998; see also 
the summaries of previous impact evaluations compiled by Gold-
berg 2005 and then Odell 2010). Much sophisticated econometric 
analysis produced by leading mainstream economists attached to 
the main international development institutions also appeared 
to confirm the validity of the microcredit model as a poverty re-
duction intervention (for example, see Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine 2007). With so much high-profile support and validation 
coming its way, Bernd Balkenhol, former Director of the Social Fi-
nance Program at the International Labor Organization (ILO), felt 
able to report in the mid-2000s that the international development 
community now saw the microcredit model as “the strategy for 
poverty reduction par excellence” (Balkenhol 2006, 2 - underlining 
in the original). 
If it's too good to be true, it usually is
Just as the celebrations began to peak in the mid-2000s, the first real 
signs began to emerge that the entire uplifting narrative was funda-
mentally flawed (see Bateman 2010). While many factors were in-
volved in the radical reappraisal of the microcredit model's impact 
on poverty and development, I will briefly summarize three of the 
most important inter-related problems. 
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First, microcredit has certainly helped a lot of new informal mi-
croenterprises get established. But what has always been deliber-
ately ignored in the analysis of microcredit impact, as even World 
Bank economists now belatedly admit was a serious error (see 
McKenzie and Paffhausen 2017), is that a very large percentage of 
these new microenterprises fail very quickly. Failure not just ends 
any ongoing income flow but can also wipe out any of the assets 
or savings that had been possible to accumulate prior to failure. 
It can also lead to the loss of any valuable collateral lodged with 
an MCI, such as vehicles, housing or, most devastating of all, land 
(Bateman 2020). Moreover, even when some new microenterpris-
es succeed, they typically only do so by taking clients away from 
many other existing microenterprises struggling to compete in the 
same local market. This “displacement” effect hurts competitors 
who are typically forced to contract and lose any employees. The 
combined result of failure and displacement, or what is formally 
termed “job churn” (Nightingale and Coad 2014), is all too often a 
zero-sum employment outcome. Even worse, the intense competi-
tion created in so many communities in the Global South – thanks 
to the unstoppable microcredit-assisted entry of new microenter-
prises (and, more recently, so-called “gig” workers) – inevitably 
helps to push average incomes down to the subsistence level. Put 
simply, a combination of quite standard labour market pressures 
tend to ensure that any positive employment and income impacts 
created by microcredit-assisted new microenterprises are all too 
often swamped by the negative economic and social impacts of the 
resulting increased local competition (Bateman  2019a). 
A second serious flaw in the operation of the microcredit model 
became evident from the early 2010s onwards. As it became clear 
that the microcredit model was associated with limited-to-no net 
employment and income gains for the poor,  the microcredit ad-
vocacy community felt that a new goal was needed in order to jus-
tify its existence and, more importantly, its continued expansion. 
Without any fanfare or formal announcement, microcredit advo-
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cates began to promote a completely new narrative: that they were 
involved in a “fight to extend useful financial services to low-in-
come households.” The term “financial inclusion” came into being 
to describe how the global poor should now see microcredit as one 
of a number of financial tools that would simply help them to bet-
ter manage their poverty (see Collins et al. 2009). This might mean 
ensuring regular access to basic utilities (water, electricity, etc.) 
as well as funding housing, healthcare and the education needs 
of the family. However, this new justification for the microcredit 
model to continue expanding, which it did, gave rise to the seri-
ous problem of over-indebtedness. Beginning in Bolivia in 1999, 
in all of the countries and regions in the Global South that were 
to go on to become the most “financially included,” we find that 
household debt began to rise to quite destructive levels (Guérin, 
Morvant-Roux and Villarreal 2013). The global poor could not fight 
off what became quite a harmful dynamic. Rising microdebt ulti-
mately diverts income from consumption into debt service, and 
the immediate economic boost provided by more microcredit has 
everywhere been swamped by the longer-term outflow of wealth 
from the communities of the poor (Mader 2015). 
A third core problem with the microcredit model is directly re-
lated to its commercialization that began in earnest in the 1990s. 
This move was demanded by key microcredit advocates keen to 
close what they argued at the time was an “absurd gap” between 
the limited supply of microcredit and the supposedly massive la-
tent demand for it. The international development community 
then joined in to support the conversion of MCIs into for-profit 
bodies. The hope was that the global microcredit industry could 
be weaned off subsidies and become financially self-sustaining – 
though, crucially, still retain its social mission. By the mid-2000s, 
however, the destructive impulses inherent to deregulated capi-
talism began to take root in many of the largest MCIs. Reckless 
lending to advance rapid but unsustainable growth goals soon 
emerged as the defining feature of the global microcredit indus-
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try. The CEOs and senior management of the largest commercial-
ized MCIs wanted to grow as large as possible, as fast as possible, 
in order to be in a position to inflate their salaries and bonuses. 
Shareholders and investors willfully egged them on so that they 
could reap growing dividend flows, and then profit even more 
when their equity investments were later sold off for much more 
than the purchase price. Inequality also rose as a new “microcre-
dit millionaire” class began to emerge alongside the rapidly grow-
ing number of individuals floundering under the weight of their 
growing debts to MCIs or having lost everything they own on an 
unwise microenterprise project. In addition, the reckless lending 
practices of the largest MCIs, combined with the inability of the 
poorest communities to absorb unlimited amounts of microcred-
it, led to a growing number of hugely destructive microcredit sec-
tor boom-to-bust events. Notable “busts” occurred in Bolivia, Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, Nicaragua, Pakistan, and then, the largest to 
date, in Andhra Pradesh state in India (Guérin).
Why did no one see this coming? 
There exists a long succession of impact evaluations and serious 
studies carried out by recognized specialists that, as noted above, 
were said to have provided an abundance of empirical evidence 
that microcredit works. Sadly, it is now recognized that almost 
all of these impact evaluations were seriously flawed and willful-
ly biased in favour of claims that microcredit produces a positive 
impact. Put simply, careers are not generally advanced by chal-
lenging the official pro-microcredit ideology of key governments 
(especially the US government), prestigious foundations (e.g., the 
Gates Foundation) or the international development agencies, no-
tably the World Bank (see Duvendack and Maclean 2015). Instead, 
one learns how to skillfully provide the positive narratives and re-
quired impact evidence that one is largely expected in advance to 
find, if not explicitly paid to produce. Sadly, even recent high-pro-
file winners of the Nobel Prize in Economics winners appear not 
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to be immune to this temptation.4 
The fundamental error committed by uncritically supporting 
the ineffective global microcredit industry is very profound indeed. 
An unprecedented investment of financial resources, technical sup-
port, political capital, academic research and institutional commit-
ment has been largely wasted on supporting an intervention that, it 
is now increasingly accepted by one-time leading advocates (Rood-
man 2012: Altman 2014, Waterfield 2020), has actually had zero 
impact on poverty. The growing disillusion was best captured by 
Morduch (2017), advisor on microcredit to many international de-
velopment agencies and co-author of The Economics of Microfinance 
(a standard university textbook), who bravely admitted that: 
Yunus’s vision – and the assumptions it rests on – is coming 
apart. Microfinance has proved fairly robust as a banking idea, but 
not as an anti-poverty intervention….Aid agencies and foundations 
have been left feeling confused, disappointed and perhaps betrayed 
– and have started moving on.
Even worse than under-performing against high expectations is 
that the growth of the microcredit industry has also generated a raft 
of destructive downsides that have actually helped to undermine the 
ability of the poorest communities to escape their poverty (Bateman 
2010; Bateman and Chang 2012; Mader 2015; Bateman et al. 2019). 
Meanwhile, as many social anthropologists and sociologists point 
4  The 'last word' on the subject of the impact of microcredit was supposedly provi-
ded by the six country impact evaluation project headed up by the 2019 Nobel Econo-
mics Prize co-recipients Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo, who could only conclude 
that microcredit had essentially no impact on poverty (see Banerjee, Karlan and Zin-
man, 2015). However, in order to come to even this tepid conclusion all six of the case 
studies used weak methodologies, ignored important downside factors ('distortion 
by omission'), and also apparently indulged in some quite unethical research practi-
ses (see Bédécarrats, Guérin and Roubaud 2017, 2019, 2020; see also Bateman 2013). 
One possible reason for Banerjee and Duflo adopting such problematic tactics was 
that otherwise their impact results might have rather awkwardly confirmed what the 
'harshest critics' of microcredit have long argued – that microcredit has actually had 
a harmful effect on the global poor – as well as the fact that their own pioneering 
impact evaluation methodology based on the the Randomised Control Trial (RCT) 
had actually failed over many years to pick up on this rather important development. 
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out, the default form of employment that microcredit was established 
to validate and expand – the informal sector – simply cannot be di-
vorced from the rising poverty, inequality, precarity, deprivation, 
crime, ill health and vulnerability that have become the defining fea-
tures of life today at the “bottom of the pyramid” (see Davis 2006). 
Further exacerbating the problem here is the fact that, largely 
as intended, the trumped-up effectiveness of the microcredit mod-
el was widely used by the international development community 
to further marginalize and discredit all collectively organized, lo-
cally owned and controlled financial interventions. In the era of 
neoliberalism, the idea that the global poor should seek to deploy 
their “collective capabilities” through their own financial institu-
tions simply had to be destroyed. All such financial institutions 
were ignored and marginalized. Where possible, they were con-
verted into conventional investor-owned financial institutions. 
Given the effectiveness of community-owned and controlled fi-
nancial institutions across so many locations in achieving more 
than what the global microcredit industry can legitimately claim 
to have achieved anywhere, this was a fundamental error. But it is 
an error that can now be corrected. 
ADOPTING A ROOSEVELTIAN APPROACH TO 
RECONSTRUCTING LOCAL FINANCE 
An entirely new approach to the impending rescue of the global mi-
crocredit industry is urgently required. This approach must use the 
expected financial support and bailout funding to insist on the con-
struction of a new and improved local financial system. The guiding 
principle is that of the need to build back better, a simple moral 
imperative that is rightly informing very many international organi-
zations and governments at this unprecedented historical juncture 
(for example, see OECD 2020). Rescuing the local financial system 
by building back better' has two quite reasonable goals: 
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• It must assist in resolving the immediate objective of helping 
the community to survive the Covid-19 crisis; 
• It must also create the core institutional foundations necessary 
to build a much more pro-poor, democratically owned and 
managed, and explicitly developmental local financial system ca-
pable of promoting bottom-up growth in the post-Covid-19 era
In terms of the sheer extent of economic decline and social dis-
ruption, the most relevant parallel to the Covid-19 crisis today is the 
Great Depression. The Roosevelt administration's response is widely 
seen as a great success. It is therefore an obvious example to study. 
The most relevant aspect to consider is the rural financial system, 
which was driven to the point of collapse. However, rather than sim-
ply reconstruct or bail out the existing ineffective rural credit struc-
ture – which was what the banks, established elites and Republican 
politicians were demanding – Roosevelt opted for a very dramatic 
change.5 This came with the passing of the Farm Credit Act of 1933, 
which represented the first step in constructing an entirely new 
farm credit system. Through an executive order, all existing agricul-
tural credit bodies were put under the supervision of a new agency, 
the Farm Credit Administration (FCA), prior to the recapitalization 
and restructuring of very many of them. More importantly, the FCA 
established twelve Banks for Cooperatives (BCs) and a number of 
production credit associations (PCAs) that combined to provide cru-
cial low-cost long-term and short-term loans to the ailing agricul-
tural sector. Roosevelt also pushed through the Federal Credit Union 
Act of 1934. This greatly enhanced the existing credit union network 
by creating a network of chartered member-owned credit unions to 
support individuals in the hardest-hit communities. 
This radically new cooperatively owned farmer credit system 
involved the investment of significant financial resources from the 
state. But this investment was well spent. The new financial system 
5  The following account is drawn from the comprehensive Living New Deal website. 
See https://livingnewdeal.org (accessed July 2020). 
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quickly rescued the US agricultural sector from collapse, and so re-
duced poverty in the rural communities. It also created a solid insti-
tutional foundation that decisively underpinned its future success. 
Moreover, in spite of numerous revisions, the still broadly coopera-
tively owned farmer credit system put in place by Roosevelt remains 
today the single biggest provider of farmer credit in the USA. Im-
portantly, it is widely recognized that these initiatives would prob-
ably not have been possible in “normal” times. The sheer magni-
tude of the Great Depression, plus the thorough discrediting of the 
previous financial regime that effectively caused it (see Galbraith 
1955), allowed Roosevelt to outflank those who combined to try to 
block what they erroneously saw as an attempt to bring socialism to 
America. A root-and-branch restructuring of the local financial sys-
tem was the result. Such a Rooseveltian approach to local finance 
is, I would argue, urgently required today and also manifestly feasi-
ble. Defining and implementing such an approach, moreover, is an 
urgent requirement before scarce financial resources are wasted.6
TWO PRACTICAL OPTIONS FOR PROGRESSIVE CHANGE TODAY
A feature of the neoliberalized financial sector that emerged after 
1970 is the extent to which ownership changes were encouraged in 
only one direction: away from public and collective ownership forms 
and towards private corporate investor-driven forms. The classic ex-
ample is the UK's ultimately disastrous de-mutualization of its hugely 
successful saver-owned building societies (see Elliot and Atkinson 
2008). Another related feature of recent history is the use of financial 
support and bailouts to provide “no-strings” financial support to the 
many private financial institutions that began to fail from the 1970s 
onwards. It was always expected that the main beneficiaries of such 
6  The global banking and financial elites appear to have already been able to  profit 
handsomely from the government's financial support designed to mitigate the eco-
nomic impact of the Covid-19 crisis (see The Washington Post 2020). 
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deals would be the key stakeholders in a struggling financial institu-
tion: the CEOs, senior managers and shareholders. As noted by many 
economists (for example, Stiglitz 2019), this effectively ushered in a 
period in which the financial sector was able to enjoy significant fi-
nancial rewards during the good times, but then look to government 
and the general public to absorb the costs when things begin to turn 
sour. The most spectacular recent example of this new trend was 
evidenced during the global financial crisis that erupted in 2008. A 
large number of financial bailouts were undertaken to save key US, 
European and Asian financial institutions but without any attempt to 
change the unstable (neoliberal) model of finance that had actually 
created the problems in the first place (Mirowski 2013, Tooze 2018). 
As a result, with even fewer and bigger banks than before 2008, an-
other financial crisis, perhaps even larger than in 2008, is almost in-
evitable (Hudson 2015, Keen 2017). 
What I am proposing in the context of the current Covid-19 crisis 
is thus the very opposite to what transpired after 2008. Rather than 
bailing out the CEOs, senior managers, investors and corporate fi-
nanciers that now own and control the global microcredit industry 
(very many of whom have enjoyed spectacular financial returns in re-
cent years), public financial support and bailout funding directed to-
wards the rescue of the global microcredit industry should instead be 
used to effect a major Rooseveltian-type change to the local financial 
sector. This will involve the conversion of for-profit MCIs into a range 
of community-owned and controlled financial institutions that have 
a far better track record of promoting local economic development, 
including under very difficult conditions. Above all, this will involve 
the recycling of wealth back into the local community as a whole, 
rather than its concentration into the hands of a narrow local elite or, 
even worse, taken outside of the community into the hands of global 
financial elites located in “tax-efficient” or low regulation locations. 
Even before the Covid-19 crisis, many similar proposals had been 
put forward to reform the local financial system in order to facilitate 
sustainable and equitable local economic development. Some of the 
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most cohesive arguments along these lines have been put forward by 
those attached to what might be called the “community wealth build-
ing” movement (for example, see Jackson and McInroy 2017, Gui-
nan and O'Neill 2019). Moreover, these ideas and concepts are also 
seen as one of the best ways to address the immediate dangers of the 
Covid-19 crisis (Guinan et al. 2020).
However, the changes proposed here represent quite a radical 
change to the current ideology and ownership structures relating to 
local financial institutions in the Global South. Inevitably, as after 
2008, they will not be supported by the neoliberal-oriented interna-
tional development community, nor, for obvious financial self-inter-
est reasons, by the global microcredit industry itself.7 But as Roosevelt 
understood, and do so many others today (for example, Bernards 
2020), extraordinary times demand extraordinary measures. This is 
the essence of what is meant by building back better. 
There are two general options for the ideal types of institutions 
that an MCI may be converted to as a condition for bailout funding 
and other forms of support. There are overlaps between these vari-
ous types – most commonly the case where a financial cooperative 
also adopts a community development banking function. However, 
the ownership structure and social mission are taken as the key de-
fining features that distinguish these institutions from MCIs. 
Option 1: Financial cooperative or credit union
This first option involves a move to convert a struggling MCI into 
a credit union or financial cooperative. A credit union is a mem-
ber-based savings and loan organization servicing a particular 
7  After the UK government bailed out what was at one time the world's largest bank, 
the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), there were serious proposals, including by one 
member of the UK Parliament (see Thomas 2016), to convert it into a mutually owned 
bank with a social mission to promote economic development as well as provide 
quality and affordable financial services for customers in lower-income segments. 
Powerful ideological and financial sector resistance to such a measure, plus the Con-
servative government's desire to get hold of the funds generated by returning RBS to 
the private sector, ensured that the proposal was blocked. 
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group, such as the population of a specific geographic area or a 
set of company employees. A financial cooperative provides sim-
ilar services to a larger group of members, but it can also have 
non-members as clients. Both financial institutions exist to provide 
quality low-cost services, while also recycling any profit back into 
improving and diversifying member services and providing a reg-
ular financial bonuses or dividends. Crucially, quite unlike today's 
MCIs, the goal of such local financial institutions is not to grow at 
a breakneck pace but to serve the needs of existing member/sav-
ers. Because they are unwilling to operate aggressively and exploit 
clients and employees in order to maximize profits, at times this 
has meant that financial cooperatives and credit unions are less 
competitive compared to investor-owned financial institutions. De-
regulation can also sometimes open up the door for unscrupulous 
individuals within a financial cooperative or credit union to abuse 
and defraud their own institution.8 Nonetheless, history shows that 
they “work” to improve the lives of the poor. 
In Italy, for example, financial cooperatives have been a major 
part of the financial sector for more than a hundred years, espe-
cially in the north of the country. Suffering greatly in the 1930s on 
account of their collective foundations, after 1945 they flourished 
once more and played a major role in the reconstruction effort. 
While after 1945 the private investor-driven banks preferred to 
support through imports the renewed conspicuous consumption 
habits of Italy's still-wealthy elites, the financial cooperative sector 
played a vanguard role in promoting sustainable economic devel-
opment and poverty reduction (Bateman 2007). After restructuring 
and re-capitalizing to repair the war damage, the financial coopera-
tives went on to play quite a decisive role in rebuilding the region’s 
formal small and medium enterprise (SME)-based industrial sector 
into one of the world’s leading examples. Japan's mutual (sogo) banks 
8  Probably the most spectacular instance of this led to the collapse of the credit 
union sector in the US in the 1990s (see Black 2005).
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and the credit banks (shinkin) formed out of the larger pre-war cred-
it unions played a key role in the post-war period by financing those 
small enterprises capable of integrating into the supply chains of 
the leading companies. Crucially, as Girardin and Ping (1997) em-
phasized, robust oversight by local governments and the central 
Zenshiren Bank helped to (re)build local trust and ensure minimal 
fraud and speculative activity using depositors’ money. And in the 
Global South, it is often overlooked that financial cooperatives have 
played a quite crucial role in supporting equitable economic devel-
opment, notably in southern Brazil (Jacques and Gonçalves 2016) 
and many parts of Colombia (Fajardo Rojas 1998). 
Financial cooperatives and credit unions naturally have their own 
problems, including the extra complication of being run more dem-
ocratically. However, history shows that they tend not just to be far 
more effective at addressing poverty and promoting equitable and 
sustainable development, but are also much more resilient when it 
comes to coping with wider macroeconomic fluctuations and sup-
porting the poor in the aftermath of a crisis of one sort or another 
(Goglio and Alexopoulos 2012, ILO 2013, McKillop et al. 2020). 
Option 2: Community Development Bank 
The second option available to those providing a bailout to a strug-
gling MCI is to facilitate its conversion into a community develop-
ment bank structure. While many community development banks 
(CDBs) offer conventional financial services to members of the com-
munity, their main role is to proactively encourage economic and 
social development. A CDB can do this in many ways: by promoting 
new enterprises in general, supporting specific new sectors of high-
growth enterprises, facilitating technology transfer, promoting in-
novation, and encouraging horizontal networks and clusters of lo-
cal enterprises in order to reap collective economies of scale and 
scope. In more recent times, CDBs have been specifically highlight-
ed in connection with the provision of “patient” (long-term) capital 
that might help the local enterprise sector to sustainably expand 
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(in numbers and average size), upgrade technology, diversify and 
export. CDBs are owned and controlled by the community, typically 
involving some element of public management by the local govern-
ment overseen by an independent supervisory board of individuals 
drawn from the wider community. 
Like financial cooperatives and credit unions, the concept of 
the CDB has a long pedigree of success. Many banks in Europe not 
specifically referred to as CDBs nevertheless function as CDBs. In 
Germany, for instance, the savings banks  (Sparkassen) are owned 
by the local town or other administrative body. They have very 
successfully promoted local economic development through two 
mechanisms: first, through their lending activities (they provide as 
much as two thirds of the lending required by Germany's famous 
Mittelstand [medium-sized] companies); second, through the rela-
tionships and networking activities they see as a management re-
sponsibility to be performed within the community (Audretsch and 
Lehmann 2016, 106-7). In addition, the Sparkassen are more efficient 
than their counterpart private sector banks, earning a significant-
ly higher return on capital than the wider private banking system 
in Germany as well as paying much more in taxation to local and 
federal levels of government (Brown 2019, 152). In Spain, as not-
ed above, two of the most successful financial cooperatives – the 
Caja Laboral Popular (now known as Laboral Kutxa after a merger 
with a local credit union) and Cajamar – are essentially quasi-CBDs, 
charged by their membership to promote local solidarity and coop-
eration by acting as a CDB in order to promote the wider econom-
ic development of the region (see Bateman 2019b). In the US, the 
state-owned Bank of North Dakota serves as a CDB in many respects 
and has played a critical role in developing the state's economy in 
an equitable and sustainable manner (Brown 2014). Much of Asia's 
rapid economic development in the post-1945 era can be attributed 
to the bottom-up development impetus that was orchestrated and 
funded by a variety of proactive local financial institutions that es-
sentially follow the CDB model. This began with Japan after 1945, 
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followed by South Korea, Vietnam, Thailand and others, and espe-
cially a decentralized China in the 1980s and 1990s (Bateman 2019c).
THE KEY RATIONALES FOR SUPPORTING CONVERSION
There are at least four key overlapping justifications for using po-
tential bailout funding to promote (where possible) the conversion 
of struggling MCIs into community-owned and controlled financial 
institutions. The latter are:
1. Better at promoting sustainable economic development and 
growth: History shows that community-owned and con-
trolled financial institutions are far more capable of promot-
ing sustainable economic development and poverty reduc-
tion compared to the average MCI. It helps that the average 
community-owned and controlled financial institution tends 
to be a functioning part of the local community and local so-
ciety, often born as a result of past struggles and difficulties. 
With its democratic structure, it is also more likely to be held 
to its mission to promote development into the future.
2. Better at providing for the reinvestment of any surplus: One 
of the earliest reasons for community-owned and controlled 
financial institutions to emerge in the 1800s was to facilitate 
the recycling of locally generated wealth (profit) back into 
the local membership or  the wider local community. This 
higher reinvestment attribute can also be facilitated by law, 
such as in Italy.9 In other words, community-owned and con-
trolled financial institutions are not extractive institutions, a 
term that would correctly describe the operations of most 
9  As with most cooperatives in Italy, financial cooperatives receive certain taxation 
benefits in return for agreeing to reinvest back into the cooperative a high percen-
tage of their surplus. This legal measure is intended to ensure that the cooperative 
is better placed to create more sustainable local jobs, raise productivity in order to 
increase wages, and improve services to members. The cooperative is monitored by 
the taxation authorities to ensure compliance. 
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medium-to-large MCIs operating today in the Global South. 
3. Better at using fintech for the benefit of the entire commu-
nity: The Covid-19 crisis has seen the very rapid deployment 
of financial technologies, or “fintech” by MCIs as a way to 
avoid contact with potentially infective cash (Haidar 2020). 
Fintech has enormous potential to deliver benefit to society, 
but it has become clear already that it has created more prob-
lems for the global poor than have been resolved. Two stand 
out: First, fintech is beginning to  exacerbate the problem of 
over-indebtedness that was raised above. With access to mi-
croloans “at the touch of five buttons on your mobile,” large 
numbers of the global poor have already been plunged into 
quite astonishing levels of unrepayable debt (for the exam-
ple of Kenya, see Donovan and Park 2019). Second, fintech is 
helping MCIs (and banks) to tap into the billions of daily tiny 
financial transactions of the poor and, by taking take a small 
cut of the value of each transaction, poor communities are 
effectively being drained of much of their wealth (Bateman, 
Duvendack and Loubere 2019).10 However, fintech nonethe-
less offers a unique opportunity for community-owned and 
controlled financial institutions to streamline and lower the 
cost of their operations, as well as retain and recycle locally 
generated wealth within the community (particularly if sub-
ject to democratic oversight).  
4. Better at promoting equality: A community-owned and con-
trolled financial institution helps to build equality in the 
community in two important ways: (1) internal constitutional 
prohibitions strictly limit the value that elected officials and 
senior managers can extract as salaries and bonuses from 
their own financial institution, and (2) internal constitutional 
requirements dictate that any profit generated is either rein-
10  For example, thanks partly to its ownership of the iconic M-Pesa mobile mo-
ney platform, Safaricom is now Africa's most profitable company, earning a Wall 
Street-sized $US747 million in 2019-20 (see Ngugi 2020). 
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vested back into the financial institution and/or passed down 
to individual members in the form of dividends, bonuses 
and other member reward systems. The problem of the “mi-
crocredit millionaires” that has emerged in many locations 
around the Global South, caused by CEOs, senior managers 
and so-called “social investors” in an MCI often quite legally 
diverting its earnings into their own pockets (Sinclair 2012), 
is much less likely to arise. 
KEY PRACTICAL ISSUES TO CONSIDER 
IN FACILITATING CONVERSION
In terms of the legal, institutional, organizational and other practi-
calities of converting MCIs into either of the desired new formats, 
dealing with these issues would naturally require a much longer 
treatment than space permits here. However, I will introduce several 
of the practical issues that will likely be important to resolve through 
negotiation when considering the conversion of a struggling MCI. 
First, what type of community-based financial institution is best 
for the community in question? Small communities may be best 
suited to a credit union format that provides a limited range of fi-
nancial services to saver-members and loans mainly for working 
capital purposes. A larger and more diverse community in terms 
of employment might be better served with a financial cooperative 
open to all local people. It would work on savings mobilization and 
establish a lending capacity geared to identifying and promoting 
more sophisticated and sustainable employment creation and oth-
er projects of value to the local community overall (e.g. coopera-
tive development, renewable energy, local supply chains servicing 
local consumption needs). The financial cooperative format would 
be particularly appropriate for communities that receive large re-
mittance inflows, which can become the financial base for much 
careful lending activity. The CDB format might also be appropriate, 
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especially in cases where none exist already, and where there are 
major economic problems, or opportunities to be exploited respon-
sibly, that require coordinated institutional action backed up by 
“patient” financial support. A consultation exercise with an MCI's 
clients and other local stakeholders will be required to assess what 
might work best. 
Second, how best to ease out the current owners of an MCI? Es-
pecially if large investments were made in recent years and/or the 
MCI was exceptionally profitable, strictly commercial investors will 
likely not exit their investment in an MCI without a fight. Inevitably, 
equity holders will overwhelmingly prefer the sort of “no strings-
no change” bailout that Wall Street's banks and bankers received 
in 2008 – a restructuring process that would rescue an MCI's equity 
holders by keeping the MCI alive and still under their control. How-
ever, if the MCI is on the verge of collapsing, conversion into the 
desired alternative ownership arrangement might not be too diffi-
cult. For example, in return for any financial bailout, a good part of 
the existing equity held by the current owners and investors could 
be swapped for an agreed amount of debt to be repaid once the new 
institution is up and running in the post-Covid-19 period (see also 
Guinan et al. 2020). The advantage of this debt-for-equity arrange-
ment is that the original equity holders have an incentive to ensure 
the smooth conversion of the MCI in order that their debt is repaid 
in full and on time. The fact that foreign investors now own and 
control a large and increasing share of the equity of MCIs across the 
Global South further complicates the conversion process. However, 
it also makes it even more imperative. Foreign investors, including 
social impact investors, generally have little interest in or sympathy 
for the countries in which they invest. Even though in the absence 
of a bailout there may actually be considerably less value attached 
to the equity they hold, creative techniques will have to be adopted 
in order to overcome the resistance of equity holders to a change 
in ownership. Inevitably, the political will to effect such changes, 
aided by informed community mobilization, will be key. 
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Third, what form of regulation is required from governments? 
Democratic ownership and management have many economic, 
political and social advantages. But it is not a foolproof method of 
managing an(y) institution and it can often be subverted by narrow 
elites (both internally and externally) with a determination do so. 
To ensure that any new institution operates according to the social 
mission it is assigned, and that it is not hijacked or destroyed by 
those ideologically opposed to collective action and/or hoping to 
benefit financially, ensuring robust regulation and (at least initially) 
local government oversight will be absolutely imperative. In par-
ticular, the hugely ineffective forms of self-regulation promoted by 
the microcredit industry itself (Sinclair 2012), will clearly have to 
be abandoned in favour of genuine measures to regulate the local 
financial system in a way that prioritizes the interests of the poor.
Fourth, who or where can we learn from? Financial institutions 
that work well in one context do not necessarily work well in an-
other. There can be no guarantee in advance that the communi-
ty-owned and controlled format will lead to local economic and so-
cial success. Nonetheless, it is still perfectly possible to learn from 
and adapt best institutional practices from elsewhere. One obvious 
and relevant example here is the way that the East Asian “mir-
acle” economies learned from each other in order to create their 
own pro-poor collectively owned and controlled financial institu-
tions. Beginning with Japan, each of the East Asian states that later 
achieved economic success did so with the help of a highly efficient 
developmental local financial model that was built on roughly the 
same core principles as pioneered in Japan but adjusted to local 
economic, social and political conditions (see Bateman 2019c). As 
Akyuz, Chang and Kožul-Wright (1999) have argued, learning from 
other experiences and adapting good practices to local conditions 
was the key to East Asia's miracle. To some extent a similar process 
of learning and adaptation got underway in Europe as a result of 
the economic destruction caused by the global financial crisis in 
2008. In the UK, for instance, European and Canadian experience 
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has been tapped into in order to form a network of 18 regional coop-
eratively owned banks, which have as their goal the building of sus-
tainable and equitable local economies (Peck 2020). Furthermore, 
it is important that many local governments have been successful 
in re-municipalizing companies that have abjectly failed to supply 
quality and low-cost services to the public, including many public 
bodies previously privatized (see Kishimoto, Steinfort and Petitjean 
2020). Much important experience of facilitating similar conver-
sions across the local economy now exist. 
Fifth, how can clients of an MCI be helped to manage their 
financial cooperative or credit union efficiently and democrati-
cally? This will likely require extensive training, mentoring and 
on-the-job coaching by skilled cooperative trainers. It helps that 
much useful experience exists of this type of activity in Europe 
and elsewhere that can be tapped into by conversion projects in 
the Global South. For example, the UK's Cooperative College and 
the Workers Educational Association (WEA) both have experience 
running training programs and adult learning packages for those 
involved in setting up a variety of cooperatives, including financial 
cooperatives and credit unions. In terms of the CDB option, many 
of the world's most successful national development banks, such 
as Brazil's BNDES or Germany's KfW, have local units and interact 
extensively with local governments. As a result, they have the ca-
pability to provide training and consultancy to those communities 
in the Global South wishing to establish CDBs out of a struggling 
MCI. Germany's Sparkassen savings banks have an international 
development arm (Sparkassenstiftung für Internationale Koopera-
tion) that provides advice and assistance to those wishing to repli-
cate elsewhere their very successful cooperative financial model. 
Finally, there is also Spain's world-famous Mondragon Coopera-
tive Complex (MCC), which has an international development con-
sulting arm that provides advice and training to those who might 
wish to follow their example. This includes providing advice on 
how to establish a version of the Caja Laboral Popular cooperative 
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bank, which played a hugely important role in developing the re-
gion around Mondragon. 
CONCLUSION
The importance of adopting a build-back-better approach local fi-
nancial systems in the context ofthe Covid-19 crisis simply cannot 
be overstated. The brief exploration of the issue in this article argues 
that governments in the Global South, the international development 
community and local activists must demand that financial support 
is not used to simply bailout once highly profitable MCIs, but is in-
stead invested in the conversion of MCIs into the most appropriate 
of three types of community-owned and controlled financial institu-
tions. While the Covid-19 crisis provides the immediate rescue pre-
text for such a bailout-cum-conversion policy, the fundamental inef-
fectiveness of the microcredit model as a development intervention 
provides the crucial rationale for the process to continue thereafter. 
While certainly no panacea, history shows that communi-
ty-owned and controlled financial institutions have a very good track 
record of providing a genuinely sustainable and equitable pathway 
for the global poor in order to exit poverty and deprivation. Not 
least of the advantages these institutions have is the ability to retain 
wealth generated within the local community and allow it to be used 
to develop sustainably the economic base and social systems for the 
good of the entire local population, not just for a narrow local elite 
(still less for a narrow foreign elite). And as the important examples 
from Europe and Asia demonstrate, community-owned and con-
trolled financial institutions can be a very transformative develop-
ment model indeed in a post-crisis rebuilding context. A new Roos-
eveltian approach to local finance in the time of the Covid-19 crisis 
thus deserves to gain traction today. We might then reasonably hope 
to see local citizens becoming the masters of the local financial sys-
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THE EVOLVING ROLES OF 
CENTRAL BANKS: AVOIDING 
A “CLIMATE MINSKY MOMENT”
Central banks took the dominant financial role in many  coun-tries’ efforts to deal with the economic fallout from coronavi-rus, using conventional and so-called ‘alternative’ monetary 
policy measures to cope with the effects of social distancing and 
lockdown. This chapter shows how banks in different countries 
used instruments such as zero or negative interest rates, differential 
changes in the regulation of commercial banks, capital guidance to 
desired end-users, exchange rate management and large-scale pur-
chases of corporate and government bonds, or Quantitative Easing 
on a massive scale. The gap between what countries could do how-
ever is massive – many countries had only a  fraction of the capacity 
needed to respond. Moreover, monetary policy was not often backed 
up by strong fiscal expenditures to boost demand and support the 
economy beyond what monetary policy alone can possibly achieve. 
This should be a concern for future contagions, whether viral or 
economic, because when one country remains vulnerable then 
all are vulnerable. Covid-19 has reminded us that national efforts 
alone can never be enough and multilateral cooperation is essen-
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tial. This chapter also shows that coronavirus should not have been 
such a surprise, because its unfolding has followed astonishingly 
closely the path of a “climate Minsky moment.” This chain of events 
was identified by central bankers and development experts several 
years ago as a threat from global warming and climate change and 
Covid-19 is unlikely to be the last shock of this nature. 
INTRODUCTION 
Central banks took the dominant financial role in many  countries’ 
efforts to deal with the coronavirus crisis, especially those that were 
constrained in their use of fiscal policy. This chapter describes 
some of the conventional and so-called ‘alternative’ monetary poli-
cies they used to cope with the sudden stop to economic life. It sit-
uates their actions within the broader debate about what central 
banks can do, or should do, which has evolved over recent decades 
and is being reappraised. This will have important resonances, not 
only for central banking’s role in the immediate Covid-19 relief and 
recovery efforts, but also for the post-Covid rebuilding that lies 
ahead – in particular with respect to how central banks respond to 
the wider issue of global warming and climate change. 
The chapter begins with a brief overview of the evolving role 
of central banks, highlighting aspects that have been illuminated 
by the Covid-19 emergency. It then describes the main tools used 
during 2020 by central banks around the world, including zero or 
negative interest rates, differential changes in bank regulations, 
guiding capital to desired end-users, managing exchange rates and 
the use of large-scale asset purchases or Quantitative Easing to fi-
nance government and corporate debt. It shows that central banks 
in some countries had only a fraction of the capacity to respond 
compared to those in rich countries – with average rescue packages 
of only 8% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) compared to 27% on 
average for the advanced economies. This chapter also argues that 
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the economic fallout from coronavirus should not have been such 
a surprise because its unfolding follows astonishingly closely the 
path of a “climate Minsky moment” identified by central bankers 
and development experts several years ago, even to the extent that 
havoc is caused as much by the policies put in place as with the 
shock itself. The chapter concludes that Covid-19 is not likely to be 
the last Minsky moment and further debate is needed not so much 
about whether central banks should be supportive of government 
policy goals but rather how. 
COVID-19 AND THE EVOLVING ROLE OF CENTRAL BANKS
Historically, especially following the Great Depression and the Sec-
ond World War, central banks had broad and powerful roles hold-
ing the reins of the economy (Tooze 2020a; UNCTAD 2019; Epstein 
2015). They acted as guarantors of their national banking systems; 
the “banker of bankers”, taking whatever steps were needed to en-
sure financial stability, to finance government expenditures and 
debts and to backstop governments’ commitments to creating an 
economy that would support full employment. They were closely 
linked with government development goals and macroeconomic 
policies and used a wide range of techniques to support them, cre-
ating credit and guiding it to sectors and activities that the market 
would not have generated on its own. These included financing gov-
ernment debt at low interest rates, reducing the flow of credit to less 
desired activities and increasing it for those that were deemed im-
portant, and generally promoting the allocation of finance to where 
government priorities lay. They could be particularly powerful be-
cause, unlike governments, which must set taxes and determine 
expenditure according to budgets that are decided by voters or on 
their behalf by parliamentary or government committees, central 
banks are participants in the market, as well as being its regulators 
and leaders (Tooze 2020a). Being ‘in’ rather than ‘above’ the mar-
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ket gave the ability to create credit without having to raise taxes or 
without having to find buyers for their debt, which is a tremendous 
potential power. Similar roles and mandates were taken up by de-
veloping country central banks too as they became independent in 
the post-colonial world. As had been the case in Europe, the United 
States and Japan, central banks were agents of economic develop-
ment, vested with “wide and flexible powers” and using tools that 
had been tried and tested in the north (Bloomfield 1957).  
However, the neoliberal revolution of the 1980s changed this (for 
most, if not all, countries), and the more active link between central 
banks and government was broken. Central banks were to be “in-
dependent” of central government and not to finance government 
deficits or specific activities; their mandates (either explicitly or im-
plicitly) were narrowed to focus on price stability alone, with infla-
tion targets to guide their course and measure their performance, 
and they were supposed to use indirect methods of monetary pol-
icy such as short-term interest rates rather than the direct meth-
ods of the past (Garriga 2016). All across the world, banks narrowed 
their mandates and tightened the scope of their responsibilities 
and tools. Central banks became more similar, whereas before they 
had differences reflecting historical context or economic size. The 
majority made the conduct of monetary policy their dominant role, 
with the specific goal of maintaining price stability as measured 
by a target for inflation (UNCTAD 2019; BIS 2009; Garriga 2016). In 
a few cases, central banks kept some additional macroeconomic 
objectives – such as the United States where the Federal Reserve 
was mandated by law to maximize employment as well as ensuring 
price stability. In most with diverse mandates, whether by law or 
statutory practice,  the goal of price stability was primary. There 
were some exceptions to this, in particular, the rapid industrialisers 
of East Asia during the middle of last century and more recent 
examples can be found in both the developed and the developing 
world – for example, the central bank of China always aimed to con-
sider government industrial policy objectives alongside monetary 
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ones (see MPAG 2019:2 for a recent reiteration of this principle). 
Generally, though, central banks trod a narrow path, focusing on 
setting interest rates and keeping prices stable. 
This changed during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008-09, 
when massive blow-outs in the financial markets (starting from the 
overloaded United States mortgage and junk bond market) spread 
rapidly throughout the world, impacting on trade, employment, in-
comes and aggregate demand virtually everywhere. Central banks 
showed they could adapt and change dramatically when times were 
tough and political will was forthcoming. Even those with narrow 
mandates for inflation targeting were able once again to make the 
link between monetary and financial stability, and the real econo-
my. They created new money on a vast scale (or what seemed like 
a vast scale in those days), justifying the use of “unconventional 
measures” such as large-scale asset purchases (otherwise known as 
Quantitative Easing or QE) to buy government and corporate debt in 
an effort to boost aggregate demand and promote recovery. 
These actions reminded people that the tasks of central banks 
have never been purely technical nor independent, even for those 
with narrow mandates restricted to just one goal and one instru-
ment. For one thing, much depends on the underlying models of the 
economy and how different elements are forecast to respond when 
parameters change. Altering assumptions or altering parameters can 
yield entirely different results, and this kind of modelling is always 
as much an art as it is a technical science. Second, even the smallest 
monetary policy decision has never been neutral because different 
groups of people are always affected differently. Importers prefer 
high value currencies while exporters prefer low ones; borrowers 
want low interest rates, but savers want high ones. Trading off or bal-
ancing these decisions requires political decision-making and con-
sideration of national goals; again something that is not technical.
In the years following the GFC, central banks were asked to re-
appraise their role still further as people became more concerned 
about the challenge of global warming and climate change. The for-
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mer Governor General of the Bank of England in 2015, in a speech to 
the Bank of International Settlements (sometimes called the central 
bank of central banks) said that climate change was a “tragedy of the 
horizon” for which central banks needed to prepare themselves (Car-
ney 2015). He reminded his audience that the horizon for monetary 
policy was typically two years and the horizon for financial stabili-
ty policy at most 10 years, while the horizon for climate change was 
very much longer. Once climate change became a defining issue for 
financial stability, it would already be too late to change it – so the 
sooner central banks started taking into account its physical, finan-
cial and transitional risks, the less costly and destructive it would be. 
Carney warned in particular that climate change could cause 
another Minsky Moment – referring to the inexorable vortex iden-
tified by the late Hyman Minsky whereby financial instability and 
uncertainty created a general economic meltdown. This described 
what happened in the Great Depression of the 1930s and the GFC of 
the 2000s, and Carney extended the analysis to warn that climate 
change would similarly cause melt-downs of first financial markets 
and then the whole economy. This fell squarely into central banks’ 
undisputed basic responsibility of maintaining financial stabili-
ty. As global warming leads to physical impacts such as rising sea 
levels, rising temperatures, extreme weather events or the loss of 
existing agricultural and habitable lands, this could be transmitted 
as a financial shock – for example, through the failures of insur-
ance companies and markets, a fall in the value of pension funds 
whose investments were affected, and a rise in loan defaults and 
bank failures. Making matters worse, a powerful second, indirect 
route to financial instability could be caused by government poli-
cies designed to combat the threat of climate change – unless these 
were organized in a coherent and coordinated way. Even just the in-
formal and spontaneous changes in behaviour on the part of firms 
and households could create destabilizing impacts if consumers 
abruptly started to eschew polluting products or equities and pen-
sion funds that invest in them (UNCTAD 2020, chapter 6). 
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A central bankers’ Network for Greening the Financial System 
was established in December 2017 and quickly gained more than 
70 member banks and financial authorities. Debate switched from 
being about whether central banks should use their role to support 
government policies for the shift to a more sustainable path, to how. 
It was argued that, as a minimum, even the narrowest mandate of 
ensuring financial stability means central banks need to do a lot to 
reduce the financial and economic risks associated with climate 
change and global warming. They needed at the least new approach-
es to macroeconomic modelling to accurately include corporate and 
financial exposure to climate change risks. Some also insisted that 
banks and financial institutions should disclose these risks. 
But many observers went further, arguing central banks should 
take a considerably broader responsibility, harking back to their 
pre-1980s role. They could create and guide capital in ways that 
would no longer favour the largest corporations and enterprises 
(which were often polluting) and rather promote green and more 
sustainable ones, issuing green bonds and green finance (Cam-
piglio et al. 2018; Tooze 2019; UNCTAD 2019). Some central banks 
were already doing this, issuing green bonds, doing ‘green’ quanti-
tative easing and differentiating the reserve requirement ratios for 
commercial banks in the system according to how much of their 
lending was directed to green activities. Bolder moves were also 
possible, such as central banks adjusting the list of corporate assets 
they define as ‘eligible’ for purchase as part of their standard port-
folio management to include more corporations that are green, and 
further requiring that the list of assets that financial institutions are 
allowed to pledge as collateral when they borrow from the central 
bank should also include more ‘green’ enterprises. Some central 
banks already require commercial banks to incorporate environ-
mental risk into their governance framework and adopt green lend-
ing targets. Across geographical and political jurisdictions, central 
banks from countries of all levels of income were trying these poli-
cy experiments, including the Central Bank of Lebanon, the Banque 
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de France, and the People’s Bank of China (Dikau and Volz 2020).  
Such a potential willingness to consider green finance arguments 
suggests there was already more policy space for central banks to 
use so-called alternative and other tools than many imagined – even 
before the coronavirus crisis in 2020 reinforced this message. No-
body thought the private sector would provide the support that was 
needed – this was the role of public banks and in particular should 
be led by the central banks. With the sudden stop in economic ac-
tivity in March/April 2020, urgent meetings were held between min-
istries and bankers everywhere, turning over long-held assump-
tions and restrictions. Central banks took on new and experimental 
roles, with the implicit and explicit backing of their governments. 
In some cases, this required changes in the law. 
One case has particular symbolic value, because it had been the 
first central bank in the world to narrow its role to just targeting in-
flation. Since 2019, it had already changed its mandate to include 
the goal of supporting maximum sustainable employment as well as 
price stability. Following Covid-19, it seemed the ground was shifting 
in other ways as well. On March 21, 2020, the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Minister 
of Finance granting an indemnity to insulate the bank from finan-
cial risks associated with the use of “alternative monetary policies” 
including large-scale asset purchases. Moreover, an accompanying 
letter from the Minister reiterated that government was neither spec-
ifying nor limiting which tools the bank could use – operational inde-
pendence meant the bank could use whatever tools it chooses. 
This is a long way from the monetary straitjacket envisaged 
in the 1980s. It shows an evolving role for central banks that was 
starting to be thought about in the climate change context and has 
now been made possible by the Covid-19 crisis. In fact, Covid-19 
can be seen as a classic example of the kind of Minsky Moment 
described above. Both the direct and indirect Minsky transmis-
sion routes have come to play – through the coronavirus and its 
attendant health impacts, and through the consequence of govern-
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ments’ policies of social distancing and lockdown to contain it. The 
link with a Minsky Moment was explicit, and Covid-19 was seen to 
bring the “tragedy of the horizon” into sharper focus (Horton 2020; 
Reguly 2020). As the pages below show, and as is summarized in 
Table 4.2, central banks everywhere pulled out whatever monetary 
policy stops they had to deal with it. 
CENTRAL BANKS LAUNCH THE CORONAVIRUS LIFE-RAFT
One of the first warnings that this health crisis was different from 
previous ones – such as SARS, Ebola and H1N1 – was that crude 
oil prices fell precipitously as lockdown killed the demand for trav-
el, transport and production of goods and services generally. The 
bellwether indicator, Brent crude oil, fell from US$70 per barrel 
on January 5 to US$30 by early March, even before lockdown had 
started for many countries in the West but some months after it had 
begun in Asia. It dropped as low as US$24 in mid-April, even going 
negative in some markets, before recovering somewhat by mid-year 
but nonetheless still at its lowest for 20 years (Trading Economics 
2020). The shock-waves swept financial markets, contributing to 
nervousness already growing about lockdown and the spread of the 
pandemic. Exchange rates whipped up and down, equity markets 
followed suit, and as much as US$84 billion fled out of developing 
countries in just a few months, seeking a haven in seemingly safer 
countries and currencies, and in so doing, further exacerbating the 
downward spiral. Automatic trading and synchronized, index-driv-
en portfolio investment strategies piled in on the sell side and the 
swift downgrading of developing country debt by the major credit 
rating agencies exacerbated the size and spread of the shock. Ac-
cording to the Bank of International Settlements as much as US$20 
billion fled out of developing economies on just a single day in mid-
March (BIS 2020). Outflows were three times larger than those re-
corded for a similar time period during the GFC.  
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This shock to the financial markets played havoc with domestic 
prices as well as international ones – which is the narrowest defini-
tion of the area of responsibility for central banks in the neoliberal 
model. They leapt quickly into action with the usual tools, trying to 
keep the financial markets liquid to avoid a credit crunch and debt 
deflation. However, the bleeding was worse than this, as the policies 
of social distancing and lockdown hit the whole of the economy and 
not only the financial sector. Consumer demand and supply dried up 
simultaneously even in countries that did not go into lockdown. This 
meant that even those central banks with mandates restricted to in-
flation targeting once again linked monetary and financial stability 
with stability in the real economy. They tried to restore confidence, 
boost demand and spending power as well as helping governments 
pay for the medical supplies and keeping hospitals, firms and house-
holds afloat. Central banks tried many different monetary tools, 
which can be broadly categorized in the following four groups: 
Reducing interest rates: For modern, inflation-targeting central 
banks the main (often the only) tool is the short-term interest rate and 
in the early days of the coronavirus crisis this was the first lever many 
tried. Cutting interest rates is quick to do, and has the effect of lower-
ing the cost of money across the board, which helps soften the blow 
to firms and households reeling from the burden of debt repayments 
and also to keep up aggregate demand. Most did this very quickly, cut-
ting rates as soon as coronavirus-related policies began (with the ex-
ception of countries where interest rates were already at zero or close 
to it). As shown in Table 4.1, in some countries these rate cuts were not 
only rapid, they were very large indeed. For South Africa, the prime 
rate was reduced to a 55-year low; Indian bank rates fell from 5.15% in 
February to 4.4% in March and down to 4% by May; similarly for other 
countries such as Indonesia and others. China stands out because it 
cut rates by only a small amount, but its large public banking sector 
took other actions to confront the crisis. Taken together, this has sig-
nificantly reduced interest rates globally and framed a new baseline 
for monetary policy everywhere (Lilley and Rogoff 2020). 
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Table 4.1: Interest rate declines in the early stages of Covid-19




Global average 1.22 -134
Developed countries -0.02 -132
Developing countries 3.16 -146
Latin America 3.60 -277
Developing Asia 2.87 -70
Note: Central bank official rates variously provided as Fed Funds rate, repo rate, dis-
count rate, Selic ON rate, depending on country. See also BIS compilation of Covid 
responses at https://www.bis.org/ifc/covid19.htm.
How low can interest rates go? Negative interest rates might have 
been unimaginable once but now they are already a stick being used 
by some central banks to try to get commercial banks to lend rather 
than hoard capital. The European Central Bank (ECB), Switzerland 
and Japan had negative interest rate policies (usually linked to some 
minimum threshold of deposit), even before the coronavirus crisis, 
which suggests there is not so much a shortage of capital available in 
the world, but rather a lack of incentive to deploy it. Supporting this 
argument, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that at 
least US$16 trillion is held in negative-interest accounts in Europe. 
In Denmark, when the central bank imposed negative interest rates, 
the commercial banks passed it on through offering negative inter-
est rates mortgages – meaning the sum households owed fell each 
month by more than the sum they had repaid. This is more than free 
money – home buyers are paid to take on debt. Some criticized this 
as a risky strategy that harms profits for the banks, others complain it 
is bad for savers and pension funds – meaning a double hit for the el-
derly. (It is also a threat for today’s workers if their future retirement 
incomes are not well invested but put at risk). 
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These concerns aside, negative interest rates are on the radar 
screen for central bankers elsewhere too, as low interest rates are 
failing to boost borrowing and lending. As early as March 2020, the 
central bank in New Zealand put negative interest rates as a possi-
bility on the table for the first time. By October, as a second wave 
of Covid was coursing through Europe, the Bank of England told its 
commercial banks to check their “operational readiness” for what 
in the UK would also be a ground-breaking move. It had cut rates 
to 0.1% at the start of the crisis and the message was couched as a 
technical IT issue; also, such a move would require a majority vote 
on the monetary policy committee. Nonetheless, markets view it as 
sign that “desperate measures” to nudge banks to lend more are be-
ing contemplated (Elliott 2020). For emerging markets and develop-
ing countries, where interest rates are still over zero, this has never 
been on the cards. The Central Bank of Brazil already noted in mid-
2020, when its interest rate was closer to 4%, that for them to be at 
2% was like being at zero for other countries. Commentators per-
ceived this to be a warning the bank would not cut rates further nor 
could it try other monetary measures being used elsewhere when 
interest rates were no longer working to stimulate the economy. 
Increasing lending: When interest rates are at close to zero (or 
what stands for zero in countries where higher rates are the norm) 
and when even the stick of negative interest rates are not inducing 
more lending on the part of banks (or demand to borrow from house-
holds and business), central banks tried more direct monetary mea-
sures. Most central banks did this through a myriad of schemes using 
their role as regulators to ‘re-regulate’. They reduced the reserve and 
capital requirements of other banks and financial institutions to re-
duce the risk of a credit crunch coming at a time of increased risk of 
loan defaults, or capital losses in the financial markets. The central 
bank of China freed up US$265 billion this way by cutting the reserve 
ratio three times in just a few months and it further encouraged new 
lending by increased guarantees for loans (as high as 80% of the 
loans, compared to more like 60% in other countries) (MPAG 2020). 
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Other policies central banks used included increasing repur-
chase agreements and lengthening the maturities of their loans 
to other banks in the financial sector; sometimes relaxing the pro-
visions for non-performing loans. They tried to make it easier for 
long-term lending to households and the non-financial sectors, 
by changing the regulations governing commercial banks loan-to-
value (LVR) restrictions that determined the level and number of 
household mortgages banks could offer. The central banks in some 
countries imposed a rule that commercial banks should offer debt 
standstills for firms and households most affected by the Covid 
shock; some imposed a freeze on loan repayments (Bank of Ban-
gladesh did this as early as January 2020). Others refused to allow 
banks to pay out dividends and encouraged mortgage holidays to 
beleaguered households. 
Some banks also used credit guiding policies to increase lend-
ing to regions in need or where economic activities were deemed 
particularly necessary, using monetary policy to do what in other 
times governments could do through expenditure and fiscal pol-
icies. Often this was focused on health but also towards micro-, 
small- and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), or sectors in trou-
ble such as tourism and the hospitality trade. As early as January 
2020, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) instructed its state-owned 
commercial banks to lend up to 30% of loans to small- and me-
dium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and a month later it reduced the 
interest rates for banks that on-lent to agriculture, farming and 
SMEs (MPAG ibid). In March, the central bank of Argentina of-
fered particularly favourable conditions to the commercial banks 
in its system that lent to SMEs, as well as the ‘stick’ of reducing its 
holdings in those that did not; the central Bank of Egypt offered 
special loans to the tourism sector, manufacturing and agricul-
ture, supported by government guarantees. In Nigeria, the central 
bank injected additional liquidity into the banking system worth 
as much as 2.4% of GDP, to support loans to the health, manufac-
turing and other impacted sectors. 
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Quantitative easing: Most interesting are central banks’ use of 
large-scale asset purchases – an instrument that is more difficult 
than the lending schemes or interest rate changes described above 
because they cannot be reabsorbed quickly once the economy 
starts to recover. When central banks buy assets on a large scale – 
usually government bonds but in some cases corporate bonds from 
the private sector as well – it is harder to unwind and the massive 
purchasing sits as an asset on the central banks’ balance sheets for 
a long time. It also reaffirms the view that the independence of cen-
tral banks is a chimera.  
For the five largest advanced economies, asset purchases were 
worth some 35-45% of GDP by the middle of the year (the United 
States, Eurozone, United Kingdom, Canada and Japan), dismaying 
critics who had been hoping central banks would get back to their 
pre-GFC slim lines. To get a sense of how big this is, consider that 
during the GFC the Fed’s balance sheet in 2009 had risen by less 
than 10%. Some predict that ECB asset purchases will be up by 
60% by the end of 2021 (Cavallino and De Fiore 2020). The Bank of 
England bought £226 billion of gilts issued by the government by 
September, meaning it had indirectly created and lent most of the 
finance needed for the government’s new Covid-related expendi-
tures (Office of Budget Responsibility 2020). It now owns just un-
der half the total government bonds issued, double the level of 
the Fed Reserve in the United States and leading to debate about 
what it can pull out of the hat next, given that QE is not having the 
expansionary results its proponents expected (Stubbington 2020). 
These figures would have been unimaginable just a year ago when 
austerity was still being recommended as the only solution to a 
stagnating post GFC economy. 
Central banks in emerging economies also purchased bonds, in-
cluding Colombia, India, Indonesia and South Africa. While the cen-
tral banks in the north mostly aimed to avert a credit crunch, in the 
south their task was more about boosting confidence, acting as ‘buy-
er of last resort’ to plug the holes left as foreign owners of local cur-
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rency sovereign bonds fled for seemingly safer shores. After years of 
extreme conservatism, they gave narrow and clearly defined expla-
nations that focused on restoring market confidence as opposed to 
monetary stimulus or monetary financing of fiscal deficits (although 
one could argue this would be perfectly justifiable given the low cost 
of capital, urgent context and development benefits). South Africa 
purchased 30% of its government’s gross issuances of bonds in April, 
citing the need to “ease dislocation” in the market, rather than call-
ing it QE (SARB 2020 a,b). For many, this was the first time they had 
ever carried out such alternative measures and in some it required 
an explicit change in the law (e.g. Brazil, Czech Republic). Most used 
their foreign exchange reserves to pay for the bonds (as opposed 
to the central banks in reserve currency countries, which can buy 
bonds simply by injecting electronic money into the system). Few 
said exactly how big their buying programmes were, although those 
that did were small compared to the advanced economies (0.1% of 
GDP in the case of Korea, 2.8% in the case of Chile). 
Exchange rate management: As predicted in the “Climate Min-
sky Meltdown” scenario of financial market instability described 
above and in Table 4.2, currency markets lurched in the rush to 
safety. Just as during the GFC, the hardest hit currencies were the 
hot and carry trade Brazilian Real, South African rand, Russian 
ruble and Turkish lira, with the exodus of sellers compounded by 
the interest rate falls, which were more pronounced in developing 
economies compared to the main reserve currency countries. How-
ever, advanced economy currencies were highly volatile too – the 
US dollar at first appreciated against the other major currencies 
Euro, Yen and Pound Sterling but as happened in the last crisis, this 
also rebounded and then depreciated again. 
Central banks responded by trying to smooth the waters 
through buying and selling currencies in the spot and derivatives 
markets, especially in developing economies where their curren-
cies were pummeled in the rush to buy reserve currencies. Their 
purchases were paid for by international reserve holdings or by 
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multilateral emergency credit lines offered through some of the 
regional liquidity funds (e.g. the Latin American Reserve Fund – 
FLAR and the European Stability Mechanism – ESM), and in a few 
cases through special swap agreements with central banks from 
the advanced economies. These actions can happen quickly. In 
the month of March 2020 alone, the US Federal Reserve (or ‘Fed’) 
offered swap lines worth US$30 billion to US$60 billion to 14 coun-
tries to ensure they had access to US dollar liquidity. This enabled 
central banks to use their holdings of US dollars, which were cur-
rently on their balance sheets as foreign reserves, as collateral 
for borrowing – anything rather than sell them. Others worked 
bilaterally. For example, the Bank of Japan offered a swap to Thai-
land of JPY 800 billion. These swap arrangements between cen-
tral banks were incredibly important, not least to help countries 
avoid falling into a balance of payments crisis simply because of 
a shortage of foreign exchange (which happens quickly for coun-
tries dependent on commodities exports, tourism or remittances, 
all of which were hit by lockdown). Having access to the US dollar 
in particular is essential because 80% of total debt in the world is 
denominated in US dollars (UNCTAD 2020). On the other hand, of 
the 14 countries with whom the Fed negotiated credit swaps, only 
a few were developing countries (Brazil, China, Korea and Mexi-
co) – some of these with very high needs even at the best of times. 
Once again, the exchange rate crisis revived debate about ending 
the hegemony of the US dollar and replacing it with other alterna-
tives such as a bundle of currencies (Tooze 2020a).
Summing up, and as shown in Table 4.2, central banks pulled out 
an unusually wide range of monetary instruments and tools and used 
them to a very large scale in their efforts to bolster firms, households 
and even governments from the effects of lockdown. Some of these 
measures were squarely within their conventional role of ensuring 
price stability; others reflect the new understanding that is emerg-
ing about the central banks can play with respect to climate change, 
of which Covid-19 may be just one, very painful, example.







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































COVID-19 PACKAGES AND THE ROLE OF 
MONETARY POLICY – GLOBAL DISTINCTIONS 
At the outset of the Covid-19 crisis, many governments pledged to 
“do whatever it takes” and there was talk of Covid as a “levelling” 
crisis in the sense that all people and all countries, rich or poor, 
could be equally impacted. In reality, income made a huge differ-
ence, and this was evident not only at the level of household ac-
commodation (who had a comfortable home and who did not) and 
jobs (who could work from home and who was either unpaid or in 
paid essential and dangerous work) but at the level of countries and 
central banks as well. Whether central banks had broad mandates 
or narrow ones, the disparity is clear when countries of different 
income levels are compared (see Figure 4.1). Some wealthier coun-
tries could put in place massive fiscal and financial packages worth 
40-50% of GDP while poor economies had to cut their cloth in single 
figures. Brazil, a large economy reeling under the economic as well 
as health impact of coronavirus, was spending only 3% of GDP on 
its response packages by the middle of 2020 (UNCTAD 2020). Many 
other developing countries had much less space. 
The composition of packages also varies according to national 
economic size, wealth and fiscal space. QE is a rich country’s tool, 
and central banks in developing countries are hampered by the fact 
theirs is not a reserve currency. Japan, which launched a stimulus 
and relief package worth over 50% of GDP, devoted roughly half of 
this to the instrument of QE, whereas Malaysia, which also had a 
significant package worth around 24% of GDP, could not use QE at 
all. Thailand – also with a sizeable rescue package, especially when 
compared to other developing countries – experimented with a very 
small amount of QE but mostly relied on loans to business and loan 
guarantees, supported by fiscal policy. In South Africa, the Reserve 
Bank argued it did not have the policy space to purchase government 
or corporate bonds like those in the United States or Europe could 
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do; moreover they were charged higher rates for borrowing on inter-
national financial markets. Their recourse was rather to the Bretton 
Woods institutions such as the IMF or World Bank – a choice some 
other developing countries tried to steer away from because of the 
conditionalities involved. The differences with regard to what central 
banks could do for Covid finance in their countries resonated with 
other long-standing inequities in the world; as noted by the Finance 
Minister of Ghana on June 3, 2020, at a virtual conference organized 
by the Harvard University Center for African Studies, “Suddenly the 
western world can print US$8 trillion to support their economies 
in these extraordinary times, while Africans are judged by the old 
rules… You really feel like shouting ‘I can’t breathe’” (Ofori-atta 2020). 
The lack of policy space for central banks in developing countries 
to provide emergency loans and loan guarantees and other mone-
tary policies is also particularly important because, compared to ad-
vanced countries, their governments also had significantly less fiscal 
space as well. This matters greatly because while central banks and 
monetary policy can do a lot to create credit and even to guide it, there 
also needs to be demand for that credit and it is here that fiscal policy 
plays the essential other side of the coin to what central banks can 
do, because it gives governments the capacity to boost public expen-
diture in ways that can support demand. As  central bank mandates 
became more narrow this further broke the link between monetary 
and fiscal policy and lead to silos of dis-connected policymaking.  
Helping to fill this gap in some developing countries where na-
tional resources are lacking has been the emergence of strong new 
Southern-led regional public banks and funds (Barrowclough et al. 
2020) and northern development bank aid programmes such as that 
by the German development bank KfW (see Marois chapter also in 
this volume), which offer technical assistance as well as finance. How-
ever, what is also needed is a concerted effort to restock the fiscal cof-
fers of developing countries – for example, through combatting illicit 
capital flows. Financial regulation, including managing capital flows, 
as well as stronger taxation laws, could help in this respect. 
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Figure 4.1: Country policy packages in response to Covid-19 (% of GDP)
Source: UNCTAD 2020.
Note: Fiscal, loan and Quantitative Easing estimates are based on government and 
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CONCLUSION
Coronavirus has ended the illusion that central banks could or 
should simply enact monetary policy technically, somehow separate 
from and independent of politics. Central banks everywhere acted 
to support national political goals, either explicitly or implicitly, and 
thus 2020 is marked by a willingness and indeed necessity to leave 
the narrow model of the last few decades behind. The wide range 
of responses in different countries means central banks are becom-
ing more diverse and complex again, with differing mandates and 
expectations and using a broader range of instruments. Many central 
banks have supported their government’s fiscal policy, in particular 
financing government expenditure for healthcare or economic re-
covery packages through their purchase of government bonds (often 
on an extremely large scale). They are also not afraid to send strong 
messages to the commercial banks in their financial systems. 
On the other hand, while the urgency of coronavirus has un-
doubtedly helped to spearhead this move – whether seen as less 
independence from government, or more independence to take 
the initiative and act as they choose – a less encouraging reason 
could be that it is also perhaps a recognition that deflation is now 
the real problem and not inflation (Tooze 2020b). In part this is be-
cause organized labour has been crushed so much it no longer has 
much bargaining power or ability to impact wages – which leads 
to the question of the distributive impact of central banks’ Covid 
efforts (see for example Brenner 2020). Their efforts to ensure li-
quidity are also a way of supporting the financial sector, which 
does not translate directly into supporting labour or the rest of the 
economy. Whether households benefit or not is one of the most 
important yardsticks as to the distributive impacts and it is a wor-
ry that already some of the private banks that have been support-
ed by central banks are failing to extend new loans or mortgages, 
apparently because they are ‘overwhelmed’ by the demand from 
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customers (or concerned about weakening shareholder returns). 
Asset bubbles benefit those who already own assets and the ev-
idence is strong that rich people are getting even richer during 
the pandemic, while workers, savers and those without capital are 
getting poorer (Economist 2020). 
There is also already starting to be a revival of the austerity man-
tra, with concerns about rising public debt and how it is to be re-
paid. Public debt is the inevitable consequence of taking on the debt 
from the private sector and needs to be seen as an investment in 
the future not a burdensome cost. This could be very dangerous if 
it leads to a premature tightening of fiscal policy again, especially 
as private banks and private finance have not leapt into the Covid 
recovery. Rather than debating whether central banks should have 
become so engaged, it would be more useful to critically examine 
the effects of their different instruments, so as to better evaluate 
what is most effective. For example, when central banks create and 
then lend money to governments for spending, can this be seen as 
a form of the “People’s quantitative easing” that was called for from 
across the political spectrum after the GFC (see Positive Money 
2020). Is this a more democratic measure and is it better for reviving 
a stagnating economy than QE directed through the purchase of cor-
porate bonds, which can lead to asset bubbles or, as happened last 
time, a flood of hot money into developing countries without pro-
ducing investment or lasting benefit? Here decision-making needs 
to be transparent and the impact of decisions empirically evaluat-
ed, for example through the Bank of International Settlements or 
the UN system. Research is also needed to better understand what 
would have happened without these initiatives. If governments fail 
to use fiscal policy and expenditures to support the coronavirus re-
lief efforts, central banks will likely keep on reaching for desper-
ate measures to stimulate the economy – however, will these create 
the broad-based and expansionary effects needed, and what will be 
their impact on inequality? These are empirical questions as much 
as theoretical or ideological and need research. 
Public Banks and Covid-19
 107
It is also important that these questions should be answered, 
not only to ensure the success of today’s Covid efforts, but also for 
the future post-Covid phase. Then, the attention of policy-makers 
and banks will turn to re-building. Building back better requires 
nothing less than structural transformation to a financial and eco-
nomic system that is more sustainable and democratic and central 
banks have an extremely important role to play. Can Quantitative 
Easing for the People be a feasible tool as compared to QE direct-
ed via banks is an empirical question that could be further re-
searched, to take just one example. More generally, for the finan-
cial system as a whole, as well as for central banks’ place directing 
it, Covid-19 can be seen as a warning of what lies ahead if we do 
not find a more harmonious way of engaging with the environ-
ment. It has also made it impossible for us to ignore the inequali-
ties at the heart of the current system, and the fact no country can 
act alone, especially when it comes to contagion whether econom-
ic or viral.  The gap in ‘response space’ between the world’s richest 
and poorest countries is massive, and this is not only inequitable 
it could hold the seeds of future crises as well. Both these inter-re-
lated issues are already on the radar screen of central banks and 
ideally they would also be in their mandate. 
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THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 
DEVELOPMENT BANK 
AND COVID-19
The Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) responded rapidly to Covid-19, approving just over €3 billion in emergen-cy financing to 15 countries in the three months from the start 
of the spread of the pandemic in Europe in March 2020. As a small 
bank with a social mandate and a well-established programme of 
lending to the public sector, it amended its rules to ‘fast track’ pub-
lic funding to health systems and small businesses that were under 
strain. CEB funding covered a broader range of operational costs (in-
cluding emergency equipment and staffing) than multilateral banks 
typically offer. CEB’s high credit rating meant it could borrow cheaply 
from international capital markets, and as a non-profit lender it was 
able to pass on favourable rates to the national and regional govern-
ments that it serves.
INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines CEB’s Covid-19 response through a brief sur-
vey of its emergency lending to 15 countries, which mostly involved 
loans to governments through the Bank’s Public sector Financing 
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Facility (PFF). CEB’s concessional lending to health systems, which 
included covering emergency operating costs, offered a cost-effec-
tive alternative to government bond issues and helped regional and 
national governments to diversify their funding portfolio. 
The first section of this chapter looks at how CEB was able to 
fill gaps in funding for public sector responses to the pandemic 
through a look at the three key features of the institution that are 
relatively little known. First, as a small institution with a relatively 
flexible governance structure, the Bank was able to quickly imple-
ment emergency lending rules to speed up lending decisions and 
disbursements, and waive the usual co-financing requirement that 
borrowers need to source 50% of the funding for a specified activity 
from other sources. 
Second, CEB was able to raise additional funds for its Covid-19 
response using its ‘social bonds’ programme to borrow from inter-
national capital markets. The Bank’s high credit rating and track 
record of socially responsible lending meant that its bond issues 
in April and June raised €1.5 billion at very favourable rates. As a 
non-profit public institution, it could directly pass on the benefit of 
this cheap financing to its member governments. Third, CEB has 
established lending schemes for public health services, and micro- 
and small-scale businesses, so it could use its experience and con-
tacts in these areas to act rapidly. This is shown in the section on 
the Covid-19 emergency response, which first outlines the extent of 
CEB lending, then focusses more closely on the PFF that was used 
to channel emergency support to health services.
The chapter then offers two brief case studies detailing CEB’s 
Covid-19 lending to Spain, which involved a €200 million loan to the 
Comunidad de Madrid, and a €300m loan to the Instituto de Crédito 
Oficial (ICO) to support micro- and small-sized companies. The im-
pact of CEB lending cannot easily be disaggregated from that of state 
financing, and it is too soon to directly establish what was achieved. 
The Madrid region is also facing systemic problems in its health and 
social care systems that finance alone cannot solve. Nevertheless, 
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CEB demonstrated the ability to provide rapid financial support for 
one of the countries that was hardest hit by the pandemic in Europe.
WHAT IS THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE DEVELOPMENT BANK?  
The Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) is a multilateral 
development bank with an exclusively social mandate. It was estab-
lished in 1999 as the successor institution to the Council of Europe 
Social Development Fund, which was originally formed in 1956 as 
the Council of Europe’s Resettlement Fund for National Refugees 
and Over-Population in Europe (Hummer 2015; PACE 2019). CEB 
is financially and legally independent of the Council of Europe, al-
though it continues to be guided by the mandate and priorities of 
that institution (CEB 2020i, 26). 
There are 42 CEB Member States, which are joint owners of the 
bank.1 CEB financing is restricted to projects in its Member States, 
and it holds just over €26 billion in total assets as of 31 December 
2019, including €15.6 billion in outstanding loans (CEB 2020d, 2). 
The bank approved €4 billion in new lending in 2019, distributed 
across 46 projects and programmes (CEB 2020d, 3). 
Funding priorities  
CEB currently has three core priorities: fostering “inclusive 
growth”; offering “support to vulnerable groups”; and enhancing 
“environmental stability” (CEB 2020i, 15). Its core focus is provid-
ing “flexible, long-term loans to finance projects of major social 
benefit” (Hummer 2015, 3), including for social housing, education 
1  The 42 Member States consist of 40 that are Council of Europe (COE) members: Al-
bania, Andorra, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Republic 
of Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland 
and Turkey) plus The Holy See (an observer State of the Council of Europe) and Kosovo.
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and healthcare. It also offers programmatic support for public sec-
tor investment and job creation through micro-, small- and medi-
um-sized enterprises (MSMEs) (CEB 2020m, 6). 
In keeping with its social mandate, CEB aims to target lending 
towards “vulnerable people”, including migrants and refugees (CEB 
2020i, 15). This was not specifically reflected in most of CEB’s emer-
gency Covid-19 funding, although the health services that received 
support included the social care sector, such as nursing homes that 
were facing severe crises and equipment shortages.
Any CEB member can apply for funding, but the bank also spec-
ifies 22 Target Countries, a list comprising poorer members of the 
bank in Southern and Eastern Europe. CEB intends to increase lend-
ing to these countries, with a Target of €1 billion in dispersals per 
year out of a total of €3.5 billion in approved funding per year (CEB 
2020i, 8). In fact, CEB regularly exceeds this target, with disburse-
ments of €1.25 billion in 2018, €1.15 billion in 2017 and an estimate 
of up to €1.35 billion in 2019 – which may suggest the goal is not 
sufficiently ambitious. The majority of CEB lending is still concen-
trated in the richer 20 member countries (CEB 2020k, 23). 
Governance  
CEB is overseen by a Governing Board which “sets  the general  ori-
entations  of  CEB  work  and  conditions  for  membership,  elects 
the  CEB’s  highest  officials  and approves  the  annual  report,  the 
accounts  and  the  balance  sheet” (PACE 2019, 9). The Governing 
Board directly correlates voting rights to countries’ shares in the 
bank’s capital (PACE 2019, 10). There is ongoing discussion on how 
to give greater weight to smaller and medium-sized countries,  “al-
though  ‘perfect equality’  in  the  sense  of  ‘one  country,  one  vote’ 
–  as  in  the  case  of  the  Committee  of  Ministers  –  would probably 
be  unrealistic“ (PACE 2019, 10). An Administrative Council, which 
is mostly comprised of representatives of national ministries of fi-
nance, “manages all the financial aspects, approves projects and the 
budget” (PACE 2019, 9). Two extra, online meetings of this Council 
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were held to process Covid-19 emergency loan requests. 
Although CEB is legally independent of the Council of Europe, 
it must ensure that its social objectives are in line with those of the 
Council, and it cannot change its statutory purposes except with 
the approval of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers 
(CEB 2020k). CEB must also regularly inform the Council of Eu-
rope of its activities and respond to any guidance and recommen-
dations made by the Council of Ministers and the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe (CEB 2020k). CEB lending rules 
include a fairly standard suite of policies governing transparency, 
anti-corruption, fiduciary duties, and environmental and social 
safeguards (CEB 2020h). 
Funding sources 
• Share capital: The CEB is owned by its 42 Member States, whose 
shares in the Bank are directly related to their relative share of 
the Council of Europe budget. The three largest Member States 
(France, Germany and Italy, 16.7% each) together hold more 
than 50% of these shares (CEB 2020a, 15). The CEB has share 
capital of €5.4 billion (CEB 2020d, 20). 
• Profits and recapitalization: As a non-profit institution, any profits 
made by CEB are reincorporated as part of the Bank’s reserves, 
increasing its overall capital so that it can engage in more lend-
ing (PACE 2019, 10). The bank’s net profit in 2019 was €105 mil-
lion (compared to €98 million in 2018 (CEB 2020d, 3). CEB pays no 
dividends but transfers profits to the bank’s reserves. It is likely 
that “in the coming years the CEB will likely hit the ceiling on the 
volume of financing it can offer to member States” (PACE 2019, 
10). To increase lending beyond this point, CEB would need a cap-
ital increase from its Member States. CEB has requested capital 
increases six times in its history, the last of which came in 2011 
(PACE 2019; CEB 2020k). 
• Bonds: Unlike many multilateral banks and agencies, CEB re-
ceives no financial assistance or other financial subsidies from 
Oscar Reyes
118 
its Member States. It raises funds by issuing bonds on interna-
tional capital markets, which amounted to €4.5 billion in 2019 
(compared to €4.9 billion in 2018 and €3 billion in 2017) (CEB 
2020l; PACE 2019, 6). CEB is able to raise funds on very competi-
tive terms because it has high credit ratings from the three main 
agencies: AAA by Standard & Poor’s; Aa1 (stable outlook) by 
Moody’s; and AA+ (stable outlook) by Fitch (CEB 2020e). These 
ratings are strong on account of the quality of CEB’s lending 
track record and risk management policies. 
• CEB’s public lending is not subject to an explicit sovereign guar-
antee from its Member States, but if the Bank were to become 
indebted it would be able to call upon “subscribed and unpaid 
capital” to meet its obligations or call for a capital increase from 
its members – a significant backstop that reduces its perceived 
riskiness (CEB 2020k). The scope of the bank’s lending is also 
tightly controlled. It only lends to Member States, sub-national 
public bodies or via intermediary financial institutions, such as 
private banks (CEB 2020g, 3). When the borrower is a non-state 
institution, the Member State must provide a letter indicating its 
“ability and willingness… to guarantee the loan” (CEB 2020g, 4). 
As such, CEB’s members have a strong interest in maintaining 
CEB’s creditworthiness (Hummer 2015).  
• CEB’s longstanding social mandate has also helped it to capi-
talize on recent trends in international capital markets, where 
investors are increasingly looking for socially responsible in-
vestments. (CEB 2020a; CEB 2020c, 6-7). Since 2017, CEB has 
issued almost €3 billion in “social inclusion bonds”, which are 
aligned with the International Capital Markets’ Association’s 
social bonds principles (ICMA 2020; CEB 2020c, 6-7). These are 
used to raise funds for four of CEB’s target sectors: social hous-
ing for low-income persons; education and vocational training; 
supporting MSMEs; and health (CEB 2020a, 12). The health sec-
tor was added to this scope in 2020 in response to the Covid-19 
pandemic (CEB 2020d, 24). 
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Loan portfolio  
CEB approved €4 billion in new loans in 2019, and currently has a 
€15.4 billion loan portfolio (CEB 2020d, 2). Recently, support for MS-
MEs has formed the largest share of the CEB loan portfolio, with the 
stated aim of creating and preserving jobs. MSME support, which is 
provided via governments and financial intermediaries, accounted 
for 37% of CEB’s 2019 lending. Other major areas of funding include 
measures “improving living conditions in urban and rural areas” 
(much of which is dedicated for social housing projects), which 
accounts for 17% of the loan portfolio in 2019, and 16% for “edu-
cation and vocational training” (CEB 2020a, 4-5). These loans are 
often made to municipal and regional governments. In 2019, 8% 
of the financing approved was targeted towards “health and social 
care” (CEB 2020a, 5. This is consistent with the pattern of lending 
in previous years (PACE 2019, 6), although the proportion of health 
financing in CEB’s lending is likely to have increased significantly as 
a result of the Covid-19 pandemic. 
Distribution by recipient country  
Thirty-four of CEB’s members are currently borrowing from the 
bank (PACE 2019, 6).2 Many of the major users of CEB loans are 
also big contributors to its capital. The largest share of outstand-
ing loans is currently held by France (€1.9 billion) and Spain (€1.8 
billion), followed by Poland, Turkey and Belgium (CEB 2020k, 22). 
The concentration of lending in a handful of countries suggests that 
CEB should work to further diversify its portfolio, although this is 
partly offset by the fact that lending to major countries is often to 
regional governments and municipalities. 
Just over half of loan recipients (51%) are Member States, with 
a further 27% of loans distributed to local, municipal and regional 
public authorities, and 22% to commercial banks and public fi-
2  This figure has been adjusted to reflect the fact that San Marino and Andorra were 
added to the list of loanees in 2020.
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nancial institutions (CEB 2020a, 4). The vast majority of Covid-19 
emergency financing has been allocated directly to CEB member 
governments. 
Types of lending  
CEB can provide loans and loan guarantees to co-finance projects 
in any of its 42 Member States. Its main financial instruments in-
clude project loans, which usually provide finance for a predefined 
individual infrastructure investment, and programme loans, which 
fund multi-project programmes – usually municipal investment 
plans (EASPD 2018, 2). Programme loans are also often implement-
ed through private commercial bank partners. 
CEB usually sets a 50% ceiling on the proportion of total project 
or programme costs that it can finance, although on a case by case 
basis, this can be increased to up to 90% for lending to poorer Mem-
ber States (CEB Target Group Countries) (CEB 2020g, 6). A broader 
waiver of the rule on funding a maximum of 50% project costs was 
introduced for Covid-19 emergency financing (CEB 2020c, 12).  
Programmatic financing facilities are used to support social in-
frastructure expenditure. Public sector Financing Facilities (PFF), 
which represent the bulk of Covid-19 emergency lending, are in-
tended to “address temporary financing gaps”, as well as facilitating 
underlying investments in public services (CEB 2020g, 6). The fact 
that CEB can offer public sector financing under this broad scope, 
rather than having to restrict its lending to infrastructure costs, en-
abled it to offer rapid support for overburdened health sectors in 
response to Covid-19.  
As a non-profit institution, CEB applies only a limited margin 
to its loans and charges no fees, passing on most of the favourable 
borrowing terms that it receives as a result of its high credit ratings 
to the social projects that it finances (EASPD 2018; CEB 2020m). CEB 
loan terms vary considerably in terms of disbursement amounts, 
maturity, currency and interest-rate structures or capital and inter-
est payment dates (EASPD 2018, 2). 
Public Banks and Covid-19
 121
COVID-19 EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
CEB responded rapidly to the spread of the Covid-19 pandemic, is-
suing close to €1.5 billion3 in “social inclusion bonds” in April and 
June 2020 to raise additional funds for its crisis response, and ap-
proving 17 emergency loans worth just over €3 billion in 15 coun-
tries by 3 July 2020 (CEB 2020b). CEB’s emergency response includ-
ed adaptations to lending rules alongside operational changes to 
enable remote working (CEB 2020c 1, 5). A ‘fast track’ approvals 
process was put in place to respond to Covid-19, which saw the first 
emergency loan agreements signed in just one month (rather than 
the typical six to nine months). The new process involved additional 
meetings of the Bank’s administrative council, a written procedure 
for approvals, and a reduction (from two to one) in the number of 
internal appraisal committees prior to approving the funding (M. 
Siguenza, CEB country manager Albania, Andorra and Spain, per-
sonal communication, September 4, 2020). 
Covid-19 emergency loans
From April 17 to July 3, 2020, CEB approved 17 new loans (plus two 
loan increases) in 15 countries in response to the Covid-19 pandem-
ic, as shown in Table 5.1.
CEB adapted its loan terms to ensure that it could respond rap-
idly to the coronavirus emergency. It introduced waivers on the 
proportion of the total cost of projects that can be financed from 
Covid-19 emergency loans (it usually caps its lending at 50% of the 
total), and the possibility for a first disbursement tranche to exceed 
the usual ceiling of 50% of the total loan amount (2020c, 12; CEB 
2020h, 4.1). The eligibility criteria for lending were also changed to 
include covering salary costs for additional medical staff during the 
3  CEB issued €1 billion in Covid-19 Response Social Inclusion Bonds in April 2020, 
and a further US$500 billion in June 2020.
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Table 5.1: CEB Covid-19 emergency response loans
Country Loan size
(€ million)
Borrower Purpose of loan




300 Government Healthcare, including medical 
supplies and equipment
Estonia 200 Government Support for MSMEs
Greece 200 Government Healthcare, including 
medical supplies, staffing and 
equipment
Hungary 175 Government Healthcare, including 
medical supplies, staffing and 
equipment
Italy 300 Government Healthcare, including medical 
supplies and equipment
Kosovo 35 Government Healthcare, including medical 
supplies, staffing and equipment
Latvia 150 Government Healthcare, including medical 
supplies and equipment




70 Government Healthcare, including 
medical supplies, staffing and 
equipment; support for MSMEs
San Marino 10 Government Healthcare, including medical 
supplies and equipment
Serbia 200 Government Healthcare, including medical 
supplies and equipment
Serbia 20 Pro-Credit Bank Support for MSMEs. Extension 
of existing loan




300 Government Healthcare, including 
medical supplies, staffing and 
equipment; support for MSMEs




medical supplies, staffing and 
equipment
Spain 300 Instituto de 
Crédito Oficial
Support for MSMEs
Turkey 200 Government Healthcare, including 
medical supplies, staffing and 
equipment
Total 3,060  
Source: CEB 2020b.
pandemic (M. Siguenza, CEB country manager Albania, Andorra 
and Spain, personal communication, September 4, 2020).
Public sector Finance Facility
The majority of CEB’s emergency Covid-19 lending (15 new loans) is 
drawn from its Public sector Finance Facility (PFF), which is aimed 
at national and sub-national public sector partners. The scope of 
this lending was expanded to include the emergency acquisition of 
medical material and equipment, including tests, ventilators and 
respirators as well as protective equipment for frontline staff, em-
ployment of temporary medical staff, the construction and conver-
sion of temporary emergency facilities, medical units and hospitals 
to meet current emergency healthcare needs (Council of Europe 
2020b; CEB 2020c, 18-19).
The extension of the PFF has allowed it to offer rapid finance 
at concessional rates. For example, a €200 million public sector 
financing facility loan to Serbia, approved in May 2020, has cov-
ered significant gaps in “the extraordinary budget lines created for 
Covid-19 mitigation measures,” with a key focus on improving the 
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supply of personal protective equipment and pharmaceutical sup-
plies in hospitals, as well as additional medical equipment, patient 
monitors and coronavirus tests (Council of Europe 2020a). By way 
of comparison, the European Union made available €97 million to 
Serbia in response to the coronavirus crisis but only €20 million 
of this was designated for medical equipment purchases, with the 
rest of its emergency funding reserved for broader economic re-
covery measures (OECD 2020, 7). The responses of the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD) have also focused on announcing plans 
for future funding increases to support economic recovery over a 
longer time scale.
A similar story can be told of the €300m PFF loan to the Czech 
Republic, which was projected to cover 90% of the immediate, 
short-term costs of addressing the pandemic at the time of its ap-
proval in mid-April 2020 (Council of Europe 2020b). CEB was able 
to offer the loan “under very generous conditions”, according to 
the Czech Government, which states that the first tranche of the 
emergency loan was offered at 0% interest rates for a loan period 
of up to nine years. These terms were more generous than could 
be achieved by the Czech Government directly issuing addition-
al government bonds (Ministry of Finance, Czech Republic 2020). 
This, in turn, was made possible by the fact that CEB can bor-
row at favourable terms on international bond markets and, as a 
non-profit public institution, it can directly pass on the benefit to 
its member governments. 
The PFF emergency response also included CEB’s first ever 
loan to San Marino, which reported that CEB offered concession-
al lending at a rate of less than 0.5% for up to 15 years to cover 
emergency medical supplies, diagnostic tests and to finance the 
reorganization and expansion of critical care capacity in the coun-
try’s only public hospital (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, San Marino, 
2020; CEB 2020n).
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CASE STUDY 1: COMUNIDAD DE MADRID
On April 17, 2020 CEB approved a €200 million loan via its PFF to the 
Comunidad de Madrid regional government, to partly fund an esti-
mated €2 billion in extraordinary expenditure on health and social 
services related to Covid-19 (CEB 2020c, 18). Management of health 
and social services is devolved to regional governments in Spain.
Madrid is Spain’s third most populous region, with almost 7 mil-
lion inhabitants, and was one of the hardest hit regions by Covid-19. 
Madrid reported 8,500 Covid-19 deaths in the three-month period 
from March 8, 2020, when the spread of the virus was at its most 
severe, although other estimates and figures including care homes 
put the total at closer to 15,000 (Gacetín Madrid 2020; Romero 2020). 
The Madrid region accounted for almost one-third of all cases in 
Spain at the time when the loan was approved (CEB 2020c, 18).
As with other PFF loans, CEB lending offers an alternative to 
borrowing on international capital markets. This has the advantage 
of diversifying funding sources as well as providing cheaper financ-
ing than would be available through bond issues, since CEB has a 
far better credit rating than the Madrid region. 
The emergency loan to Madrid is being used to partly fund the 
hire of additional medical staff, phone line operations and payment 
of additional overtime expenses; to provide additional medical and 
pharmaceutical supplies, including diagnostic tests and ventilators; 
to purchase personal protective equipment; and to strengthen ser-
vices in care homes for the disabled and elderly (CEB 2020c, 18-19). 
CEB funds were also used to part-finance the conversion of Madrid’s 
conference centre, IFEMA, into the biggest hospital in Spain. 
CEB’s rapid response may well have helped to avert a far greater 
disaster in the Madrid region, but such financial provisions obvi-
ously cannot correct for structural failings in the region’s partial-
ly privatized medical system. The IFEMA hospital helped to ease 
the pressure on other parts of Madrid’s overwhelmed hospital sys-
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tem, but its operation was far from smooth. Medical staff and trade 
unions criticized a severe lack of personal protective equipment 
and poor sanitary standards, forcing the temporary closure of parts 
of the site (Asuar 2020; Cadenas and Valdes 2020).
Neither could CEB’s support for social care in Madrid overcome 
the “structural and systemic problems in relation to the Spanish 
model of nursing homes”, three-quarters of which are privately 
run (Médecins Sans Frontières 2020, 3). Almost 6,000 people died at 
care homes in the Madrid region in the three months from March 
8, 2020, when the Covid-19 crisis was at its most severe, with 88% of 
those deaths occurring in the period before April 17, 2020, when the 
region’s overflowing hospitals were denying admissions to some pa-
tients (Santa Eulalia et al. 2020). The situation was compounded by 
the severe pressure facing ICU units in Madrid, and controversial 
triage protocols that excluded many care home residents (Herreros 
et al. 2020; Sendles-White 2020). 
A further €200 million loan for social care in the Madrid region 
was approved on September 25, 2020, building on an existing €200 
million programme for the maintenance and upgrade of residential 
care homes, day care and support services that was approved in 2018 
(CEB 2020b). While this loan is not explicitly part of CEB’s Covid-19 
emergency response measures, it will nevertheless increase sup-
port for the sector that has been hit hardest by the pandemic. At 
the same meeting of the CEB Administrative Council, a further €50 
million loan for social care was approved to the Government of Na-
varra, another of the Spanish regions hit hardest by Covid-19.  
CASE STUDY 2: INSTITUTO DE CREDITO OFICIAL  
A €300 million loan to the Instituto de Crédito Oficial (ICO), a nation-
al state-owned public bank that finances MSMEs and self-employed 
people in Spain, was approved on April 17, 2020. Emergency fund-
ing for MSMEs was offered as a core priority for job preservation 
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since, according to European Commission data, Spain’s small busi-
nesses account for 72% of employment in the country (EIB 2020). 
The CEB loan is for the provision of “second-floor facilities”, a 
phrase referring to the fact that ICO acts as an intermediary for 
funds that are actually distributed to MSMEs via private commer-
cial banks. ICO determines the loan terms and provides loans or 
risk guarantees to the private banks, which are responsible for ac-
tually making funding approvals.  
The exact distribution of the CEB lending is left to ICO, which 
had not requested a disbursement of funds as of the first week of 
September (M. Siguenza, personal communication, September 4, 
2020). However, an example of this type of “second-floor facility” is 
the €400 million credit line that ICO arranged with BBVA, Bankinter, 
Cajamar and Santander banks on March 23, 2020 to help MSMEs 
and self-employed people in the tourist sector cope with liquidity 
problems arising from the Covid-19 shutdown (Bolsamania 2020). 
The recipients include hotels, restaurants, taxi and vehicle hire 
companies, as well as workers and business in related entertain-
ment and leisure industries.  
Lending decisions are administered by the private banks, but 
it is ICO that fixes the financial terms available through this credit 
line, which offers loans of up to four years’ duration at a fixed inter-
est rate of 1.5%, with an initial grace period on repayments and no 
opening commission (Bolsamania 2020). ICO provides a guarantee 
for 50% of the financing.  
CEB is not the only multilateral lender to ICO, which will also 
receive up to €1.5 billion for its Covid-19 emergency response from 
the European Investment Bank (EIB 2020). Unlike EIB, however, 
CEB support is specifically targeted at micro- and small-scale com-
panies (M. Siguenza, personal communication, September 4, 2020). 
The emergency MSME funding builds on a long record of coop-
eration between CEB and ICO, and it is the fifth agreement signed 
between the two institutions. ICO has previously received over 




It is too soon to measure the impact of CEB lending via ICO, 
but this will be calculated in terms of the number of loan awards 
and metrics on the size and needs of the businesses supported, to 
ensure a focus on micro- and smaller-scale companies has been 
maintained. With emergency lending distributed to provide these 
companies with working capital during the pandemic, it can be as-
sumed that CEB has contributed to job savings, although it would be 
difficult to disaggregate its contribution from Spanish Government 
and EIB support to calculate the scale of this impact.  
CONCLUSION
The Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) responded rap-
idly to Covid-19, offering 19 emergency loans worth €3 billion in 
the three months following the widespread shutdown of Europe-
an economies. This represents two-thirds of the lending that the 
bank regularly offers on an annual basis. CEB was able to scale 
up its lending in response to Covid-19 because it had a well-estab-
lished programme of funding for public health systems and small 
businesses, and the flexibility to amend loan rules to offer ‘fast 
track’ approvals for government support to these sectors. CEB was 
also able to borrow €1.5 billion in additional funds on internation-
al capital markets in April and June 2020 and, as a non-profit insti-
tution, can directly pass on the benefit of this cheap financing to 
its member governments.
CEB was able to rapidly step up its operations in response to a 
health emergency that rapidly ushered in a severe economic down-
turn. This is consistent with the behaviour of other public banks, 
which tend to act ‘countercyclically’, lending more in order to stim-
ulate the economy at times of crisis, while in the same moments 
private banks tend to become more conservative and risk-averse 
(Griffith-Jones et al. 2018).  
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As a public development bank, CEB is able to offer lending on 
concessional terms that cannot be matched by private banks, which 
are required to make a profit. CEB has a strong track record of fi-
nancing the public sector, in particular, as well as social sectors that 
are not well catered for by private, for-profit institutions. CEB fi-
nancing is mainly attractive as an alternative to raising funds on 
international bond markets, where its high credit ratings enable it 
to borrow more cheaply than many of its Member States, and the 
regional and municipal governments that it serves.
To date, the only external examination of CEB’s emergen-
cy lending has been offered by credit ratings agencies. Moody’s 
found that “CEB’s involvement in the coronavirus crisis response, 
and the associated increase in lending, further supports the im-
portance of its mandate for its shareholders [Member States]” 
(CEB 2020e). Fitch reached a similar conclusion, taking the view 
that a strong Covid-19 response had increased CEB’s “importance 
for its member states” (CEB 2020e).  
It is not possible to independently verify how effective CEB’s 
emergency lending was, in the absence of any means to disaggregate 
its impact from that of emergency financing raised by governments 
through bond issues, or subsequently offered as a result of EU funds. 
Likewise, while CEB has a ‘social mandate’ that emphasizes sup-
port to disadvantaged populations, there is no clear metric against 
which to assess this, although it should be noted that CEB adopted a 
broad definition of vulnerability for its emergency financing on the 
grounds that healthcare workers and older populations should be 
considered vulnerable in the face of the pandemic. Working to de-
velop performance indicators for public banks, including measures 
of their social impact, should be a priority for future research. 
What can be clearly established, however, is that CEB was able 
to offer cheap lending to public health authorities and (via inter-
mediaries) to micro- and small businesses; CEB lending supported 
emergency staffing for public health and short-term working capital 
costs for small business; CEB offered concessional loan terms that 
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could not be achieved by private lenders; and CEB lending helped 
Member States and regions to receive cheap and rapid finance at 
a time when the Covid-19 pandemic had put significant strain on 
their finances. In this way, CEB has likely helped to protect numer-
ous lives and livelihoods in the face of Covid-19. 
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THE ROLE OF THE 
EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK 
IN TIMES OF COVID-19
The COVID-19 pandemic represents Europe’s worst human-itarian and economic crisis since the Second World War. However, initial responses by European Union (EU) institu-
tions to the pandemic in general – and the European Investment 
Bank (EIB) in particular – were limited: national governments and 
National Promotional Banks reacted much more quickly and to a 
greater extent than the EU institutions. It took the European Coun-
cil (EU Heads of governments and states) over a month from the 
beginning of the pandemic in March 2020 to reach an agreement 
on additional potential lending (at the end of April), due to the di-
vided positions of Member States on the guarantee and risk-shar-
ing financial arrangements to respond to the economic impact of 
Covid-19. Though the EIB introduced in March an early – but limit-
ed – Emergency Package, it was not until end April that it assumed 
– although not yet operational – a substantial role in responding to 
the crisis via the Pan-European Guarantee Fund (EGF). Funded by 
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the EU Member States, the bulk of EGF finance is oriented to fund-
ing enterprises, particularly Small and Medium-sized Enterprise 
(SMEs) and, to a lesser extent, on measures to halt the spread of 
Covid-19. Most of the EGF funding implemented by the EIB is to be 
made available through financial intermediaries, namely, Nation-
al Promotional Banks and private commercial banks. For the EIB’s 
role in responding to the crisis to be truly effective, it needs to focus 
more on the final beneficiaries of projects during this crisis, rather 
than on private financial intermediaries themselves – for which the 
EIB has been criticised in its main funding programme of the past 
half-decade, the European Financial Strategic Investment (EFSI) 
(the Juncker Plan, 2015-20). 
THE EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK: A BRIEF BACKGROUND
The EIB was established in 1957, and it is the financial arm of the 
EU. From the beginning, it was deemed essential that finance in-
struments would be required to facilitate the policy objectives of 
the European project. The EIB was designed to promote three main 
lending objectives: development, to prevent economic imbalances 
amongst its Members and encourage economic growth of the least 
developed regions; integration, to develop the Common Market; 
and investment, to rebalance capital markets through investments 
and the setting of interest rates (Clifton et al 2018a). From the 1960s, 
the EIB also began lending to non-member states and non-Europe-
an countries. By the 1990s, the EIB emerged as the world’s largest in-
ternational development bank, overtaking the World Bank in terms 
of assets and liabilities volumes (EIB 1994). During the context of 
the financial and economic crises from 2008 (Clifton et al 2018b), 
the EIB came under criticism for being overly conservative, and 
for not prioritising the European regions most in need and those 
in the rest of the world (Griffith-Jones and Tyson 2012). Today, the 
EIB has around 3,450 employees, mostly based at its Luxembourg 
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headquarters. Its current capital base is €243 billion and it lent €63.3 
billion in 2019 (EIB 2020a). The EIB enjoys a “triple A” credit rating 
(EIB 2020b). Around 90% of its loans are destined for EU Member 
States, while the rest is lent to neighbouring countries, as well as 
countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. 
THE COVID OUTBREAK IN EUROPE
Europe found itself early on at the very epicentre of the Covid-19 hu-
manitarian crisis: the first case in Europe was officially recorded by 
the World Health Organization (WHO) Covid-19 Dashboard on Feb-
ruary 21, in Italy and, by end March, Europe accounted for the vast 
majority of the world’s Covid-19 cases, reaching 40,000 at the time. 
The virus spread unevenly in Europe, first in Italy, but then to Spain, 
which reached a national peak, at 9,222 cases on April 1, accounting 
for almost one quarter of all European cases that day (WHO 2020). 
The high number of cases in Europe was accompanied by high death 
rates. Deaths due to Covid-19 rose quickly from March and deaths 
in Europe by far dominated world deaths that month. Official dai-
ly deaths in Europe reached 5,140 on April 8. During April, Europe 
started to see gradual declines in cases and deaths, in the context 
of different national approaches to strict lockdowns for millions of 
citizens and varieties of furloughs for millions of workers. However, 
as lockdown restrictions were relaxed, cases again rose, reaching 
by late August infection levels approaching the worst days, although 
Covid-19 deaths were significantly reduced. EUROSTAT calculations 
of “excess deaths” – the number of deaths in a set period when com-
pared to the same period in previous years – reveals wide dispari-
ties across Europe. Deaths in Italy peaked first, followed by Spain 
(where “excess deaths” were double the deaths in previous years), 
France, Belgium and the Netherlands (EUROSTAT 2020a). Overall, 
EUROSTAT estimates there were 160,000 excess deaths in Europe 
between March and May 2020 (EUROSTAT 2020b). Overall, WHO re-
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ports that, to August 22, Europe accounted for nearly 4 million of 
the global 23 million Covid-19 cases, and 216,478 deaths of the total 
800,000 deaths.
The economic consequences of Covid-19 will remain with us 
for the long term. The World Bank recognises that Covid-19 has 
plunged the world economy into the worst recession since the Sec-
ond World War and will see global GDP contract by 5.2% in 2020. 
The European Central Bank (2020) and the International Monetary 
Fund (2020) predict GDP in the EU will contract between 8.7% and 
9.3% in 2020, before growing 5.7% and 5.2% in 2021, returning to its 
2019 real GDP level only in 2022. 
KEY FINANCIAL ACTIONS TAKEN (AND PLANNED) BY THE 
EIB AND EU INSTITUTIONS TO RESPOND TO COVID-19
In an attempt to mitigate the economic and business shock of the 
pandemic, national governments in the EU set in place diverse 
emergency measures from March 2020, which aimed to support in-
dividuals, workers, and firms in difficulties. These national fiscal 
and financial measures amounted to around 2% of EU GDP by the 
end of that month (EIB 2020c). Meanwhile, financial support mea-
sures at the EU level were limited to the suspension of EU fiscal 
policy rules (the Stability and Growth Pact), increased lending, and 
redeployment of existing EU funds. These measures included a pro-
posal to make available lending from the European Stability Mech-
anism (ESM) to up to 2% of GDP for each member state and €240 
billion in total, to be lent without the ESM’s standard conditionality 
of structural reforms imposed upon recipient governments (Mer-
tens et al. 2020). In response to the macro-economic impact of the 
pandemic, the EIB proposed the extension of its total lending for 
2020, which had been originally set at €63 billion. However, further 
measures at the EU level to tackle the socio-economic consequenc-
es caused by Covid-19 were still pending by end March (EIBc 2020), 
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which, as they are classified as “Special Activities”, are “off balance 
sheet” and in addition to EIB lending “on balance sheet” from the 
EIB’s own resources. In a 25 March joint letter, the heads of gov-
ernment and state of France, Italy, Spain and six other EU Member 
States, called for the creation of EU Commission issued “corona-
bonds” to fund additional health care costs related to the pandem-
ic (Dombey et al. 2020). However, Germany, the Netherlands and 
a number of other Member State governments opposed this move 
(Dombey et al. 2020).
The European Council took until April 23 to come to an agree-
ment finalising a common package amounting to up to €540 billion 
in additional lending to mitigate the macroeconomic crisis caused 
by the pandemic (European Council 2020a). This package included 
instruments to support governments, workers and firms. It would 
operate through three main instruments. The first was to be man-
aged by the ESM, as noted above; the second was to involve lending 
from the EU Commission to boost Member State efforts through the 
new “Support Unemployment Risks in an Emergency” (SURE) pro-
gramme; the third was to be a €25 billion Pan-European Guarantee 
Fund (EGF) managed by the EIB to support firms, particularly Small 
and Medium sized Enterprises (SMEs) with the aim of achieving a 
multiplier of ten, and hence mobilising up to €200 billion of addi-
tional capital. The European Council called for the EGF to be opera-
tional by 1 June 2020 (EIB 2020d). 
Subsequently, in July, the European Council agreed upon a sub-
stantially larger package of support funds (Next Generation EU) 
(European Council 2020b). This package included up to €750 billion 
in lending and pre-allocated grants, with funds to be largely raised 
by the EU Commission, through the issue of long-maturity debt. 
The details on the repayment of this debt have yet to be agreed. 
However, the EIB’s EGF agreed in April remains its main contribu-
tion to addressing the pandemic to date. 
On May 26, the EIB Directors agreed on the EGF’s structure and 
business approach. All 27 EU Member States were awarded the right 
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to contribute to the EGF with a share pro rata to their shareholding 
in the EIB’s capital. The EGF would become operational as soon as 
Member States that accounted for at least 60% of EIB capital signed 
their contribution agreements and a Contributors Committee will 
be set up to decide on proposals to the EIB for the use of guarantee. 
Since the EGF will operate within the EIB, any project supported 
by the EGF will also require final approval according to the EIB’s 
regular procedures and its decision-making structure. The EGF will 
approve operations until the end of 2021. EGF is not yet operational 
as two Member States have not completed the ratification proce-
dure for their participation, and a further seven, mainly from Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, have not yet made known their decision 
to participate (EIF 2020). As a consequence, while the selection of 
financial intermediaries for established EIB products has started, 
for EDF a preliminary Call for Expression of interest has been pub-
lished on August 31, 2020 (EIF 2020).    
Prior to establishing the EGF, the EIB had already implemented 
some emergency measures in March to repurpose existing guar-
antees and support for companies during the crisis. The first mea-
sure taken, launched by the European Investment Fund (EIF), a 
subsidiary of the EIB, on April 6, offered dedicated EU-support-
ed guarantees to SMEs and midcap companies (those with up to 
2,999 employees) to soften the impact of the pandemic, worth €8 
billion. Another key initiative taken by the EIB Group was to use 
existing financial instruments shared with the European Commis-
sion – primarily the InnovFin Infectious Disease Finance Facili-
ty (IDFF) (EIB-European Commission 2020) – to finance projects 
that focused on halting the spread of Covid-19, including vaccine 
development. Of the fourteen operations signed in Europe under 
IDFF up to September 7 for a total €372 million, only one can be 
directly related to Covid-19, which was for €10 million and des-
tined for Poland (EIB 2020h). The EIB Group also announced the 
support of emergency measures to finance urgent infrastructure 
improvements and equipment required by the health sector, us-
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ing existing framework loans or undisbursed amounts from ex-
isting health projects. The EIB Group’s Covid-related project list 
in the health sector included seventy-two projects and amounted 
to around €17.86 billion by end of August 2020, of which thirty 
projects totalling €10.54 billion had been signed, representing 
17% of the total EIB lending for 2020 estimated at €63 billion (EIB 
2020e). The project list includes fourteen projects worth €12.27 
billion in total for outside the EU, four projects worth €475 mil-
lion in total for Research and Development – all of which in Ger-
many, and six projects worth €2.69 billion in total for healthcare 
facilities – two in Spain, one in Italy and the rest outside the EU, 
representing 13%, 2.7% and 15% of the list, respectively, in the 
context of Covid-19 response. The vast majority though is in the 
form of credit lines to financial intermediaries for SMEs, and con-
cerns sixty-two projects worth €14.69 billion, i.e. 82.2% of the EIB 
Group’s Covid-related project list. Although EIB’s contribution to 
the health sector appears at first glance larger than its usual prac-
tice – which represented 2.24% of its total lending since its estab-
lishment (EIB 2020f), a closer examination of the figures shows 
this is not the case. It is expected that the EIB’s response directly 
related to Covid-19, will be in the same order of EIB’s historic aver-
age contribution in the health sector, given that projects approved 
but not yet signed in Covid-related projects’ list concerning Re-
search and Development as well as Healthcare facilities amount 
to a mere €3.17 billion, i.e. 5% of the total EIB lending for 2020. 
Moreover, not all loans approved are effectively signed. Scrutinis-
ing the list further, it can be observed that the total amount of the 
projects included in the list has to be interpreted with caution, as 
some projects have been signed for amounts inferior to the loan 
amount approved and mentioned in the list, whilst others might 
end up never being approved and/or signed — as for example five 
health projects in the UK appearing in the EIB project pipeline 
under appraisal since 2007. Some other projects in the EIB Group’s 
Covid-related project list do not seem related to the Covid-19 re-
Judith Clifton, Daniel Díaz-Fuentes, David Howarth and Helen Kavvadia
142 
sponse, such as some projects in the Czech Republic, Italy, Spain 
and Belgium, which are multisector investment programmes, or 
the Amadeus IT Group SA project, which concerns the develop-
ment of technologies used by “airlines, travel agencies and rail 
operators” (EIB 2020g). These examples strengthen longstanding 
concerns about the EIB transparency and accountability raised 
in the last twenty years by academia, NGOs, press as well as the 
European Parliament (European Parliament, 2001), and recently 
by the European Ombudsman (European Ombudsman 2020). This 
would suggest there is a process of “Covid-wash” occurring. Fur-
thermore, the Amadeus project in particular, raises also concerns 
as to EIB’s consistency with its claim of being a climate bank, an-
nounced in November 2019 (Counter Balance 2020b). 
Beyond Europe, the EIB group has provided funding to support 
infrastructure and research in the health sector to fight Covid-19. 
This funding is to provide up to €6.7 billion as part of the “Team Re-
sponse”, and is supported by guarantees from the EU budget (EUEA 
2020). This will both strengthen urgent health investment and ac-
celerate long-standing support for private sector investment that 
corresponds to financial needs in up to more than 100 countries 
around the world.
INTENDED BENEFICIARIES OF EIB ACTION
The EGF was designed to provide guarantees to the EIB and the EIF 
for funding enterprises – in particular SMEs – that were deemed 
viable over the long-term, which met financial intermediaries’ re-
quirements for commercial lending, but were struggling as result 
of the pandemic. At least 65% of EGF financing is earmarked for 
SMEs (enterprises with up to 249 employees). A maximum of 28% is 
destined for non-SMEs with at least 250 employees. Of this amount, 
a maximum of 5% can be destined for public sector companies and 
entities active in the areas of health, health-research, or activities 
Public Banks and Covid-19
 143
providing essential services important in the context of the health 
crisis. Up to 7% of EGF funds can be allocated to venture and growth 
capital (through the EIF) and venture debt in support of SMEs and 
mid-cap companies (EIF 2020).
Counterparts and beneficiaries established in Member States 
that are contributors to the EGF will be eligible. No country quo-
tas for lending guarantees were established, and every contributing 
Member State will proportionally guarantee all operations. Through 
the EGF, EU Member States will provide irrevocable, unconditional 
and first-demand guarantees to the EIB Group in relation to opera-
tions satisfying the eligibility criteria of the fund. 
HOW EFFECTIVE WAS EIB ACTION IN RESPONSE TO COVID-19?
The EGF is spearheading EIB action in response to Covid-19. It will 
provide guarantees to the EIB and the EIF to reimburse any possible 
losses incurred in their operations. By pooling credit risk across all 
of the EIB’s members, the overall average cost of the EGF will be 
significantly reduced, compared to national schemes. Financially 
speaking, this appears an efficient solution given the objectives of a 
Regional Development Bank (Clifton, Diaz and Howarth et al 2021: 
Clifton et al 2021) – which the EIB can be categorised.
Most of the EGF funding will be made available through finan-
cial intermediaries – National Promotional Banks and commercial 
banks. Once the funds are made available and the list of financial in-
termediaries established, companies can file requests directly with 
financial intermediaries. One analysis of the EIB’s role in providing 
long-term finance in the period following the financial crisis, from 
2015 to 2020, within the context of the Juncker Plan (the European 
Financial Strategic Investment, or EFSI) maintained that the bank 
was partially successful in providing long-term finance to invest-
ments that would have not otherwise taken place (Griffith-Jones and 
Naqvi 2020). However, the EIB’s use of complex financial products 
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and opaque pricing methods (Griffith-Jones and Naqvi 2020) has 
sometimes offered terms too generous for private investors. While 
increasing intermediation in EIB products, it diminishes transpar-
ency and accountability provision. We argue that especially in view 
of the public health crisis, it is high time for the EIB to establish a 
health sector strategy – as already recognised (EIB-European Com-
mission 2018) and step up its contribution from its own funds, be-
yond risk-sharing facilities with the Member States and the Com-
mission as EGF and IDFF respectively.  In its response to Covid-19 
economic crisis, it is imperative for the EIB to focus squarely on 
the final beneficiaries (SMEs, innovation, social and environmen-
tal projects) rather than the private financial intermediaries. This 
is not the first time the EIB has been criticised by observers for its, 
arguably, generous treatment of private investors. While recogniz-
ing that “market failures and investment gaps suggest that the pub-
lic sector has a key role to play” (EIB 2020e, 41), the EIB has played 
an important role since the 1990s in promoting Public Private Part-
nerships (PPPs) (Liebe and Howarth 2019) for transferring design 
and construction to the private sector (Health Management 2007). 
Counter Balance (2020a 2020c) also warns that the financial instru-
ments promoted by the EIB should not lead to privatisation – partic-
ularly of the core public services sectors such as health – which are 
already impacted due to decades of dismantling. For the EU’s pub-
lic bank, the need for assuring transparency and accountability, in 
view of the increasing use of budgetary and Member States’ funds 
especially in the public good health sector, is higher than ever. 
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THE KFW AND COVID-19: 
COORDINATING PUBLIC FINANCE 
RESPONSES AT HOME AND ABROAD
The KfW is a German public development bank with decades of institutional history and substantial financial capacity. When the Covid-19 pandemic hit Germany, the KfW formed 
part of the Government’s coordinated financial response, collabo-
rating with public authorities to deliver rapid and substantial sup-
port at home and abroad. In this moment of crisis, the KfW has 
made use of its accumulated resources and expertise to facilitate a 
pro-public response. The KfW offers important lessons about the 
importance of building up public banking capacity and about hav-
ing the democratic structures in place to mobilize public banks in 
the public interest.
INTRODUCTION
Germany is often singled out in the media as having, by and large, 
coordinated a successful response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Its 
first confirmed coronavirus case was in Munich on February 27, 
2020 (Wieler et al. 2020). The outbreak was not unexpected, given 
what was happening in China and Italy, and plans were already 
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underway to begin dealing with the novel virus threat. By the end 
of February, Germany reported 26 confirmed cases, and travellers 
from high-risk countries like China and Italy were required to pro-
vide contact details. Over the next month or so, gatherings of more 
than 1,000 people were banned, EU borders were closed to non-EU 
citizens, and anyone coming into Germany was required to quaran-
tine for 14 days. Between mid-March and mid-April 2020, confirmed 
Covid-19 cases spiked, peaking at just over 6,000 a day (a number 
well below other EU peaks) before falling to less than 1,000 per day 
by late April and early May. 
According to German health experts, ample and effective public 
health authority capacity and facilities underpinned the country’s 
coordinated strategy of prevent (through data, analysis and crisis 
management), detect (through scaled up testing), contain (particu-
larly by limiting transmission to long-term care facilities) and treat 
(made possible because of existing hospital and intensive care 
unit (ICU) capacity and because healthcare workers had adequate 
protective equipment) (Wieler et al. 2020). Germany also reached 
out and collaborated with France, Italy and the Netherlands to 
pre-order 300 million doses of an in-development Covid-19 vaccine 
(Varagur 2020). In consequence, most Germans look favourably on 
the Government’s coordinated response. According to one survey, 
over 70% of respondents stated that “Berlin’s coronavirus policies 
were ‘more democratic than undemocratic, more fair than unfair, 
more competent than incompetent’” (Rahn 2020). Indeed, one gets 
the sense that in German state authorities put the public interest 
first in how it sought to manage the Covid-19 crisis.
Having managed the immediate health crisis, however, is by no 
means the same as averting the economic crisis. As is the case every-
where, the German economy and people’s livelihoods were dramat-
ically and suddenly impacted by the lockdown measures designed 
to contain the spread of Covid-19. In response, two supplementary 
budgets were penned authorizing additional fiscal spending of €156 
billion (4.9% of Germany’s Gross Domestic Product – GDP) in March 
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2020 and another €130 billion (4% of GDP) in June 2020 (IMF 2020). 
The Government funds were (and are) destined for healthcare pro-
visioning, vaccine research, financial supports for students, work-
ers and families, grants for small businesses and the self-employed, 
and expanded unemployment benefits. The Government funds also 
provided for various bank credit guarantees, as well as green invest-
ment and digitalization subsidies to support economic stabilization 
and recovery. Within this flurry of economic crisis and public fi-
nance responses, the German public bank, the KfW, has assumed 
a central role in Covid-19 crisis recovery, both at home and abroad.
THE KFW AS A DYNAMIC PUBLIC BANK
The KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, or ‘Credit Institute for 
Reconstruction’) is a public development bank (or ‘promotional’ 
bank in EU terminology). It was founded in a time of crisis, in 1948, 
as an institutional vessel meant to manage post-World War II re-
construction funds coming to Germany via the US Marshall Plan 
(hence, ‘reconstruction’ in its name). Over the decades, the KfW 
has expanded significantly and evolved dynamically (Marois forth-
coming). As a development bank, it does not maintain a branch net-
work (as it does not accept personal deposits) but it has acquired a 
network of 80 offices within Germany and around the world. It had 
6,705 employees in 2019. 
Housed in a high-income advanced capitalist European country, 
the KfW has grown to be one of the world’s largest public banks (Hu-
bert and Cochrane 2013; Moslener et al. 2018). According to Orbis 
BankFocus, an online database for all banking institutions, the KfW 
had assets totaling US$569 billion in 2019. This makes the KfW the 
89th largest bank in the world, out of some 32,000 public and private 
institutions, and the 15th largest public bank, out of 910 public in-
stitutions, with more than twice the total assets of the World Bank. 
Unlike the overwhelming majority of private banks around the 
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world, the KfW is by mandate not a profit-maximizing bank. That 
is, it has not built up its current mass of public financial capital by 
ruthlessly pursuing financial returns, as so many of the so-called 
too-big-to-fail corporate banks have done. This does not mean it 
is a loss-making bank. The KfW has an average return on assets 
(ROAA) of 0.35% (between 2012 and 2019) (whereas many private 
banks average 1-2% ROAA). In turn, this netted the KfW an annual 
average profit of US$2.10 billion over this same period, which are 
then recycled back into the bank’s reserves to be used for further 
lending (Marois forthcoming). The point is that public policy and 
political direction, not profit maximization, are at the core of the 
bank’s institutional persistence and functional orientation (Deeg 
1999; Naqvi et al. 2018). In the words of one KfW Regional Manager, 
the rationale of public banks are to do ‘public tasks’ (confidential 
interview, online, October 12, 2020). Despite not being oriented to-
wards profit-making, neoclassical economists and neoliberal ad-
vocates nonetheless (absurdly) insist on assessing public banks on 
how their profitability levels stand up against other profit-maximiz-
ing private banks (see La Porta et al. 2002). For those knowledgeable 
about the public banking sector, this ideological grafting of private 
accumulation logics onto all public banks, regardless of context, is 
nonsensical (Schmit et al. 2011, 104):
This wide range of underlying economic rationales [of public 
financial institutions in Europe] renders meaningless most 
performance-based analyses of public sector banks, since all 
that such analyses measure is financial performance (which 
presupposes the overriding aim of profit maximisation), ne-
glecting all other kinds of objectives pursued by public finan-
cial institutions.
There are other ways of operating than according to private 
performance measures. In this the KfW is a decidedly ‘public’ and 
‘dynamic’ bank, both quantitatively and qualitatively. It is firmly sit-
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uated within the German public sphere, being legally owned by the 
Federal Republic of Germany (80%) and by the federal states (20%). 
At the same time, the KfW is run according to public law, not pri-
vate (specifically, the Law Concerning KfW). The public purpose of 
the KfW is represented in its mandate, which is to provide for the 
“sustainable improvement of the economic, social, and ecological 
conditions of people’s lives”. This mandate and the bank’s opera-
tions are mediated by German Government ministries and their 
political priorities and by the bank’s own governing Board, which 
together constitute a representative democratic form of institution-
al governance (see Hubert and Cochrane 2013; Marois 2017). Im-
portantly, KfW’s Board is broad-based and legally-defined. By law, 
the Board has 37 members: it is co-chaired by the Federal Minis-
ters of Finance and Economic Affairs and Energy in rotation plus 
35 further members drawn from German society. These include 
14 appointments divided between the German Bundestag (Lower 
House) and Bundesrat (Upper House) and five more federal gov-
ernment ministers. The mortgage banks, savings banks, coopera-
tive banks, commercial banks and business credit institutions each 
have a representative on the KfW Board, as do German municipal-
ities, agriculture, crafts, trade and housing associations. The KfW 
Board membership is rounded off by representatives from four 
trade unions and two from industry.
As the KfW is located within the German public sphere, it can 
be shielded from direct exposure to market-based and financialized 
operational imperatives. A key element to this market shielding is 
the German state’s formal guarantee of the KfW’s stability, which 
translates into a very strong credit rating as the likelihood of default 
on monies borrowed is seen as remote by market actors (S&P AAA). 
This helps the KfW enjoy preferential access to global financial mar-
kets and receive the lowest possible interest rates. In the current 
low rate environment, this can mean borrowing near, at and even 
below 0% interest rates (that is, the KfW has borrowed long-term 
debt with negative yields) (Ramnarayan 2019). Indeed, KfW govern-
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ment-backed debt is often regarded as a proxy for German ‘bunds’ 
(government bonds). This is important as most incoming sources 
of KfW capital now come via bond issuances in global markets (in 
addition to the year-on-year build up of retained earnings) (Naqvi et 
al. 2018, 681-82; KfW 2019, 12-13). As part of its public mandate, the 
KfW then passes on such financial advantages through the public 
sphere to its mandated ‘promotional’ lending. The spread between 
what the rate KfW borrows at and lends at is determined both by 
mandated lending programmes and by the need to be financially 
‘sustainable’ (that is, to cover operating costs and lending losses).
In its more than seven decades of operation, the KfW has been 
anything but a static financial institution. In its first decades of op-
eration, it moved beyond its initial post-World War II reconstruction 
role to involve itself in foreign aid operations and to situate itself as 
a cornerstone of German domestic and export-oriented industri-
alization, particularly by supporting small- and medium-sized en-
terprises (SMEs) (Deeg 1999; Moslener et al. 2018). The KfW would 
go on to play a central role in German reunification and acquire a 
catalytic hand in German energy transition. 
None of these institutional changes come without challenges, 
conflict and contradictions (Marois forthcoming). On the one hand, 
for example, KfW industrial lending has grown significantly and 
has been geared towards accelerating domestic growth, thus un-
derpinning German economic expansionism (Naqvi et al. 2018). On 
the other hand, German society is increasingly conscious of the en-
vironmental impacts of endless industrial growth, demanding that 
the KfW be more ‘green’ and ensure reductions in carbon emissions 
(cf. Angel 2017; Paul 2018). The KfW attempts to balance these of-
ten-competing demands. Currently, about 40% of all lending helps 
to reduce carbon (although 60% continues to carbonize the envi-
ronment) (KfW 2017, 2; KfW 2019, 3). In recognition of such ‘green’ 
changes, however incomplete, the KfW is seen as an industry leader 
in environmental financing (Ervine 2018, 149-51). Still, at times KfW 
operations have caused controversy, including over costly subsidies 
Public Banks and Covid-19
 155
(as with its early promotions of solar panels for households) or in 
the operational mismanagement of its subsidiaries (such as the IKB 
financial scandal in 2008). No one should ever suggest that public 
banking is easy or that it should not be constantly held to account 
by the public.
The KfW nonetheless demonstrates that pro-public change is 
possible, even within the structural constraints of neoliberal finan-
cialization. In greening itself, the KfW has found innovative ways 
of connecting to the German public at a local level. For example, 
the KfW Energy-Efficient Urban Rehabilitation programme targets 
energy transitions within towns and cities and through munici-
pal entities and not-for profit institutions with energy-efficiency 
refurbishment loans for buildings (Bach 2017). This programme 
has a distinctly public-public character, with over €700 million in 
financing directly supporting municipal energy efficiency retrofit-
ting. Indeed, such public programme lending reflects the vision of 
public banks in Germany. The Association of German Public Banks 
(AGPB) writes that acting “on behalf of public authorities they [pub-
lic banks] perform tasks that support political goals” (AGPB 2014, 
3). This is reflected in KfW’s own mandate, which states that it pro-
vides “financing with a public mission” (KfW 2019b, 4). This public 
mission includes both public and private sector support, to the ex-
clusion of neither. The KfW is not without its problems but it has, 
nonetheless, found ways and acquired institutional patterns that 
suggest an enduring level of societal credibility that enable it to per-
sist and reproduce itself in the German context.
The KfW thus reflects four dimensions that can help us think 
about the bank as a ‘public’ and ‘dynamic’ bank.1 First, it is firmly 
located within the public sphere through ownership, control and 
1  These four dimensions are more fully explained in a forthcoming book-length mo-
nograph (Marois forthcoming). A key feature of this rethinking is to avoid ascribing 
to public banks any essentially ‘good’ or ‘bad’ characteristics because of their being 
publicly-owned. Instead, it is far more important to empirically and historically fo-
cus on what public banks do and why. This means examining how contentious social 
forces in society struggle to make and remake public banks over time.
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legal mandate. Second, it performs banking functions that, as and 
because they evolve over time, suggest that the KfW has no innate 
purpose or essential policy orientation. The KfW, in other words, 
is made and remade by social forces over time and in the context 
of Germany. Third, the KfW functions in public and private inter-
ests, responding to needs within the public sector and to those in 
the private sector. The balance or imbalance of this functioning is 
the result of competing interests over what the bank does. This too 
suggests that there is nothing innate or essential to being ‘public’ as 
each bank will acquire different orientations and functions depend-
ing on the power relationships in which it is embedded.
Finally, the KfW persists as a credible, contested and evolving in-
stitution, meaning it will always be subject to the pull of competing 
and class-divided interests so long as it exists and persist as an insti-
tution within capitalism. This framing provides a sober understand-
ing of the KfW as a public bank. It grafts nothing essentially negative 
or positive onto the institution by virtue of merely being ‘public’ but 
focuses attention on how it is made to function institutionally. The 
bank is understood as perennially open to dynamic change, poten-
tially progressive and potentially oppressive, as a result of social forc-
es making it so in time- and place-bound historical circumstances 
in capitalism. The KfW, and public banks generally, are already un-
avoidably contested, and therefore dynamic, institutions (and those 
concerned with a green and just transition ought to recognize this). 
This more open way of thinking about the KfW can help us to give 
some context to its Covid-19 support at home and abroad.
DOMESTIC COVID-19 SUPPORTS
As a domestic response to the impact of Covid-19 in Germany, the 
German Government tasked the KfW with expanding its credit of-
ferings and guarantees for all sizes of firms, credit insurers and 
non-profit institutions, thus increasing the total volume of KfW 
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lending by “at least €757 billion (24 percent of GDP)” (IMF 2020). 
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), such lending 
may include “facilities for public equity injection into firms with 
strategic importance.” In the first half of 2020, “KfW’s financing vol-
ume more than doubled as a result of coronavirus aid programmes” 
(KfW 2020b). The German Government at the same time relaxed 
national financial regulatory requirements so that KfW-backed 
Covid-19 support loans given out by other financial institutions 
would not negatively impact their leverage ratios or exposure lim-
its. Local and regional governments in Germany likewise provided 
additional financial supports to their own state and municipal pub-
lic banks to support recovery.
KfW action was first initiated on March 11, 2020, when Chan-
cellor Angela Merkel announced that the Government would do 
whatever it took to address the Covid-19 crisis. The KfW was key to 
the Government’s strategy, particularly in terms of the German Eco-
nomic Stabilisation Fund (FRGFA 2020). On March 23, 2020, Federal 
Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy Peter Altmaier made the 
following statement (FMF 2020):
It is now important to help companies quickly and without 
red tape. An important element here is to provide access to 
liquidity. The improved financing conditions set out in the 
KfW Special Programme 2020 will help to significantly sup-
port the economy in this respect. Applications will be pro-
cessed quickly and without undue bureaucracy. Payments 
will be made as quickly as possible because we know that, 
for many enterprises, every week counts.
No doubt behind the scenes discussions had been underway 
between the KfW and the Government in the preceding weeks. 
Just prior to this announcement, Finance Minister Scholtz had 
said that the KfW would receive a €100 billion loan to support the 
programme lending being asked of it by the Government (Chazan 
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2020). Moreover, the Government announced that, with official 
backing, the KfW could lend without limit to businesses in trou-
ble (Chazan 2020). The benefit of the Government lending to and 
through the KfW is that the bank can then leverage its accumulated 
financial capacity and expertise. At the same time, the funds chan-
nelled through the KfW can be further magnified and dispersed via 
the country’s existing public and private banks, as well as through 
the expansive and powerful public savings banks, the Sparkasse 
system. It is important to acknowledge the historic built up Ger-
many’s public financial legacy, a legacy that does not exist in other 
advanced capitalist systems like the US and the UK. The Chair of 
the Board of Managing Directors at KfW, Günther Bräunig, under-
scores this point (FMF 2020):
The banks and KfW have prepared intensively for today. 
Never before have we been able to put a full programme 
together this quickly. The federal government will assume 
close to full liability and the loan margins are extremely low.
As of late September 2020, the KfW had on offer four aid/loan 
programmes providing financial support to companies, self-em-
ployed people and freelance workers (KfW 2020a). These loans are 
to provide liquidity and to help cover operating costs, thus giving 
businesses and individuals time to overcome the crisis.
KfW Instant Loans for medium-sized enterprises 
The KfW Instant Loans for medium-sized enterprises is a pro-
gramme that is notable for its speed of delivery – that is, basically 
‘instant’. The necessary conditions are fairly basic: it is meant for 
medium-sized firms of with more than 10 employees, which are 
active since at least January 1, 2019, and which are profitable on 
average for the three previous years. The credit amounts available 
then vary according to firm size. Ten-year loans are granted at 3% 
interest. The issuing or on-lending bank is backed 100% by the KfW 
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(which is in turn backed by the Federal Government). The structure 
allows for the rapid granting and release of credits for eligible com-
panies as, once the conditions are met, no further risk assessment 
needs be done by the issuing bank or by the KfW.2
KfW loan for companies on the market for 
longer than five years (Entrepreneur Loan)
The KfW Entrepreneur Loan is meant to assist with investments 
and to provide for working capital for companies that are older than 
five years. For larger companies, the KfW assumes 80% of the risk 
while for small- and medium-sized companies, it assumes and up to 
90%. Qualifying companies can apply for up to €100 million, subject 
to a series of conditions.
KfW loan for young companies on the 
market for less than five years
For companies that are less than five years old, the KfW has the ERP 
Start-up Loan. The conditions are similar to the Entrepreneur Loan 
(80% for large companies and up to 90% for SMEs, with access to up 
to €100 million), just with a shorter time period of being in opera-
tion as the basis of qualifying.
KfW Special Programme
Finally, there is the large-scale Special Programme meant for in-
vestment and working capital in medium-sized and large compa-
nies. The programme involves syndicated financing wherein the 
KfW takes on direct participation of at least €25 million but no more 
2  The KfW showed dynamism in its initial response to the pandemic. As in many 
other countries around the world, the commercial banks balked at only receiving 
an 80% guarantee for funds to be on-lent to struggling companies. They saw their 
capital at risk everywhere. Within days of first announcing its 80% and even 90% 
guarantees, the KfW reviewed and then improved its programme. The 100% guaran-
tee loan programme was then rolled out on April 3, 2020, which allowed commercial 
banks, public and private, to lend out Covid-19 support funds without risk (Mertens 
et al. 2020, 6). This became the KfW Instant Loan.
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than 50% of the total debt. The KfW assumes 80% of the risk, sub-
ject to certain conditions being met.
The KfW reports that, as of June 30, 2020, it had received 70,000 
loan applications and had in turn lent out just under €34 billion 
(KfW 2020b). The lion’s share of applications (some 97%) came 
from SMEs with almost all of the loans (indeed 99.8%) being for 
up to €3 million in support. By mid-August 2020, loan applications 
had topped 81,000 and KfW loan commitments neared €43 billion. 
While part of the four programmes above, the KfW also directed 
support towards students, via the KfW Student Loan, which is a ze-
ro-interest rate loan provided until March 31, 2021. As of mid-Au-
gust 2020, about 24,000 students applied with KfW loan commit-
ments reaching €700 million.
INTERNATIONAL COVID-19 SUPPORTS: 
THE KFW DEVELOPMENT BANK
The KfW is a corporate banking group composed of five divisions, 
split into domestic and international operations. Domestically, the 
SME Bank (Mittelstandsbank) and the Municipal and Private Client 
Bank (Kommunal- und Privatkundenbank/Kreditinstitute) make up 
the bulk of KfW lending (about two-thirds). Most of the Covid-19 
support is accounted for here. In 2012, KfW founded a fifth charita-
ble division, the KfW Stiftung, which is geared towards not-for-prof-
it projects in Germany. Abroad, the KfW IPEX Bank (project and 
export financing) and the Development Bank account for about a 
third of KfW lending. Here I look at some of the KfW Development 
Bank Covid-19 lending around the world and its role in facilitating 
development aid.
In this international aspect of KfW operations, the Develop-
ment Bank responds to funding requests from its partner coun-
tries (about 70 globally). KfW partner countries include ‘least 
developed countries’ with average gross national income (GNI) 
Public Banks and Covid-19
 161
per capita under US$992. Normally, the KfW assesses the devel-
opment project, usually via the Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ) or the European Commis-
sion, which takes the final funding decision. So too with Covid-19 
aid. Consequently, KfW aid and lending decisions are mediated 
by the public sphere. Where existing national development banks 
are already in place in the partner countries, the KfW can work 
with and through these institutions, refinancing their domestic 
loan programmes. Otherwise, the KfW works with local clients 
and beneficiaries, whether they are public or private institutions, 
depending on the domestic programme.
According to Marc Engelhardt, Head of the Task Force of KfW 
Development Bank, the KfW will offer about €5 billion in Covid-19 
financial support via the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
and Development’s Emergency Covid-19 Support Programme 2020 
(KfW 2020c). These emergency funds will be followed up with addi-
tional Federal Government support funds that will also be channelled 
through the KfW in the coming months and years. The immediate 
concern, however, was for the KfW to react swiftly to support health 
initiatives and social security and to help public and private sectors 
weather the initial storm of the pandemic. According to Engelhardt, 
“[t]ime is an especially critical factor in this pandemic. This is why 
we want to pay out all of the additional Federal Government budget 
funds this year, to make tangible improvements in our partner coun-
tries very fast.” As of mid-July 2020, the KfW had supported 140 proj-
ects globally, focused on Africa and the Middle East, but including 
commitments in Asia, Southeastern and Eastern Europe and Latin 
America. Having acquired not only significant financial capacity, but 
also decades of institutional expertise and development memory, the 
KfW also provides technical support around the design, preparation 
and implementation of funded projects. Such internal technical sup-
port and expertise is often a feature of public development banks, for 
example, with the North American Development Bank, the Nordic 
Investment Bank and the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
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Development. Internal to the KfW, Engelhardt notes that it can lever-
age its domestic experiences as well, for example, by learning from 
how the KfW at home rapidly supported German SMEs in order to 
provide similar support in Central America via its regional develop-
ment bank, the BCIE. Below I review four country- and region-specif-
ic Covid-19 interventions by the KfW Development Bank.
KfW and Covid-19 in Peru
The KfW, on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ), has loaned Peru €250 million 
(KfW 2020d). The loan’s framework connects plans to combat the 
impacts of Covid-19 to realizing climate and environmental goals 
in Peru. It does so by first providing financial support to small busi-
nesses and their employees to overcome the immediate economic 
crisis and then, as recovery takes shape, by channeling resources 
into green investments.
In the first instance, the priority is rapid dispersal to help the 
heavily informal workforce in Peru, which is disproportionately 
impacted by the pandemic and related lockdowns. This meant tar-
geting micro and small enterprises, many of which have little ac-
cumulated capital to weather the storm of economic restrictions 
imposed but nonetheless employ upwards of 50% of Peruvians. The 
KfW does not lend directly to such enterprises but needs to work 
through a local institution, which in this case involved the Peruvian 
public development bank, COFIDE (Corporación Financiera de De-
sarrollo or Development Finance Corporation). COFIDE was found-
ed in 1971 under the Velasco military regime to promote business in-
vestments.3 It has since evolved. In the 1980s, the Government made 
COFIDE subject to private, not public law. Since then COFIDE has 
tended to on-lend to other financial entities in Peru. As of 2019, it has 
US$3.2 billion in assets and a return of average assets of 0.25% (Or-
bis BankFocus October 2, 2020). According to the KfW, COFIDE has 
3  For more on COFIDE and public banks in Peru, see Dancourt and Jiménez 
Sotelo 2018.
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supported over 300,000 micro and small enterprises during the pan-
demic. The bulk of the KfW loan will go towards supporting COFIDE 
in this area. What is less clear is the extent to which this massive loan 
will in fact be green. The KfW reports that the Peruvian Government 
committed to reduce carbon emissions by 30% and to promote sus-
tainable development, so long as this was backed by international 
aid, presumably including contributions from the KfW. No further 
details were forthcoming. A KfW Regional Manager confirms, how-
ever, that firm survival and jobs are the first priority and that they 
are not yet able to turn efforts towards energy efficiency, greening, 
and so on (confidential interview, online, October 12, 2020).
KfW and Covid-19 in Senegal
In Senegal, the KfW has facilitated the transfer of a German Gov-
ernment grant worth €100 million (KfW 2020e). The purpose of the 
grant is to help address the economic and social impacts of the pan-
demic. A further €124 million in grant money will be provided by 
the European Union (EU) [which combines contributions from EU 
Member States and the European Commission, as well as from two 
other EU public banks, the European Investment Bank (see Clifton 
et al, this volume) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development]. A key feature of this programme is that the funds 
provided are pure grants, and are therefore non-repayable. The 
funds are intended to support micro-, small- and medium-sized 
enterprises and related jobs and to help the Government meet its 
needs, particularly in the health sector. The funds are expected to 
be dispersed by the end of October 2020.
KfW and Covid-19 in Zambia
In Zambia, the KfW partnered with UNICEF and the Zambian Min-
istry of Health to provide €20 million in emergency Covid-19 pan-
demic containment financial support (KfW 2020f). The German 
BMZ will provide the funds, which are to be directed by the KfW 
towards hospitals, for use at Covid-19 treatment and isolation cen-
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tres and for broad-based support. Specifically, the KfW-facilitated 
aid package included the delivery of personal protective equipment 
for medical staff in early September 2020. This included surgical 
masks, gloves, oxygen devices and Covid-19 test kits to be distrib-
uted to 1,400 health centres. Support will also go towards training 
staff in the application of the Covid-19 tests. At the same time, the 
funds will support general health efforts, such as tuberculosis im-
munizations for infants and pregnant women. The KfW funds will 
further target improved water and sanitation services in schools, 
health centres and villages to help prevent the spread and impact of 
Covid-19. In both urban and rural areas, water purification chemi-
cals are to be provided. Finally, emergency income support for the 
poor and informal workers most impacted by the crisis will be pro-
vided. Via UNICEF, the BMZ and KfW will allocate €8.75 million in 
cash transfers meant to top up existing government payments to 
the poor to help cover basic needs in the coming months.
KfW support for Covid-19 research in Africa
In Africa more broadly, the KfW Development Bank has supported 
Covid-19 research geared towards finding reliable and rapid tests 
that can be made available to the poorest people and communities 
(KfW 2020g). In this case, it is the German Federal Ministry of Educa-
tion and Research (BMBF) that has made €25 million available to the 
KfW Development Bank. In turn, the KfW will direct BMBF support 
towards the Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative (€15 million) and 
the Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics (€10 million). This is 
an important intervention in the context of Covid-19, but the work 
of the KfW in this sector is not new as it has been active in drug re-
search and affordability initiatives since 2011. The aim has been “to 
develop new adapted diagnostic procedures that also work in places 
where there is often only basic health care.” The public ethos and 
pro-poor direction of KfW support here is clear. An unnamed KfW 
project manager states it in unambiguous terms (KfW 2020g):
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Inexpensive, fast and safe diagnostics and medication should 
actually be available to everyone. However, it has always 
been the poorer population groups in developing countries 
who have lost out. Traditionally, globally active pharmaceu-
tical companies invest around 90% of their research funds in 
the development of new drugs for diseases from which only 
the wealthy ten percent of humanity suffers.
The KfW not only supports such public health measures finan-
cially and morally. As a large, internationally active public develop-
ment bank, the KfW has acquired internal expertise of the kind not 
normally associated with banks. There are dedicated health pro-
fessionals and medical doctors on the KfW staff who are well-po-
sitioned to advise and support the bank’s financial operations with 
appropriate technical expertise. The KfW Development Bank thus 
illustrates a concrete pro-public alternative to what economist 
Mariana Mazzucato (2020) highlights as a highly problematic and 
contradictory strategy of using public health money (as in the US) 
to support private sector Covid-19 treatment and vaccine research 
that will be subsequently priced well beyond what most people can 
afford (at about US$3,000/treatment).
Public finance and banks are not always the solution, but they 
do offer important alternatives and their capacity could certainly 
be scaled up to meet pressing societal needs. Indeed, public banks 
can function in stark contrast to the profit-maximizing neoliberal 
model and can be made to confront societal challenges and crises 
in the public interest. Notably, the KfW in the first half of 2020 has 
announced Covid-19 related losses of €576 million (compared to 
a return of €904 in the first half of 2019), with similar losses ex-
pected for the second half of 2020 (KfW 2020b). This is, in effect, 
a wealth redistributive mechanism. Moreover, it is only through 
the public sphere and in the public interest that a bank could and 





Across its seven-decade journey, the KfW as a public financial in-
stitution has been both constituted by and constitutive of the world in 
which it reproduces itself. In the current context, one can see events 
and social forces having an effect on the KfW and in turn, the KfW 
affecting society around it. The exact measure of its Covid-19 inter-
ventions cannot yet be known, but undoubtedly they have helped 
to mitigate the Covid-19 crisis for many, at home and abroad. Let 
it not be forgotten that, in poorer countries, such support simply 
would not have been forthcoming. In Germany, without its existing 
public banking capacity, it too would have struggled to provide rap-
id and effective support, much as the US and the UK have struggled 
to do through banks that were either unwilling or unable to do so. 
By contrast, the KfW has often made time available to businesses, 
health providers, public services, governing authorities and even to 
students to help them adjust to the pandemic.
Apparently, however, KfW workers would like to see its interven-
tions go further and for the KfW to have a more sustained impact 
on society. According to KfW staff, “the emerging recovery process 
needs to be perceived as an opportunity to rethink our economic and 
social systems and promote a greener model for prosperity over the 
long term” (Lau and Müller-Späth 2020). We need to recognize, they 
continue, “the crisis as transformation” such that “green recovery” 
means confronting the economic and social impacts while aiming 
to reduce greenhouse gases and mitigating climate change. The KfW 
could and should play a catalytic role in a green transition.
No doubt the functions of the KfW in any green recovery and tran-
sition will be subject to contentious power struggles and the pull of 
public and private interests. This cannot be avoided within class-di-
vided capitalism given contending interests between the public good 
and private accumulation. Yet the KfW is a decidedly ‘public’ bank. 
Its institutional structure and historical legacy enable it to function in 
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pro-public ways – particularly at times of acute crisis and as we face 
huge societal challenges like climate change. Its representative form 
of governance enables the public interest to be heard. It can leverage 
not only its accumulated capital but its decades of built-up expertise 
in local economies, public services and even in health expertise. 
At times of crisis, the KfW can mobilize its capital and knowledge 
to confront the problem. It can do so, moreover, not based on the need 
to maximize its financial returns but on the need to respond to public 
mandates. This is possible because the bank has acquired a range of 
banking functions and built up its institutional capacity over time – 
including in its form of representative governance. Without such an 
institutional legacy no such emergency Covid-19 financial support 
would have been forthcoming through the public sphere. Governing 
forces would instead have to barter with private banks to provide sup-
port services by first bending Covid-19 recovery financial programmes 
to private interests and profit mandates in ways that meet the risk-re-
turn preferences of corporate shareholders. The existing capacity and 
historical legacy of the KfW provide an effective and viable alterna-
tive, one that needs to be built upon internationally as we move from 
Covid-19 recovery to a global green and socially-just transition.
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THE “BANK OF WELFARE”  
AND MEXICO’S MORAL ECONOMY
The Mexican state-owned bank Banco del Bienestar (Bank of Welfare) has received a lot of attention for its role in the cur-rent Government’s ambitious political project to create an 
“alternative to neoliberalism” and turn Mexico into a “moral econ-
omy”. This chapter analyzes the activities of Banco del Bienestar 
(BB), with special attention to the recent economic crisis induced 
by the Covid-19 pandemic. Its main argument is that, while the BB 
contributes to the survival of the poor through its social benefit and 
microcredit programmes, it has primarily served to push forward 
an agenda of financial inclusion. This agenda is based on a conflu-
ence of interests, which includes the Washington institutions/Wall 
Street alliance, powerful Mexican financial and corporate elites, the 
Mexican military and the Mexican reactionary left. It is highly prob-
lematic because it cements a “moral economy” that increases the 
dependency of the poor on a patriarchal state and their inclusion in 
exploitative social relations with the financial and corporate elite.
INTRODUCTION
Banco del Bienestar (Bank of Welfare) is the smallest among nine 
banks owned by the Mexican state that, together, form the Mexican 
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development bank system. Since Andrés Manuel López Obrador 
(AMLO) took over Government at the end of 2018 as President, and 
in particular with the advent of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Banco 
del Bienestar (BB) has received a lot of attention in the country and 
abroad for its role in the President’s ambitious political project to de-
velop an “alternative to neoliberalism” and turn Mexico into a “moral 
economy”. This chapter analyzes the activities of the BB with a spe-
cial focus on the recent economic crisis induced by the Covid-19 pan-
demic. The chapter’s main argument is that, while the BB contributes 
to the survival of the poor through its social benefit and microcredit 
programmes, it has primarily served to push forward an agenda of 
financial inclusion. This agenda is based on a confluence of inter-
ests, which includes the Washington institutions/Wall Street alliance, 
powerful Mexican financial and corporate elites, the Mexican mili-
tary and the Mexican reactionary left. The financial inclusion agenda 
is highly problematic as it cements a “moral economy” that increases 
the dependency of the poor on a patriarchal state and their inclusion 
in exploitative social relations with the financial and corporate elite. 
To make this argument, I first present the history and functioning 
of the BB and how it emerged in the context of the financial inclusion 
agenda. Second, I describe the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic on 
the economy and rising poverty in Mexico, before giving an overview 
over the main actions of the BB to respond to the crisis. After that, I 
expand on the details of the privatization and financialization of so-
cial policy implemented by the BB, which particularly relate to the 
involvement of private financial institutions in the administration of 
its policies. Finally, I conclude with an overview of the effectiveness 
of the BB programmes, drawing some general conclusions. 
THE BANK OF WELFARE AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION
Banco del Bienestar (BB) was created in 2001 under the name of 
BANSEFI (National Savings and Financial Services Bank). As part 
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of the World Bank-supported Savings and Credit Sector Strengthen-
ing Program in Mexico, its aim has been to generate access to safe 
and efficient financial services for the poor. BANSEFI was used by 
previous governments to implement the conditional cash transfer 
programmes that have become an increasingly important source of 
income for a large share of the Mexican population since the end of 
the 1990s, and that were also supported through World Bank loans.
When Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) took over the Gov-
ernment in 2018, he re-named BANSEFI in order to give expression 
to his major initiative to distribute resources to the poor and sup-
port the “economy of the people” (la economía popular). Like pre-
vious left-populist governments in Latin America, AMLO follows a 
proclaimed anti-neoliberal, but decidedly neo-extractivist economic 
policy. His Government has focused on increasing the income of the 
poor, primarily through increasing the productivity of the state oil 
company PEMEX, fighting corruption and imposing harsh auster-
ity measures in the public sector, as well as investments in (highly 
conflictive) infrastructure megaprojects, including a new oil refinery. 
The freed resources are supposed to be channelled to the poor, main-
ly in the form of social benefits paid out to individuals. 
AMLO therefore seeks to massively expand the role of what the 
President has called the “Bank of Welfare for the People” (Banco del 
Bienestar del pueblo). The most important programmes delivered 
through the BB are cash benefits for disabled people and the elderly 
(Pensión para Personas con Discapacidad/Adultos Mayores), scholar-
ships for high school students (Beca Benito Juárez) and subsidized 
employment of youth at participating private companies (Jovenes 
Construyendo el Futuro). The official data indicate that these cash 
transfer programmes, with a budget of MXN 267,344 billion (US$ 
12 billion), reached almost 18 million beneficiaries in 2020 (Cámara 
de Diputados/CEDRSSA 2020). Moreover, the BB runs a microcredit 
programme for microenterprises (Tandas del Bienestar). 
The other key political narrative, of which BANSEFI – now BB, 
have been an important element, is financial inclusion. According 
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to the World Bank, Mexico lags behind in terms of financial in-
clusion, as only 37% of adults have a bank account (World Bank 
2020, 16). The World Bank has therefore supported the institution-
al development of the financial sector in Mexico since the end of 
the 1990s and continues to do so through loans to the Government 
(US$500 million in 2019 and US$1 billion in 2020). Therefore, and in 
order to comply with World Bank credit conditionality, the Govern-
ment launched the 2020-2024 National Financial Inclusion Policy 
in March 2020 (Gob 2020a). The policy aims to facilitate access to 
financial products and services for people, in particular through 
the provision of microcredits for micro-, small- and medium-sized 
companies (MSMEs), backed by the idea that this will result in the 
well-being of the poor: “Increased access to financial services can 
lead to a significant increase in income, particularly among low-in-
come individuals and those located in areas with lower pre-exist-
ing bank penetration. Financial inclusion promotes economic 
well-being by assisting vulnerable households to build up produc-
tive assets, manage risks, and respond to financial shocks” (World 
Bank 2019: 5).
However, critical observers argue that the financial inclusion 
agenda has served to re-legitimize the instrument of microcredit 
in light of its huge failure as a poverty reduction strategy (Bateman 
2012; see also Bateman, this volume). With this policy, the Govern-
ment follows the World Bank’s idea that financial inclusion contrib-
utes to economic growth and wellbeing. The BB is the key to imple-
menting financial inclusion as it “promotes and facilitates savings 
among Mexicans, inside and outside the country, as well as access 
to first and second floor financing, in an equitable way, for indi-
viduals and corporations” (Gob 2020b). To drive home the national 
financial inclusion message, the Government policy also includes 
financial education at schools.
Another element of the financial inclusion policy is to reduce the 
use of cash and increase the use of financial technologies and dig-
ital payments in the economy. Most payments in Mexico are cash, 
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reflecting the large share of informal economic activity. Therefore, 
the central bank, Banco de México, launched the digital payment 
app CoDi (Digital Charge). In turn, the BB will use CoDi to deliver 
social benefits. The stated aim of implementing CoDi, and financial 
inclusion in general, is to draw more people into the formal econo-
my and to combat money laundering and corruption (Galizia Cruz 
2019; World Bank 2020). 
In January 2020, the Government announced the ambitious goal 
of constructing 2,700 new branches of BB in the country, adding to 
the 538 existing BANSEFI branches. If this is realized, the BB will 
be by far the most geographically widespread bank in Mexico. Its 
branches will be constructed in locations without existing bank-
ing services or where services are insufficient or involve high fees. 
MXN 10 billion has been earmarked for branch construction, with 
MXN $5 billion having already been transferred to an account at 
Banjército (National Bank of the Army, Airforce and Navy),1 as the 
military is responsible for construction, equipment and transport-
ing the cash to the branches.
As of June 2020, 230 new branches had been finished (Gob 
2020c). One of the major challenges of constructing the bank 
branches across the country and having them use digital technolo-
gies is that many rural areas lack Internet access. In response, the 
Government created a new state-owned telecommunications and 
Internet company in the National Electricity Commission (CFE), 
whose aim is to provide Internet access on a non-profit basis to 
the population currently without access and free Internet access 
in public spaces (IFT 2019). The company was assigned a budget of 
another MXN 10 billion.
In addition to expanding access to banking and financial services, 
the financial inclusion agenda involves tapping into international 
financial markets to fund the issuing of microcredits. This usually 
1  Banjercito is another one of the nine banks owned by the Mexican state that form 
the Mexican development bank system.
Nadine Reis
176 
happens through securitization, i.e. the bundling of microcredits 
and selling of the loans or their derivatives as combined packages 
on financial markets (in turn, providing an income stream for in-
vestors). The link to debt issuance on financial markets is also evi-
dent in the case of the BB, despite the President’s assertion that the 
bank is “financially independent”. According to BB financial state-
ments, its liabilities include one loan of more than MXN 300 million 
issued by Nacional Financiera (NAFIN, which issues debt for the 
Mexican government on international financial markets), one loan 
guarantee of more than MXN 300 million issued by Banjército, and 
one loan of more than US$45 million issued by the Inter-American 
Development Bank (BB 2019, 46; BB 2020, 4, 10). The first two are 
specifically designated for the issuance of microcredits.
The available data remain inconclusive on the IDB loan but 
suggest that it is also designated for the issuance of microcredits. 
Moreover, the BB also conducts repo operations of substantial vol-
ume on financial markets, i.e. it borrows short term on financial 
markets. It remains unclear to what extent the resources of the two 
World Bank loans on Financial Inclusion (World Bank 2019, 2020) 
have been channeled to the BB. Typically, the World Bank focuses 
its activities regarding financial inclusion on implementing a regu-
latory environment that favours the integration of the economies of 
countries in the global south with global financial markets, and the 
profitability of these markets.  
THE DEVASTATING EFFECTS OF COVID-19 ON POVERTY
Mexico is among the countries with the highest level of infections 
and deaths due to the coronavirus. As of the beginning of Novem-
ber 2020, there have been more than 933,000 confirmed cases of 
Covid-19 and more than 92,000 deaths. However, as the Govern-
ment uses the Sentinel method to track the pandemic, where only 
a certain number of monitoring clinics deliver data, it is estimated 
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(including by the Government itself) that the real number of infec-
tions was already around 2.8 million in June 2020, while indepen-
dent sources assume 5.7 million (Infobae 2020). 
At the end of March, the Government began to implement a 
series of public health response measures. In general, these were 
less restrictive than in many other Latin American countries, as the 
Government acknowledged the reality that more than half of Mex-
ico’s population make their living in the informal economy. Hence, 
there was never a complete confinement. However, all schools and 
universities were closed, public events were cancelled and econom-
ic activities that were classified as non-essential were suspended. 
Around 60% of all enterprises partly or fully closed their activities 
(INEGI 2020a). The Government launched the “Jornada Nacional 
de Sana Distancia” (National Workday of Healthy Distance), which 
urged people to stay at home and only leave the house for absolutely 
essential activities. 
In June, a traffic light system was launched, which consists 
of four colours (red, orange, yellow and green). These mark the 
severity of the pandemic in each state and indicate, accordingly, 
which kind of activities are safe to resume. As of November 2020, 
the majority of the country is still on orange, while the infection 
rate is still high.  
The Covid-19 pandemic has had a devastating economic impact 
on Mexico. According to Banco de México, more than 12 million 
people lost their jobs between April and May: 3.72 million in the 
formal sector and 8.46 million in the informal sector. Another 8 
million became underemployed, i.e. employers cut their working 
hours (El Financiero 2020). Some 91% of enterprises reported de-
creased income, 30% of households reported that one or more of its 
members lost their job because of the pandemic, and 65% of house-
holds reported income losses (INEGI 2020a).
Not only have millions of people lost their jobs, but the share 
of the working poor has massively increased as incomes have de-
clined. In May, the share of the working population who could 
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not afford the official basket of essential consumer goods rose to 
54.9%, from 35.7% in March (Coneval 2020b). Among the most af-
fected are women, especially because of the large number of un- 
or underemployed domestic workers (El Economista 2020a). The 
deterioration of working conditions became even more evident 
with the gradual opening of the economy in June. Two-thirds of 
those who returned to a job took up work in the informal sector, 
and almost three quarters of them earned less than before the 
pandemic began. Of the total working population, 46% state they 
earned less than before the pandemic. No less than 52% of the 
working population in Mexico work in the informal sector,2 while 
almost half of them make their living through microbusinesses 
that are based on the resources of the household (INEGI 2020b). 
Some 60.7% of the working population earn less than two mini-
mum wages (El Economista 2020b), which equals less than around 
US$ 5.60 per day or around US$ 170 per month.
KEY ACTIONS BY THE BB TO RESPOND TO COVID-19
The measures taken by the BB to tackle the economic crisis caused 
by the Covid-19 pandemic essentially consist of an expansion of 
programmes that already existed, in particular the microcred-
it programme (however, as explained below, the programmes are 
hardly administered by BB itself). The pensions for the elderly pro-
gramme, which pays MXN 2,670 every two months to all people 
over the age of 65 who have a pension of less than MXN 1,092 per 
month, was paid in advance for four months, i.e. beneficiaries re-
ceived MXN 5,340 at once. This also applies to the pensions for the 
disabled programme if the beneficiaries are under 18 or indigenous 
people (Economía Hoy 2020). The “Sembrando Vida” (Sowing Life) 
2  The latest report of the National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development 
Policy (CONEVAL) speaks of 56.3%, also citing data from INEGI (CONEVAL 2020a, 27).
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programme, which pays subsidies to the rural poor for agroforestry 
projects, increased by 200,000 recipients. 
The microcredit programme existed before under the name 
“Tandas para el Bienestar” and provided an interest-free credit of 
MXN 6,000 to family microenterprises that have existed for more 
than six months. The loan must be paid back in 12 monthly pay-
ments, with an initial grace period of three months. If borrowers 
repay the full amount, they will have access to a second credit of 
MXN 10,000, and in a third and fourth round, of MXN 15,000 and 
MXN 20,000 respectively. Because of the crisis, the beneficiaries of 
this programme may defer their payments for three months, and 
they may access the second credit if they have paid pack only 60% 
of the first one. 
With the beginning of the Jornada Nacional de Sana Distancia, 
the Government announced the expansion of the microcredit pro-
gramme. The programme, called Crédito a la palabra (Credit to the 
Word, i.e. without providing much paper work or the need for a 
credit history), foresees the issuing of 2 million individual credits 
of MXN 25,000 to MSMEs in urban areas. This includes 1 million 
individual credits each for the formal and informal sector. Both 
the formal and informal sector borrowers must pay back the cred-
it in 33 monthly payments of MXN 824 each after a grace period of 
three months. 
For formal sector enterprises, the interest rate is varied ac-
cording to their size: 6.5% for enterprises with between 1 and 10 
employees; 7.5% for those with between 10 and 20; 8.5% for those 
with between 20 and 50; and 10% for those with above 50 employees 
(IMSS 2020). Beneficiaries must be registered at the social security 
institute IMSS (Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social) and must not 
have laid off personnel for the past six months. Interested enter-
prises must apply for the credit online through the IMSS. Domestic 
workers can also apply for this type of credit; however, they must be 
registered for social security. According to the President, funding 
for this part of the programme comes from the recovered taxes of 
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large corporations, which he personally urged them to pay as they 
owed MXN 50 billion to the state. According to Government infor-
mation, tax collection from ‘large contributors’ increased by 144% 
although we were unable to verify this information based on statis-
tical data from the tax administration office. 
One million individual credits at interest rates of 6.5% are 
planned to be issued to informal microenterprises registered in the 
“Census of Wellbeing” (Censo de Bienestar). To register the poten-
tial beneficiaries of social benefit programmes, 26 of 31.9 million 
households in Mexico were surveyed within six months in 2019 (Gob 
2020d). According to official information, one million microenter-
prises such as small kiosks, restaurants, street food stands and taxi 
enterprises were identified through the census, which are offered 
the “Credits to the Word” programme through phone calls. Should 
informal businesses not be registered in the census, they can reg-
ister themselves through the webpage of the Secretariat of Wellbe-
ing. According to the President, funding for this programme comes 
from a public development bank, Nacional Financiera (NAFIN). 
In July 2020, the Government announced a further credit pro-
gramme, the Direct Productive Credit (Crédito Directo Productivo), 
which will provide MXN 20,000 to 50,000 to formal sector microen-
terprises at an interest rate of 12%. The aim of this programme is 
to allocate MXN 300 million for a term of 18 months after a three-
month grace period. These target the cities and towns most affected 
by Covid-19. Funding for this programme, according to the Presi-
dent, also comes from NAFIN (Urbeconomica 2020). 
THE PRIVATIZATION AND FINANCIALIZATION OF SOCIAL POLICY
Because of the poor infrastructure of the BB, in terms of its tech-
nological and human capacity as well as its geographical presence, 
all of its programmes have completely relied on collaboration with 
private domestic banks, in particular Banco Azteca. Banco Azteca 
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is part of Grupo Salinas, a powerful transnational conglomer-
ate owned by Ricardo Salinas Pliego, Mexico’s second wealthiest 
man (after Carlos Slim) and a close ally of President AMLO. With 
around 1,900 branches and more than 10,000 ATMs, Banco Azteca 
is the private bank with the widest geographical reach in Mexico. 
Its branches are usually located inside the stores of its parent com-
pany, Elektra, a retail chain that sells consumer goods such as ap-
pliances, electronics, motorcycles and computers. A key element 
of Salinas’ business model has been ‘financial inclusion’, i.e. the 
massive expansion of lending money to the low-income sector and 
households, as the director of Banco Azteca explains: “[Banco Az-
teca] is a bank that was born as an institution of the people, so we 
have used financial inclusion not as a matter of rhetoric, but as a 
business model that we know how to do well” (La Razon 2020).
This business model became possible with the 2008 reform of 
the Credit Law, which created the figure of “niche banks”, allowing 
retail chains such as Elektra and WalMart to carry out banking op-
erations and offer financial services to their clients (Dávalos Torres 
2020). Banco Azteca is known for providing credit at very high in-
terest rates of around 88% (El Financiero 2014) and very low default 
rates, as it operates a fleet of debt collectors. Its return on equity 
was 10% in 2019 (Edwards 2020).
AMLO’s system of social benefits is operated via bank cards, so-
called “Wellbeing Cards” (Tarjetas de Bienestar). Without public ten-
der, the emission and operation of the cards was assigned to Grupo 
Salinas. The beneficiaries of social programmes, including 2,000 
adolescents working at the companies of Grupo Salinas within the 
“Youth Constructing Future” programme, automatically receive the 
card. Using the card, they can withdraw the money without fees at 
Banco Azteca, and in the retail chains Chedraui, Walmart, Soriana, 
Suburbia and LaComer at minimum spending levels and/or tied to 
special offers. “Credits to the Word” are issued through Banco Azteca, 
Banorte or Santander. To receive the credit, beneficiaries must open 
a bank account at one of these banks if they do not yet have one. 
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It is likely that the operations of the BB will continue to rely on 
collaboration with the private banks in the future. First, in July 2020 
the Government cancelled a contract for over MXN 10.8 billion to 
install 8,000 ATMs at BB branches, officially because of a shortage 
of funding (Hernández 2020). According to media reports, the is-
sue may also have been related to corruption and shifts in political 
loyalties inside AMLO’s Morena Party, as the contract cancellation 
occurred simultaneously with the removal of the BB Managing Di-
rector (Maldonado 2020a). 
Second, the first act of the new BB Director was a 40% cut in 
the bank’s human resources budget, which involved a reduction of 
1,200 staff contracted via outsourcing and wage cuts for the remain-
ing staff (Maldonado 2020b). This too suggests funding problems. 
Third, beneficiaries are already used to receiving their benefits at 
the private commercial banks and these banks have a strong interest 
in maintaining the business of “Wellbeing” since it provides access 
to huge sets of personal data and portends potentially new banking 
clients. In the case of Grupo Salinas/Banco Azteca, it also ensures 
that the target group of costumers is drawn into their stores. 
Considering the immense power of these financial institutions 
and business conglomerates, and AMLO’s close alliance with Mexi-
co’s economic elites, it is doubtful that the current Government will 
somehow interfere in this business. It seems more likely that the 
BB will only be an alternative in remote rural areas, where it does 
not compete with commercial banks. But even there, Elektra seeks 
to profit from benefit recipients, developing a virtual store format 
to serve remote areas without physical buildings (Echeverría 2020).
EFFECTIVENESS OF THESE BANK ACTIONS
Between January and July 2020, more than MXN 58 billion was dis-
tributed to more than 6.6 million individuals through social benefits 
programmes – 80% through pensions for the elderly and the dis-
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abled, and scholarships for adolescents (Gob 2020e). Considering 
the devastating economic situation, and that the large majority of 
elderly, disabled and adolescents live in nuclear families, it is likely 
that the expansion of these programmes in the course of the pan-
demic also benefitted the families of these beneficiaries. However, 
this may be a side-effect of the programme rather than its intended 
goal, as there is no unemployment benefits scheme in Mexico.
According to the data provided by the BB, 808,014 “Credits of 
the Word” were issued in May and June 2020. Of these, 79% went 
to informal sector enterprises, 20% to formal sector enterprises 
(the large majority to enterprises with between 1 and 10 employ-
ees) and 1% to domestic workers. In Mexico, there are 4.8 mil-
lion informal enterprises, which make up 75.2% of all enterprises 
and are, for the overwhelming majority, microenterprises (INEGI 
2019, 6). This means that around 13% of informal enterprises have 
received the credit.
A survey by the statistical bureau noted that only 7.8% of all 
enterprises in Mexico reported that they have received some sort 
of support thus far during the pandemic (89% of which received it 
from the Government). However, it is also important to note that 
this survey includes large enterprises and does not exclusively re-
fer to the credits offered by the BB (with some municipalities, such 
as Mexico City, also offering credits). In the same survey, of those 
who did not receive support, 37% say they did not know support 
was available. This seems somehow surprising considering the 
broad coverage of the topic in the media, including a daily one-
hour press conference of the Secretariat of Wellbeing (Secretaría 
del Bienestar). Another 18% thought the support offered was too 
complicated to apply for and/or they applied but they did not re-
ceive it. Only 12% stated that they did not receive support because 
it was not necessary. 
Some formal enterprise owners also report that they were de-
nied the credit because they were not allowed to have any deregis-
tering of staff members, even if they left voluntarily and before the 
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crisis (personal communication, small business owner in Mexico 
City, August 19, 2020). As regards informal enterprises, it is unclear 
as to which criteria were selected from the census. 
Regarding the use of these credits, it is likely that the recipients 
mostly used the money to pay for essential costs, in particular rent, 
electricity and water, and social security for their employees and 
taxes if they were formal sector enterprises. In contrast to large 
corporations, which benefitted from tax reductions (INEGI 2020a) 
and the buying of bonds through the Mexican Central Bank in the 
course of the Covid-19 crisis, MSMEs have neither benefitted from 
exemptions from taxes or utility payments nor cash transfers. On 
the contrary, some small business owners report that, during the 
pandemic, their electricity was cut off due to outstanding bills (per-
sonal communication, small business owner in Mexico City, August 
19, 2020). It is thus unlikely that entrepreneurs will use the credit 
in a productive way. The medium life span of a microenterprise in 
Mexico is 14 months (Aguirre 2010, 223). Of those that took credit 
before the crisis, 81% used it for buying supplies and 26% for paying 
off other credit (INEGI 2019). In fact, there have been media reports 
that Banco Azteca withholds money if the recipient of the Credit to 
the Word has an existing debt with them (Guerrero 2020).
Furthermore, it is instructive to think about the repayment of 
the credits. The demand for microcredit securities on financial 
markets assumes that the borrowers will receive sufficient income 
to be able to pay back the credits. Considering that 18 million Mex-
icans are beneficiaries of some kind of social benefit programme, 
it stands to reason that part of the funds distributed through these 
schemes will flow back to the BB in the form of debt and interest 
repayments. A microcredit scheme run by the previous Govern-
ment was tied to the guarantee of repayments through the PROS-
PERA cash transfer programme by design. The BB had to incur 
major losses in 2019 due to a fallout rate of 85% in the microcredit 
programme, where credit repayment of the beneficiaries worked 
through discounts on payments of the PROSPERA programme, a 
Public Banks and Covid-19
 185
cash transfer scheme for poor women. 
When PROSPERA was abandoned by the AMLO Government, 
the BB had to roll over the microcredits (Contrapeso Ciudadano 
2019; El Sol de México 2020). What is more, PROSPERA (in the past, 
known under the names PROGRESA and OPORTUNIDADES) was it-
self financed through World Bank loans, i.e. the interest paid on mi-
crocredits were (supposed to be) financed through public debt. This 
illustrates not only that microcredits do not achieve their supposed 
goal of economic development and poverty reduction, as backed by 
a substantial amount of research (see for instance Bateman 2014), 
but also the absurdity of a social policy that is based on the financ-
ing of social benefits and microcredits through external debt.  
CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter I have analyzed the actions of the Mexican public 
commercial bank, the Banco del Bienestar, with respect to the eco-
nomic and social crisis induced by Covid-19 in Mexico. It has be-
come clear that, even if a bank is publicly (i.e. state) owned, it does 
not imply that it is free from class-based and class-divided inter-
ests. On the contrary, the analysis has shown that ‘public’ banking 
in Mexico has primarily served the private interests of a broad and 
very powerful coalition of actors comprised of the Washington in-
stitutions/Wall Street alliance, important fractions of the Mexican 
financial and corporate elite, the Mexican military and the reaction-
ary left in the guise of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador. 
In the context of the Covid-19 crisis, the policy of the BB has 
been focused on expanding its existing social benefit programmes 
and particularly its microcredit programmes. This approach is 
driven by the neoliberal agenda of financial inclusion and the 
World Bank narrative that linking the poor with the financial sec-
tor serves their economic wellbeing. While it serves the legitima-
cy of these actors, this narrative is highly problematic. First, the 
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programmes do not serve to increase the income of the poor and 
creation of productive assets, as stated by the World Bank, much 
less, as in the words of the President, to revive the economía popu-
lar. Rather, the debt-based programmes cement and increase the 
dependency of the poor on state welfare payments and credits. 
This is problematic, albeit not surprising. 
In many ways, the Mexican public sector recovery strategy rein-
forces a centuries-old patriarchal and anti-emancipatory political 
culture in Mexico wherein legitimate political authority is based on 
the exchange of votes for social benefits (Albertus et al. 2012). After 
four decades of neoliberal financial crises that have steadily expulsed 
larger segments of the population from livelihoods and living spaces 
(Sassen 2014), social benefits have essentially come down to uphold-
ing pure survival and the minimum of social reproduction. 
President AMLO recently summarized this “moral economy” 
as follows:
Justice is to serve the humble people, the poor people. This 
is the role of the government. Even animals [animalitos] – 
which have feelings, it has been proven! – … there is no way 
to say to a pet: ‘Go, find your food!’ They have to be given 
their food. (Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Daily Press Con-
ference, March 29, 2020).
Second, what is even more worrying is that, through this poli-
cy, the state actively supports the further advance of social control 
and exploitative relations by a small financial and corporate elite in 
Mexico. One of the obvious effects of both the social benefit and the 
microcredit programmes is that the administering private banks, 
especially Banco Azteca, have materially benefitted through gain-
ing access to the personal data of the poor, its explicit target con-
sumer group. This is even more disturbing as Grupo Salinas exec-
utives control key positions in the state: The National Banking and 
Securities Commission (Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores) 
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under the Secretariat of Finance (Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito 
Público) is run by a former high executive and co-founder of Banco 
Azteca; and the Secretariat of Education (Secretaría de Educación 
Pública), which is responsible for implementing financial educa-
tion at schools, is run by the former long-standing director of Fun-
dación Azteca. Less obvious but also deeply problematic is that the 
BB and the Mexican public banking system overall serves as bond 
between the poor and global financial markets. As pointed out by 
Soederberg (2013, 606), the poor have become attractive borrowers 
over the last two decades because financial investors see them as 
very reliable payers of high interest, and thus an investment vehicle 
that is resilient to economic crisis. 
Part of Mexico’s “moral economy” is that the Government ap-
peals to the “solidarity” of the people when it comes to paying back 
the loans (Press conference of the Secretariat of Wellbeing, August 
15, 2020). The current crisis has pushed millions more to the limits 
of survival. It is to be feared that through the “Bank of Welfare”, the 
Covid-19 crisis has worked as a catalyst for the further ratcheting 
up the power of finance capital over the poor in Mexico. In order 
to transform the Bank of Welfare into a truly pro-poor public bank, 
progressive academics and policy advocates must address crucial 
issues such as the dissociation of public banking and public financ-
es in general from financial markets and private banks. 
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PUBLIC BANKS AND 
INDIA’S INEFFECTIVE COVID-19 
CRISIS RESPONSE
India’s experience with public banking and coronavirus spells a cautionary tale. At the time of writing India is, after the United States, the country with the second largest number of known 
Covid-19 infections. This is partly a reflection of the country’s large 
population (1.4 billion). The proportion of people infected is rela-
tively low, but the pandemic has overwhelmed India’s hugely un-
derfunded public health system and is devastating the economy. 
Public banks have been given the major responsibility for providing 
relief but they cannot play the supportive role that was possible in 
the past, because they have been so undermined, and in some cases 
even dismantled, over the last two decades. 
India’s response to Covid-19, which has been primarily mon-
etary, therefore cannot succeed because the banks cannot do the 
heavy lifting required – in part because they have not been al-
lowed to.  Publicly owned banks still comprise the majority of the 
financial sector, but they are public in name and not in mandate. 
They are judged primarily by their ability to maximize earnings 
and profits, which means they can no longer follow the counter-
cyclical or long-term goals they did in the past and on which the 
Covid-19 recovery depends.  
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Without a fiscal stimulus and autonomous spending to create 
demand, India’s credit-growth policies will not work because the 
banks are reticent to lend. This is because they are already over-bur-
dened with non-performing assets and fear this can only get worse, 
reducing profits and incomes still further. This is a problem both 
for India’s recovery from coronavirus and for the future of public 
banking. The failure of the monetary policies to induce banks to 
lend will likely strengthen the case of those arguing for privatiza-
tion as a means for banks to increase their capital.  This would spell 
the end of India’s public banking system – and a long and painful 
path out of coronavirus.
INTRODUCTION
At the time of writing, India is, after the United States, the country 
with the second largest number of known Covid-19 infections. Giv-
en the country’s large population of around 1.4 billion, the propor-
tion of the population infected (5.4 million) is still relatively low. 
However, the pandemic has overwhelmed the hugely underfund-
ed public health and hospital system, prompting the government 
to impose in panic one of the most severe nation-wide lockdowns, 
which had and continues to have a devastating impact on the econ-
omy. The government’s response to the post-Covid economic crisis 
has fallen short, with the fiscal stimulus placed at a relatively low 
1% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The dominant effort comes in 
the form of monetary policy measures – reduction in policy interest 
rates, injection of liquidity, easing of debt servicing terms and pro-
vision of guarantees to facilitate the flow of credit to select sectors.
Given this reliance on monetary policy, public sector banks that 
dominate India’s commercial banking system have become crucial 
intermediaries in the transmission of the official stimulus. Taking on 
a social mandate of this kind is not new to the public banking system, 
which, after its expansion through nationalization in 1969, substan-
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tially enhanced credit provision for growth; ensured that there was 
much greater financial inclusion with credit provided to neglected 
sectors, regions and sections; and achieved that without the periodic 
bank failures that characterized the pre-1969 period.
But much has changed since then, especially after 1991 when, 
based on the reports of two committees, the banking and financial 
policies were extensively liberalized. Underlying this transition was 
a decision to change the mandate given to public banks. If the ear-
lier emphasis had been placed on realising socio-economic devel-
opment objectives to which the profit objective was subordinated, 
now the demand was for better profitability and innovation in ser-
vice provision. That not only changed banking behaviour over time, 
but the subordination of public banking to the needs of what was 
seen as a private investment-led growth strategy resulted in lending 
of a kind that increased the volume of bad assets on the books of the 
public banks. This has made it difficult to ensure that public banks 
can perform the role they have been given as part of the post-Covid 
relief and recovery strategy.  
PRE-COVID CONTEXT – THE CHEQUERED HISTORY  
OF PUBLIC BANKING IN INDIA
Ever since the nationalization of 14 major private banks in India in 
1969, the country’s banking system has been overwhelmingly pub-
licly owned. The entry of many new private sector banks after the 
launch of neoliberal reform in 1991 has not radically altered that 
picture. This has meant that, for more than half a century now, the 
government’s influence on banking behaviour and performance 
has been substantial. However, this has not played out the way that 
supporters of public banking might have expected. 
This chapter shows that mandates matter as much as ownership, 
as does the macroeconomic environment in which public banks 
are embedded. This has strongly limited the role that public banks 
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could play in the relief and recovery efforts required for Covid-19. 
Banks are the first port of call of a nation’s savings. Therefore, own-
ership and control over the banking system gives the State the pow-
er to influence and determine the allocation and use of the financial 
surpluses of a nation. Using that power, a government can facilitate 
investment and influence the allocation of financial resources in re-
sponse to a recession, say, or in pursuit of a medium-term develop-
ment agenda. The fact that the publicly owned banking system can 
serve as an instrument of countercyclical policy, expanding rather 
than reducing credit during a recession and targeting that credit 
to best aid recovery, is a major source of power. Has that source 
of power been used to advantage in the response to the ongoing 
Covid-induced crisis in India? 
A feature of a predominantly publicly owned banking system 
is that the profit motive need not govern the allocation of credit, 
as would be the case under private ownership. Subordinating the 
profit motive to social objectives, the government may, for example, 
direct public banks to ensure adequate lending to farmers despite 
the risks stemming from monsoon dependence, or increase lend-
ing to small, dispersed rural borrowers, despite the higher transac-
tion costs involved. That the private sector could not be persuaded 
to meet such requirements was clear from the fact that, prior to 
nationalization, banks in India had allocated just 2% of advances 
to the agricultural sector that contributed around 50% of national 
GDP, in violation of central bank guidelines.
Whether the State’s influence, through public ownership, over 
the process of financial intermediation, proves socially beneficial 
depends in the final analysis on whether the government’s policy 
agenda advances the interests of all or most of its citizens, or just a 
favoured few. In the immediate aftermath of bank nationalization, 
State ownership was indeed socially beneficial. Banking policy 
changed to ensure access to financial services to hitherto neglected 
sections and regions. The number of scheduled commercial banks 
(SCBs) in India rose from 74 in 1972 to 270 in 1990. The number 
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of branches of SCBs rose from 8,262 in 1969 to 32,419 in 1980, and 
60,220 in 1991. As a result, the population per branch fell from 
around 75,000 in 1967 to 18,000 at the end of 1981 and 14,000 by 
March 1991. Furthermore, the share of rural branches in total SCB 
branches rose in tandem from 22% in 1969 to 58% in 1990.
At the end of March 2019, public sector banks accounted for 61% 
of the assets in the commercial banking system, private banks for 
32%, and foreign and small finance banks for the rest. Among the 20 
public sector banks, the largest – State Bank of India – accounted for 
36% of their assets; and Bank of Baroda – the second largest public 
bank – for a distant 7.7%. Within the private sector, the three largest 
of the 22 banks – HDFC Bank, ICICI Bank and Axis Bank – accounted 
for 23.5%, 18.2% and 15.1% of total assets, respectively.
There also was a decisive shift in credit deployment in favour 
of the agricultural sector. The share of agricultural credit in total 
non-food credit rose sharply from 2% before nationalization to 9 
% in 1970-71 and close to 21% in the mid-1980s, before falling to 
17% by the end of the 1980s. Small scale and other “priority sector” 
advances also rose, resulting in the increase in the share of priority 
sector advances in total credit from 22% in 1972 to as much as 45% 
at the end of 1980s. The share of small-scale units in total bank cred-
it increased from 7% in June 1968 to 12% in June 1973, and there-
after was sustained in the range of 11 to 14% until the early 1990s. 
In summary, public ownership, the end of corporate control over 
banks and the turn to social control over banking resulted in dra-
matic progress in the direction of enhanced lending to productive 
sectors and to greater social inclusion.
The perspective that drove these changes in banking behaviour 
does not frame the government’s policy agenda anymore. With neo-
liberal reform from the 1990s, the government’s stated (even if not 
realized) overall objective was transformed from one of advancing 
State-led development with redistribution to that of privileging and 
incentivizing private investment. This has influenced banking pol-
icy and the structure of banking. Not only is private presence in 
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the banking system increasing, but public banks are increasingly 
judged by their ability to maximize earnings and profit. However, 
despite these changes, the dominance of publicly owned banks is 
still a reality. This has meant that the public banking system contin-
ues to be used as a direct lever to implement the government’s pol-
icy agenda. But with that agenda having changed, the role of public 
banks has changed as well.
THE COVID-19 CRISIS AND INDIA’S PUBLIC BANKS
This changed role for India’s public banking is clearly evident in the 
Covid-19 induced crisis that is ongoing. Public banking was osten-
sibly given the major responsibility, with flexibility to significantly 
increase lending supported by central bank injection of liquidity, 
permission to offer temporary debt service moratoria, and freedom 
to reschedule debt on improved terms of stressed corporates. How-
ever, this shift of a part of the onus of responding to the pandem-
ic onto the banks occurred in a context where public banks were 
already burdened with large non-performing assets, because they 
had been persuaded to lend to large, capital intensive infrastruc-
ture projects, which proved commercially unviable, leading to de-
faults. In addition, with the fiscal stimulus offered by the govern-
ment to counter the severe demand compression precipitated by 
the Covid-19 crisis and the lockdown response to it, entities looking 
for credit were unlikely to be in a position to meet the debt service 
payments when they fell due. 
In the second quarter of 2020, India’s GDP contracted by 24%, 
which is much larger than in many other economies severely af-
fected by the Covid-19 pandemic. Despite the central government’s 
claims to the contrary, there is no evidence that a V-shaped recovery 
would follow. The economy is likely to remain steeped in recession 
over the financial year 2020-21 (April-March), and that recession is 
likely to last into the following year as well.
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One reason for the severity of the setback is the government’s 
regressive and wrong policy response. Overall, the additional fiscal 
stimulus provided by the central government amounted to around 
a meagre 1% of GDP. This has also meant that the income and 
employment support provided by the government to the mass of 
workers deprived of their jobs and livelihoods has been woefully 
inadequate, worsening the deprivation of already marginalized sec-
tions and pushing many more people into poverty. This has meant 
that the supply-side shock that resulted from the sudden halt in 
economic activity triggered by the pandemic and the lockdown re-
sponse to it has been worsened by massive demand compression. 
These circumstances warranted resorting to a large fiscal stimulus 
that the government has not been willing to deliver.
This is because a feature of neoliberal macroeconomic policy is 
fiscal conservatism, manifested in a combination of lenient direct 
taxation, controlled fiscal deficits and caps on the public debt. This 
fiscal conservatism also leads to the privileging of monetary poli-
cy instruments (interest rate reduction and liquidity creation) over 
pro-active fiscal intervention as a means to revive a flagging econo-
my. The dependence on such instruments increases as tax conces-
sions to incentivize private investment limit revenue growth, which 
in turn, given the self-imposed limits on deficit financed spending, 
reins in the stimulus provided by the government’s spending.
With its embracing of neoliberalism, the Indian government 
too had veered in favour of monetary instruments even before 
the Covid-19 shock. So, when the impact of the Covid-19 pandem-
ic and responses to it on an economy already descending into a 
recession triggered a massive contraction in economic activity, 
the fiscal response was limited, as noted earlier. The focus of the 
‘stimulus’ – if it could be called that – was a set of monetary poli-
cy measures. The government has chosen to let the central bank, 
with its monetary policy instruments, do the heavy lifting. This 
does give the public banking system a major role. What is that role 
and how effective has it been?
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INDIA’S ‘HEAVY LIFTING’ – LIQUIDITY MEASURES  
TARGETED FOR RESCUE AND REVIVAL 
The dominant component of the India rescue and revival package 
consisted of monetary measures involving a reduction in policy 
interest rates, injection of liquidity, easing of debt servicing terms 
and provision of guarantees for new debt provided to select sectors. 
Principally, public banks have been made the means of transmit-
ting the effects of stimulus initiatives designed and implemented by 
the Reserve Bank of India, the country’s central bank.
In the Reserve Bank of India’s own words, its intervention began 
in March in order to “unfreeze financial market activity and revital-
ise financial institutions to function normally in the face of Covid-19 
related dislocations” (Reserve Bank of India 2020, 101). Besides a 
series of policy rate or repo rate cuts, measures were adopted to 
inject cheap liquidity into the system. Swap auctions and open mar-
ket operations to purchase securities were undertaken. The ability 
of commercial banks to lend was extended by reducing the cash 
reserve ratio (CRR) by 100 basis points – from 4% of net demand 
and time liabilities (NDTL) to 3% – effective March 28, 2020, for a 
period of one year, releasing liquidity amounting to INR 1.4 trillion 
(around US$18 billion) into the market or 1.4% of total outstanding 
stock of non-food credit advanced by commercial banks. The limit 
on overnight borrowing by banks under the Marginal Standing Fa-
cility was also raised by 100 basis points from 2% of NDTL to 3%.
The central bank also adopted initiatives to push bank credit to 
specific categories of borrowers. Targeted Long-Term Repo Operation 
(TLTRO) auctions of three years’ maturity totalling INR 1 trillion were 
held in March and April. To encourage credit flow and ease liquidity 
pressures, the RBI decided to conduct an initial round of TLTRO auc-
tions that banks could avail of to obtain money at reasonable rates to 
invest in investment grade bonds, commercial paper and non-con-
vertible debentures of corporates. In a second round, resources were 
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released for investment in paper sold by non-bank financial compa-
nies (NBFCs), which were facing difficulty in rolling over funds mo-
bilized by issuing short maturity instruments and used for long-term 
lending. By design, at least 50% of the liquidity accessed through this 
auction was required to be directed to small- and mid-sized NBFCs 
and microfinance institutions (MFIs). The central bank also institut-
ed a special liquidity facility for mutual funds of INR 500 billion in 
April to address the severe liquidity pressures faced by them in the 
aftermath of the closure of a set of six funds investing in debt securi-
ties operated by mutual fund major Franklin Templeton.
The central bank’s initiatives were directed not only at the cor-
porate and financial sectors, but at other sections of the economy 
too, such as agriculture, small industry and housing. To support 
them, special refinance facilities totalling INR 500 billion at the 
policy repo rate were established. (The repo rate too has been re-
duced by 1.15 percentage points since March 2020, to 4%, which 
is its lowest level since 2000). Of the refinance facilities, INR 250 
billion was allocated to the National Bank for  Agriculture and Ru-
ral Development (NABARD) to support lending by regional rural 
banks, cooperative banks and microfinance institutions. The Small 
Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI) was allocated INR 
150 billion, and the National Housing Bank (NHB) was provided 
INR 100 billion to support housing finance companies. While these 
still existing development banking institutions have been called 
upon to play a supplementary role, others like the Exim Bank of 
India have had to be supported. With foreign trade adversely af-
fected by the onset of the pandemic, the Exim bank was unable to 
mobilize resources through foreign currency borrowing to sustain 
its operations. In May, the Reserve Bank of India extended a INR 
150 billion line of credit available for 90 days and extendable for up 
to a year, so that the institution could mobilize dollar funding by 
entering into swap agreements.
In all of these initiatives, commercial banks were expected to 
mediate the stimulus by using the increased liquidity to provide 
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credit and transmit lowered interest rates to the final borrower. In-
terestingly, this use of commercial banks as intermediaries in the 
rescue and revival effort has been used by the government as well. 
Even before the Covid-19 pandemic, in the budget for 2019-20, the 
Finance Minister had announced a partial credit guarantee scheme 
(PCGS) to support non-bank financial companies (NBFCs) that were 
seen as facing a liquidity squeeze. To encourage credit flow to the 
sector, the purchase by public sector banks of highly-rated pooled as-
sets of financially sound NBFCs up to a total amount of INR 1 trillion 
over the financial year was supported with a one-time guarantee 
to cover first loss of up to 10% of the pool. In December 2019, that 
guarantee was extended to low-rated NBFCs as well.
Post-Covid, in May this year, this scheme was restructured and 
extended, with a one-time partial credit guarantee of up to 20% of 
the pool (or double the earlier limit) for purchases totalling INR 450 
billion by public sector banks of low-rated instruments (including 
unrated paper of maturity up to one year) issued by non-bank lend-
ers. This guarantee is valid for 24 months and the scheme is to be in 
place till March 2021.
In addition to this partial credit guarantee scheme, in May 2020, 
the government announced an Emergency Credit Line Guarantee 
Scheme (ECLGS) under which a Guaranteed Emergency Credit Line 
(GECL) was to be provided to micro-, small- and medium-sized en-
terprise (MSME) borrowers, with a turnover of up to INR 1 billion, 
holding outstanding credit of up to INR 250 million from banks, finan-
cial institutions and NBFCs. Any past dues on the credit outstanding 
had to be of a duration less than or equal to 60 days as of February 
20 for the unit to be eligible for a GECL. If these criteria were met, 
the unit could apply for an additional credit line without collateral 
equal to 20% of its past borrowing. The lender is given the benefit 
of a 100 credit guarantee from the government’s National Credit 
Guarantee Trustee Company. Loans under the scheme have a ten-
ure of four years with a debt service moratorium of one year on 
the principal amount. The total credit that can be provided under 
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the scheme was set at INR 3 trillion and the government promised 
to set aside a corpus of INR 416 billion over four financial years to 
fund the scheme.
This combination of schemes, besides sundry others not listed 
here, defined the rescue and revival package resting on credit from 
the financial sector, mainly public sector banks, that was pushed by 
monetary policy initiatives and government guarantees. With the 
additional fiscal stimulus placed at around 1% of GDP being grossly 
inadequate, this was the dominant element in the overall economic 
package designed as a response to the Covid-19 pandemic’s effects 
in India. While elsewhere in the world the Covid-induced crisis had 
led to a rethink of the adherence to so-called ‘fiscal prudence’, India 
has largely continued with the embrace of monetary measures as a 
substitute for much-needed fiscal activism.
BANKING RISK AFTER THE DILUTION OF DEVELOPMENT BANKING
An aspect of this monetary stimulus based on liquidity injection 
to provide relief from the sudden shock to the economy caused 
by coronavirus needs highlighting. Barring a small portion of the 
credit flow the liquidity infusion was expected to generate, which 
was partially or fully guaranteed by the government, the risk as-
sociated with providing that credit is to be carried by the banks, 
particularly public sector banks. This burden of increased risk was 
being placed on these banks at a time when the economic contrac-
tion is expected to result in large-scale debt default, if not outright 
bankruptcies. To reduce the intensity of such defaults, the central 
bank has allowed banks to offer a temporary moratorium on debt 
service payments until December 2020 and provided for a one-time 
debt restructuring scheme. The idea was partly to prevent bunched 
defaults requiring large loan loss provisions from eroding the capi-
tal and solvency of banks. It was in a period like this that the public 
banks were being required to take on additional risk.
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This should not be a surprise. The transfer of the burden of 
risk associated with addressing a crisis from the treasury and the 
central bank to the public banking system is also a feature of neo-
liberal macro policy. A major change brought about by neoliberal 
reform was the dismantling of the specialized development bank-
ing infrastructure India had built since Independence. In that im-
mediate aftermath of Independence, the turn to and emphasis on 
development banking was explained by two features characterizing 
the Indian economy at that point in time: the inadequate accumula-
tion of own capital in the hand of indigenous industrialists; and the 
absence of a market for long-term finance (such as bond or active 
equity markets), which firms could access to part finance capital-in-
tensive industrial investment. 
Post-independence policy perceived that banks per se could 
not close the gap for long-term finance, because there are limits 
to which banks could be called upon to take on the responsibility 
of financing such investments. Banks attract deposits from many 
small and medium (besides, of course, large) depositors, who have 
relatively short savings horizons, would prefer to abjure income 
and capital risk, and expect their savings to be relatively liquid, so 
that they can be easily drawn as cash. Lending to industrial inves-
tors making lumpy investments, on the other hand, requires allo-
cating large sums to single borrowers, with the loans being risky 
and substantially illiquid. Getting banks to be prime lenders for 
industrial (and infrastructure) investment, therefore, results in sig-
nificant maturity, liquidity and risk mismatches, limiting the role 
that banks can play in financing long-term productive investment. 
Other sources need to be found.
This was the gap that the state-created or promoted develop-
ment-banking infrastructure sought to close. That infrastructure 
was created over a relatively long period of time and was populat-
ed with multiple institutions, often with very different mandates. 
Funds for the development banks came from multiple sources oth-
er than the ‘open market’: the government’s budget, the surpluses of 
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the Reserve Bank of India and bonds subscribed by other financial 
institutions. Given the reliance on government sources and the im-
plicit sovereign guarantee that the bonds issued by these institu-
tions carried, the cost of capital was relatively low, facilitating rel-
atively lower cost lending for long-term purposes. Therefore, until 
the 1990s, India was an exemplary instance of the use of develop-
ment banking as an instrument of late industrialization.
Other countries, such as Brazil with its development banking 
behemoth BNDES, followed a similar trajectory. However, they con-
tinued to rely on these institutions even after adopting measures of 
financial liberalization. In fact, in China, the China Development 
Bank was a post-reform creation and a major player in the long-term 
financing market. The Indian government, however, chose to dis-
mantle its development banking infrastructure as part of liberaliza-
tion. In India, the all India development finance institutions, which 
with budgetary and central bank support and implicit sovereign 
guarantees were seen as distorting the playing field for commer-
cial banks, were abolished. Some were allowed to atrophy whereas 
others like the IDBI and the ICICI were allowed to establish com-
mercial banking arms (IDBI Bank and ICICI Bank), with which the 
parent development banking institutions were ‘reversed merged’. 
However, the need for long-term funds, especially for private in-
vestment or public-private partnership projects in infrastructure, 
remained. In fact, the need for funding had increased because fis-
cal conservatism had resulted in reduced budgetary allocation for 
investments in these areas. The result was that the government had 
to get the public banks to provide the long-term financing needed 
for investments in these capital-intensive projects.
The share of infrastructure lending in the total advances of SCBs 
to the industrial sector rose sharply, from less than 2% at the end 
of March 1998 to 16% at the end of March 2004 and as much as 35% 
at the end of March 2015. So even as the volume of bank lending to 
industry rose, the importance of lending to infrastructure within 
industry has increased hugely. Sectors like steel, power, roads and 
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ports, and telecommunications were the most important beneficia-
ries. For commercial banks, which are known to prefer lending for 
short-term purposes, this turn to lending to infrastructure was a 
high-risk strategy. Unfortunately, with the pattern of growth under 
liberalization and the deceleration of the rate of growth in recent 
years, many of these projects have proved unviable, leading to debt 
defaults. The result has been a sharp spike in the ratio of non-per-
forming assets (NPAs) to gross advances recorded in the books of 
the banks, especially the public banks. Government support, in the 
form of recapitalization funds, to deal with this problem has been 
far from adequate. This has made banks cautious and forced them 
hold back on lending to all but the best projects. It was in these 
circumstances that the new burdens associated with the post-Covid 
stimulus were placed on the public banks.
PUBLIC BANKS CANNOT DO THE HEAVY LIFTING ALONE
For this reason and because the crisis is not on account of absence 
of credit but of absent demand, the monetary stimulus is proving 
ineffective. Six months down the line, it is clear that the assumption 
that the recovery could be driven from the supply side with cheap 
credit and inducements to lend (in the form of selective partial or 
full guarantees) was wrong, rendering the dominant aspect of the 
stimulus weak and ineffective. Even the presumption that infusion 
of liquidity would automatically result in increased credit supply 
and offtake has not been realized. Credit growth has not picked up 
because of the reticence of banks, already burdened with NPAs, to 
lend, in the absence – in the view of the banks – of sufficient de-
mand for credit. In the period between April 1 and August 14, 2020, 
when all of the post-Covid monetary initiatives were implemented, 
credit outstanding had fallen by 1.5%. Over the year ending August 
14, 2020, bank credit grew by 5.5%, as compared to 11.7% over the 
year ending mid-August 2019.
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Besides failing to substantially increase credit disbursements as 
a ‘means’ to trigger a recovery, the supply side measures were also 
far less successful in getting banks to support the most stressed sec-
tors experiencing liquidity shortages. This comes through from the 
relative success of the different TLTRO rounds that targeted differ-
ent sectors. The most successful was TLTRO round one, in which 
liquidity was injected to encourage investment of the capital bor-
rowed at the relatively low repo rate in investment grade corporate 
bonds, commercial paper and non-convertible debentures. Much 
of this money was picked up by large corporates like Reliance, In-
dia’s largest business conglomerate, and engineering and construc-
tion major L&T looking to benefit from the low interest rate on 
borrowing supported by the scheme. According to reports, in the 
first round of TLTRO auctions, 27 corporates raised INR 266 billion 
against commercial paper and 18 raised INR 253 billion against me-
dium- and long-term bonds (Gopakumar and Upadhyay 2020).
As compared to this, TLTRO 2.0, directed at stressed NBFCs and 
MFIs, received a tepid response. On offer in the initial auction un-
der this scheme was a total of INR 250 billion for three years at the 
repo rate of 4.4%. The RBI received bids for only INR 128.5 billion, 
which is just above 50% of the offered sum. While some of this cap-
ital had to be used to buy low-rated paper issued by smaller NBFCs 
and MFIs, the cost of that credit was reportedly significantly higher 
for these entities than for the larger firms with AAA ratings. This 
obviously increases the probability of default, especially since rev-
enues and surpluses of these firms have shrunk or disappeared as 
a result of the Covid-19 shock. With public banks already sitting on 
large NPAs, their reticence to lend, even when offered access to 
cheap capital was therefore understandable.
Increased lending through the GECL window of the ECLG 
Scheme to MSMEs has also been tardy. Announced on May 20, the 
scheme was to provide credit totalling INR 3 trillion to creditworthy 
MSMEs, backed with a full guarantee from the government. Close to 
three months later, as of August 18, public and private sector banks 
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had sanctioned loans of just over INR 1.5 trillion, or 50% of the pro-
vision. Disbursements by them were much lower at around INR 1 
trillion. Since this was a scheme that was open to private banks to 
participate and since there was a full government guarantee, pri-
vate banks too played a role – accounting for almost half the sanc-
tioned loans. However, here again banks blame limited demand 
for credit as the explanation for indifferent performance. The slow 
offtake possibly explains the fact that, at the beginning of August, 
the government widened the scope of the scheme making units 
with outstanding loans of up to INR 500 million (as opposed to the 
earlier INR 250 million) eligible for credit. As a result, the number 
of eligible borrowers rose significantly and the maximum guaran-
teed credit that could be provided to a single borrower, set at 20% of 
that borrower’s debt outstanding, increased from INR 50 million to 
INR 100 million. In addition, individual loans given to professionals 
like doctors, lawyers and chartered accountants for business pur-
poses were also included in the scheme. This was clearly an effort to 
increase offtake of credit through the scheme, which was sluggish 
possibly because demand for credit in the midst of the crisis from 
smaller borrowers is low and the scheme is open only to entities 
with outstanding loans that had not defaulted on past borrowing.
CONCLUSION 
The message is clear. In the midst of a crisis and with no prospect 
of an immediate recovery, many firms would either fall in the cate-
gory of those ineligible for additional credit by virtue of being con-
sidered uncreditworthy or would be reticent to take on debt given 
the uncertainty about their capacity to service that debt. In such 
circumstances, making credit the instrument to drive the recovery 
does not make sense, unless demand can be raised through autono-
mous spending of some kind. Such spending can only be undertak-
en by the government through its fiscal policy. The ineffectiveness 
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of the many monetary policy initiatives of the RBI to impart any 
buoyancy to the system only corroborates that perception. Mean-
while, however, public banks are faced with the prospect of a fur-
ther rise in their non-performing assets. This would strengthen the 
case of those arguing that the government in India does not have 
the resources to recapitalize these banks and they must resort to 
equity sale to private investors to mobilize resources to meet capital 
adequacy norms. That would, in most cases, require the dilution 
of the government’s stake to a degree that spells the end of a domi-
nantly public banking system. 
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CREDIT POLICY RESPONSE: 
MACROPRUDENTIAL REGULATION 
AND PUBLIC BANK CREDIT 
DURING COVID-19
This chapter analyzes the countercyclical credit policy res-ponse in Argentina due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Specifi-cally, the macroprudential regulations implemented by the 
Central Bank of Argentina (BCRA) to stimulate bank credits to mi-
cro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) is examined. 
In addition, the specific credit response of the state-owned com-
mercial bank, the Banco de la Nación Argentina (BNA), the biggest 
commercial bank in Argentina, is also scrutinized.
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, I analyze the countercyclical credit policy response 
in Argentina due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Specifically, I focus on 
studying the new credit lines to micro-, small- and medium-sized en-
terprises (MSMEs) that were put in place in Argentina in March 2020. 
The end date of this analysis is August 2020. Several other credit pro-
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grammes and financial supports are being granted to individuals and 
enterprises in Argentina, but these are not analyzed here.1
I first examine the macroprudential regulations implemented 
by the Central Bank of Argentina (BCRA) to stimulate bank cred-
its to MSMEs. I then present some figures for these credits for the 
entire banking system. Finally, I analyze some of the specific con-
ditions and requirements for these new credit lines offered by the 
state-owned commercial bank, the Banco de la Nación Argentina 
(BNA), the biggest commercial bank in Argentina. 
The reaction of the Argentinean authorities to the Covid-19 pan-
demic has been swift. There was a substantial disbursement of new 
credit lines to MSMEs until August 2020 of around US$5.25 billion, 
equivalent to 1.45% of Argentina’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
in 2019. This countercyclical credit policy response has been pos-
sible thanks to the macroprudential regulations of the BCRA and 
the cooperation of both public and private banks, in particular the 
state-owned commercial bank BNA, given its large size in the bank-
ing sector (19%). Evidently, the credit needs from the Covid-19 pan-
demic by MSMEs are very large and the public banking sector is not 
large enough to face these credit needs on its own.
MACROPRUDENTIAL REGULATION BY THE BCRA
Early in the Covid-19 pandemic outbreak, Argentina’s monetary au-
thority − the BCRA − put in place several macroprudential regulations 
to increase the credit supply to MSMEs. Specifically, in March 2020, 
the macroprudential regulations ruled that commercial banks would 
obtain several benefits, in terms of their reserve requirements and 
1  Besides the MSMEs’ credits, the most important financial support programmes 
are the Ingreso Familiar de Emergencia (IFE), which focus on the unemployed and 
low wage earners, and the Programa de Asistencia de Emergencia al Trabajo y la Pro-
ducción (ATP), which provides financial assistance to companies for paying salaries 
and zero interest credits to self-employed workers. For a list of additional financial 
support for MSMEs see MPD (2020). 
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other liquidity regulations, if they granted bank credits to MSMEs at 
a nominal annual interest rate of 24% (BCRA 2020a). Note that the 
nominal interest rate of 24% is negative in real terms because current 
annual inflation is 42.4% and the expected annual inflation rate by 
the end of the year is 31%. The MSMEs can use these funds for work-
ing capital, paying salaries and paying deferred checks.
Regarding the benefits to public and private commercial banks, 
it was ruled that there would be a reduction in the reserve require-
ments by an amount equal to 40% of the granted MSMEs credits. Be-
cause most of the reserve requirements in Argentina involve central 
bank deposits that pay no interest rate, the reduction in the reserve 
requirements means that banks can hold a higher proportion of in-
terest paying assets. Thus, this macroprudential regulation stimu-
lates MSMEs’ credits. 
Regarding the other liquidity regulations, it was ruled that 
the central bank bill holdings by banks would be reduced if they 
did not increase the granting of MSME credits. Note that, in Ar-
gentina, there are limits to banks’ holdings of central bank bills 
(Leliqs), which are bills with a maturity of 28 days, issued by the 
BCRA and that pay a nominal annual interest rate of 38% (BCRA 
2020b). The alternative for banks that want to hold highly liquid 
and short-term assets is to hold one day repos with the BCRA that 
pay a nominal annual interest rate of 19%, which is clearly a neg-
ative interest rate. In addition, they could also hold treasury bills 
with an annual interest rate of between 26% and 29%. Thus, this 
interest rate differential for the assets holdings of banks stimu-
lated MSME credits.
The macroprudential regulations were further strengthened in 
June 2020, when it was ruled that it was mandatory for both pri-
vate and public banks to lend to MSMEs that had received a special 
guarantee by the Ministry of Productive Development, through the 
Fondo de Garantía Argentino (FOGAR) (BCRA 2020c). In addition, 
banks were not only allowed to lend to MSMEs but also to both pri-
vate and public hospitals, clinics and other health providers, which 
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used the credit to buy health supplies and equipment, and to other 
large private companies that used the credit to buy machinery and 
equipment produced by MSMEs. 
The total number of MSME credits granted by the whole bank-
ing sector up to the third week of August 2020 was 241,000 and the 
total disbursements were AR$390 billion (Argentine pesos) (equiv-
alent to around US$5.25 billion), equivalent to 1.45% of Argentina’s 
2019 GDP (BCRA 2020d). A total of 13% of those disbursements were 
made to MSME credits that had a FOGAR guarantee. In addition, the 
usage of the total disbursements was distributed as follows: 47% for 
working capital; 30% to cover deferred checks; 17% for salary pay-
ments; 2% health supplies and equipment; and 4% for other needs. 
In addition, 40% of the total disbursements were granted by private 
domestic-owned banks, 32% by foreign-owned banks and 28% by 
state-owned banks.
CONDITIONS AND REQUIREMENTS OF MSME CREDIT LINES 
BY THE BANCO DE LA NACIÓN ARGENTINA
The Banco de la Nación Argentina (BNA) is Argentina’s largest com-
mercial bank, with total assets of US$22 billion, which represent 
19% of the entire banking system. It has 639 bank branches across 
the country and is owned by the national government. Its total loans 
participation in the banking system is 17.7% and its total deposits 
participation is 22%.
BNA implemented five different credit lines related to the MS-
MEs’ credits mandated by the macroprudential regulation of the 
BCRA, analyzed above (BNA 2020).2 All of these credit lines offer a 
fixed nominal interest rate of 24% and are AR$ (Argentine pesos) 
2  Note that these five different credit lines follow what was specified by the macro-
prudential regulation of the BCRA. There is no official information on whether the 
other banks in Argentina offered all these five credit lines or only a subset of them. 
As discussed below, from visiting the webpages of several banks, the BNA was the 
only one that had clear and thorough information on the different credit lines.
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denominated. However, they have different conditions and require-
ments, which are analyzed below. The five credit lines are: 
1. Credit line for MSMEs (Línea de asistencia a MiPyMES para 
Capital de Trabajo – Gastos de Evolución): 
This credit line is for MSMEs from all economic sectors. The usage 
of the funds is for working capital. The maximum amount of the 
credit is up to two and a half months of sales. The term of the credit 
is 18 months with the German amortization system,3 with monthly, 
quarterly or biannual payments of capital and interests. In the case 
of a guarantee from a Mutual Guarantee Society, the term of the 
credit is 24 months. This credit line requires sufficient guarantees 
accepted by the bank.
2. Credit line for homeworking (Teletrabajo): 
This credit line is for MSMEs from all economic sectors. The usage 
of the funds is for buying goods and installation services, that are 
necessary, for both the enterprise and its workers, for homework-
ing and home offices. The maximum amount of the credit is up to 
AR$3,000,000 (US$40,500). The term of the credit is 36 months with 
the German amortization system, with biannual payments of capi-
tal and interests. This credit line requires sufficient guarantees ac-
cepted by the bank.
3. Credit line for salary payments with guarantee by FOGAR 
(Pago de Haberes con aval de FOGAR): 
This credit line is for MSMEs from all economic sectors that are 
clients of BNA with a salary payment agreement. The usage of the 
funds is for salary payments. The maximum amount of the credit is 
one payroll. The term of the credit is 12 months with the German 
3  The German amortization system is characterized by constant instalments in each 
period of time, except for the first installment, which is related to the interest paid 
in advance. The interest decreases as loan periods pass and the amortized capital 
increases over the life of the loan.
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amortization system, with quarterly payments of capital and inter-
ests. This credit line has the guarantee of FOGAR.
4. Credit line for work cooperatives (Asistencia a Cooperativas 
de trabajo): 
This credit line is specially orientated to work cooperatives that are 
registered in the National Institute of Social Economy (INAES) or 
have a MSME certification. The usage of the funds is for working 
capital. The maximum amount of the credit is established for each 
cooperative by the INAES. The term of the credit is 15 months. This 
credit line has the guarantee by FOGAR.
5. Credit line SMEs plus (Pyme Plus): 
This credit line is for all micro- and small-sized enterprises that 
have no credit with the banking system. The usage of the funds is for 
working capital. The maximum amount of the credit is AR$250,000 
(US$3,380) for micro enterprises and AR$500,000 (US$6,760) for 
small enterprises. The term of the credit is 12 months with the Ger-
man amortization system, with quarterly payments of capital and 
interest. This credit line has the guarantee by FOGAR.
Although there are no official figures yet about the total disburse-
ments of the new credit lines to MSMEs by the BNA, the Asociación 
de Bancos de la Argentina (Adeba) estimated that, by April 2020, 
the total disbursements by the BNA were AR$21,828 million. This 
represented 15.5% of the total disbursements by all banks at that 
time. The BNA was the second bank, after Banco Galicia (18.4%), 
that disbursed the most at the time.4 Moreover, the BNA has been 
4  Of the biggest banks in Argentina, the ones that under-performed relative to their 
importance in the banking system were several foreign-owned banks, such as HSBC, 
ICBC and Banco Patagonia, and the state-owned banks Banco de la Provincia de Bue-
nos Aires and Banco Ciudad de Buenos Aires. Among the ones that over-performed 
were several private domestic-owned banks, such as Banco Galicia, Banco Macro, 
Banco Supervielle and Banco Comafi, and the cooperative bank Banco Credicoop. 
Note, however, that these are estimates made in April 2020 and the relative perfor-
mances have improved through time. See the Adeba estimations in Telam (2020).
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actively promoting the new credit lines to MSMEs to its customers 
and non-customers. The information about the five different credit 
lines to MSMEs available on its web page is the most complete and 
detailed in comparison to other banks.5 Thus, it is clear that the BNA 
has led the implementation of the new credit lines to MSMEs and 
the countercyclical credit policy response in Argentina.
CONCLUSION
The reaction of the Argentinean authorities to the Covid-19 pan-
demic has been swift. The new credit lines to MSMEs, which were 
put in place in March 2020, have been very helpful in terms of deal-
ing with the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic for MSMEs. 
In particular, they have provided MSMEs with working capital. 
There has been a substantial disbursement of the new credit lines 
to MSMEs up to August 2020 of around US$5.25 billion, equivalent 
to 1.45% of Argentina’s GDP in 2019. 
In terms of total credit to the private sector, including the new 
credit lines to MSMEs, the annual real growth rate was 5.6% in June 
2020, registering the second consecutive month with a positive an-
nual real growth rate, after 20 months without positive growth rates 
(Argentina has been suffering several currency crises since April 
2018 and has been in recession since then).    
At first, until April 2020, state-owned commercial banks – in 
particular the BNA – and private domestic-owned banks were fast-
er in their credit response with new credit lines to MSMEs. How-
ever, foreign-owned banks picked up their lending in the following 
months. Up until August 2020, 40% of the total disbursements were 
granted by private domestic-owned banks, 32% by foreign-owned 
5  Web pages were visited for the following banks: BNA, Banco Galicia, Banco San-
tander, Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, Banco Macro, BBVA, Banco Ciudad de 




banks and 28% by state-owned banks. These shares are slightly dif-
ferent if compared to the distribution of total outstanding credit by 
February 2020, when 31.3% of total outstanding credit correspond-
ed to private domestic-owned banks, 31.5% to foreign-owned 
banks and 37.2% to state-owned banks. Still, we are at an early 
point in the Covid-19 pandemic and probably more credit will be 
needed by MSMEs.
It is too early to reach any conclusions about whether the cred-
it response by these three types of banks have over- or under-per-
formed relative to their importance in the banking system. More-
over, as the Covid-19 pandemic has progressed, and its economic 
consequences have become more evident, many public banks – in-
cluding the BNA and the BICE (Banco de Inversión y Comercio Exte-
rior, a public development bank) – have started offering additional 
credit lines related to the Covid-19 pandemic. This means that, in 
order to assess the credit response of these three types of banks in 
future, we not only have to take into account the new credit lines 
to MSMEs analyzed in this chapter, but also these other credit lines 
related to the Covid-19 pandemic.
The main conclusion of this analysis is that the swift counter-
cyclical credit policy response has been possible thanks to the 
macroprudential regulations of the BCRA and the cooperation of 
both public and private banks, in particular the state-owned com-
mercial bank BNA, given its large size in the banking sector. The 
macroprudential regulations put in place by the BCRA generated 
a broad credit response by the whole banking sector, including 
all the three types of banks, that reached an extensive segment of 
MSMEs in Argentina. What is clear is that the credit needs from 
the Covid-19 pandemic by MSMEs are very large and the public 
banking sector alone is not big enough to face these credit needs 
by itself. However, it is also true that there is a need to strengthen 
further the public banking sector in Argentina, especially its de-
velopment bank, BICE.
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NATIONAL AND MULTILATERAL 
DEVELOPMENT BANKS DURING 
THE 2020 PANDEMIC: THE ROLE 
OF IADB AND CDC DURING THE 
FIRST PHASE OF COVID-19
This chapter focuses on the strategic role played over the first few months after the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic by a Multilateral Development Bank – the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB) and a National Development Bank – the 
UK CDC Group. We also present an overview of the mandates, loan 
portfolios, services and clients of the two banks prior to the Covid-19 
response, and how these adapted in light of the crisis in 2020.
INTRODUCTION
Before analyzing two public development banks, the IADB and CDC, 
we would like to emphasize the key difference between development 
banks (DBs) and commercial banks. A key difference between devel-
opment banks and purely commercial banks is that the main (and usu-
ally only) aim of commercial banks and other private investors is to 
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maximize risk-adjusted expected returns, often short-term ones. Thus, 
they generally do not aim to pursue development goals. Their focus is 
on minimizing risks that may lead to financial losses or reduce profits. 
While commercial banks need to manage the full range of economic, 
environmental and social risks, they generally only do so to the extent 
that these risks have an impact on their financial returns. 
In contrast, DBs have a double mandate. They mainly aim to max-
imize sustainable and inclusive development impacts (including eco-
nomic, environmental and social impacts), while maintaining some 
financial profits or avoiding financial losses. A key point to make 
here is that for DBs the main goal is to achieve a high level of devel-
opment impact – making a major contribution to meeting the Sus-
tainable Development Goals (SDGs). Although important, achieving a 
good financial return is somewhat secondary to the dominant aim of 
development impact. In addition, DBs should evaluate investments 
over a longer period as their liability structure and projects have a 
long-term horizon, and because sustainable development results 
need to be evaluated over a longer timeframe to be sustained.
The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) played a major 
role during the first phase of the Covid-19 pandemic, disbursing 
more than US$7 billion, in response to Covid-19, over the first 10 
months of 2020. The UK CDC (Commonwealth Development Cor-
poration) Group also reacted quickly to offset the negative conse-
quences since the beginning of 2020, disbursing over US$650 mil-
lion in its Covid-19 response, over the first few months of 2020, to 
primarily increase liquidity in the markets and to invest in long-
term projects for the recovery phase. 
This chapter is structured as follows: it begins by briefly discuss-
ing the background about the IADB, its history, shareholders, sources 
of funding, usual clients, services and loan portfolios, to then focus 
on the short-term measures put in place to address the consequences 
of the Covid-19 pandemic. Then, the same analysis is presented for 
the CDC Group, first briefly discussing the background of the bank 
and then focusing on the bank’s short-term Covid-19 reaction.
Public Banks and Covid-19
 223
INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (IADB)
Since World War II, Latin American representatives had been ap-
pealing for a regional aid and financing programme of substantial 
proportions, along similar lines to the Marshall Plan. Probably 
the most coherent and concrete of these Latin American propos-
als was created at the 1954 Inter-American Economic and Social 
Meeting at Quintadinha, inspired by Raul Prebisch and the think-
ing of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Ca-
ribbean (ECLAC). The main proposals included the creation of an 
Inter-American bank. This, and other proposals, as well as similar 
ones repeated later, were consistently rejected by representatives 
of both the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations. The violence 
that Vice-President Nixon met on his Latin American tour, as well as 
the likely triumph of the Cuban Revolution, seems to have sparked 
off a concrete response from Washington. In 1958, the American 
Administration accepted some of the Latin American proposals, the 
main one being to establish and fund an Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank. This was followed in 1961 by the launching by President 
Kennedy of a large US aid programme for Latin America.
The IADB was officially founded in 1959, and headquartered in 
Washington, D.C. Ownership is divided between 48 countries, al-
though only 26 countries can borrow money from the bank. In terms 
of voting shares, the first largest shareholders are the US with 30%, 
followed by Brazil and Argentina both with 11.35% apiece, then Mex-
ico with 7%. Overall, the 26 borrowing members have 50.01% of the 
voting shares of IADB (see IADBa). Until recently, the President of the 
IADB was always a Latin American citizen and the Senior Vice-Pres-
ident was a US citizen, giving a strong voice to the Latin American 
borrowing countries. This tradition was broken, however, when a US 
citizen was appointed as President of the IADB in 2020.
The largest borrower is Brazil, followed by Mexico and Argen-
tina. The IADB is part of the IADB Group, which also includes the 
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Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF) and IDB Invest, both of which 
invest in private companies. 
The mandate of the bank is “to foster the economic and social de-
velopment of the IDB’s borrowing member countries, both individu-
ally and collectively” (see IADBb). In this light, reduction in poverty 
and inequality and sustainable development are among IADB’s top 
priorities. In 2019, the Institutional Strategy of IADB was approved by 
the Governors, ratifying three strategic priorities: i) Social inclusion 
and equality; ii) Productivity and innovation; iii) Regional economic 
integration. The Institutional Strategy also indicates that these prior-
ities need to be combined with actions that highlight gender equality, 
inclusion, environmental sustainability and institutional capacity. 
The financial instruments currently offered by IADB are: i) 
Loans; ii) Guarantees; iii) Non-reimbursable Grants; iv) Equity in-
vestment; and v) Technical cooperation. All these instruments can 
be combined by IADB. Table 11.1 highlights the number of funded 
projects and total disbursement of IADB over the last five years (pe-
riod 2015-2019), by type of instrument.
Table 11.1: IADB disbursement from 2015–2019, 





Loan operations 53.43 573
Container* 21.21 49
Non-reimbursable grants 1.25 84




Source: Authors’ own elaboration using IADB data. *Containers ‘contain’ a 
combination of instruments.
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Over the last five years, IADB provided finance for US$77.6 bil-
lion, with 69% of the overall financial resources distributed through 
loan operations. Technical cooperation instruments are the most 
recurrent type of instrument used, with more than 2,400 approved 
projects over the last five years, although the amount is only equal 
to 1.5% of the overall amount disbursed by IADB. 
Table 11.2 gives an overview of the three sectors reporting the 
highest number of approved projects over the period 2015-2019, 
by type of instrument.
Table 11.2: IADB top three sectors of interest over 

















Energy Private Firms 
and SME 
Development





















Source: Authors’ own elaboration using IADB data.
Reform and modernization of the state, energy, environment 
and natural disaster, and agriculture and rural development are 
among the top sectors of interest for IADB. Over the last five years, 
these sectors have received funding for several projects through dif-
ferent instruments. Looking at how IADB financial resources are 
distributed among countries, Figure 11.1 reports the top five coun-
try recipients over the period 2015–2019.
Marco Carreras and Stephany Griffith-Jones
226 
Figure 11.1: Top five country recipients of IADB financial 
resources over the last five years, in US$ billion 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration using IADB data.








Over the last five years, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico are the 
countries that have received more than US$10 billion each, with 
Brazil receiving almost 30% of what was received by all top five 
countries combined. Colombia and Ecuador have received, respec-
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Loan operations
IADB issues loans to the public sector, through Sovereign Guaran-
teed Loans (SGL) and to the private sector through Non-Sovereign 
Guaranteed Loans (NSGL). Table 11.3 gives an overview of the three 
sectors that have received the highest number of loan approvals 
over the last five years, by type of loan issued.
Table 11.3: IADB top three sectors of interest over 
the last three years, by type of loan
Sovereign Guaranteed Loans Non-Sovereign Guaranteed Loans
Reform, modernization of the state Private firms and SME development
Social investment Agriculture and rural development
Transport Financial markets
Source: IADB website.
While the majority of approved SG loans were addressed to-
wards reforms and modernization of the state, together with so-
cial investments and transport, NSGLs for the private sector have 
been mainly directed towards support for private firms, agricul-
ture and rural development, and financial markets. Looking at the 
type of financial resources offered to both the public sector, IADB 
offers three lending categories of SGLs, characterized by different 
types of instruments:
i. Investment lending: to support the acquisition of goods, 
works and services to promote social and economic develop-
ment and in case of natural disasters.
ii. Policy-based lending: to support policy reforms and/or insti-
tutional changes, prior to approval from IADB. 
iii. Special development lending: to support countries during 
macroeconomic crises.
In addition to the three lending categories described above, 
the IADB can also guarantee loans issued by private financial in-
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stitutions and directed to public sector projects. Currently, IADB 
offers two types of guarantees: i) Partial Credit Guarantees, to 
partially cover the risk of repayment for private financial insti-
tutions; and ii) Political Risk Guarantees to cover for the risk of 
non-compliance and non-repayment of sovereign or other pub-
lic institutions.
For the private sector, the IADB offers the financial resources in 
the form of NSGLs for investments for transactions generally in all 
sectors, subject to an exclusion list. There are currently four instru-
ments issued by the bank:
i. A/B Loans and Syndications: loans to attract and engage 
with co-funders.
ii. Small enterprises: to support participation in local markets 
of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
iii. Social Entrepreneurship Programme: to support sustain-
able solutions to socioeconomic issues.
iv. Opportunities for the Majority Initiative: to promote sus-
tainable business models.
Over the last five years, IADB overall disbursement in SG and 
NSG loans has been equal to US$60 billion. Figure 11.2 shows the 
total amount of approved loans over the last five years, by type of 
loan disbursed by IADB.
SG loans account for most of the amount disbursed by IADB, 
generally more than 80% of the overall number of loans fund-
ed by the bank. Among SG loans, SG Investment are the instru-
ments accounting for the highest amount disbursed, although 
these are very similar to the amount disbursed with SG poli-
cy-based instruments. 
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Figure 11.2: Loan approvals over the last five years 
by category of loan, in US$ billion
Source: IADB Annual Report 2019.
Non-reimbursable grants
IADB issues non-reimbursable funds for technical cooperation pro-
grammes that can be financed by either IADB’s own financial re-
sources or from funds received from other institutions. Currently, 
there are four different programmes through which IADB distrib-
utes non-reimbursable grants:
• IADB Grant Facility: to provide financial support for Haiti, 
established in 2007.
• Trust Fund Grantees: grants for the relatively less developed 
countries, for both public and private sector organizations.
• IADB Lab Grants: administered by IADB Lab, member of the 
IADB Group, to support small-scale targeted investment for 
both public and private sector organizations.
• Social Entrepreneurship Programme: for private, non-prof-
it, community-based organizations and public local develop-
ment institutions.
 Sovereign-guaranteed investment  Sovereign-guaranteed policy-based
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Figure 11.3: Top 5 recipients IADB grants over the last five years
Source: Authors’ own elaboration using IADB data.
Country








Among the top five recipients of IADB grants, Haiti is the coun-
try that has received most of the financial resources, equal to 
US$874 million or 82% of the disbursement for the top five recip-
ients. Honduras, Nicaragua and Bolivia are the other countries in 
the ranking, together with regional programmes involving more 
than one country, receiving a similar amount of resources equal 
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Technical cooperation
The IADB also offers financial resources to achieve objectives in 
line with the mandate of the bank – reduction of poverty, capacity 
building, etc. To do so, the IADB provides the funds for technical co-
operation activities, through the Fund for Special Operations (FSO), 
in three different forms:
• Non-reimbursable resources: generally targeted at the rela-
tively least-developed countries.
• Reimbursable resources: in the form of non-sovereign guar-
anteed loans.
• Contingent recovery resources: to provide financial resourc-
es that will be reimbursed if a loan from any other source is 
obtained.
The majority of the resources for technical cooperation dis-
bursed by IADB over the last five years have been distributed over 
several regional programmes involving more than one country. The 
total number of funded projects for the period 2015-2019 has been 
equal to 786 approved projects, for an overall amount of US$501.1 
million. Figure 11.4 shows the countries with the highest number 
of funded projects for technical cooperation over the last five years, 
together with the total amount received.
Focusing the attention on countries only, and excluding re-
gional programmes, over the period 2015–2019 Colombia has been 
the country receiving the highest number of approved projects – 
113, and the highest amount received – US$82.3. Among the other 
top five recipients, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador and Honduras have re-
ported a similar number of funded projects, although the overall 
amount received differs between countries, with Brazil receiving 
US$72 million and Ecuador and Bolivia receiving slightly more 
than US$30 million.
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Figure 11.4: Top recipients of IADB technical 
cooperation resources over the last five years
Source: Authors’ own elaboration using IADB data.
Equity investment
Due to the mandate of the bank, the IADB cannot directly invest in eq-
uity. However, other members of the IADB Group, such as IDB Invest 
and the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF), can make direct equity 
investments and in equity funds. Over the period 2015–2019, IADB 
Group made 35 investments in equity to a total value of US$140.3 mil-
lion. Figure 11.5 presents the economic sectors where equity invest-
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Figure 11.5: Number of equity investments 
over the last five years, by economic sector
Source: Authors’ own elaboration using IADB data.
The highest number of funded equity investment projects made 
over the last five years have been directed towards “Private firms 
and SMEs development”, with an overall disbursement equal to 
US$77 million. Furthermore, energy is the second sector for IADB 
equity investment, with only five funded projects that have attract-
ed investments of US$50 million. Finally, financial markets, water 
and sanitation, science and technology, and environment have 
received marginal resources, equal to an overall disbursement of 
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IADB AND COVID-19 
In light of the Covid-19 pandemic, the IADB is generally operating 
according to four aims:
1. Strengthening health systems.
2. Helping fund non-conditional transfers – more resources to 
vulnerable people.
3. Providing liquidity to ministries of finance. 
4. Funding to SMEs.
Being aware that the recovery will not be linear, while discuss-
ing the potential recovery plan, there is a need to keep the dis-
bursement for social expenditure at the same time as increasing 
the disbursement for infrastructure and green transformation; for 
Latin America, another sector of primary importance is the food 
industry, which will need adequate financial resources. For the 
short and medium term in Latin America, the social component 
will need primary attention. Counter-cyclical finance is seen as 
crucial both for urgent short-term expenditures, as well as for lon-
ger term investment, to help minimize damaging effects for long-
term development. 
At the moment, the IADB has increased both policy-based loans 
– to supply more liquidity – and non-conditional transfers. In light 
of Covid-19, the IADB also began a ‘fast-track’ procedure to facilitate 
the approval of projects, with a 66% time reduction, leading to pro-
cedures that allow the bank to issue a loan in one and a half months 
or maximum two. On the other hand, equity investments are now 
more complicated, due to the uncertainty brought by the Covid-19 
pandemic. The three instruments mainly used by IADB during the 
initial phase of the Covid-19 pandemic – Investment Loans; Poli-
cy-based Loans; Special Development Lending – have been mainly 
directed towards the following areas of intervention:
• Immediate public health response.
• Vulnerable populations.
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• Productivity sector & employment.
• Multiple priority areas.
• Public policy and fiscal management.
• Special development lending.
Table 11.4 illustrates the overall IADB disbursement since the 
beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic, by area of intervention.
Table 11.4: IADB disbursement in response to Covid-19, 
by area of intervention
Areas of intervention Disbursement (US$ million)
Vulnerable populations 2,000
Productivity sector & employment 1,900
Public policy and fiscal management 1,200
Special development lending 1,200
Immediate public health response 666
Multiple priority areas 250
Covid-19 Response Total 7.2 billion
Source: Authors’ own elaboration using IADB data.
The main focus of IADB intervention over the first phase of the 
2020 pandemic has been towards the areas of “Vulnerable popu-
lations” and “Productivity sector & employment”, both receiving 
financial resources for US$2 billion dollars (US$1.9 billion for the 
latter). Among the other areas of IADB intervention, “Public policy 
and fiscal management” and “Special development lending” have 
both received US$1.2 billion. Looking at a country level, Table 11.5 
illustrates the amount of financial resources received, and areas 
of intervention, by country.
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Table 11.5: IADB country breakdown 
operations in response to Covid-19
Country Loan size(US$ million) Areas of intervention
Brazil 1,750 Vulnerable populations; Productivity sector & Employment
Argentina 970 Immediate public health response; Productivity sector & Employment
Bolivia 580 Vulnerable populations; Productivity sector & Employment
Uruguay 555 Vulnerable populations; Productivity sector & Employment; 
Public policy & Fiscal management
El Salvador 550 Immediate public health response; Public policy & 
Fiscal management; Special development lending
Panama 550 Productivity sector & Employment; Special development lending
Costa Rica 515 Vulnerable populations; Special development lending
Dominican Republic 500 Public policy & Fiscal management; Special development lending
Ecuador 344 Productivity sector & Employment; Multiple priority areas
Paraguay 210 Public policy & Fiscal management
Mexico 154 Productivity sector & Employment
Honduras 146 Immediate public health response; Productivity sector & 
Employment; Special development lending
Guatemala 100 Vulnerable populations
Trinidad And Tobago 100 Public policy & Fiscal management
Haiti 87 Immediate public health response; Vulnerable populations
Nicaragua 43 Immediate public health response
Suriname 20 Immediate public health response
Bahamas 19 Vulnerable populations
Belize 18 Immediate public health response; Vulnerable populations
Barbados 0  
Chile 0  
Colombia 0  
Guyana 0  
Jamaica 0  
Peru 0  
Venezuela 0  
Total 7.21 billion
Source: Authors’ own elaboration using IADB data and IADBc.
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As of October 2020, Brazil has been the largest recipient of fi-
nancial resources disbursed by IADB since the beginning of the 
Covid-19 pandemic, receiving US$1.7 billion towards the areas of 
‘Vulnerable populations’ and ‘Productivity sector & Employment’. 
Argentina is the second largest recipient of IADB funds, receiving 
roughly US$1 billion invested in the areas of public health and pro-
ductivity sector, and employment.
Finally, we compare the disbursement of IADB over the first 10 
months of 2019 and 2020, looking at whether the bank supplied any 
additional resources during the Covid-19 pandemic compared to 
the same period in the previous year. Table 11.6 shows the overall 
2019 and 2020 disbursement of IADB, by type of instrument.
Table 11.6: Comparison of IADB disbursement in 2019 and 2020, 
by type of instrument 














Loan operation 7.45 68 19.62 154
Container* 2.59 11 6.46 16
Technical cooperation 0.17 348 0.23 451
Non-reimbursable grants 0.15 12 0.37 30
Equity 0.02 4 0.01 4
Total 10.38 443 26.69 655
Source: Authors’ own elaboration using IADB data. *Containers ‘contain’ a 
combination of instruments.
The IADB reacted quickly to the challenges brought about by the 
Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, increasing both the number of funded 
projects and the amount disbursed compared to the same period in 
2019. Looking at loan operations in particular, IADB almost tripled its 
disbursement and more than doubled the number of funded projects. 
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THE COMMONWEALTH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (CDC)
The CDC Group plc (CDC, hereafter) – formerly the Colonial Devel-
opment Corporation, Commonwealth Development Corporation 
and Capital for Development Corporation – is the UK development 
bank. It was 100% owned by the Department for International 
Development (DfID) until 2020, when DfID was merged with the 
Foreign Commonwealth Office into the Foreign, Commonwealth 
& Development Office (FCDO). Although it is entirely owned by 
the UK Government, CDC’s operations and investment decisions 
are independent. 
The CDC was founded in 1948 and has changed its structure 
and mandate over the years. The current mandate of the bank is to 
“[…] solve the biggest global development challenges by investing 
patient, flexible capital to support private sector growth and inno-
vation. It is the world’s first impact investor with over 70 years of 
experience of successfully supporting the sustainable, long-term 
growth of businesses in Africa and South Asia” (CDCa). 
Figure 11.6 shows the overall disbursement of the CDC from 
2015–2019, by geographical area and Table 11.7 reports the country 
breakdown of the overall exposure of the CDC.
Almost two-thirds of the funds disbursed by the CDC over the 
last five years have been invested in the African continent, while 
almost all the remaining financial resources went to the South 
Asian continent and only 5% was disbursed in other countries. 
Looking at the countries where the CDC invested more resourc-
es, India accounts for 27.6% of the overall CDC investments, fol-
lowed by four African countries – Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa 
and Côte d’Ivoire – each accounting for around 5% of the overall 
CDC investments. 
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Figure 11.6: CDC disbursement over the last 
five years, by geographical region 










Source: CDC website (CDCb).
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The financial resources disbursed by the CDC are generally 
for long periods, often for more than 10 years, and are aimed at 
increasing the capital flows in underdeveloped markets, partic-
ularly in fragile sectors or in those with the highest growth po-
tential (CDCc). In line with the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, the strategic prior-
ities identified in the CDC Strategic Framework 2017–2021 are 
the following:
Developmental: The main developmental goal of CDC is to erad-
icate poverty through the creation of decent jobs, in line with SDGs 
1 and 8. However, other broader impacts that are expected as a re-
sult of CDC investments are the removal of market constraints in 
energy and infrastructure, promoting access to essential goods and 
services – health and education – and increasing capital flows to 
support the process, with particular focus on women’s empower-
ment and climate change. 
Responsible: Particular attention is also paid to the quality of 
the investments, with standards defined in the ‘Code of Responsi-
ble Investing’, which reports the guidelines for environmentally, 
socially and business responsible investments. To achieve the tar-
gets, CDC provides financial resources under the principle of addi-
tionality, both in financial terms – do not supply resources that are 
already offered in the market – and in terms of value – to provide 
value beyond the capital itself, as technical assistance. 
Innovative: The CDC invests in long-term projects with higher 
developmental impacts aiming to create new markets and reinforce 
existing ones. These investments, which come at greater risk and 
where capital markets perceive a risk that’s too high to commit, are 
funded by the CDC with the provision of concessional capital, al-
ways in light of the principle of additionality.
Enduring: The CDC operations are independent from the UK 
Government and are in line with the Investment Policy and the Code 
of Responsible Investing set by DfID – now FCDO. The activity of 
the CDC is primarily based on five principles that aim to guarantee 
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the self-funding of the institution and the long-term sustainability: 
i) Accountability; ii) Proficiency; iii) Independence; iv) Continuity 
and stability; v) Financial regulation
The CDC works under the principle of capital preservation and 
therefore cannot undertake operations like first loss guarantees, 
which could break the capital preservation. As a consequence, the 
CDC does not offer provision against losses and is not allowed to 
borrow on the capital markets. This implies that the CDC can either 
participate in funds that invest in projects – intermediate invest-
ments – or can raise funding from government grants and resourc-
es coming from the aid budget. 
To maximize the impact of the intervention, the CDC channels 
funds through regional development banks, like the TDB (Trade 
and Development Bank) in Africa, as well as commercial banks, as 
both know the local/regional clients better, leading to less informa-
tion asymmetry. 
Table 11.8 presents the type of instruments used by the CDC, 
with relative disbursement and number of approved projects over 
the period 2015–2019.
Table 11.8: CDC disbursement from 2015–2019, 
by type of instrument
Instrument Disbursement
(US$ million)
Number of approved 
projects
Direct equity 1,803.7 39
Intermediated investment 1,496.2 525 (54 funds)
Direct debt 1,313.2 39
Trade finance 550 3
Direct debt, direct equity 227.4 3
Co-investments equity 7.9 1
Total 5.4 billion 610
Source: Authors’ own elaboration using CDC data.
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Direct equity investments are the CDC instrument with the high-
est disbursement from 2015–2019, with US$1.8 billion distributed 
over 39 projects only. Intermediate investments, as previously dis-
cussed, are types of operations where the CDC invests in funds that 
eventually invest directly in companies; from 2015–2019, the CDC 
invested in 54 funds that led to investments in 525 projects proposed 
by companies, for an overall amount of US$1.5 billion. 
Direct debt operations are the third type of instrument in terms 
of disbursement, with around US$1.3 billion disbursed by the CDC 
over the last five years. Finally, trade finance, combined operations of 
direct debt and direct equity and co-investment equity represent the 
minority of CDC investments, with less than US$1 billion disbursed 
over the last five years. Among CDC direct operations, hence exclud-
ing intermediated investments, we can see from Figure 11.7 that 50% 
of CDC resources are invested in direct equity operations. This is a sig-
nificant share of the overall disbursement, but is still lower than in the 
past, when the CDC used to have 80% of its direct transactions in eq-
uity. Although riskier than other types of commitments, equity invest-
ments allow the CDC to have a greater engagement with the compa-
nies. However, these imply a riskier and more volatile portfolio. The 
seven priority sectors of intervention identified by CDC are presented 
in Table 11.9, together with the share of budget allocated in 2019.
Looking at the sectorial breakdown of the 2019 disbursement 
in Table 11.9, more than half of the resources invested by the CDC 
have been directed towards financial services, while almost a quarter 
was granted for investments in infrastructure. However, it should be 
noted that many of the funds channelled to financial services would 
have been on-lent to other sectors. Food and agriculture and health 
both accounted for 3% of the overall CDC spending in 2019 while the 
category ‘Other’ also including projects with more than one sector 
of intervention, have accounted for 17% of the total disbursement. 
Looking at the composition of the overall CDC portfolio in Figure 
11.7, infrastructure is the sector where the CDC has the greatest ex-
posure, closely followed by the financial services sector.
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Table 11.9: Sectorial breakdown of CDC operations, 2019
Areas of intervention Share of disbursement
Financial services 53%
Infrastructure 23%




Construction and real estate 0%
Other 17%
2019 Disbursement 1.66 billion
Source: CDC website (CDCd).
Figure 7: Total CDC underlying portfolio, by sector (%)
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THE CDC AND COVID-19
Finance and support from institutions like the CDC have been crit-
ical during the Covid-19 pandemic and will be so for the rebuilding 
process. To achieve better alignment and coordination with other 
institutional actors, the CDC currently works in collaboration with 
the group of European Development Finance Institutions, the EDFI 
and with other institutions such as UNICEF for the distribution of 
medical products in lower and middle-income countries through a 
CDC subsidiary, MedAccess.
In light of the Covid-19 pandemic, the CDC identified three ar-
eas of focus: ‘preserve’, ‘strengthen’ and ‘rebuild’ (Covid-19 briefing 
document 2020, CDCe).
Preserve: provide working capital and technical assistance to 
the most affected sectors.
Strengthen: channel liquidity to local banks to be distributed to 
the domestic supply chains.
Rebuild: invest in long-term projects for the recovery phase.
Over the first nine months of 2020, the CDC disbursed more 
than US$650 million: US$400 million to increase liquidity in the 
markets under the ‘Strengthen’ pillar, together with health, social 
and finance programmes in Asia and Africa and US$250 million 
under the ‘Rebuild’ pillar to invest in long-term projects for the 
recovery phase. 
As a first response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the CDC also 
issued two new technical assistance and support facilities: the 
“Covid-19 Business Response Facility”, for the healthcare sector 
and the distribution of basic goods and pharmaceuticals; and the 
“Covid-19 Emergency Technical Assistance Facility”, to provide 
technical assistance and expertise during the pandemic crisis 
(CDCf). Using both facilities, over the three rounds in April, July 
and September, the CDC funded 50 projects for an overall amount 
of £4.5 million (CDCg). 
During a pandemic crisis with high levels of uncertainty, there 
is greater emphasis on loans, as they are perceived to be easier 
to roll out. Equity instruments, on the other hand, are harder to 
roll out, come with higher costs and time of approval, and are 
also harder to price given the context of uncertainty. Hence, debt 
instruments are the preferred mechanism in the initial phase of 
Covid. At the same time, in situations where companies are al-
ready highly indebted, increased debt would imply too much 
leverage for companies. In conclusion, Table 11.10 compares the 
amount disbursed by the CDC over the first nine months of 2020 
compared with the overall amount disbursed in 2019.
Table 11.10: Comparison of CDC disbursement in 2019 and 2020
2019 Jan 2020 – Sep 2020
CDC total disbursement (US$ billion) 1.66 0.65
Source: Authors’ own elaboration using CDC data and CDC website.
From January to September 2020, the CDC provided technical 
assistance to companies and disbursed more than US$650 million 
in the form of liquidity and investment as first response measures 
in light of the Covid-19 pandemic (CDC Covid-19 Briefing Report 
– see CDCh). The financial resources disbursed over the first nine 
months of 2020, equal to 40% of the overall disbursement in 2019, 
represent an important first step in supporting companies; nev-
ertheless it is very likely that additional financial resources will 
be necessary in the near future to allow for the countercyclical 
role that Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) are required 
to fulfil. 
In this sense, it becomes important for the CDC, like other bilat-
eral DFIs, to be capitalized soon and at a significant level, to meet the 
challenges both of Covid and of green and inclusive development.
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CONCLUSION
Since the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic, the IADB and the 
CDC have been very active, disbursing financial resources and pro-
viding technical assistance for governments and companies in the 
short term. The increase in activities seems far more significant in 
the case of the IADB. There is, however, the need to expand the ac-
tivities of both these financial institutions, to cope with the future 
social and economic challenges that the Covid-19 pandemic will 
bring over the next months, as well as supporting the important 
structural transformation to more dynamic, greener and more in-
clusive economies. 
In order to increase their activity, there is a need to take into 
consideration the nature, mandate and structure of these finan-
cial institutions. The IADB, as a Multilateral Development Bank 
with several states as shareholders, has a wider spectrum of duties 
around its own shareholders’ country-specific and general priori-
ties, both in the short and long term. The CDC, as a development 
finance institution owned by the UK that is geared towards funding 
the private sector in poorer countries, has a different mandate and 
mission, and therefore faces different challenges. The type of in-
struments they use are also different, in that the IADB mainly uses 
loans, whilst the focus of CDC instruments is on equity.
However, both banks face major challenges in terms of fulfill-
ing their mandates. Therefore, it seems key in both cases that their 
capital is significantly increased to allow them to fulfil their roles 
properly, and at sufficient scale.
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THE ROLE OF PUBLIC CREDIT 
PROGRAMMES IN MITIGATING THE 
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE COVID-19 
PANDEMIC: BRAZIL’S EXPERIENCE
This chapter’s objective is to examine the role that public insti-tutions play in mitigating the social and economic effects of Covid-19 in the context of transformations under way in the 
Brazilian financial system. During the pandemic, subsidized loans 
granted by both public and private banks were supported exclusive-
ly with resources from Brazil’s Federal Government. With regard to 
these resources provided, our investigation did not find substantial 
differences between the actions of public and private banks. How-
ever, these subsidized loans represent only a small fraction of total 
loans granted during the pandemic, which means that the financ-
ing of the economy was mostly sustained by private banks through 
interest rate adjustment and market mechanisms. On the one hand, 
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which are the pri-
mary source of job creation, did not receive sufficient affordable 
financial support. On the other hand, Brazil’s Federal Government 
obtained support to modify the country’s Constitution to adopt the 
controversial non-conventional monetary policies (NCMP). Among 
other decisions adopted by the Central Bank, the NCMPs offered 
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important support for private banks and financial funds. In sum, 
the secondary role played by public banks during the pandemic cri-
sis is in line with the neoliberal policy adopted by the Government, 
despite the evidence that such policies tend to deepen chronic Bra-
zilian social inequality.
INTRODUCTION
Brazil’s Ministry of Health announced the country’s first case of 
Covid-19 on February 26, 2020. Beginning in the second half of 
March, several major cities adopted social distancing measures 
to curb the pandemic. The Federal Government’s response to the 
economic effects of Covid-19 focused on three areas: (i) providing 
emergency funds to low-income families; (ii) postponing or elimi-
nating selected taxes and fees, and; (iii) offering credit and increas-
ing liquidity in the country’s financial system. 
This chapter examines the role played by public financial insti-
tutions in mitigating the pandemic’s social and economic effects in 
the context of the ongoing changes to Brazil’s financial system. The 
investigation includes: (i) details of credit lines and financing con-
ditions; (ii) identification of the segments benefitting from these 
changes; and (iii) a description of the government measures vis-à-
vis the behaviour of the financial market.
The investigation found that private financial institutions have 
been primarily responsible for the supply of credit during the 
Covid-19 pandemic, inasmuch as governmental aid programmes 
cover only a fraction of the country’s credit demands, and private 
financial institutions operate some of the credit lines supported 
by public resources. Furthermore, Brazil’s National Congress, by 
adopting the 106th amendment to the country’s constitution, al-
lowed for the adoption of so-called non-conventional monetary 
policies. Thus, banks were allowed to take out loans from Brazil’s 
Central Bank backed by private securitized credit portfolios and 
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corporate debt securities. Similarly, public banks have bought cred-
it portfolios from private medium-sized banks and quotas from debt 
funds, with the purpose of increasing economic liquidity.  
All these public measures are in line with the principles of the 
macroeconomic policies adopted after 2015, which focus on reduc-
ing state intervention in the country’s economy. This contrasts with 
Brazil’s experience during the 2008 economic crisis, when public 
banks provided credit to support economic development (Vascon-
celos et al. 2018; Deos and Mendonça 2017). 
In April, the Federal Government released measures to expand 
private banks’ liquidity a few weeks after the first lockdowns, 
whereas Government loan programmes only reached small firms 
in June. Central Bank statistics show that loans have been grant-
ed mainly to large companies, and small- and medium-sized busi-
nesses have been facing credit restrictions, usually related to their 
credit history or lack of sufficient guarantees. Such firms have also 
had to contend with higher interest rates in the loans provided 
by private banks. Although Brazil’s benchmark interest rate has 
continued to fall in recent years due to the country’s economic 
slowdown, credit costs remain higher in light of the challenges 
imposed by the Covid-19 crisis. 
The movement of credit markets undoubtably depends on other 
Government policies, especially policies for direct income transfers 
and productive investments intended to restore economic devel-
opment. However, Government policy seems to depend on a mar-
ket-based approach, meaning that Brazil may face high unemploy-
ment rates and low economic growth for the foreseeable future.
This chapter is organized into four sections. The first outlines 
the methodological approach. The next gives details related to 
lines of credit provided by Brazil’s Federal Government to illus-
trate both the scope and the beneficiaries of Government aid pro-
grammes. The third section analyzes Brazil’s domestic credit sup-




CONTENDING VIEWS AND METHODOLOGY
The predominant neoliberal view of the role of public banks in 
the economy is based on the theory of financial repression adopt-
ed by Shaw (1973) and McKinnon (1973). They argue that savings 
allocation is artificially distorted by the actions of public banks, 
which in turn leads to inefficient financial markets and obstruct-
ed economic growth. According to these authors, the state should 
only guarantee the security, stability and predictability of the finan-
cial system so as to reduce costs and risks for economic agents. Still 
within the orthodox economic field, Stiglitz (1993) allows for some 
governmental intervention in specific situations, such as in the case 
of a lack of long-term credit supply, or in order to avoid banking 
insolvency during systemic crises.
Economists not aligned with neoliberalism, such as Mazzucato 
and Penna (2016), argue that Stiglitz’s approach restricts knowledge 
regarding the role of public banks. They believe that Stiglitz’s inter-
pretation regarding the theory of market failures is static and limited, 
since it focuses exclusively on a cost-effective perspective, which in 
turn implies a specific design for public institutions. From Stiglitz’s 
perspective, the use of public banks as a countercyclical economic 
tool is unjustifiable. Mazzucato and Penna emphasis the market and 
value creating the potential of public banks and patient finance. 
Castro (2008), an economist from the institutionalist school of eco-
nomics, argues that the financial system must contribute to economic 
development without creating imbalances or weaknesses in financial 
markets. She defends the use of public banks to mitigate the effects 
of economic crises. Similarly, Yeyati et al. (2007) show that, in periods 
of economic uncertainty, private banks usually cut the supply of cred-
it as a defensive measure. Supported by the principles of Keynesian 
and institutionalist lines of economic thought, their research discusses 
the supply of credit to businesses and individuals. In methodological 
terms, it focuses on small and medium-sized firms because of their 
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important roles in job creation, as well as on governmental measures 
directed toward firms of this size. A detailed accounting of credit lines 
in Brazil only exists for those managed by the large public banks (see 
Box 12.1), although, at a regional level, the country depends on other 
medium-sized public banks. Both public and private financial insti-
tutions operate most of the measures related to the Federal Govern-
ment’s credit provisions. In some cases, public banks manage credit 
funds operated by private banks. This chapter analyzes government 
measures introduced between March and July 2020.
THE PROFILE OF GOVERNMENT CREDIT PROGRAMMES 
The current configuration of Brazil’s financial system has its roots in 
reforms that took place in the 1960s and 1990s. In the 1960s, the Fed-
eral Government undertook a wide-ranging reform that included 
measures ranging from the creation of the country’s Central Bank 
to the design of specialized institutions and mechanisms focused 
on long-term funding. The primary changes of the 1990s included 
the internationalization of Brazil’s financial system, support for pri-
vate banks and the privatization of several regional public banks. 
Regarding private institutions, in the 1990s Brazil’s Federal 
Government created PROER (Programme for the Stimulation of 
Restructuring and Strengthening the National Financial System 
– Programa de Estímulo a Reestruturação e ao Fortalecimento do 
Sistema Financeiro Nacional), a programme dedicated to support-
ing private banks through the acquisition of toxic assets and the 
creation of guarantee funds so as to support specific banking prod-
ucts. Also in the 1990s, the Federal Government created the PROES 
(Programme for Incentivizing the Reduction of the Public Sector in 
Baking Activity –  Programa de Incentivo a Redução do Setor Públi-
co Estadual na Atividade Bancária) with the intention of privatizing 
or closing public banks created by individual Brazilian states (see 
Vidotto 2005; Araujo 2001; Araujo and Cintra 2011).
Alberto de Oliveira
254 
Box 12.1: Large Brazilian Public Banks
Banco do Brasil (Bank of Brazil – BB) was created as a public 
bank during Brazil’s colonial period, and it served as the country’s 
monetary authority until the 1960s, when the Central Bank 
was created. In 1996, the Federal Government’s privatization 
programme opened its capital. Currently, the Federal 
Government is the bank’s majority shareholder, while remaining 
shares are divided between domestic (23.9%) and foreign 
(25.6%) investors. Banco do Brasil is one of the main institutions 
responsible for rural credit in Brazil (see Graner et al. 2019).
The Caixa Econômica Federal (Federal Economic Fund – CEF) 
was also created as a public bank during the colonial period, 
but its importance was accentuated in the 1980s, when it 
assumed primary responsibility for operating Brazil’s housing 
credit programme, as well as for major investments in urban 
infrastructure and basic sanitation. Today, Brazil’s Federal 
Government holds 100% of stocks in CEF, which is responsible 
for approximately 70% of the country’s housing-related credit.   
Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social 
(National Bank for Economic and Social Development – 
BNDES) is a fully public bank and it was created in the 1950s to 
support long-term investments. In the 1990s, BNDES became 
the primary operator of Brazil’s privatization policy. BNDESpar 
is the subsidiary of BNDES for operating large investments 
through the acquisition of shares or private securities. In the 
2000s, the Federal Government undertook a major capitalization 
of BNDES (Torres Filho and Costa 2013), but beginning in 2016, 
the expansion of BNDES credits was reversed. In 2019, BNDES 
transferred US$32 billion to the Treasury (BNDES 2019), which is 
the equivalent of 65% of the World Bank’s disbursements (US$49 
billion) during the same period (World Bank 2020).
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The measures announced by Brazil’s Federal Government to 
mitigate the economic effects of the pandemic have affected indi-
viduals as well as companies. Banks have offered short-term lines 
of credit and have postponed loan payments to individuals. In ad-
dition to offering companies new lines of credit and postponing 
loan payments (see Table 12.1), public banks have bought credit 
portfolio from medium-sized banks. Similarly, BNDES has bought 
quotas from debt capital funds oriented to provide credit to small- 
and medium-sized firms. BNDES and the CEF (Caixa Econômica 
Federal) are management guarantee funds for supporting credit 
operations made by both public and private financial institutions. 
Finally, health institutions, as well as municipal and state govern-
ments, have been supported by credit lines with interest rates be-
low market rates.
Table 12.1: Credit Postponement measures
Institution Beneficiaries Product name (1) Benefit










CEF Firms Working capital 





interest) for 90 





Institution Product name (1) Benefit




reduction (for 90 
days) from 4.95% 
p.m. to 2.90% p.m.




reduction (for 90 
days) from 7.7% 





reduction (for 90 
days) from 2.29% 
p.m. to 2.17% p.m.
Short-term loans 
(Crédito Consignado) 
regarding new loans 
Interest rate 
reduction (for 90 
days). During this 
period, fees charged 
begin at 0.99% 
p.m. These fees may 
vary depending on 
the guarantees. In 
Jan 2020, the 






rate reduction (for 
90 days) from 2.10% 
p.m. to 1.99% p.m.
Sources: CEF and BNDES websites; legislation related to aid programmes; legislation 
provided by monetary authorities.
Brazil’s Federal Government has directed most of its aid pack-
ages towards small- and medium-sized enterprises, although 
Government aid programmes have also supported large compa-
nies. Credit lines are classified in three categories: (i) support for 
employment (BRL 17 billion); (ii) support for agricultural activ-
ities (BRL 34 billion); and (iii) support for working capital (BRL 
21 billion).
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In terms of employment support, the Federal Government creat-
ed the PESE programme (Programme for Emergency Employment 
Support – Programa Emergencial de Suporte ao Emprego) in order 
to finance payearoll expenses to firms with annual revenues be-
tween BRL 360,000 and BRL 10 million. For a period of four months, 
companies can take out loans of up to two monthly minimum wag-
es per employee. BNDES is the official manager of the PESE pro-
gramme, but other public and private commercial banks are also 
allowed to operate this credit line. 
BNDES manages and is the direct operator for medium-sized and 
large companies with annual revenues above BRL 10 million. Other 
public and private banks provide loans supported by the PESE pro-
gramme for businesses of all sizes. The interest rate charged by the 
PESE programme (3.75%/year is below market rate (usually above 
11%/year) and the Federal Government will share losses on these 
loans (85%) with bank operators (15%). 
The PESE programme was launched in April, but by the end 
of June only 12.5% (or BRL 4.3 billion) of its original resources 
had been contracted (Bacen 2020). Monetary authorities and the 
media argued that most small business did not have sufficient 
guarantees or good enough credit history to take out PESE loans 
(see Datt 2020; CN-Covid-19 2020). Despite the obstacles that these 
firms face, most may have chosen to dismiss their employees in-
stead of taking out loans to support their payearolls. According to 
the Government’s statistics bureau (IBGE 2020), 8.9 million jobs 
were lost between the first quarter (Jan-March 2020) and the sec-
ond (April-June 2020). In addition, a survey conducted by SEBRAE/
FGV (2020) showed that 12% of small firms laid off their employ-
ees. In July 2020, BRL 17 billion from PESE’s original budget (BRL 
34 billion) was transferred to the PRONAMPE programme, which 
will be discussed further below. 
In relation to agricultural activities, Brazil’s Department of 
Agriculture or MAPA (the Ministry of Agriculture, Stockbreed-
ing and Supplies – Ministério da Agricultura Pecuária e Abaste-
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cimento) released new credit for two existing rural funding pro-
grammes: PRONAF (National Support Programme for Family 
Agriculture – Programa Nacional de Apóio a Agricultura Familiar) 
and PRONAMP (Support Programme for Midsize Rural Producers 
– Programa de Apoio ao Médio Produtor Rural). PRONAF is ded-
icated to small rural producers, while PRONAMP is oriented to-
wards midsize producers. The programmes’ interest rates range 
from 4% to 6%/year, depending on the size of the specific rural 
producer. The credit limit is BRL 20,000 for small producers and 
BRL 40,000 for midsize producers. Farmers also have the option 
to postpone payments on contracts signed before the pandemic 
(MAPA 2020).
In recent years, Government-provided credit lines with con-
trolled interest rates have been replaced by loans based on market 
rates. Servo (2019) shows that the share of controlled interest rate 
loans declined from 92.6% to 71.6% between the periods of 2014/15 
and 2018/19. In addition, Zaia (2020) reports that market interest 
rates for rural producers have increased during the Covid-19 crisis. 
These rates were between 6.5% and 8.7%/year before the crisis, but 
now they may be as high as 10.5%/year.
Concerning working capital credit lines, Brazil’s Federal Gov-
ernment instituted PRONAMPE (National Programme Supporting 
Small and Microbusinesses – Programa Nacional de Apoio as Mi-
croempresas e Empresas de Pequeno Porte), a loan programme ori-
ented toward small businesses with annual revenues between BRL 
360,000 and BRL 4.8 million. PRONAMPE’s credit limit is 30% of a 
business’s total revenue for 2019. The financing term is 36 months, 
and lenders have an additional grace period of eight months. The 
interest rate is based on the SELIC (the Brazilian benchmark inter-
est rate) plus 1.25%/year. Intermediary banks may charge admin-
istrative fees, which are to be negotiated between borrowers and 
lenders. In August 2020, the SELIC was 2.0%/year. Loan funding is 
provided by operator banks, but loans are 100% guaranteed by a 
governmental fund called FGO (Operator Guarantee Fund – Fundo 
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Garantidor de Operações), managed by Banco do Brasil. Around 
90% of the resources from the first phase of PRONAMPE (BRL 15.9 
billion) were contracted in the programme’s first few weeks. In 
July 2020, another BRL 17 billion was transferred to FGO from the 
PESE programme. 
Public banks have also expanded their own credit lines, but 
these loans are more expensive than those provided by governmen-
tal aid programmes. BNDES made BRL 5 billion available to busi-
nesses with annual revenues of up to BRL 300 billion, and another 
BRL 2 billion to companies with annual revenues above BRL 300 
billion. The costs of these loans depend on lenders’ profiles (see 
Table 2). Costs include a fixed interest rate for BNDES (from 1% to 
1.5%/year), in addition to a variable interest rate (TLP or SELIC), in 
addition to interest rates charged by intermediary banks based on 
borrowers’ credit histories and the guarantees they offer. The TLP 
(Long-Term Rate – Taxa de Longo Prazo) is a long-term interest rate, 
based on a fixed interest rate plus an inflation adjustment. The total 
cost of BNDES loans may reach 11%/year (Datt 2020). BNDES has 
also provided BRL 2 billion to healthcare institutions. The total cost 
is determined by the SELIC rate plus 1%/year (BNDES fees), and an 
additional 4.26%/year (risk component).
The CEF has been offering working capital credit lines guaran-
teed by a fund called FAMPE (Guarantee Fund for Small and Mi-
crobusiness – Fundo de Aval às Micro e Pequenas Empresas). Its 
interest rates are between 1.19% p.m. and 1.59% p.m. (per month), 
equivalent to a range of 15% to 20%/year. The CEF also makes work-
ing capital credit lines without FAMPE available, for which its inter-
est rates begin at 0.57% p.m. to 1.51% p.m., depending on borrow-
ers’ risk profiles (see Table 12.2).
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Table 12.2: Additional public financial 
institution resources for firms







up to BRL 300 
million
Financing up to 
BRL 70 million 
Term: 60 months. 
Grace period: 24 
months
Interest Rate = 
TLP or SELIC*
BNDES fees = 
1.25%/year
Intermediation 








above BRL 300 
million
Financing up to 
BRL 200 million 
Term: 48 months. 
Grace period: 12 
months




















Financing up to 
BRL 150 million 
Term: 60 months. 
Grace period: 
from 3 to 24 
months
Interest Rate = 
TLP***
BNDES rate = 
1.0%/year










BRL 360,000 up to 
BRL 10 million)
Financing of 















from 0.57% p.m. 
to 1.51% p.m.






workers – annual 
income up to 
BRL 81,000;
(ME) Micro-firms 
– annual revenue 
up to BRL 360,000
(EPP) Small firms 







Term: from 24 to 
36 months. 
Grace period: 
from 9 to 12 
months  
MEI = 1.59% p.m. 
ME = 1.39% p.m.   











Credit lines up 
to BRL 20,000 
(PRONAF) or up 












360,000 and BRL 
4.8 million
Loans provided 
by public or 
private banks, 
with controlled 
interest rate. The 
loans are entirely 









Sources: CEF and BNDES websites; legislation related to the aid programmes; legis-
lation provided by monetary authorities.
Notes: * The amounts indicated represent those made available by the banks, and 
not the sum of the loans contracted. ** Administrative fees charged by banks are not 
included. *** In August 2020, the SELIC rate was 2.00%/YEAR, while the TLP rate was 
1.78%/YEAR plus inflation.
In an effort to increase economic liquidity, the Federal Gov-
ernment has supported private financial institutions. BNDESpar, 
which is a subsidiary of BNDES, made BRL 4 billion available for 
purchasing quotas from debt capital funds. These purchases are 
limited to BRL 500 million per fund, and BNDESpar is allowed to 
buy up to 90% of the total quotas. Debt capital funds that benefit 
from BNDESpar resources must steer their credit operations toward 
small- and medium-sized firms with annual revenues of up to BRL 
300 million (BNDESpar 2020) (see Table 12.3). 
During the 2008 crisis, resources were transferred to major banks 
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in response to a single account holder’s perception regarding the vul-
nerability of small- and medium-sized banks. However, this migra-
tion of resources did not increase credit offers for the entire economy, 
because major banks retained a significant portion of these resourc-
es (Schiozer and Oliveira 2013). To avoid the situation that occurred in 
2008, that CEF made BRL 30 billion available to purchase credit port-
folios from private midsize banks to reinforce their financial health. 
Small- and medium-sized banks play an important role in offering 
credit to small and medium-sized companies (see Table 12.3). 
Both initiatives – the purchasing of quotas and portfolios respec-
tively from debt capital funds and midsize banks – are among the 
typical policies directed to the financial market. According to Bra-
zil’s Federal Government, the deconcentration process is a way to 
increase the competition and efficiency of the financial system. As 
such, policies to support midsize banks and other financial institu-
tions are among the Government’s strategies. However, this is not 
the only way to increase the competition in the financial system. 
The increase of credit supply by public banks under competitive 
conditions may be an important stimulus to improve the behavior 
of private financial institutions. 
Additionally, the Federal Government created the PEAC pro-
gramme (Special Programme for Access to Credit – Programa Especial 
de Acesso ao Crédito) in order to offer complementary guarantees to 
borrowers through a fund guarantee called FGI (the Investment Fund 
Guarantee – Fundo Garantidor de Investimentos), which is managed 
by BNDES. FGI was designed for businesses with annual revenues of 
up to BRL 300 million, and its coverage may comprise up to 30% of 
loans for small business, and up to 20% of loans for midsize firms. 
The Federal Government justified the guarantee funds it made avail-
able by invoking obstacles faced by small- and medium-sized busi-
nesses in accessing banking credit. In late April 2020, a SEBRAE/FGV 
survey (2020) showed that only 14% of small firms were successful in 
contracting loans within Brazil’s banking networks.  
In addition to credit lines and guarantee funds supported by 
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public resources, the Federal Government is offering fiscal incen-
tives to private financial institutions. In July 2020, the Government 
created a working capital credit programme called CGPE (Giro Cap-
ital for Business Preservation – Capital de Giro para a Preservação 
de Empresas), which is directed toward firms with annual revenues 
of up to BRL 300 million. The CGPE programme does not include 
public resources, and it will be operated by public and private 
banks. Its interest rates and other loan parameters will be negoti-
ated directly between borrowers and lenders. However, banks are 
allowed to seek reimbursement for some of their losses related to 
CGPE operations through two federal taxes: the Imposto de Renda 
Pessoa Jurídica (Corporate Income Tax) and the Contribuição Social 
sobre Lucro Líquido (Social Fund for Liquid Profits).
Table 12.3: Public financial institutions’ indirect 
measures to expand the credit supply
Institution Amount* Target companies Expected benefits
BNDES BRL 
4 billion
Purchase of quotas from 
private credit funds directed 
to small and medium-sized 
firms with annual revenues 
up to BRL 300 million
Increase economic liquidity 
CEF BRL 
30 billion
Purchase of credit portfolio 
from midsize financial 
institutions related to payroll 
loans (crédito consignado) and 
automobile loans
Increase economic liquidity 




Firms with annual revenue 
from BRL 360,000 and BRL 
300 million. The guarantee 
coverage is limited to 30% of 
loan to small business and 
20% to midsize firms
Increase credit offerings 
to small and medium-sized 
firms 
Sources: CEF and BNDES websites; legislation related to the aid programmes; legis-
lation provided by monetary authorities.




In accessing banking credit, small and medium-sized busi-
nesses not only face a lack of guarantees, they also must contend 
with higher interest rates. A report by Infinity Asset Management 
(Menezes 2020) shows that interest rates negotiated in Brazil are 
among the highest in the world. 
Brazil’s Central Bank classifies credit lines into two distinct cat-
egories: market credit lines (or free lines) and targeted credit lines. 
Interest rates and other parameters for market credit lines are free-
ly negotiated between lenders and borrowers, whereas funding 
for targeted credit lines are regulated by the state, meaning that 
the Government can define interest rates and other parameters. 
Most of the targeted credit lines are made available through pub-
lic banks, but some are provided by private banks in accordance 
with definitions set by Brazil’s monetary authorities. According to 
governmental policy, targeted credit lines may be provided with 
or without controlled interest rates. Targeted loans with controlled 
interest rates may be contracted by individuals or firms, and their 
costs are usually below the market rate. 
Since 2017, the benchmark interest rate (SELIC) has decreased 
as a result of low economic growth, which has had important im-
pacts in market interest rates. In June 2020, the market interest 
rate for working capital lines was 11.2%. This is lower than the 
average 2019 rate (16.4%). In June, the interest rate charged by 
BNDES through its working capital lines decreased from 6.6% to 
4.1% in response to federal government mandates. The same oc-
curred in relation to investment credit lines provided by BNDES 
(see Table 12.4).
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Table 12.4: Interest rates according to credit line*
Credit lines 2019 average Jan/20 Feb/20 Mar/20 Apr/20 May/20 Jun/20












33.1 30.8 30.7 30.0 27.7  25.4 25.2 
Working capital 16.3 16.0 15.1 15.0 13.6 12.4 11.2 
Targeting credit lines (with controlled interest rates) - /YEAR percentages
Rural producers 6.8 6.2 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.6 5.2 




12.1 16.3 13.3 11.0 6.7 6.6 4.1 
Investment 9.3 10.4 8.3 8.4 7.4 8.2 6.5 
Agribusiness 7.4 7.4 7.3 7.8 7.1 6.7 7.5 
Sources: Central Bank/press release (Bacen 2020a).
Notes: * Rates are calculated based on different types of credit. They represent the 
weighted average of the respective portfolios. 
Finally, the Federal Government is also negotiating aid programmes 
to large companies through BNDES (see Neder 2020; ANEEL 2020; Rit-
tner 2020a; Rittner 2020b). The Federal Government may release BRL 
4 billion to urban transport companies. According the ANEEL (the Na-
tional Electric Energy Agency – Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica), 
Brazil’s energy regulation agency, a pool of banks (BNDES included) 
released BRL 14.8 billon to energy distribution companies in an at-
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tempt to mitigate losses related to the pandemic crisis.
In summary, the Federal Government is offering credit lines at 
below market rates through public and private banks to small- and 
medium-sized businesses, in addition to improving guarantee funds 
managed by public banks in order to increase private banks’ sup-
ply of credit to firms with difficulties accessing financing. In other 
words, public and private banks utilized resources made available 
by Brazil’s Federal Government to attend to the credit necessities 
of businesses. Therefore, these financial institutions acted only as 
operators of public resources. The final borrowers benefitting from 
federal programmes are indifferent as to whether their financing is 
obtained through a public, semi-public or private bank. In the case 
of the CGPE programme, public and private banks used their own 
resources in credit operations. However, any eventual losses that 
banks sustain in operations supported by CGPE will be compensat-
ed through fiscal renunciation. The question here, then, is whether 
these initiatives are sufficient to attend to small- and medium-sized 
firms. The following section will present statistics regarding the 
amount of credit made available to firms and individuals by the 
public and private sectors during the pandemic.
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENTAL CREDIT PROGRAMMES 
IN BRAZIL’S FINANCIAL SYSTEM
Keynesian and post-Keynesian economists (Keynes 1973; Minski 
1986) argue that periods of uncertainty are marked by liquidity pref-
erence: the supply of credit decreases and interest rates rise due 
to defensive decisions made by financial institutions. Thus, the key 
question is: how are governmental measures impacting Brazil’s fi-
nancial system during the Covid-19 pandemic crisis? 
In March 2020, when social distancing measures were initiat-
ed in several Brazilian cities, credit concessions to firms and indi-
viduals moved in different directions. In March, credit operations 
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to firms grew 59.7%, from BRL 140.8 billion to BRL 224.8 billion. 
However, beginning in April, these concessions returned to levels 
observed in 2019. In contrast, credit concessions to individuals de-
creased by approximately 20% in April and May, before returning to 
2019 levels in June, probably as a reaction to the economic reopen-
ings taking place in certain major cities (see Figure 12.1).
Figure 12.1: Credit concessions in the first half of 2019 and 2020*
Source: Central Bank/press release (Bacen 2020a).
Notes: * In BRL billion as of 2020, June. Inflator: IPCA.
Loans contracted by firms and individuals have similar values in 
terms of total concessions. In June, total loans contracted by indi-
viduals accounted for BRL166.2 billion, while those made to firms 
totaled BRL 155.7 billion. Targeted operations with controlled inter-
est rates to individuals are concentrated in housing programmes, 
while loans with controlled interest rates to firms are oriented to-
ward rural and BNDES programmes. Despite the growth that oc-
curred beginning in March, the share of targeted loans to firms in 
June (BRL 15.1 billion) accounted for approximately 10% of the total 
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Table 12.5: Concessions by beneficiary  











Jan/19 283.8 159.8 124.0 116.6 7.4
Feb/19 284.1 155.0 129.1 121.3 7.8
Mar/19 297.3 155.4 141.9 134.7 7.1
Apr/19 304.3 168.7 135.7 129.2 6.5
May/19 329.3 177.8 151.5 143.7 7.8
Jun/19 318.3 166.5 151.8 141.5 10.2
2020
Jan/20 322.5 184.0 138.5 133.1 5.4
Feb/20 308.7 167.9 140.8 135.4 5.4
Mar/20 396.8 172.0 224.8 216.3 8.5
Apr/20 296.0 140.6 155.4 143.7 11.7
May/20 287.2 145.5 141.8 127.4 14.3
Jun/20 321.9 166.2 155.7 140.6 15.1 
Source: Central Bank/Press release (Bacen 2020a). 
The total of targeted credit operations grew during the pan-
demic crisis. The sum of targeted operations between March and 
June 2020 was BRL 48.553 million. During the same period in 2019, 
these amounts reached BRL 31.662 million. Compared to 2019, ap-
proximately 45% of the new targeting operations were granted by 
BNDES. BNDES’s working capital concessions grew from BRL 122 
million to BRL 1.76 trillion between the periods of March-June 2019 
and March-June 2020. Other credit lines with controlled interest 
rates also showed relevant growth: rural credit increased to 42.4% 
and real estate credit grew to 75.7% between the periods of March-
June 2019 and March-June 2020 (see Table 12.6). 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In addition to the regular channel of communications regard-
ing monetary statistics (Bacen 2020a), the Central Bank created 
a new channel (Bacen 2020b) to divulge resources and measures 
related to the Covid-19 pandemic. Statistics from the new channel 
were first published on March 16, when most Brazilian cities be-
gan their lockdowns. Through to July 24, most loans were provid-
ed by private financial institutions to major companies. Only 15% 
of total loans (BRL 598.4 billion) were supported by public banks. 
Table 12.7a shows that major public banks lent BRL 38.9 billion 
to large companies, which is slightly more than the amount made 
available to small businesses (BRL 32.5 billion), whereas midsize 
firms borrowed BRL 16.4 billion from public banks.
Table 12.7a: New credit concessions between March 16 and July 24
Financial institution








Large institutions – public 38,955 16,444 32,495 87,894 
Large institutions – private 238,251 41,868 43,862 323,981 
Other institutions 108,683 52,353 25,503 186,539 
Total 385,889 110,665 101,860 598,414 
Source: Banco Central do Brasil (BACEN 2020b).
During the same period, BRL 195.2 billion went toward renewing 
existing loan contracts. Major public banks were responsible for 25% 
of total loan renewals (BRL 49.4 billion), and the majority of their re-
newals benefited small and medium-sized businesses. Among major 
private banks, renewals were mainly directed to large companies (see 
Table 12.7b). Additionally, the deferral of installments reached BRL 
59.9 billion. Major public banks were responsible for 21% of total post-
ponements, which mainly benefited small businesses (see Table 12.7c). 
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Table 12.7b: Loan renewals between March 16 and July 24 
Financial institution







Large institutions – public 8,450 18,970 21,967 49,387 
Large institutions – private 82,051 17,369 13,123 112,543 
Other institutions 20,433 8,767 4,118 33,318 
Total 110,934 45,106 39,208 195,248 
Source: Banco Central do Brasil (BACEN 2020b). 
(1) Include operations with new resources.
Table 12.7c: Postponement of payments  









Large institutions – public 2,176 3,443 7,054 12,673 
Large institutions – private 11,743 9,801 6,127 27,671 
Other institutions 2,788 14,235 2,555 19,578 
Total 16,707 27,479 15,736 59,922 
Source: Banco Central do Brasil (BACEN 2020b).
Through to July 29, loans provided through the Federal Govern-
ment’s programmes totalled BRL 31.5 billion, which represents 
a small fraction of the country’s financial markets’ total cred-
it operations (BRL 598.4 billion) between March and July 2020. 
PRONAMPE’s credit line was the most in-demand among govern-
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ment programmes, due to its attractive costs (see Table 12.8a). 
BNDES and the CEF were responsible for 51.2% of total conces-
sions related to Federal Government programmes, while private 
banks contributed 29.7% of total concessions. Banco do Brasil, 
which is a semi-public institution, provided 18.2% of the total 
amount of public credit programmes (see Table 12.8b). 






BNDES/FGI 20,000 4,139 20.7%
FAMPE 12,000 1,880 15.7%
PESE (2) 17,000 4,529 26.6%
PRONAMPE/FGO** 32,900 18,696 56.8%
Total 81,900 29,244 35.7%
Source: Economic Ministry (Ministério da Economia, 2020).
Notes: * Concessions from April 8 to July 29. ** In July of 2020, BRL 14 billion was 
transferred from the PESE to PRONAMPE programme.
Table 12.8b: Federal Government credit  




Public banks 16,169 51.2%
Caixa Econômica Federal 9,476 30.0%
BNDES (2) 6,475 20.5%
Banco Desenvolvimento de Minas Gerais 215 0.7%
Banco Desenvolvimento do Rio Grande do Sul 3 0.0%
Semi-public banks (1) 6,013 19.0%
Banco do Brasil 5,740 18.2%
Banco da Amazonia 257 0.8%
Banco do Nordeste 16 0.1%
Private banks 9,395 29.7%
Itau 5,183 16.4%
Banco cooperativo do Brasil (cooperative credit) 1,248 4.0%
Santander 957 3.0%





Source: Economic Ministry – Ministério da Economia (2020) (1) Concessions from 
April 8 to July 29 (2) include working capital credit lines.
Notes: * Data from the semi-public banks were separated from the ones from the 
public banks. In some cases, the semi-public banks may operate as a private bank in 
response to the shareholders’ demands. 
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New concessions for families contracted between March 16 and 
July 24 totalled BRL 273.8 billion. These loans were granted in al-
most equal measure by large public and private banks (BRL 99.0 
and 88.5 billion, respectively). Another BRL 122.3 billion was used 
to renew loans taken out by families. In some cases, such renew-
als included granting additional resources. Additionally, the post-
ponement of payments related to credit agreements with families 
reached BRL 41.7 billion (BACEN 2020b). 
Finally, the Central Bank made BRL 1.274 trillion – equivalent 
to 17.5% of Brazil’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – available to 
increase the liquidity of the country’s financial system (BACEN 
2020b). Some of these measures are common in financial crises, 
such as loosening mandatory requirements on reserves (BRL 135 
billion) and on term deposits (BRL 70 billion). However, by adopting 
constitutional amendment number 106 on May 7, 2020, Brazil’s Na-
tional Congress allowed the Central Bank to operate with public and 
private bonds in the context of so-called non-conventional mone-
tary policy. Thus, the Central Bank made BRL 91 billion available to 
debêntures (private debt securities) operations and BRL 670 billion 
to loans backed by Letras Financeiras (private debt securities), all 
guaranteed through credit operations.
The Central Bank also created the NDPGE (Novo Depósito a 
Prazo com Garantias Especiais – New Term Deposit with Special 
Guarantees), which is a debt security supported by the FGC (Fun-
do Garantidor de Créditos – Credit Guarantee Fund). Through the 
NDPGE small- and medium-sized banks may attract investors to 
support their credit lines. The Central Bank estimates in BRL 200 
billion the effects over the credit supply derived by the NDPGE 
(see Table 12.9). 
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Table 12.9: Conventional and non-conventional 
Central Bank measures
Measures BRL billion
Reduction in reserve requirement ratio on time deposits (from 31% to 25%) 
and regulation enhancement on liquidity coverage ratio (LCR)
135
Additional reduction on reserve requirements on term deposit 70
More flexibility on LCA regulation (LCA = debt securities) 2
Reduction of requirements related to targeting resources (housing 
programme)
56
Loans backed by Letras Financeiras guaranteed by credit operations 670
New Term Deposit with special guarantee (NDPGE) 200
One-year term repos backed by federal securities 50
Loans backed by debentures 91 
Total 1.274
Source: Central Bank (BACEN 2020b).
Many countries used non-conventional monetary policies 
(NCMP) during the 2008 subprime crisis, but the effects of such 
policies are controversial. On the one hand, defenders of NCMP 
argue that the reduction of distortions on secondary markets may 
stimulate the supply of credit, thereby resulting in positive effects 
on labour markets and economic growth (Meinusch and Tillmann 
2016; Anderson and Gascon 2009). On the other hand, studies sug-
gest that its effects may not be sustainable in the long term (Gam-
bacorta et al. 2014). Additionally, experiences from Japan show 
that NCMP have contributed to increases in income inequality 




In recent years, the Government’s attention has been directed al-
most exclusively to the reformulation of judicial and constitutional 
orders to reinforce fiscal austerity policies. In this context, the role 
played by public banks during the pandemic could not be any more 
different. Loans made with Brazil’s Federal Government resources 
only attended to a small fraction of these demands. Both public and 
private banks intermediated in these subsidized loans. Final bor-
rowers were indifferent as to whether their financing was obtained 
through a public or private bank. Such operations may even be ad-
vantageous to certain private banks given the low risks involved and 
the potential to attract new clients. 
Pronouncements of authorities from Brazil’s Central Bank and 
the Ministry of the Treasury highlight the virtuosic role played by 
private financial institutions. However, this chapter shows that the 
private financial institutions were supported in many ways by the 
Brazil’s Federal Government during the pandemic crisis. Actions are 
in progress to replace public funding systems by private ones. 
A series of measures aimed at the long-term strengthening of pri-
vate financing is underway, with the secondary market for private 
titles playing a standout role. Additionally, Brazil’s Federal Govern-
ment obtained support to modify the country’s constitution to make 
the adoption of controversial non-conventional monetary policies 
(NCMPs) viable. While NCMPs were already in effect in April 2020, 
loans supported by the Government only reached small businesses 
in July 2020. There is no doubt that the measures adopted by Brazil’s 
Central Bank were favourable for investment funds and banks. 
However, BNDES’ financing capacity is continually being re-
duced because of the transfer of resources to the Federal Govern-
ment, as well as modifications in its interest rates over the long 
term. Semi-public banks, especially the Bank of Brazil, already act 
in accordance with private sector logic. Brazil’s congress is debating 
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Provisional Measure 995, which opens lucrative segments of busi-
ness under the CEF’s control to the private sector.
The economic recovery depends on other Government poli-
cies, especially policies for direct income transfers and productive 
investments. However, during the pandemic, while the primary 
sectors responsible for job creation did not receive enough finan-
cial support, a series of measures adopted by Brazil’s Federal Gov-
ernment have benefited the financial sector. In accessing banking 
credit, small- and medium-sized businesses not only face a lack of 
credit, they must also contend with higher interest rates. In this 
context, Brazil may face high unemployment rates and low eco-
nomic growth for the foreseeable future.
Although a full discussion of the transformations under way in 
the Brazilian financial market is beyond the scope of this chapter, 
this review of the measures adopted by Brazil’s Federal Government 
and its peculiarities allow us to see that the market-based approach 
is not the answer to the current crisis.
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Brasileiro de Apóio às Micro e Pequenas Empresas (SEBRAE). https://fgvpro-
jetos.fgv.br/sites/fgvprojetos.fgv.br/files/credito_no_brasil_para_mpes_
em_tempo_de_covid19_v08_site_1.pdf.
Servo, F. 2019. “Evolução do crédito rural nos últimos anos-safra.” Car-
ta de Conjuntura, 43(2). 1-8, IPEA. http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bit-
stream/11058/9286/1/cc_43_nt_evolu%c3%a7%c3%a3o%20do%20
cr%c3%a9dito_rural.pdf.
Shaw, E.S. 1973. Financial deepening in economic development. New York, Ox-
ford University Press.
Stiglitz, J.E. 1993. “The role of the state in financial markets.” In The World 
Bank Economic Review, 7 (sup.1), 19-52.
Torres Filho, E.T., & da Costa, F.N. 2013. “Financiamento de longo prazo no 
Brasil: um mercado em transformação.” Texto para Discussão no. 1843, 
IPEA. https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/121601/1/821942573.pdf
Valor Econômico. 2019. “Ranking dos 100 maiores bancos do Brasil.” https://
www.valor.com.br/valor1000/2018/ranking100maioresbancos.
Vasconcelos, D.S., Klaumann, A.P. and Ipiranga, A.H. 2018. “Bancos públi-
cos e política anticíclica: uma análise exploratória com indicadores de 
alavancagem e liquidez da Caixa Econômica Federal, Banco do Brasil e 
BNDES, no período de 2005 a 2014.” Textos de Economia, 21(2), 26-49.
Vidotto, C.A. 2005. “O PROER no Centro da Reestruturação Bancária Brasilei-
ra dos Anos Noventa.” Texto para discussão no. 172. http://www.abphe.org.
br/arquivos/carlos-augusto-vidotto-resumo-e-completo.pdf.
World Bank. 2020. “Fiscal Year 2019 Data.” Annual report 2019 https://www.
worldbank.org/en/about/annual-report/fiscal-year-data.
Yeyati, E.L., Micco, A., Panizza, U., Detragiache, E., and Repetto, A. 2007. 
“A Reappraisal of State-Owned Banks [with Comments].” Economía, 7(2), 
209-259.
Zaia, C. 2020.  “Sobem os juros em operações de crédito rural.” Valor Econô-






THE PUBLIC BANKS AND 
PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA: 
CONFRONTING COVID-19 
(IF NOT WITHOUT CONTROVERSY)
The outbreak of Covid-19 in Wuhan and its subsequent dom-ino effects due to the lock-down in major cities have had a devastating effect on the Chinese economy. China is an 
interesting case to illustrate what policy instruments the central 
bank can deploy through state-owned commercial banks (a form 
of ‘hybrid’ public banks) to buffer the economic shock during 
times of crisis.
In addition to the standardized practice of liquidity injection 
into the banking system to maintain its financial viability, the Chi-
nese central bank issued two top-down and explicit administra-
tive directives to state-owned commercial banks: the minimum 
quota on lending to small- and medium-sized enterprises (MSEs) 
and non-profitable lending. Notwithstanding its controversy on 
loopholes related to such lending practices, these pro-active policy 
directives provide counter-cyclical lending and appear able to pro-
vide short-term relief for SMEs from the Covid-19 shock in a timely 
manner. This has helped to mitigate the devastating impacts of the 




The outbreak of Covid-19 leading to the lock-down in Wuhan on 
January 23, 2020 and the subsequent pandemic had significant im-
pacts on the Chinese economy. China’s policy response regarding 
the banking system has helped to mitigate the devastating impacts 
of pandemic on the Chinese economy.   
Before we review the measures implemented by the Chinese gov-
ernment, it is important for us to give a brief overview of the roles 
of two major group of actors (institutions) in the banking system. In 
China, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) is the central bank. It is 
responsible for formulating and implementing monetary policy (in-
cluding setting minimum reserve requirements and interest rates, 
and money supply and exchange rate targets) to ensure the stability 
of the financial system (Yeung et al. 2017).  
There are numerous financial institutions but the key banks in 
terms of equity and market share are five state-owned commer-
cial banks (SOCBs): the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
(ICBC); Bank of China (BOC); China Construction Bank (CCB); Ag-
ricultural Bank of China (ABC); and the Bank of Communications 
(BOCOM). The state is the largest equity owner, although all SOCBs 
have been listed in the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong between 2005 
and 2010 and function like private commercial banks elsewhere, es-
pecially in their daily operations at the local/branch level.  
What makes the SOCBs different is that the PBoC can issue ad-
ministrative directives on SOCB lending due to the nature of its hy-
brid ownership structure (Yeung forthcoming). Importantly, the 
most senior executives at the SOCBs are appointed by the central 
government: they could be former senior executives from another 
SOCB or seasoned officials transferred from the PBoC and other 
government development banks (Agricultural Development Bank 
of China, China Development Bank and Exim Bank of China). One 
could therefore argue that the senior management at the SOCBs’ 
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headquarters could prioritize the status of the national economy 
over profit-maximization in their decision-making processes, in-
cluding the conception of ‘corporate strategies’, i.e. SOCBs could 
be functioning more like ministries in the central government 
than private commercial banks. There is also an impression that 
SOCBs have a lending bias favour for the state-owned enterpris-
es as both are ultimately owned by the Chinese government. This 
impression could, however, be partially reconciled by the lack of 
credible financial credit records among private entrepreneurs in 
China (see Yeung 2009). 
The PBoC has issued a number of administrative directives since 
January 2020 and we will focus on two of the most important ones: 
liquidity supports and quotas on low-cost lending, and non-profit-
able lending. A brief and very preliminary review of the effects of 
such lending directives will be presented.  
COUNTER-CYCLICAL LENDING MEASURES: 
SUPPORTS AND QUOTAS ON LOW-COST LENDING 
After the first Covid-19 case in Wuhan was reported in December 
2019 and the subsequent outbreak of the coronavirus spread across 
the country, the PBoC implemented a series of measures to stabilize 
the economy in China through two related policies: to maintain the 
liquidity in the banking system and to provide low-cost lending. 
Liquidity is crucial for the financial viability of the banking 
system during times of crisis. Commercial banks tend to be much 
more conservative to preserve their scarce capital with the expec-
tation of a (much) higher non-performing loan ratio. Potential bor-
rowers, especially the small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
could find their credit lines cut or even their existing loans recalled 
by banks due to their deteriorating balance sheets and diminish-
ing market value of their collateral. Capital injection by the central 
bank is a common policy instrument to maintain the liquidity in the 
Godfrey Yeung
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banking system, with the expectation that commercial banks are 
more willing to grant loans to credible companies. 
Instead of increasing the money supply by purchasing govern-
ment and corporate bonds, as per the US Federal Reserve, the PBoC 
improves liquidity through adjusting its regulatory requirements, 
specifically the reduction of reserve requirement ratio (RRR). The 
RRR is the minimum percentage of a commercial bank’s depos-
its that are held in cash or cash-like assets in order to reduce the 
chance of bank run or failure due to mass customer withdrawals. 
A lower RRR allows banks to provide more credits and this in turn 
improves liquidity in the banking system. The PBoC reduced the 
RRR by 0.5% during the beginning of the outbreak in January 2020 
(see Table 13.1). To maintain ample market liquidity, the PBoC has 
since cut the RRR twice, in March and again in April 2020, and sub-
sequently pumped a total of CNY 1.75 trillion (US$245 billion) into 
the banking system. Moreover, the PBoC reduced the reverse bond 
repurchase agreement rate in February and March and the loan 
prime rate (LPR, the benchmark interest rates charged by com-
mercial banks for their most creditworthy customers) in February 
and April 2020. 
To further improve liquidity in the banking system, the Chinese 
government issued two explicit instructions to SOCBs to provide 
credits to privately-owned SMEs. A number of SMEs have already 
been under tremendous financial pressure due to the ongoing trade 
friction between the US and China. In spite of the above-mentioned 
policies, however, new lending fell significantly: from CNY 3.34 
trillion (US$468 billion) in January to CNY 906 billion (US$127 bil-
lion) in February 2020. Importantly, short-term business lending, 
normally used by SMEs, contracted by CNY 396 billion in February 
2020 (SCMPa 2020). 
About one month after the lock-down of Wuhan started on Jan-
uary 23, 2020, the State Council and PBoC instructed the SOCBs to 
grant at least 30% of their loans to SMEs in the first half of 2020 (see 
Table 13.1). As part of this important initiative, the PBoC provided a 
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preferential LPR at 0.25% lower to SOCBs for their lending to farms, 
agriculture firms and small businesses in February 2020. Moreover, 
SOCBs were eligible for additional government funding for loans, 
if they should charge a lower interest rate to borrowers at no more 
than 0.5% mark-up from the LPR.
Table 13.1: Major capital injection measures 
implemented by the PBoC in the first half of 2020
Date Institutes Measures
Jan 6 PBoC • Reduced RRR by 0.5%: 12.5% for SOCBs & 10.5% for 
small- and medium-sized banks
Feb 1 PBoC & 
CBIRC
• Allow banks to sell coronavirus relief bonds
Feb 3 PBoC • Reduced the seven-day reverse bond repurchase 
agreement rate from 2.50% to 2.40% & the 14-day 
tenor from 2.65% to 2.55% 
• Resulted in an injection of CHY 1.2 trillion 
(US$168 billion)
Feb 20 PBoC • Reduced the one-year LPR from 4.15% to 4.05% & 
five-year LPR from 4.8% to 4.75%
Feb 25 State 
Council & 
PBoC
• Provided CHY 800 billion (US$112 billion) for small 
business lending
• SOCBs have to grant at least 30% of their loans to 
small businesses in the first half of 2020
• Three government-run policy banks to lend CHY 
350 billion (US$49 billion) to small businesses at 
preferential rates
• LPR for farms and agriculture firms & small 
businesses reduced from 2.75% to 2.5%
• Banks are eligible for additional government 
funding for loans no more than 0.5% higher than 
the LPR
Mar 16 PBoC • Reduced RRR by another 0.5-1%, results in an 




Mar 30 PBoC • Reduced the seven-day reverse repurchase 
agreement rate to 2.2%, resulted in an injection of 
CHY 50 billion (US$7 billion) into the banking system
Mar 31 State 
Council
• PBoC provided a credit line of CHY 1 trillion 
(US$140 billion) to small lenders
Apr 3 PBoC • Reduced RRR of small- and medium-sized banks 
to 6%, resulted in an injection of CHY 400 billion 
(US$56 billion) into the banking system
Apr 15 PBoC • Reduced the one-year MLF loans to financial 
institutions from 3.15% to 2.95%, resulted in an 
injection of CHY 56.1 billion (US$7.9 billion) into 
the banking system
Apr 20 PBoC • Reduced the one-year LPR to 3.85% & five-year LPR 
to 4.65%
June 1 PBoC • CHY 400 billion (US$56 billion) to acquire 40% of 
unsecured loans made to SMEs with maturities 
of at least six months made between March 1 & 
December 31 2020
June 17 State 
Council & 
PBoC
• Instructed banks to sacrifice CHY 1.5 trillion 
(US$210 billion) in profits in 2020 to provide low-
cost loans to small businesses
Sources: Compiled from State Council February 27, 2020; CBIRC June 3, 2020, 
SCMPc and SCMPe, 2020.
Notes: CBIRC (China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission): the 
regulatory authority of banking and insurance institutions; RRR (reserve 
requirement ratio): cash or cash-like assets that banks are required to hold in 
reserve to maintain the liquidity; LPR (loan prime rate): a lending reference rate 
set monthly by 18 banks for their most creditworthy customers. Banks have to link 
their LPR quotations to the rate of MLF (hence, the lower costs loans) since August 
2019; MLF (medium-term lending facility): a funding facility that the PBoC extends 
to commercial banks.
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COUNTER-CYCLICAL LENDING MEASURES: 
PROVISION OF NON-PROFIT MAKING LOANS 
The lock-down of Wuhan and its domino effects have had devastat-
ing effects on the Chinese economy. The economy shrank by 6.8% 
in the first quarter of 2020 in spite of all the pro-active policies to 
improve the liquidity and the provision of low-cost loans to busi-
nesses. The possibility of a collapse of more than 18 million private 
enterprises (most of them SMEs and single proprietor businesses 
that employ some 200 million people) could result in massive un-
employment, since SMEs account for 60% of industrial output and 
employ 80% of employees in China. As only one fifth of private-
ly-owned SMEs were ever granted a bank loan before the pandemic 
(Yeung forthcoming), the reduction of the RRR and LPR appears to 
be unable to provide sufficient lending to private enterprises.  
In June 2020, the State Council and PBoC issued another set of 
strong policy measures to the SOCBs to ensure the provision of low-
cost lending to SMEs. Under the ‘Document 6’, the PBoC acquired 
40% of unsecured loans made to SMEs with maturities of at least six 
months made between March 1 and December 31, 2020 (see Table 
13.1). By effectively taking over almost half of such loans to SMEs, 
the PBoC freed up CHY 400 billion (US$56 billion) of liquidity in the 
banking system.  
Another more important and unprecedented policy directive in-
volves the most explicit instruction given to the SOCBs since partial 
privatization in the 2005-2010 Stock Exchange of Hong Kong listing. 
Following on from the May 2020 open call from Premier Keqiang Li 
on the duties of SOCBs, PBoC Governor Gang Yi openly said: “Finan-
cial institutions are urged to sacrifice profits to benefit corporate 
borrowers, helping reduce their borrowing costs” (SCMPe 2020). 
Specifically, the PBoC instructed the SOCBs to sacrifice up to CHY 
1.5 trillion (US$210 billion) in profits in 2020, equivalent to 75% of 
their profits in 2019, to provide low-cost loans to SMEs. Moreover, 
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the SOCBs have had to reduce their various fees to customers, defer 
loan repayments and grant unsecured loans to SMEs to help them 
survive the economic downturn. 
This measure is not administratively feasible or even financially 
viable for conventional private commercial banks in developed or 
developing countries. This unusual instruction on lending issued by 
the PBoC could be reconciled by the hybrid nature of the SOCBs, for 
which the Chinese state still holds the majority of the equity. Own-
ership here translates into effective control, should state authorities 
choose to exercise it. Due to the hybrid nature of its property rights, 
the state can deploy the SOCBs to provide counter-cyclical lending 
to contain economic shocks from the Covid-19 pandemic in a timely 
manner (see Yeung 2009 and forthcoming). 
The aggressive policy lending in China appears to have created a 
(short-term) stimulus effect on the economy: Gross Domestic Prod-
uct (GDP) grew by 3.2% in the second quarter of 2020 and the urban 
unemployment rate fell from 6.2% in February to 5.7% in June 2020 
(NBS July 17, 2020). Such aggressive lending by the SOCBs, however, 
has its drawbacks. 
EXPLOITATION OF LENDING LOOPHOLES 
The SOCBs have been lending aggressively to fulfill their lending 
quotas and this unavoidably has led to cases of abuse. Under the 
policy directives of the PBoC, SOCBs have been granting loans at 
unusually high levels of leverage, which increased from the usual 
50 to 90% of the collaterals, and at below the benchmark interest 
rate of 4.35% (SCMPb 2020).  
An unknown proportion of loans intended for improving the li-
quidity for SMEs were granted to shell corporations and diverted for 
speculation on real estate illegally (SCMPb 2020). Such exploitation 
of the lending policy from the SOCBs appears to have contributed to 
the rising property prices in major cities, especially the Shenzhen 
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special economic zone in southern China. The property prices in 
Shenzhen increased at the fastest rate among Chinese cities at 1.6% 
between February and March 2020, during the peak of the Covid-19 
outbreak in China (SCMPb 2020). It is also estimated that the pric-
es of new properties in 100 major cities in China increased by 15% 
year on year during the first quarter of 2020 while GDP fell by 6.8% 
simultaneously (SCMPd 2020). 
There is no reliable way to estimate the extent of such exploita-
tion of the lending policy in Shenzhen or China. According to offi-
cial figures, bank lending in Shenzhen reached CHY 315.8 billion 
(US$44 billion) in the first quarter of 2020 (an increase of CHY 71.8 
billion from the same period in 2019, while there was a reduction 
of lending nationwide), and around 80% were to corporate entities. 
The PBoC has since instructed SOCBs to control such lending, in-
cluding the close inspection of using property as the collateral for 
new loans (SCMPb 2020). 
CONCLUSION
The top-down administrative directives adopted by the PBoC has 
had an impact on stimulating economic growth during the Covid-19 
pandemic in China (although this has not been without controver-
sy). Liquidity in the banking system is one of the keys for the provi-
sion of low-cost lending. What makes the Chinese case interesting 
is that the PBoC issued two very explicit directives to the SOCBs: 
the minimum quota on lending to SMEs and the non-profitable 
lending. These pro-active policy directives provide counter-cyclical 
lending and appear able to provide short-term relief for SMEs from 
the Covid-19 shock in a timely manner.
Nonetheless, the potential cost inefficiency of such capital in-
jection in the long-term cannot be ignored. Another pertinent issue 
revealed by the recent counter-cyclical lending is the ‘publicness’ of 
the SOCBs: to what extent could such lending be classified as policy 
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lending by public banks? The hybrid ownership structure of SOCBs 
illustrates the limitations of conventional typology of public and 
private banks in the financial system. Perhaps it is the time for us to 
re-examine the meanings of public banks. 
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COVID-19 AND MEASURES 
TO SUPPORT ENTERPRISES 
AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
IN ITALY: THE ROLE OF CASSA 
DEPOSITI E PRESTITI
This chapter focuses on the strategic role Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP) is playing in response to the Covid-19 crisis. After an overview of the mandate and business of this public 
development bank, the chapter highlights the adverse impacts of 
the Covid-19 pandemic on the Italian economy and the extraordi-
nary measures set up by CDP to support the country. These mea-
sures, in line with the mission of the bank, are specifically targeted 
towards enterprises and local authorities and are aimed at support-
ing liquidity needs to cope with the health emergency, as well as 
providing financial resources for meeting working capital require-
ments and sustaining investments and exports. 
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INTRODUCTION
Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP) is a joint-stock company under 
public control owned by the Italian Ministry of Economics and 
Finance (83%), with several banking foundations owning the 
remaining shares.1 Founded in 1850, CDP is a ‘National Promo-
tional Bank’2 with the explicit mandate of fostering sustainable 
development, supporting growth in different business areas and 
boosting employment. According to the ‘Articles of Association’, 
the specific corporate objectives of CDP are granting financing to: 
i) the State, the regions, local authorities, public entities and pub-
lic law bodies; and ii) public or private entities, with the exclusion 
of natural persons. The overall aim of the bank is to support initia-
tives for company growth and invest in research, development, in-
novation, protection and leveraging of cultural assets, promotion 
of tourism, environment, energy efficiency, sustainable develop-
ment and the green economy. 
CDP pursues its mandate using several financial instruments, 
such as loans, guarantees, mezzanine finance and risk-sharing in-
struments. In recent years, it has also set up equity instruments, 
such as venture capital and seed funds to finance start-ups and 
young firms, as well as strategic equity investments in companies 
of national interest. It offers non-financial services as well, such 
as technical and administrative assistance, advisory services and 
1  In December 2003, CDP was transformed into a joint-stock company with the Sta-
te’s assets and shareholdings transferred to CDP S.p.A. and assigned to a ‘separate 
account system’. In line with other European national promotional banks, only part 
of the banking regulations were applied to CDP, that is the provisions of Part V of the 
Consolidated Banking Act (Legislative Decree No. 385, September 1, 1993) applicable 
to intermediaries registered in the special list of Article 107 of the cited Decree.
2  National Promotional Banks – also referred to as ‘development financial institu-
tions’, ‘state investment banks’, ‘promotional banks’ – are “legal entities carrying out 
financial activities on a professional basis which are given a mandate by a member 
state or a member state’s entity at central, regional or local level, to carry out develo-
pment or promotional activities” (European Commission 2015).
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training programmes. CDP may finance end-customers directly 
(first-tier lending) or through financial intermediaries that in turn 
lend on to end-customers (second-tier lending).
On the liability side, CDP typically relies on a mixture of fund-
ing sources, such as loans from other financial development insti-
tutions, debt instruments issued on capital markets and funding 
from European programmes. CDP also indirectly relies on deposit 
funding raised via postal saving products. In line with the ratio-
nale for the existence of development banks – i.e. overcoming 
market failures, stimulating innovation paths and improving in-
stitutional frameworks (Yeyati et al. 2007; Gutierrez et al. 2011; 
Luna-Martinez and Vicente 2012; Mazzuccato and Penna 2016; 
Eslava and Freixas 2016; Frigerio and Vandone 2020) – CDP typ-
ically funds projects with high risk (which is usually the case for 
start-ups), high-tech or new industries, providing long-term ‘pa-
tient’ capital to promote strategic investments for economic de-
velopment (e.g. infrastructure projects, export, housing, etc.) or 
for socially challenging projects (e.g. climate finance, renewable 
and environmental-friendly energy, food security initiatives). In 
doing so, CDP plays a counter-cyclical role in times of crisis by 
sustaining growth and employment when private commercial 
banks typically disintermediate their credit activity because of 
deteriorating asset quality, capital shortages, deleveraging and 
higher risk aversion.  
In the aftermath of the economic and financial global crisis of 
2008-09, together with many other European development banks, 
CDP has been called on by European policy-makers to share the 
management of European Union (EU) financial instruments and to 
play a primary role in restructuring the economy, channelling lev-
eraged funds into the market, boosting innovation, supporting so-
cio-economic and environmental challenges, and implementing fi-
nancial instruments and programmes set up to reverse the low level 
of investment by EU firms, in particular start-ups and small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (European Commission 2014, 
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2015). Accordingly, in recent years CDP has significantly increased 
assets, co-financed a rising number of projects and investment plat-
forms, fostered the growth of venture capital across Italy and en-
larged the business volume in resource efficiency, digital infrastruc-
ture and innovation. As a result, CDP’s total assets have increased 
from €287 billion in 2011 to €448 billion in 2019 (an increase of 56%), 
while total loans increased from €220 billion to €311 billion in the 
same period (a 41% increase).
CDP also operates with sufficient profitability: in 2019, the CDP 
profit before taxes was around €5 million, with a return-on-equity 
of close to 10%. In recent years, the issue of profitability has be-
come relevant for development banks. Indeed, although it is well 
recognized that development banks, unlike private banks, have 
goals that go beyond profitability, given the limited fiscal space 
available in Member States in the aftermath of the global crisis, 
development banks are increasingly expected to combine their so-
cio-economic goals with conditions of efficiency and profitability 
in order to “stand on their own feet” and secure a reasonable level 
of financial strength and stability without continued capital injec-
tions by government.3
In fact, the relevance of economic and financial sustainability 
is now explicitly stated as a key principle in the statute of CDP, as 
for many other development banks (e.g. Nordic Investment Bank, 
NRW Bank). Furthermore, strengthening the economics of proj-
ects is also crucial to leveraging additional financing for blend-
ed programmes and public-private partnership arrangements. 
3  Specifically, in outlining the best practices development banks should follow, 
the European Commission pointed out that “National Promotional Banks prove to 
work best where they focus on economically viable projects and operate with su-
fficient profitability (albeit below private operators’ cost of equity) to maintain fi-
nancial soundness without continued capital injections by the government (profits 
mostly being retained to bolster future lending capacity)” (European Commission, 
2015, p5). Misallocation of resources and destruction of value due to political inter-
ference and inefficiencies has historically been one of the major concerns related to 
the action of state-owned banks ((Hart et al. 1997; Kornai 1979; La Porta et al. 2002; 
Shleifer and Vishny 1994, 1997). 
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These programmes are attracting growing interest as a way to de-
velop solutions for the delivery of long-term public goals. As ex-
plained below, CDP’s role in mobilizing liquidity for enterprises, 
especially SMEs, has been particularly relevant in response to the 
Covid-19 crisis, given the strong dependency of these small-size 
firms on bank financing and their inability to directly access the 
capital market.
THE IMPACT OF COVID-19 IN ITALY
The first Italian Covid-19 case was announced on February 21, 
2020. By June 2020, the country counted more than 230,000 positive 
cases and more than 33,000 deaths (Istat 2020c). The total number 
of deaths, compared to that observed in the same period of 2019, 
increased everywhere in the country. There were strong peaks in 
some territories and a higher concentration of death among people 
aged over 65, particularly amongst men.
From an economic perspective, the Covid-19 pandemic and the 
adverse impact of its containment measures – including the in-
terruption of 2.2 million firms’ activities (39% of the total Italian 
firms, 65% of exporting firms) and 4 million workers (44% of the 
workforce) – has caused a dramatic fall in economic activity (Istat 
2020d). The pandemic has also had a strong impact on foreign de-
mand, international tourism and investment plans, with repercus-
sions on employment, household income, spending decisions and 
demand for a wide range of goods and services. Overall, GDP fell by 
6% in the first quarter of 2020 and is expected to decline by 10% by 
the end of 2020 (see Figure 14.1). 
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Figure 14.1: The GDP quarterly change and contribution, Italy
Source: Istat 2020b.
Qualitative indicators, such as business and consumer confi-
dence indexes, also crashed heavily. In particular, the business 
confidence climate index slumped from 98.8 before the beginning 
of the pandemic down to 53.7 in May 2020. Although decreases oc-
curred in all the four components of the index, it has been partic-
ularly strong in market services (e.g. transportation and storage, 
accommodation and food service activities, advertising, rental 
and leasing, scientific research and development, business sup-
port activities, sport amusement and recreation activities), with a 
60% reduction from January to May 2020 (see Table 14.1). By the 
end of August, the index slightly recovered, although well below 
pre Covid-19 levels.
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Table 14.1: Business confidence climates
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug
Manufacturing 98.8 99.1 86.4 n.a. 72.3 80.9 85.3 86.1
Construction 142.7 142.3 139.0 n.a. 108.4 124 129.7 132.6
Market services 98.9 98.6 75.2 n.a. 39.1 52.2 66 74.7
Retail trade 105.9 106.7 94.8 n.a. 68.3 80 86.7 94
Total confidence index 98.5 98.9 79.2 n.a. 53.7 66.8 77.0 80.8
Source: Istat 2020a.
As for consumer confidence, the Social Mood Index of people’s 
perception of the crisis began decreasing in mid-February and con-
tinued on a downward trend to the end of May (see Figure 14.2), 
mainly due to expectations of unemployment and deterioration 
in income. Financial markets also collapsed, with a reduction of 
10,000 basis point in the FTSE MIB Index (Milano Italia Borsa) – the 
benchmark stock market index for the Italian stock exchange – in a 
few days, and a huge increase in volatility (see Figure 14.3).
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Figure 14.3: FTSE Milano Italia Borsa (MIB) Index
Source: Borsa Italiana, website.
CDP AND COVID-19: KEY ACTIONS
Since the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic in Italy, the CDP, 
together with the Italian Ministry of Economics and Finance, has 
been at the forefront, putting several extraordinary measures in 
place to support public entities, local bodies, infrastructure and 
enterprises. Less than a week after the first case of Covid-19 was 
announced, the CDP set up the measures to support enterprises and 
local authorities (see Figure 14.5).
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Figure 14.4: CDP’s key actions to support 
enterprises and local authorities
Source: Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, 2020c. 
There are a variety of measures and instruments adopted by the 
CDP to support the economy in response to Covid-19. These mea-
sures, in line with the mission of the bank, are specifically tar-
geted towards enterprises and local authorities (Cassa Depositi e 
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Prestiti 2020a, b). As far as enterprises are concerned, measures 
are aimed at supporting temporary liquidity needs, meeting the 
working capital requirements of Italian businesses, supporting 
investments, relaunching exports and diversifying reference mar-
kets. As for local authorities, measures are aimed at enabling re-
gions to receive immediate financial resources, payment morato-
ria, guarantees and insurance coverage with the ultimate goal of 
receiving necessary supplies in the shortest time possible to cope 
with the health emergency. The following sections summarize 
these actions.
Moratoria and deferral of instalments, renegotiation of loans 
Moratoria, deferral of instalments and renegotiation of loans are 
intended to free up resources that can be promptly used to face 
balance-sheet tightness due to the pandemic and to finance ex-
penses that cannot be postponed to overcome the health emergen-
cy phase. These measures are especially relevant for the budgets 
of local entities (municipalities, metropolitan cities, provinces, 
unions of municipalities and ‘mountain’ communities), regions 
and autonomous provinces that are facing liquidity tension due to 
the combined effect of the increase in expenses related to the ep-
idemiological emergency coupled with the likely reduction in tax 
revenues. They are expected to allow approximately 7,200 entities 
to free up resources in 2020, with up to €1.4 billion in support, re-
flecting about 135,000 loans for a total debt residual of €34 billion 
(Cassa Depositi e Prestiti 2020b, e). Renegotiation of loans, accom-
panied by a similar measure taken by the private Italian banking 
system, also target enterprises. To access these measures firms 
are required to have a healthy balance sheet before 31 December 
2019 (Cassa Depositi e Prestiti 2020f). 
Insurance and guarantees 
Insurance and guarantees are designed to guarantee loans from 
banks and to provide insurance coverage to support exports. For en-
Public Banks and Covid-19
 305
terprises, the main goal is to facilitate the supply of loans by banks 
to finance working capital needs (e.g. raw materials, warehouse 
stocks, half-processed products) and to cope with the shock that 
hit the national and international production chain and the tempo-
rary delays in collecting the proceeds of existing orders. Insurance 
coverage is aimed at guaranteeing big foreign players, especially in 
the oil and gas sector, infrastructure, energy and agrifood, to boost 
their purchase of Italian goods and services.4 
 For local authorities the main goal is to guarantee loans from 
banks and other financial institutions and to provide insurance cov-
erage to support procurement oversees (direct and indirect) sought 
by Italian regions to buy the goods needed to face the health emer-
gency, such as medical equipment, accessories for individual pro-
tection, diagnostic devices and other non-medical goods.
Provision of liquidity
Provision of liquidity, mainly targeting enterprises (Cassa Depositi 
e Prestiti, 2020b), have the goal of supplying new funding to SMEs, 
medium and large enterprises. Funding is provided both in the 
form of first-tier lending (directly to the end-customer) and sec-
ond-tier lending (to banks and financial intermediaries that in turn 
lend on to end-customers). For medium and large companies, the 
CDP supplies short-term and medium- to long-term loans to sup-
port staff costs, investments or working capital in production facil-
ities and business activities located in Italy. Loans are also aimed 
at supporting temporary liquidity needs, mainly in investment re-
search, development, innovation, protection and enhancement of 
cultural heritage, promotion of tourism, environment, energy effi-
ciency, promotion of sustainable development and green economy. 
4  According to CDP’s documents, the process is carried out entirely online with 
pre-stabilized financial documentation, rapid resolution times and a pre-stabilized 
pricing on the basis of a risk/return metrics/profiles agreed upon with the bank and 
paid for either upfront with the finalization of the loan agreement or in a ‘running 
mode’ with each interest payment according to the contract.
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Loans may also be co-financed by the private banking system, 
with a CDP share of greater than €5 million and a maximum dura-
tion of six years (with a grace period of up to 24 months),5 and count-
er-guaranteed by the State until 31 December 2020.6 To be eligible 
to apply for this type of financing, companies must have an annual 
turnover of more than €50 million, and be able to demonstrate loss-
es due to the Covid-19 emergency, equal to at least a 10% reduction 
in turnover compared to the same period of the previous year
As for SMEs, lending to support investments and working capital 
needs is granted to banks that, in turn, supply loans to enterprises 
at lower interest rates compared to the market. Funding from CDP 
to banks has a maturity from three to 15 years, and banks are re-
quired to grant new finance to enterprises with a maturity from one 
to 10 years (Cassa Depositi e Prestiti 2020f). To ensure the highest 
possible transparency, CDP asks the banks to indicate, in the loan 
agreement with the company, the cost at which the funding is ob-
tained from CDP and the maturity, thus giving evidence of the mar-
gin applied by the bank to enterprises.
THE COVID-19 SOCIAL RESPONSE BOND
In April 2020, the CDP also launched the Covid-19 Social Response 
Bond to support Italian enterprises and local authorities that had 
been adversely affected by the pandemic. The bond totals €1 bil-
lion and was subscribed to by institutional investors (53% domestic 
5  The amount of the CDP share is expected to be no greater than the highest value 
of the following: 25% of 2019 revenue, as indicated in the approved budget or tax 
declaration, or twice the company's 2019 staff costs, as indicated in the budget or the 
certified data, if the company has not yet approved the budget. 
6  Counter guarantee has the following coverage percentages: 90% of the loan 
amount for companies with less than 5,000 employees in Italy and turnover of up to 
€1.5 billion; 80% of the loan amount for companies with a turnover of between €1.5 
billion and €5 billion or with more than 5,000 employees in Italy; 70% for companies 
with a turnover of more than €5 billion.
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investors, 47% foreign investors) and divided in two tranches with 
the following features: €500 million, three years, 1.5% fixed annual 
coupon; €500 million, 7 years, 2.0% fixed annual coupon. 
Funds raised through the Covid-19 Social Response Bond are in-
tended to provide both immediate relief in the context of the current 
emergency and to support, in the medium to long term, overall eco-
nomic recovery. In line with the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals 
3 and 8 (i.e. to “Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at 
all ages” and “Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable econom-
ic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all”) 
the bond’s targeted initiatives include easing access to credit for Ital-
ian SMEs that have been severely affected by the pandemic and sup-
porting public administrations and local authorities in strengthening 
and intensifying local healthcare capacity. Initiatives to be financed 
may include helping corporates, mainly SMEs, to access banking and 
financial services, also through direct lending, providing local au-
thorities with financial support in their efforts related to healthcare, 
social and economic measures, financing the construction, develop-
ment, maintenance or renovation of healthcare facilities, medical 
equipment and technologies for the improvement and protection of 
public health (Cassa Depositi e Prestiti 2020c).
CONCLUSION
Although it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of the measures 
that have been put in place by CDP in the face of the Covid-19 cri-
sis, it seems that the bank’s engagement has been strong, prompt 
and relevant. The CDP is playing a key role in providing liquidity to 
enterprises and local authorities, as well as implementing financial 
instruments and programmes to contribute to reversing the cur-
rent drop in the level of investment and consumption. With the pre-
ferred creditor status and other risk-sharing mechanisms, the CDP 
is also creating the conditions to work as a catalyzer of private fi-
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nance towards supporting investments and stimulating a response 
to the health emergency. 
The extraordinary measures put in place by CDP to face the 
Covid-19 pandemic are a clear example of the unique role public 
banks can play in facing negative extreme events and mitigating 
market failures. With the injection of liquidity, guarantees, debt 
and equity instruments, CDP is assisting with the health emergency 
and sustaining growth and employment, whereas private banks are 
mostly disintermediating their credit activity because of higher risk 
aversion, capital shortages and deleveraging. 
This countercyclical role of public banks has already come to 
light in response to the global financial crisis, when CDP started 
playing a primary role in restructuring the economy, channelling 
leveraged funds into the market, boosting innovation and support-
ing socio-economic and environmental challenges. Indeed, in the 
last few years CDP has provided long-term ‘patient’ capital to pro-
mote strategic investments for economic development, such as 
infrastructure projects, export and social housing, or for socially 
challenging projects such as climate finance, renewable and envi-
ronmentally-friendly energy and food security initiatives. 
Public bank financial support overcomes funding gaps stemming 
from a private sector that is reluctant to provide funding to socially 
valuable projects, which may prove unprofitable, at least in the short 
term, due to the impossibility of monetizing positive externalities. 
CDP has also funded several projects with high risk, which private 
banks do not finance if there are difficulties in evaluating the busi-
ness, and in the innovation process, where expected returns take 
time or if there is a lack of guarantees and collateral. 
Given the growing relevance and role of development banks in 
Europe, the 2015 Communication to the European Parliament and 
the Council of the European Commission pointed out that “Member 
States that do not yet have a national promotional bank may consid-
er setting one up” (European Commission 2015, 2).
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IN PANDEMIC TIMES: 
PORTUGAL’S CAIXA GERAL 
DE DEPÓSITOS 
It is widely acknowledged that public banks have the potential to play an anti-cyclical role in times of economic crisis. As lending by private banks dries up, public banks step in. The 
world is currently confronting a twin crisis: a pandemic that has 
generated a profound recession. Within this public health and 
economic crisis, what role do state-owned banks play? This chap-
ter examines how Caixa Geral de Depósitos (CGD) has responded 
to the crisis in Portugal. It shows that the CGD acted swiftly when 
faced with a pandemic. It launched its own initiatives and it played 
a role within the Portuguese Government’s response. Some of the 
most important measures were the debt moratoria, various credit 
lines and a series of steps to facilitate the digitalization of finance. 
These measures helped to accommodate the lockdown and to me-
diate its economic effects on families and businesses. Despite this, 
the bank’s initiatives need to be understood within the competitive 
– and indeed profit seeking – logic in which the CGD operates. Fur-
ther research is required to investigate the extent to which CGD’s 




Portugal has a brief but relatively recent history of a large state pres-
ence in the banking sector. Almost the entire financial system was 
nationalized in the mid-1970s, but by the mid-1990s, most of it had 
returned to private ownership (Antão et al. 2009, 432; Rosa 2014, 180). 
Bank ownership and control have played a central role in social and 
economic change in Portugal, whether of an authoritarian or social-
ly progressive character. Today, the country’s only remaining state-
owned bank is Caixa Geral de Depósitos (hereafter referred to as CGD 
or Caixa), which is fully owned by the national government.  
It is widely acknowledged that public banks have the potential 
to play an anti-cyclical role in times of economic crisis (Yeyati et al. 
2007). As lending by private banks dries up, public banks step in. For 
example, the World Bank’s Global Survey of Development Banks high-
lights that most development banks in Latin America, Africa, Asia 
and Europe scaled up their lending at a time when private banks 
held back in the period between 2007 and 2009 (Luna-Martínez and 
Vicente 2012). The world is currently facing a pandemic that has 
generated a profound recession. As states around the globe sought 
to contain the virus, lockdowns and workplace closures led to vio-
lent interruptions in capital accumulation.
The lockdowns and social distancing measures worldwide have 
had a huge impact on work and production. In April 2020, full or par-
tial lockdowns affected 81% of the world’s workforce (ILO 2020, 1). 
As workers were prevented from going to work, production plum-
meted, and as people were subject to compulsory or voluntary social 
distancing, demand collapsed too. Millions have been thrown into 
unemployment, and according to the International Labour Organiza-
tion (ILO) (2020), “nearly half of global workforce [is] at risk of losing 
livelihoods”. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD) (2020, p.8) warns that, “By the end of 2021, the loss of 
income exceeds that of any previous recession over the last 100 years 
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outside wartime, with dire and long-lasting consequences for people, 
firms and governments”. 
Within this public health and economic crisis, what role do state-
owned banks play? This chapter examines the CGD’s response to the 
pandemic crisis in Portugal. It is still early in the crisis, however, so 
the analysis is necessarily a preliminary note that addresses some 
of the bank’s measures. 
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section gives an 
overview of public banking in Portugal. The second provides histor-
ical background of the CGD. The third section gives an overview of 
the manifestations of the pandemic in Portugal and outlines some 
of the Government’s measures to contain the virus and counter the 
recession. The fourth section situates the CGD within the Govern-
ment’s response and outlines some of the bank’s own initiatives.  
PUBLIC BANKING IN PORTUGAL  
After a military coup in 1926, Estado Novo was formally established 
by the Constitution of 1933: an authoritarian regime based on cor-
poratism, nationalism, fascism and a revival of colonialism (Chil-
cote 2010, 78). During this period, a monopolistic/duopolistic na-
tional bourgeoisie controlled the bulk of finance and industry. This 
part of the bourgeoisie was dominated by seven capitalist groups 
(Costa et al. 2010; Rosa 2014). Some started in industry and expand-
ed into finance (“industrial business groups”), and others did the 
reverse (“bank-centred business groups”) (Ferreira da Silva et al. 
2015). Through these owners, finance and industry were connected. 
Portuguese colonialism was at the heart of the Estado Novo dic-
tatorship. A new phase of imperialism had started in the 1890s, and 
after its decline in the 1920s, it was restored by the Colonial Act, 
which was included in the 1933 Constitution (Lains 1998,466-467, 
485). Several of the economic groups replicated their diversification 
process from Portugal when establishing economic activities in the 
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colonies (Ferreira da Silva et al. 2015).
The 1974, the Carnation Revolution brought an end to the dicta-
torship. It began as a peaceful coup-d’état by the Movement of the 
Armed Forces (MFA) on April 25 of that year. Initially, there was no 
plan for a transition to socialism. The objectives were to achieve 
democracy and to end the colonial wars. The situation soon polar-
ized, however, and the revolutionary demands radicalized. A failed 
coup was attempted in March 1975 but failed. This led to the ap-
pointment of the Revolutionary Council, which called for “bold 
measures against the capitalist elite that control finance and much 
of industry” (Norohna 2013, 1). Within three days, the entire bank-
ing system was nationalized, except for credit unions and those 
that were foreign owed. This happened with the help of delegates 
from bank workers’ trade unions, who had pushed for nationaliza-
tion and occupied banks (Noronha 2013, 1; Rosa 2014, 180). This 
step was justified with reference to social and economic policies. 
In the words of the Revolutionary Council’s Decree-Law 132-A/75, 
the banking system was to be converted into a “fundamental lever 
of command over the economy in order to create growth and em-
ployment”. During this brief historical period, credit allocation was 
coordinated by the Bank of Portugal, with the bank workers’ unions 
playing a role in this process (Noronha 2013).
The Constitution of 1976 stated that “all the nationalisations put 
into effect after 25 April 1974 are irreversible conquests of the work-
ing classes”. However, in the 1980s, several constitutional revisions 
opened the door to the re-privatization of banking and insurance. 
In 1988, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) could be transformed into 
joint stock companies with up to 49% private capital. In 1989, a con-
stitutional revision allowed SOEs to be fully privatized, except in 
certain sectors. The stated objectives were to enhance firms’ com-
petitiveness, to reduce the role of the state in the economy, to re-
duce the public debt and to strengthen the entrepreneurial capacity 
(Rosa 2014, 184-186). In the words of Miguel Cadilhe, who was Min-
ister of Finance 1985-1990, “The objective is to strengthen and pro-
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mote the Portuguese entrepreneurial class through privatisation” 
(Mortágua and Costa 2015, 7).  
The speed at which the Portuguese banking system was privat-
ized was remarkable (Antão et al. 2009, 432). In the words of Pinho 
(1997, 6) “the 1985-1995 period witnessed an impressive change in 
ownership structure as a result of the creation of new private-owned 
Portuguese banks, the entry of many reputable foreign institutions 
but, most importantly, as a result of privatisations”. The constitu-
tional revisions of the 1980s also gave rise to what Rodrigues and 
Reis (2012, 196) call “the most intense cycle of privatization in the 
EU”. During those years Portugal’s revenue from privatization was 
equivalent to 23% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2000 pric-
es. This was twice as much as other “big privatisers” like the UK 
(Rodrigues and Reis 2012, 196). The transfer to private ownership 
first focused on the financial sector, but then spread to other sectors 
(Baer and Nogueira Leite 2003, 749). Most of banking was privatized 
in the beginning of the 1990s, and the process was largely complet-
ed by 1995. As this transition progressed, the market share of banks 
under public ownership decreased from 74% to 24% between 1990 
and 1996, and remained stable thereafter (Antão et al. 2009, 432).
CAIXA GERAL DE DEPÓSITOS  
The CGD has been state owned since its foundation in 1876 and re-
mains 100% so (Antão et al. 2009, 432; CGD 2019, 331; DBRS 2020). 
It was modelled on the French Caisse Générale des Dépôts et Consigna-
tions and its initial purpose was to mobilize private savings. It also 
collected fiscal and administrative deposits required by law. Soon 
after its creation, the CGD came to dominate the Portuguese bank-
ing system. Between the 1890s and World War One, it was by far 
the largest institution as far as deposits are concerned. In contrast 
to a specialized banking system, the CGD served as a development 
bank for industry, agriculture and civil construction. It also played 
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an important role vis-à-vis activities in the colonies. Until the late 
1920s, in a context of budget deficits, an important function was to 
finance public expenditure through purchases of public debt (CGD; 
Reis 1997, 255-268). 
In 1929, 90% of the CGD’s deposits went towards financing the 
public sector’s needs, but a series of reforms soon transformed its 
role. António de Oliveira Salazar, who at the time was a Minister of 
Finance, played a central role in this transition. As a dictator and 
Prime Minister (1932-1968), he was committed to budgetary dis-
cipline and austerity, and the 1929 reforms sought to reverse the 
CGD’s role in channelling resources into the public sector (CGD; 
Reis 1997). These reforms also restructured the bank and changed 
its name to Caixa Geral de Depósitos, Crédito e Previdência, which ad-
ministered two autonomous institutions: Caixa Nacional de Crédito 
(CNC) and Caixa Nacional de Previdência (CNP). The CNC was re-
sponsible for credit for industry and agriculture whilst the CNP cov-
ered a range of social security schemes for public sector employees 
(CGD; Reis 1997, 255-268). The CGD continued to be an important 
economic instrument through which the Estado Novo regime pro-
moted the “national interest” (Reis 1997, 255-268). In Salazar’s view, 
“the reconstruction of the country [could] not be achieved without a 
strong credit structure – in the metropole and in the colonies” (Sala-
zar 1930, quoted in Reis 1997, 261). 
At the end of the dictatorship, the Lei Orgânica changed the 
CGD’s legal framework. So far, it had been subject to the same rules 
as the public administration, but it was now transformed into a 
public enterprise. Its management came to comply with guidelines 
for business management. This made it increasingly aligned with 
other financial institutions (CGD). During the Revolution, following 
the nationalizations provoked by the coup attempt in March 1975, 
CGD became part of “Groupo Estado”, along with other banks and 
companies that were now under state ownership (Rosa 2014, 180-
182). In 1993, the CGD’s governance once again changed. It became 
a joint stock company with the state as an exclusive owner of its 
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shares (CGD). The CGD is currently a universal bank (CGD 2019, 
370). It is the largest retail and commercial bank in Portugal, and 
it is part of the CGD Group, which comprises many financial insti-
tutions in Portugal and abroad. Some of these include Caixa Gestão 
de Ativos, SGFI, CGD Pensões Caixa Banco de Investimento, Caixa Cap-
ital and Caixa Imobiliário, The CGD is a leader in several markets 
and has a 29% market share of individual deposits (CGD 2019, 6, 16; 
DBRS 2020). It is a profit-seeking institution and, in 2019, its profits 
amounted to €776 million – 57% higher than the 2018 level. This was 
the first time in nine years that it was able to pay dividends to its 
shareholder, the state, which received €200 million that year (CGD 
2019, 8; O Minho 2020).
Like private banks, CGD is subject to external assessments by 
credit rating agencies. In 2019, several of these improved their as-
sessment of the bank. DBRS upgraded it by one notch, to BBB, where-
as Fitch changed it from BB to BB+ (CGD 2019, 6; O Minho 2020). The 
CGD Group is highly internationalized and has a presence in France 
and in Portugal’s former colonies. Among the institutions that are 
fully or partly owned by the CGD Group are Banco Caixa Geral (Bra-
zil), Banco Nacional Ultramarino (Macao), Banco Comercial do Atlântico 
(Cape Verde) and Banco Caixa Geral (Angola) (CGD 2019, 16). 
In the context of the 2008-09 financial crisis, the CGD played a role 
in state interventions in finance. It was instrumental in the rescue 
operation that saved the private bank Banco Português de Negócios 
(BPN). The BPN’s nationalization in 2008 was one of ten bank nation-
alizations in Europe that year (Assembleia da República 2009, 214). 
Despite a small market share, it was justified on the grounds of “sys-
temic risk”. The BPN was integrated into CGD, which administered 
it during its time under public ownership (Moura e Silva 2013, 130; 
Torres 2009, 61). It remained under state ownership between Novem-
ber 2008 and March 2012. The “toxic assets” of the BPN were separat-
ed out and placed under public ownership (Cabral 2015; Assembleia 
da República 2012; Mortágua 2015). The healthy part of the bank, on 
the other hand, which was later given the nickname “BPN bom” was 
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privatized and purchased by Banco BIC, with Angolan capital. Its pri-
vatization “on an accelerated schedule” was part of the structural ad-
justment programme that Portugal underwent in the context of the 
crisis in the Eurozone (IMF 2011, 8). 
Over the last decade, the CGD has been subject to restructuring. 
When Portuguese authorities were compelled to request a rescue 
package from the European Commission (EC), the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank (ECB) in 2011, 
the creditors sought to include the CGD’s privatization in the struc-
tural adjustment programme. However, this was averted (Cardoso 
2016). Instead, the insurance arm of the CGD, Caixa Seguros, was 
among the state-owned enterprises that were listed for sale (IMF 
2011, 45). This CGD has regularly been recapitalized, and this last 
happened in 2017-2018. 
In the context of the last recapitalization, the CGD was required 
to implement a “strategic plan”, which Portuguese authorities have 
drawn up with the European Commission (Cavaleiro and Vicente 
2020; CGD 2019, 6). The restructuring plan (2017-2020) included a 
scaling down of international operations, a reduction in the num-
ber of branches, and a reduction in non-performing assets. In 2016, 
its ratio of non-performing loans was three times higher than the 
current level of 4.7% (CGD 2019, 6; DBRS 2020). It was compelled 
to sell its subsidiaries in Spain and South Africa in 2019 (Cavaleiro 
2019; DBRS 2020; Fernandes 2019). As part of the strategic plan, CGD 
was also required to sell off Banco Caixa Geral – Brazil and reduce its 
ownership in banking in Cape Verde. However, this has been dis-
rupted by the Covid-19 pandemic (Cavaleiro and Vicente 2020; CGD 
2019, 7; DBRS 2020; Relvas 2020).
THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC IN PORTUGAL 
In the European context, Portugal fared quite well in the early stag-
es of the Coronavirus pandemic. Portugal’s initial ‘success’ is likely 
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to reflect resolute action at an early stage. The school system was 
closed on 16 March and a lockdown was imposed before any Covid-19 
deaths had been recorded. Subsequently, the border with Spain was 
closed by mutual agreement and connections through air, river and 
rail were suspended. The country entered a state of emergency on 18 
March, which lasted until early May (Jones 2020; Mamede et al 2020; 
Peixoto et al. 2020; Presidência 2020; Worldometers 2020). 
Like elsewhere in Europe, the situation is getting worse, and 
total deaths now amount to 2,297 (as of late October 2020). The 
number of active cases was contained between the end of May and 
the end of August, but thereafter started to increase and, at the 
time of writing, is at its highest level so far. Deaths also started to 
creep up from the second half of September and Portugal entered 
a “state of calamity” in mid-October (Direção-Geral da Saúde 2020; 
Worldometers 2020). 
Covid-19 and the measures to contain the virus brought pro-
found disruptions to production and demand. Portugal is now in 
recession. In the first quarter of 2020, GDP contracted by 2.3% 
year-on-year and in the second quarter it shrunk by 16.5% (Ataíde 
2020; European Commission 2020). Before the pandemic, the coun-
try had been in growth for six years, but industrial slowdown in 
Germany had already been a cause of concern (Ribeiro 2019; World 
Bank 2020). The form of Portugal’s recovery from the previous crisis 
also came to shape the pandemic induced recession. In a Fast and 
Exceptional Enterprise Survey conducted by Statistics Portugal and 
the Bank of Portugal in mid-April, 80% of respondent enterprises 
reported a decrease in turnover resulting from the pandemic. The 
most frequently cited causes were the absence of clients and or-
ders and the restrictions that accompanied the state of emergency 
(Instituto Nacional de Estatística 2020a). The hospitality sector was 
hard hit (European Commission 2020). By the end of April, almost 
60% of firms in the accommodation and food sector had shut down 
temporarily (53.9%) or indefinitely (5.5%) (Mamede et al. 2020). 
Portugal’s economic recovery from the previous crisis was in part 
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driven by tourism, and this came to shape the economic effects of 
Covid-19. Tourism was the most severely affected sector, as visits 
plummeted by nearly 100% in April, compared with the previous 
year (European Commission 2020). Despite an easing of restric-
tions, tourism was practically in suspension also in May, when 
overnight stays by non-residents dropped by over 98% year-on-year 
(Instituto Nacional de Estatística 2020b). Faced with international 
travel restrictions and quarantines in other countries, much of the 
tourist season was lost.
To facilitate the lockdown and to counter the recession and its 
social impact, the Portuguese Government implemented a large an-
ti-cyclical programme, much like other Western countries. These 
measures can be grouped into: 1) liquidity and access to credit; 2) 
employment retention and training; 3) extended social protection; 
and 4) taxation and social security contributions. Taxation mea-
sures included deferral of various taxes paid by companies and the 
self-employed in situations such as compulsory closure or a turn-
over loss of more than 20%. It also included reductions and deferral 
of social security contributions depending on firm size, sector and 
losses. A furlough scheme sought to retain jobs. This was condition-
al on avoiding dismissal of workers. The extension of social protec-
tion included cash benefits to pay for care of children or grandchil-
dren to facilitate self-isolation; financial support for workers who 
cared for children due to school closure; automatic extension of 
unemployment benefits; and a new benefits scheme for informal 
workers with no prior history of paying social contributions (Ma-
mede et al. 2020, 18-19). 
A whole series of credit and debt related measures were 
launched. These targeted companies as well as individuals. A €13 
billion scheme approved by the European Commission financed 
grants and state guarantees on loans to for investments and capital 
needs. This included a €6.2 billion credit line with state guarantees 
channelled through the banking system. It was oriented towards 
industry (€4.5 billion), tourism (€900 million), restaurants (€600 
Public Banks and Covid-19
 321
million) and travel agencies (€200 million). A €400 million credit 
line was oriented towards the companies that were most severely 
hit by the pandemic and another credit line was directed towards 
micro-enterprises in tourism (€60 million). Subsidized credits were 
offered to operators in the fishing and aquaculture sector (€20 mil-
lion) and a €25 million support package targeted start-ups and so-
cial innovation (Mamede et al. 2020, 18). A debt moratorium was 
among the “exceptional” measures to protect families and compa-
nies’ access to credit. The moratorium, which was passed through 
Decree-Law no. 10-J/2020, was the result of a close collaboration be-
tween Banco de Portugal and the banking system. It allowed the sus-
pension of debt and mortgage repayments and included the princi-
pal and interest. The scheme required that the mortgage financed 
their permanent home. It was initially for a period of six months, 
until 30 September 2020, but was subsequently extended until Sep-
tember 2021 (Bank of Portugal 2020a).
During the state of emergency and thereafter, there was a ban on 
terminating rental contracts due to delayed rent caused by income 
loss (Governo de Portugal 2020). Cancellation of essential services 
such as water, electricity, gas and electronic communication was 
also banned during this period (Diário da República 2020). In other 
words, individuals and families were protected against evictions and 
from having essential services cut off. The banking system played 
an important role in operationalizing many of the above measures. 
CAIXA GERAL DE DEPÓSITOS AND COVID-19 
The World Health Organization (WHO) declared that Covid-19 
was an international pandemic and a public health emergency on 
March 11, 2020. Two days later, the CGD communicated its commit-
ment to support Government policies through a credit line (CGD 
2020a). Subsequently, it launched a broader set of initiatives. It stat-
ed that, “without compromising measures that are being approved 
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by national and European authorities, CGD has decided to imple-
ment a series of measures that … will be carried out at the request 
of its customers” (CGD 2020b). This was immediately after Portugal 
entered a state of emergency. In the context of the pandemic, it was 
decided that the CGD would not transfer dividends to its only share-
holder – the state in 2020. The Vice-Chair and Executive Officer ab-
stained from bonuses. 
Many of CGD’s actions towards individuals and firms can be 
broadly divided into three categories: 1) debt moratoria and a 
flexible stance towards debt repayment; 2) credit lines; and 3) dig-
italization of finance and measures to support financial transac-
tions that reduced the risk of Covid-19 transmission. These were 
the CGD’s initiatives, but they were in line with legislation that was 
about to come through.  
Concerning credit lines, CGD announced that “as part of the 
state package to support companies to minimise the impact of the 
new coronavirus on the economy” it would make a new credit line 
available for enterprises. On March 13, a total of €200 million was re-
served for micro-enterprises, small enterprises and medium-sized 
firms. The credit line was supported by state guarantees. The ratio-
nale was to offer support and to accommodate “abrupt reduction in 
demand in many sectors of economic activity” (CGD 2020a). Subse-
quently, new measures were introduced and CGD announced that 
it would “keep in operation, with great simplification of processes 
and speed of decisions, all the financing lines that CGD has, satis-
fying the needs of customers in time and capacity”. Additionally, it 
would reinforce existing credit lines, and create new ones to assist 
companies with the acquisition of IT and telecommunications to 
facilitate teleworking (CGD 2020b). In April, the CGD launched a 
new €400 million credit line exclusively for microenterprises (TVi24 
2020). These constitute the vast majority of Portuguese firms. Cur-
rently, the credit line Linha de Apoio à Economia Covid-19 offers 
loans with six years maturity for up to €50,000 for microenterpris-
es and €250,000 for small firms. The conditions include not having 
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been in difficulty before December 31, 2019, having seen a drop in 
business volume of more than 40% and committing to maintaining 
permanent jobs until the end of 2020 (CGD 2020c). Another credit 
line with state guarantees − Linha de Apoio ao Setor Social COVID-19 
− is available for companies and charities in the area of social assis-
tance and solidarity (CGD 2020d). 
A second set of measures concerned debt moratoria and a flex-
ibilization of debt repayment vis-à-vis companies and individuals. 
On the day Portugal entered a state of emergency, the Government 
held a press conference where the Minister of Finance, Mário Cen-
teno, outlined the “possibility of constituting a moratorium on cap-
ital and interest”. The details were yet to be decided. At the time, it 
was not mentioned that this would also cover families, but this was 
later included (Melo 2020). The CGD immediately announced the 
introduction of initiatives along these lines. Vis-à-vis companies, 
the CGD accepted readjusted monthly debt repayments for a period 
of up to six months. Additionally, companies in the tourist sector 
were offered an extension of up to five years on the maturity of any 
debts. For individual customers with mortgages or personal cred-
it, CGD would consider the suspension of capital repayments for a 
period of up to six months (CGD 2020b). When the Decree Law that 
outlined the moratorium came into force, CGD was legally required 
to offer moratoriums on capital and interests to its customers. In 
CGD’s own assessment (2020e, 7), it was “quick to react in making 
prompt adjustments” to the legislative changes. Additionally, CGD 
has a private moratorium. This compliments the legally required 
moratorium. It covers mortgage debt and personal credit that is 
not included in the Government’s moratorium. There are several 
private moratoria in Portugal, and these have been designed in the 
context of guidelines provided by the European Banking Authority. 
The CGD offers the one that is promoted by the Portuguese Banking 
Association (APB). Private banks also offer private moratoria (Bank 
of Portugal 2020b, 84-85; CGD 2020f). Furthermore, Caixa was pro-
active in signalling its willingness to extend the moratoria beyond 
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the initial six months covered by the Decree-Law (O Minho 2020). 
By July 28, the CGD had approved 48,326 moratoriums: 36,604 to in-
dividuals (€3,063 million) and 12,222 to companies (€3,919 million) 
amounting to €6,982 million (Sapo 2020).
A last set of measures concerned a digitalization of finance and 
of support of socially distant financial transactions. Caixa waived 
small merchants’ fees for Automatic Payment terminals with bills 
below €7,500 per month. To facilitate payment by card rather than 
cash, it would maintain the practice of not changing the fixed 
component of the merchant service charge for transactions with 
a small value. Individual account holders would benefit from free 
transfers through digital channels during the “crisis period”. For 
account holders without a debit card, Caixa would waive the debit 
card fee for the first year. Finally, the CGD stressed its commitment 
to protect the most vulnerable groups, through an exemption from 
commissions for customers with an income of up to 1.5 times the 
minimum wage and young people up to the age of 26 (CGD 2020b). 
The bank evaluates its digital efforts successfully and highlights 
that the number of digital customers in the domestic market in-
creased to 1.76 million (CGD 2020). According to the bank’s own 
evaluation, “the Covid-19 pandemic enabled CGD to consolidate 
its leading position as the digital bank of Portuguese citizens, in 
its almost immediate provision of distance solutions designed to 
facilitate access to the bank and maintain customer proximity” 
(CGD 2020e, 8). This points towards a simultaneous digitalization 
of finance and a support of transactions that reduce the risk of 
Covid-19 transmission. 
CONCLUSION
On the eve of the pandemic, the CGD wrote that “2020 is likely to be 
an especially complex year owing to the, as yet, uncertain impact 
of Covid-19” and that “the progress achieved over the last few years 
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enables us to claim that Caixa is currently ready and in a position 
to make an important contribution to minimising the pandemic’s 
effects on economic actors and Portuguese society, as has been 
the case on several occasions over its 144 years of existence” (CGD 
2019, 7). There is no doubt that the CGD’s response to the Covid-19 
pandemic has played a role within the Government’s public health 
management and its anti-cyclical programme. Along with the rest 
of the banking system, the CGD was legally required to provide “ex-
ceptional” support to companies and firms. In relieving families of 
their immediate debt obligations, it facilitated the lockdown and 
mediated the social impacts of income loss. The CGD also acted 
proactively. It passed measures before they were required by law 
and signalled its commitment to extending the moratoria. 
However, some of these measures should be understood with-
in the market imperatives and the regulative framework within 
which the public bank operates. While the moratorium is socially 
inclusive, it is also a financial stability measure. Defaults on debt 
represented a major risk, and the moratoria protected creditors 
as much as obligors. For the banks, it was important that these 
were not classified as “non-performing loans” within the Euro-
pean framework. This was the case for the CGD and for private 
banks. The moratoria flexibilized debtors’ contractual obligations 
vis-à-vis creditors and it simultaneously helped the banks to avoid 
a large amount of non-performing loans in their portfolio (Bank 
of Portugal 2020, 83-85; Melo 2020). This may explain why Caixa, 
as well as the private banks, implemented private debt moratoria. 
Various associations including Associação Portuguesa de Bancos, 
Associação de Instituições de Crédito Especializado and Associação 
Portuguesa de Leasing, Factoring e Renting promoted these (Bank of 
Portugal 2020, 83-85). 
Finally, it should be pointed out that some of the GCD’s initia-
tives that concerned a digitalization of finance and of support of 
socially distant financial transactions were compatible with the 
bank’s identity as a profit-seeking public bank. The bank positively 
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evaluated its improved position in the market for digital customers. 
However, further research is required to examine how different the 
CGD’s response was from that of the private banks. 
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Levou à Nacionalização do BPN e sobre a Supervisão Bancária Inerente. 
Relatório Final e Anexos. December 16, 2008- July 10, 2009. http://www.
parlamento.pt/sites/COM/XLEG/CINBPNposRAR/Paginas/Relatorios-
Actividade.aspx (accessed December 3, 2016).
Assembleia da República. 2012. Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito ao Proces-
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TURKEY’S PUBLIC BANKS 
AMID THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC
Turkey’s public banks have fulfilled critical functions during the Covid-19 pandemic. By extending cheap credit to house-holds and small and medium-sized enterprises, public banks 
partially mitigated Turkey’s economic slump in 2020. However, 
hardwiring public banks to extend supportive loans amid turbu-
lent times has prevented them from addressing other policy chal-
lenges and providing equity-centred responses that focus on social 
and environmental issues. The use of Turkey’s public banks during 
Covid-19 pandemic is a testament to the need for democratizing the 
social content of public banking.
INTRODUCTION
Public banks still occupy an important place in the global financial 
system despite decades of financial transformation and the animosi-
ty of neoliberal state managers in many countries. In the aftermath of 
the 2008-09 international financial crisis, interest grew in the oppor-
tunities provided by the financial capacities of public financial insti-
tutions. In recent years, public banks have been critical in providing 
financial support to infrastructural investments, yet many scholars 
have associated such banks with corruption and the mismanagement 
of public funds. To be sure, policy-makers have used and abused pub-
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lic banks to win support across electoral cycles. Yet this is not always 
or inherently so. Public banks also hold great potential for achieving 
public policy objectives. New multilateral and national development 
banks have been founded globally with multiple objectives – rang-
ing from greening the economy to funding large-scale infrastructure 
projects. 
Public banks are used for a range of purposes across the globe. 
The ways they function reflect the contending interests and political 
projects of different social groups and classes (Marois and Güngen 
2016). Turkey’s public banks are no exception. Their activities ulti-
mately depend on the social-political pressures and the capital accu-
mulation regime in which they are situated (Yalman et al. 2019). 
The Covid-19 crisis came as an unanticipated shock. Turkey’s 
economy was still suffering from the effects of the country’s 2018-
19 economic crisis when the Covid-19 pandemic hit hard in spring 
2020. In response, authorities implemented partial lockdowns and 
public health measures from April onwards. But even before these 
measures, the country was experiencing one of its highest unemploy-
ment rates. As capital outflows from the global south reached historic 
proportions in March and April, surpassing the levels of the 2008-09 
economic crisis, the Turkish Lira (TRY) depreciated rapidly. High lev-
els of foreign exchange-denominated debt in Turkey’s non-financial 
sector, as well as the dependence of economic activity on easy access 
to financial sources, pushed policy-makers to replicate the measures 
they took during the 2018-19 crisis. Turkey’s public banks thus became 
more critical than ever in responding to the emerging downturn. 
TURKEY’S PUBLIC BANKS IN TIMES OF CRISIS 
Throughout Turkey’s contemporary history, the country’s public 
banks have been used to stabilize the economic system and facili-
tate developmental projects. In the twenty-first century, they have 
evolved into profit-seeking enterprises, yet they are still important 
Public Banks and Covid-19
 335
in supporting households and small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs). This history and the public banks’ actions over the last cou-
ple of years provide a blueprint for understanding their uses during 
the Covid-19 pandemic. 
Before the 1980s, public banks in Turkey mainly focused on 
mobilizing scarce domestic resources. They had specific man-
dates such as supporting industrial production by funding SMEs 
(Halkbank) or agricultural production by providing cheap credits 
to farmers (Ziraat Bank). The post-1980 neoliberal transformation, 
however, eroded such developmentalist activity. The ratio of total 
loans to special loans for segments that were negatively affected by 
the neoliberal transition started to decline in the late 1990s (Marois 
and Güngen 2016). Despite the declining ratio of special loans, the 
duty losses (that is, government-assigned losses tied to programme 
lending) arising from cheap credit provisioning continued to in-
crease, since successive governments did not transfer the necessary 
amounts to public banks. Turkish authorities increased the risks of 
public banks in the late 1990s by not repaying these financial losses. 
This undermined decades of otherwise relatively stable operations. 
Turkey’s currency and banking crisis of 2001 paved the way for 
a neoliberal restructuring of the banking system. Despite keeping 
elements of a distant developmentalist past, incoming market re-
formers, above all economist Kemal Derviş made the public banks 
in Turkey evolve into explicitly profit-oriented institutions (Marois 
and Güngen 2013 and 2016). Financial losses arising from cheap 
credits extended to large social segments are now directly paid by 
the Turkish Treasury in the same month they are incurred. By their 
new name, these “income losses” have been relatively insignificant, 
except for the 2008-09 economic crisis and the post-2018 period. 
Despite neoliberal ‘depoliticization’ processes, the public banks 
have become instrumental for political projects of successive Jus-
tice and Development Party (AKP) governments. After failing to 
privatize these financial institutions in the early 2000s, state man-
agers have explicitly used public banks in the last decade to garner 
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further electoral support by expanding Islamic finance and funding 
large-scale infrastructural projects.1
Table 16.1: Public banks in Turkey as of 2020
Bank, type and 
year established
Ownership profile and explanation
Ziraat Bank; 
Commercial (1863)
100 % belongs to the Turkey Wealth Fund
Halkbank; 
Commercial (1938)
75.3 % belongs to the Turkey Wealth Fund; remaining shares 
belong to individuals and legal entities
Vakifbank; 
Commercial (1954)
37.46 % belongs to Ministry of Treasury and Finance, 35.99 % to 
the Turkey Wealth Fund, 16.15 % to individuals and legal entities; 





99.08 % belongs to Ministry of Treasury and Finance; 0.92 % to 
individuals and legal entities
Eximbank; 
Development (1987)
100 % belongs to Ministry of Treasury and Finance
Iller Bank; 
Development (1933)
Belongs to municipalities and special provincial administrations
Ziraat Katilim; 
Participation (2015)




100 % belongs to General Directorate of Turkish Foundations
Emlak Katilim; 
Participation (2019) 
100 % belongs to Ministry of Treasury and Finance
Source: Banks Association of Turkey (2020), Public Disclosure Platform website and 
bank websites.
Note: The Turkey Wealth Fund (TWF) is a 100% state-owned sovereign wealth fund. 
Participation banks are financial institutions that operate according to the principles 
of Islamic finance. They are categorized separately in official documents. 
1  The Government founded two public participation banks in 2015 (see also Table 
16.1). The AKP aims to attract more Islamic finance and efficiently fund the develo-
pment of “strategically important industries”.
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Public bank funding, for instance, may provide implicit state back-
ing to a respective business venture. Turkish infrastructural projects 
funded in this manner over the last decade enjoy the ability to access 
new sources from international financial markets at relatively advan-
tageous terms. In that sense, public banks have been used to channel 
financial resources to business groups close to the AKP. It would be 
one-sided, however, not to emphasize their importance in mitigating 
the ravages of neoliberalism. For large sections of society, public banks 
continue to help alleviate the economic woes stemming from the so-
cially traumatic consequences of Turkey’s economic fluctuations.
In the main, however, public banks in Turkey over the last two 
decades have increasingly carried the stamp of an authoritarian 
neoliberal mentality, if in contradictory ways (Güngen 2020). While 
AKP governments have attempted to reimpose financial discipline 
on households and SMEs during and in the aftermath of recurrent 
crises, public banks have also provided supportive credits, especial-
ly during those turbulent times. The social content of public bank-
ing has included practices that have benefited small producers and 
indebted households, although the lenders’ activities are hardwired 
to disproportionately benefit corporations.
Providing financial access and support to SMEs and households 
has helped large sections of society to tread the troubled waters of 
the Turkish economy, even as it has also stabilized and reproduced 
Turkish capitalism by giving more help to corporations. The inter-
esting aspect of these Janus-faced interventions has been the per-
sistent profitability of Turkish public banks. Contrary to neoliberal 
tenets, public banks have outperformed private banks in terms of 
their return on asset ratios over most of the twenty-first century so 
far. During the crisis years (2008-09 and 2018-19), income loss pay-
ments jumped radically, temporarily eroding profitability. Howev-
er, more often than not, annual profits have contributed more to the 
national budget than total compensation for their income losses. 
That said, the lack of democratic oversight still raises questions as 
to the most effective use of these public banks.
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Table 16.2: Assets and loans of the biggest public banks in Turkey
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Ziraat Bank  
Total Assets 
(billion USD) 92.65 99.05 109.01 106.61 105.57 121.03 107.94 116.67
Gross loans and 
advances (billion USD) 42.80 55.47 65.36 68.77 72.31 87.50 77.58 81.51
Return on Assets (%) 1.68 1.73 1.77 1.91 2.02 2.14 1.82 1.17
Return on Equity (%) 17.82 17.39 18.09 17.80 19.49 17.21 20.33 19.49
Halkbank  
Total Assets 
(billion USD) 61.20 66.25 67.79 65.63 67.49 82.70 73.72 78.82
Gross loans and 
advances (billion USD) 39.07 42.13 46.49 46.17 48.00 57.44 50.92 53.72
Return on Assets (%) 2.63 2.28 1.53 1.34 1.19 1.47 0.77 0.54
Return on Equity (%) 26.35 22.94 15.67 13.31 12.53 17.28 9.74 7.43
Vakifbank  
Total Assets 
(billion USD) 60.58 65.21 70.15 64.63 62.15 74.04 65.49 72.86
Gross loans and 
advances (billion USD) 40.72 43.49 47.99 45.37 44.84 52.17 45.39 50.29
Return on Assets (%) 1.58 1.41 1.11 0.85 1.36 1.61 1.49 0.90
Return on Equity (%) 13.63 13.10 11.27 8.77 14.50 17.92 17.33 11.05
Source: BankFocus Database (August 2020).
The use of public banks by policy-makers during the 2018-19 cri-
sis should be understood within this context. Against a backdrop of 
global financial tightening, Turkey faced a credit crunch in 2018 and 
an economic crisis in 2018-19 (Akçay and Güngen 2019). The public 
banks were at the forefront of response measures. State managers 
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used the public banks to help maintain currency stability and res-
urrected their historical legacies for supporting SMEs and crucial 
sectors via a newly designed National Industry project. Ultimately, 
there were three main ways that Turkish policy-makers used the 
public banks during the 2018-19 crisis: debt restructuring, counter-
cyclical lending and securitization. 
Credit campaigns have been effectively and recurrently used 
by state managers to stimulate the economy. Public banks played 
their part in restructuring corporate loans and household debt in 
2018-19, essentially displacing debts in time. For example, the ma-
turity period for consumer credits was extended to 60 months in 
February 2019 (CBRT 2019). The Banking Regulation and Super-
vision Agency (BRSA) also revised credit card instalment regula-
tions to enable more instalments. In early 2019, state managers 
first ordered Ziraat Bank (the biggest bank in Turkey, public or 
private) and then other public commercial banks to restructure 
credit card debt at lower-than-market rates. While household debt 
restructuring was mainly the task of public banks during the 2018-
19 crisis, US$20 billion in corporate debt was restructured in 2018 
as a result of negotiations between large corporations and various 
Turkish banks, both public and private. 
The countercyclical lending capacity of public banks also bene-
fited distressed firms during the 2018-19 crisis. The income losses 
arising from targeted campaigns provide a proxy to estimate the 
extent of these campaigns. Indeed, income loss transfers increased 
26.5% in real terms from 2018 to 2019. Turkey’s public banks led the 
credit expansion in the first half of 2019 and the last quarter of the 
year, repeating their active role in extending commercial credits 
during the 2008-09 crisis. The credit expansion and the income loss 
payments during the pandemic, however, surpassed the volumes of 
previous campaigns (further elaborated below).
After converting the Development and Investment Bank 
(Kalkınma ve Yatırım Bankası, a public development bank) into a 
lender exempt from regulations in October 2018, state managers 
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flexed their new muscle in December 2018 to issue asset-backed 
securities. The state provided a guarantee for investors via the De-
velopment and Investment Bank. Private banks shifted long-term 
future revenues from mortgage-backed securities and received 
new liquidity. The volume of securitization was just TRY 4.15 bil-
lion, but the two rounds of securitization during the crisis made it 
easier for private banks to access fresh liquidity. 
In brief, the credit policies of public banks were effective in keep-
ing thousands of small firms afloat. At the same time, countercycli-
cal lending bought time for the AKP to wait for a change in global 
financial conditions. Public banks contributed to economic stability 
through supportive loans and countercyclical measures both during 
the 2018-19 crisis and the previous instances of turbulence. 
Ironically, the Turkish public banks have grown used to mitigat-
ing the economic instability and social damages brought about by 
neoliberal policies. Such public sector mitigation, however, accom-
panies the AKP’s constant commitment to market-based financial 
deepening. The public banks formed a buffer against the further 
contraction of economic activity. At the same time, they provided 
an opportunity for many non-financial corporations to postpone 
financing needs. This provides context for the actions of and limita-
tions to public banks during the Covid-19 pandemic.
THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC AND BANK ACTIONS
The first Covid-19 case in Turkey was officially reported in the sec-
ond week of March 2020.2 Unsurprisingly, the partial lockdowns 
and the social distancing measures, together with curfews in 31 
2  As of mid-August, the number of Covid-19 patients exceeded 250,000, while the 
death toll had reached 6,000. After April, the number of active cases declined gra-
dually to around 10,000. However, the excess mortality data for Istanbul and the pro-
blems in reporting and contact tracing imply that the death toll is much higher than 
the official figures show.
Public Banks and Covid-19
 341
provinces in April and May resulted in a huge economic slump. 
During this time, public banks emerged at the forefront of the sup-
port provided to low-income households and SMEs.
Since the start of the pandemic, the country has been extremely 
vulnerable to capital flows, as the foreign exchange reserves of the 
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) (excluding the swaps 
with other central banks and domestic banks) were already depleted 
by March 2020. Turkey also witnessed the biggest drop in labour force 
participation in its history.3 The initial response by policy-makers was 
to announce the Economic Stability Shield Package on March 18, 2020. 
By June, the total value of the Covid-19 response package by President 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan administration had reached almost TRY 300 
billion4 (equivalent to around 6% of Gross Domestic Product – GDP).5
The Erdoğan administration expanded fiscal spending amid the 
pandemic, and the CBRT revised its open market operations limit. 
Buying more government debt in the secondary market helped the 
Unemployment Insurance Fund offload large volumes of govern-
ment debt. The fund’s resources were of vital importance for the 
easing of short-term allowances, which was extended to 3.2 million 
people in April and May. CBRT regulations and the revised asset ra-
tio calculations imposed on commercial banks also directly helped 
3  Since people were not looking actively for jobs in April and May, while short-term 
allowance payments placed more than 3 million workers into a grey zone, the pande-
mic did not result in the highest official unemployment rate in the country’s history. 
Still, the number of unemployed, and the number of those not seeking a job but 
ready to start, seasonally employed and time-related underemployed exceeded 10 
million in total in April-May 2020. In those months, the labour force population also 
dropped below 30 million (see Turkstat, 2020). 
4  US$1 is approximately TRY8.4.
5  The figure by June was TRY 498 billion (including deferred payments and other 
credit campaigns), according to the International Monetary Fund’s Covid-19 respon-
se tracker. The Ministry of Treasury and Finance announced the size of the Econo-
mic Stability Shield Package as TRY 600 billion in late May (adding an unknown mul-
tiplier effect to boost the number). By early June, the actual volume of the measures 
as part of the package was TRY 207 billion in credit support, TRY 14 billion in short-
term allowance payments (including payments through all of June), TRY 5 billion in 
cash assistance and TRY 66 billion in deferred premiums payments.  
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the Treasury set new records of domestic borrowing. Monetary and 
fiscal expansion during the slump, particularly amid the backdrop 
of capital outflows, put additional pressure on the Turkish Lira. 
Similar to practices during the 2018-19 crisis, public banks were 
used to intervene in the currency markets. It was not possible to 
halt the currency’s depreciation under such financial distress, but 
state managers could mobilize the public banks to slow down the 
speed of the fall, providing breathing room for Turkish corpora-
tions who had heavy foreign exchange debts.6 
Erdoğan’s administration provided additional cash assistance to 
low-income households. According to official figures, more than 5 
million households received one-time cash support (TRY 1,000 per 
household, or US$140 at the time). The insufficient cash assistance 
was topped up with supportive loans. These loans were provided 
by the biggest three public banks, Ziraat Bank, Halkbank, and Va-
kifBank. From April 1, 2020, until the reopening of the economy 
in mid-June, almost 7 million individuals applied for basic needs 
credit (with limits up to TRY 10,000). The interest rates were less 
than half the market rate and required no payments in the first six 
months, helping people to avoid the initial impact of the crisis.
Apart from the ‘basic needs credit’, public banks extended cheap 
credit to 180,000 SMEs and 1.1 million shopkeepers. The dramatic 
rise in the credit volume in Turkey in April and May was achieved 
partly by the contributions of the Credit Guarantee Fund (CGF), 
through which the Turkish Treasury assumed part of the counter-
party risk. The CGF-supported credit volume doubled during the 
pandemic and reached TRY 330 billion, the lion’s share of which 
consisted of public bank credits to SMEs. The CGF was also used to 
provide surety for individual credits during the pandemic. 
6  There are no official figures on the scope and details of such intervention in the cu-
rrency markets. The currency intervention by the Central Bank and the public banks 
from early 2019 to mid-2020 is estimated to have exceeded US$100 billion (Reuters, 
2020). The net foreign exchange position of public banks fell US$8 billion from mid-
March to early August 2020. 
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Table 16.3: Summary of public bank actions during 
the Covid-19 pandemic (March 2020-July 2020)
























Stimulating consumption to 










Rediscount credit Support for FX earning 
industries
TRY 30 billion
Eximbank Stock financing 
support
Credit Guarantee Fund 
supported loan for exporters
not known
Halkbank Postponing loan 
repayments for 6 
months






Investment credit Support for new investment TRY 20 billion
Iller Bank Postponing loan 
repayments for 
3 months
Measure against declining 
revenues of municipalities
not known
Source: Bank websites. Public commercial banks include Ziraat Bank, Halkbank 
and VakifBank. Halkbank postponed loan repayments initially for three months in 
March, then extended the period for another three months in July. Ziraat Bank and 
VakifBank provided credit restructuring opportunities for commercial credits, but 
the restructurings did not necessarily decrease payments or increase credit maturity. 
Ali Rıza Güngen
344 
Iller Bank is a specialist public banking institution that transfers 
funds allocated to municipalities from general budget revenues. As 
a result of the presidential decision to make capital injections to 
Iller Bank in 2019, Iller started to impose a deduction on the funds 
transferred to the municipalities. In late March 2020, this practice 
was suspended for three months, providing much-needed support 
to already declining municipal revenues. Iller Bank, however, did 
not postpone municipal loan repayments at first. Only after nego-
tiations and a request from the Union of Municipalities of Turkey 
did Iller change its policy and postpone municipalities’ loan repay-
ments for three months (TRT Haber 2020). This support was critical 
in preventing municipal service disruptions. However, Iller did not 
subsequently increase municipal borrowing limits.
In June 2020, the Turkish public banks joined the ‘Nefes Kredi-
si’ campaign (which literally translates as “credit to take a breath”). 
This was initially launched by the Union of Chamber and Com-
modity Exchanges of Turkey and Denizbank (a private commercial 
bank). Turkish public banks have been instrumental in reopening 
the economy as policy-makers devised new retail loan campaigns 
on June 1 to stimulate the tourism, automotive and housing sectors. 
Framed as a ‘New Support Package’, these cheap credits mainly tar-
geted household consumption. The package also included a specific 
loan for domestic small-scale producers that was supported by low-
er interest rates and required no repayments in the first six months. 
On most occasions, the credit support to SMEs and households 
were provided via campaigns that included all three public commer-
cial banks. A campaign or contribution to a programme related di-
rectly to public health has not occurred, since Turkish health authori-
ties have preferred to paint a picture of success from the beginning of 
the pandemic. Still, public banks made generous contributions to the 
solidarity campaign launched by the Presidency. TRY 2.1 billion was 
amassed in the ‘Biz Bize Yeteriz’ solidarity campaign. The initiative 
was mainly a political manoeuvre to consolidate the AKP’s electoral 
base. The CBRT donated TRY 100 million to the President’s campaign; 
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Ziraat gave TRY 62.3 million, Halkbank TRY 56 million and VakifBank 
TRY 50 million. According to the campaign’s website, these donations 
have been added to the budget for social transfers.
The major support for export-oriented firms and new investment 
during the pandemic has been via the CBRT’s revised credit pro-
gramme. The TRY 60 billion credit to be extended for FX-earning in-
dustries was allocated as rediscount credits on March 31, 2020. Two 
months later, one-third of the credit was converted to investment cred-
its to be provided by the Development and Investment Bank, with the 
remaining rediscount credit to come mainly from Eximbank (a public 
export-import bank) and the public commercial banks (CBRT 2020). 
Although it was a contravention of the CBRT’s law, the provision 
of these investment credits was promoted as a response to the pan-
demic and a new boost to Turkey’s sustainable development policies. 
Once again, it was a continuation of the previous crisis management 
experience. Authorities had previously designed special financing 
opportunities for sectors producing intermediary goods (reportedly 
to minimize the current account deficit), using public banks to give 
export-oriented firms long-term loans in 2019 at favourable rates.
The BRSA revised banking sector regulations in April 2020 (and 
once again in May 2020) to promote further lending. Public banks 
were already conforming with the new asset ratio calculations, 
since they boosted credit volume from the beginning of the pan-
demic onwards. As a result of these policies and public bank ac-
tions, Turkey experienced the biggest credit expansion in its history 
in spring 2020 (see Figure 16.1). The speed of credit expansion led 
by the public banks was most striking in May and June. The credit 
volume of public banks increased from TRY 800 billion to almost 
TRY 1.1 trillion from mid-March to mid-August. During this peri-
od, TRY credit volume of public banks increased by 37%, while the 
ratio of increase was 17% in the case of private banks and 22% in 
the case of foreign banks. The increases in credits of private and 
foreign banks would have been much lower had it not been for the 
BRSA regulations to push more lending. 
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Figure 16.1 Turkish Lira credit flow (quarterly change, TRY billion, 
January 2018 to August 2020)
Source: BRSA (2018-2020).
In short, the main response to the economic slump was to foster 
credit expansion – something that has partially mitigated the 2020 
slump. However, the participation of public banks in credit cam-
paigns did not foster cooperation with other public service provid-
ers.7 The institutions at the forefront of the fight against the pandem-
ic did not take loans from Turkey’s public banks but applied to other 
7  Having said this, we can expect an increase of cases in which public service pro-
viders and the public banks jointly apply multilateral financial institutions for not 
only responding medical emergencies but also supporting post-slump recovery. At 
the time of writing, the Development and Investment Bank, with the backing of the 
Ministry of Treasury and Finance, applied for a US$300 million loan from the Asian 
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facilities in the spring of 2020. For example, the Turkish Health Min-
istry preferred to apply for a €200 million loan from European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to build a pandemic 
hospital in Istanbul and to finance purchase of ventilators and ICU 
monitors, and other emergency medical equipment (EBRD 2020).
CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS
The Turkish economy suffered severe damage in the 2018-19 crisis. 
Only by using public banks did authorities manage to mitigate the 
impact of the crisis for large segments of society. They have resorted 
to a similar strategy during the Covid-19 pandemic. Despite the suc-
cess in providing temporary support and alleviating the economic 
slump by helping low-income households and SMEs, this strategy 
has had its down sides. 
Apart from a few exceptional years, Turkey’s public banks have 
consistently outperformed private banks in the post-2001 period 
(Marois and Güngen 2019). This seems to have changed in recent 
years. In both 2018 and 2019, the return on asset ratios of public 
banks (1.2% and 0.7%, respectively) remained significantly below 
the sectoral average (1.5% and 1.3%, respectively) (BAT 2019; BAT 
2020). Turning public banks into cure-alls for Turkey’s financial 
woes not only damaged their performance but also created new 
controversies. For example, public banks breached their legal lim-
it of open foreign exchange position in July 2020. This stems from 
the recurrent use of public financial resources during the pandemic 
to slow down the Turkish Lira’s depreciation. State authorities also 
started to use public banks in July 2020 to help the Treasury borrow 
in US dollars from the domestic market at lower interest rates. This 
represents a further restraint on public bank actions, since their 
resources are increasingly being directed to avoid short-term cur-
rency fluctuations rather than addressing health challenges or sup-
porting new investments. 
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The public banks’ greatest problem therefore rests in the un-
democratic and unaccountable way in which they are allowed to 
function. Although the retail loan campaigns and loans that support 
industrial activity prevented financial distress for some households 
and SMEs, the risks assumed by public banks cannot be traced eas-
ily and discussed openly. The financial muscle possessed by these 
public institutions could have been used better to provide equi-
ty-centred responses. The basic needs credit, for example, opened 
the doors of the financial system to Turkey’s low-income and infor-
mal labourers. Nevertheless, this was a sort of financial inclusion 
based on growing indebtedness despite the lower-than-market 
interest rates of the loans. In addition, the postponement of loan 
repayments and credit support to low-income households provide 
only a temporary solution. Although presented as elements of suc-
cess in the fight against the Covid-19 pandemic, the financial sup-
port for Turkey’s labouring classes has largely remained minuscule 
in comparison to relief packages in other countries. During the first 
five months of the pandemic, the capacity of the public banks has 
not been harnessed for equity-centred responses, but instead for 
state-sponsored credit expansion.
Both as a result of the 2018-19 economic crisis and the Covid-19 
pandemic, public banks’ non-performing loans have increased to 
historic proportions. This has not, however, resulted in immediate 
financial problems for the public banks, as the Treasury automati-
cally compensates for the public banks’ income losses each month. 
Nevertheless, the swelling losses led to dramatic increases in the 
amount of funds transferred: The income loss payments to public 
banks in March 2020 was three times as high as the payments of 
March 2019. The cash transfers from the Treasury jumped from TRY 
1.9 billion (March-July 2019) to TRY 3.5 billion (March-July 2020), 
raising questions about the sustainability of the support provided 
by public banks to the economy in general. 
The official owner of the public commercial banks, the Turkey 
Wealth Fund (TWF), injected TRY21 billion core capital in May into 
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them as previous loans and recurrent credit expansion was de-
creasing capital adequacy ratios. The TWF, whose capital injection 
helped it increase its ownership shares in Halkbank and VakifBank, 
declared this injection a part of its operations to support financial 
deepening and the prospective financialized use of Turkey’s pub-
lic banks. In that sense, the Covid-19 pandemic responses and the 
TWF’s design may eventually lead to a further erosion in the social 
mandates of the public banks, barring a coordinated response by 
social forces. This might provide a new challenge to the credibility 
of public banks in the post-pandemic environment.
CONCLUSION
During the Turkish economy’s drift into new economic troubles af-
ter 2013, the political initiatives of AKP Governments have further 
chipped away at the historic social mandates of the country’s public 
banks. While funding for huge infrastructure projects boosted eco-
nomic performance, the achievement of high rates of GDP growth 
was eventually dependent on the tempo of capital inflows. After the 
coup attempt of 2016, and particularly during the 2018-19 crisis, AKP 
Governments (and from 2018 onwards, Erdoğan’s presidential ad-
ministration) committed themselves to bailing out indebted SMEs 
and kick-starting credit expansion. The makeshift arrangements did 
not increase the export capacity of Turkish firms or generate further 
employment, let alone reduce social inequality.  
The uses of public banks during the first five months of the 
Covid-19 pandemic (early March to early August in the Turkish con-
text) have not addressed health challenges. They also have not in-
volved projects focusing on environmental and social issues. That 
said, we can speak of multiple uses of public banks in both the 
2018-19 economic crisis and the 2020 economic slump. By using the 
public banks, the Erdoğan administration has attempted to stabilize 
the TRY, provide cheap credits (for both households and distressed 
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SMEs) and enhance a reportedly new developmental framework (to 
boost the competitiveness of the economy). The coming years will 
show whether the simultaneous pursuit of these goals and focus on 
repeatedly restarting credit expansion works as a strategy. It is still 
too soon to tell. 
In the absence of a collective political will to reclaim Turkey’s 
public banks, the social content defining the performance of these 
institutions has been shaped to a great extent by a combination 
of the AKP’s political projects and economic survival attempts, as 
well as by structural global financial conditions. Echoing the AKP 
Governments’ actions during previous crises, the Erdoğan adminis-
tration succeeded in re-imposing financial discipline through new 
credit campaigns spearheaded by public banks and mitigating the 
negative social impacts of the 2020 slump at the same time. 
In Turkey, the social content of public banking amid the AKP’s 
economic policies pushed these financial institutions evermore to-
wards responding to the credit needs of various social segments. 
However, it was this same push that allowed policy-makers to use 
public banks to nurture political alliances crosscutting various 
social segments. It was also this social and political environment 
that prevented the use of public banks’ capacity to address more 
challenging issues such as environmental degradation and social 
inequality. The Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted this limitation 
in Turkey, as well as the effective use of public banks to offer tem-
porary economic relief. A pro-public and democratic turn to public 
banking is required to turn this deteriorating situation around. 
Current uses of Turkey’s public banks provide no space for trans-
parency and accountability mechanisms. The way public banks have 
been used in Turkey in recent years attempts to revitalize econom-
ic activity by offering cheap loans. The crisis atmosphere in which 
these institutions have operated in recent years makes it even more 
challenging to propose alternative and progressive uses for these 
institutions. However, public bank actions in Turkey during the 
Covid-19 pandemic showed the importance of democratizing public 
Public Banks and Covid-19
 351
banks’ social content. There is an urgent need to reclaim public fi-
nancial institutions, in a way that subordinates them to democratic 
decision-making and serves public interests. Their financial capacity 
should not only provide temporary relief to large social segments but 
should also be used for providing equity-centred responses during 
public health crises and economic turbulence. 
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COVID-19 AND PUBLIC BANKS  
IN THE UNITED STATES:  
A MOMENT OF OPPORTUNITY?1
New regulations introduced by the United States (US) Federal Reserve are intended to improve liquidity in the American economy as part of a set of Covid-19 economic relief mea-
sures at the federal level. The real winners from these changes ap-
pear to be private commercial banks, however, which have been tak-
ing advantage of new rules to lend to powerful institutions that are 
able to buy up assets at dramatically reduced prices. Cash-strapped 
states and local governments, meanwhile, are being told they will not 
be bailed out. However, the Federal Reserve changes also provide a 
remarkable opportunity for lower tiers of government to establish 
new public banks, with the aim of creating critical sources of funding 
for local authorities and businesses, offering a potential silver lining 
to an otherwise crushing Covid-19 experience in the US.
INTRODUCTION
The US Congress seems to be at war with the states. Only US$150 
billion of its nearly US$3 trillion coronavirus relief package – a mere 
1  This is an edited version of an article first published in Common Dreams (2020). 
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5% – has been allocated to the 50 states; and they are not allowed 
to use these funds where they are needed most, to plug the holes 
in their budgets caused by the mandatory shutdown. On April 22, 
2020, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell said he was opposed 
to additional federal aid to the states, and that his preference was to 
allow states to go bankrupt (New York Times, 2020). 
No such threat looms over the banks, which have done extreme-
ly well in this crisis. The Federal Reserve has dropped interest rates 
to 0.25%, eliminated reserve requirements and relaxed capital re-
quirements. Banks can now borrow effectively for free, without re-
strictions on the money’s use. Following the playbook of the 2008-09 
bailout, they can make the funds available to their Wall Street cro-
nies to buy up distressed Main Street assets at fire sale prices, while 
continuing to lend to credit cardholders at 21%.  
If there is a silver lining to all this, it is that the Fed’s relaxed liquid-
ity rules have made it easier for state and local governments to set 
up their own publicly-owned banks, something they should do post 
haste to take advantage of the Fed’s very generous new accommoda-
tions for banks. These public banks can then lend to local businesses, 
municipal agencies and local citizens at substantially reduced rates 
while replenishing the local government’s coffers, recharging the 
Main Street economy and the government’s revenue base.
A COVERT WAR ON THE STATES
Payments going to state and local governments from the Corona-
virus Relief Fund under the CARES Act may be used only for coro-
navirus-related expenses. They may not be used to cover expenses 
that were accounted for in their most recently approved budgets as 
of March 2020. The problem is that nearly everything local govern-
ments do is funded through their most recently approved budgets, 
and that funding will come up painfully short for all of the states 
due to increased costs and lost revenues forced by the coronavirus 
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shutdown. Unlike the federal government, which can add a trillion 
dollars to the federal debt every year without fear of retribution, 
states and cities are required to balance their budgets. The Fed has 
opened a Municipal Liquidity Facility that may buy their municipal 
bonds, but this is still short-term debt, which must be repaid when 
due. Selling bonds will not fend off bankruptcy for states and cities 
that must balance their books. 
States are not legally allowed to declare bankruptcy, but Senator 
McConnell contended that “there’s no good reason for it not to be 
available.” He said, “we’ll certainly insist that anything we borrow 
to send down to the states is not spent on solving problems that they 
created for themselves over the years with their pension programs” 
(Leo Weekly, 2020). And that is evidently the real motive behind the 
bankruptcy push. McConnell wants states put through a bankrupt-
cy reorganization to get rid of all those pesky pension agreements 
and the unions that negotiated them. However, these are the safety 
nets against old age for which teachers, nurses, police and firefight-
ers have worked for 30 or 40 years. It is their money. 
It has long been a goal of conservatives to privatize public pen-
sions, forcing seniors into the riskier stock market. Lured in by mar-
ket booms, their savings can then be raided by the periodic busts of 
the ‘business cycle,’ while the more savvy insiders collect the spoils. 
Today political opportunists are using a crushing emergency that 
is devastating local economies to downsize the public sector and 
privatize everything.  
FREE MONEY FOR BANKS: THE FED’S VERY LIBERAL NEW RULES
Unlike the states, the banks were not facing bankruptcy from the 
economic shutdown; but their stocks were sinking fast. The Fed’s ac-
commodations were said to be to encourage banks to “help meet de-
mand for credit from households and businesses.” However, while 
the banks’ own borrowing rates were dropped on March 15 from an 
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already-low 1.5% to 0.25%, average credit card rates dropped in the 
following month only by 0.5% to 20.71%, still unconscionably high 
for out-of-work wage earners. 
Although the Fed’s accommodations were allegedly to serve 
Main Street during the shutdown, Wall Street had a serious liquid-
ity problem long before the pandemic hit. Troubles surfaced in 
September 2019, when repo market rates suddenly shot up to 10%. 
Before 2008, banks borrowed from each other in the fed funds 
market; but after 2008 they were afraid to lend to each other for 
fear the borrowing banks might be insolvent and might not pay 
back the loans.
Instead the lenders turned to the repo market, where loans 
were supposedly secured with collateral. The problem was that 
the collateral could be ‘rehypothecated’ or used for several loans 
at once; and by September 2019, the borrower side of the repo 
market had been taken over by hedge funds, which were notorious 
for risky rehypothecation. The lenders therefore again pulled out, 
forcing the Fed to step in to save the banks that are its true constit-
uents. However, that meant the Fed was backstopping the whole 
repo market, including the hedge funds; an untenable situation. 
So it flung the doors wide open to its discount window, where only 
banks could borrow.
The discount window is the Fed’s direct lending facility that 
is meant to help commercial banks manage short-term liquidity 
needs. In the past, banks have been reluctant to borrow there be-
cause its higher interest rate implied that the bank was on shaky 
ground and that no one else would lend to it. But the Fed has now 
eliminated that barrier. It said in a press release on March 15, 2020:
The Federal Reserve encourages depository institutions to 
turn to the discount window to help meet demands for cred-
it from households and businesses at this time. In support 
of this goal, the Board today announced that it will lower the 
primary credit rate by 150 basis points to 0.25% … To further 
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enhance the role of the discount window as a tool for banks 
in addressing potential funding pressures, the Board also 
today announced that depository institutions may borrow 
from the discount window for periods as long as 90 days, 
prepayable and renewable by the borrower on a daily basis. 
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2020) 
Banks can get virtually free loans from the discount window 
that can be rolled over from day to day, as necessary. The press 
release said that the Fed had also eliminated the reserve require-
ment – the requirement that banks retain reserves equal to 10% of 
their deposits – and that it is “encouraging banks to use their capi-
tal and liquidity buffers as they lend to households and businesses 
who are affected by the coronavirus” (emphasis added). It seems 
that banks no longer need to worry about having deposits that are 
sufficient to back their loans. They can just borrow the needed li-
quidity at 0.25%, ‘renewable on a daily basis.’ They do not need 
to worry about ‘liquidity mismatches,’ where they have borrowed 
short to lend long and the depositors have suddenly come for their 
money, leaving them without the funds to cover their loans. The 
Fed now has their backs, providing ‘primary credit’ at its discount 
window to all banks in good standing on very easy terms. The 
Fed’s website states:2
Generally, there are no restrictions on borrowers’ use of pri-
mary credit… Notably, eligible depository institutions may 
obtain primary credit without exhausting or even seeking 
funds from alternative sources. Minimal administration of 
and restrictions on the use of primary credit makes it a reli-
able funding source.
2  Federal Reserve. The Primary & Secondary Lending Programs. https://www.
frbdiscountwindow.org/pages/general-information/primary-and-secondary-len-
ding-programs (accessed November 3, 2020).
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WHAT STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS CAN DO:  
FORM THEIR OWN BANKS
On the positive side, these new easy terms make it much easier for 
local governments to own and operate their own banks, on the stel-
lar model of the century-old Bank of North Dakota (Mother Jones, 
2009). To fast-track the process, a state could buy a bank that was for 
sale locally, which would already have Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) insurance and a master account with the central 
bank (something needed to conduct business with other banks and 
the Fed). The state could then move its existing revenues and those it 
gets from the CARES Act Relief Fund into the bank as deposits. Since 
there is no longer a deposit requirement, it need not worry if these 
revenues get withdrawn and spent. Any shortfall can be covered by 
borrowing at 0.25% from the Fed’s discount window. The bank would 
need to make prudent loans to keep its books in balance, but if its cap-
ital base were to be depleted from a few non-performing loans, that 
too apparently need not be a problem, since the Fed is “encourag-
ing banks to use their capital and liquidity buffers.” The buffers were 
there for an emergency, said the Fed, and this is that emergency.
To cover startup costs and capitalization, the state might be 
able to use a portion of its CARES Relief Fund allotment. Its bud-
get before March 2020 would not have included a public bank that 
could serve as a critical source of funding for local businesses 
crushed by the shutdown and passed over by the bailout. Among 
the examples given of allowable uses for the relief funds are such 
things as “expenditures related to the provision of grants to small 
businesses to reimburse the costs of business interruption caused 
by required closures,” (US Department of the Treasury, 2020). Pro-
viding below-market loans to small businesses would fall into that 
general category. 
By using some of its CARES Act funds to capitalize a bank, the 
local government can leverage the money by 10 to 1. Equity of 
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US$100 million can capitalize US$1 billion in loans. With the state 
bank’s own borrowing costs effectively at 0%, its operating costs 
will be very low. It can make below-market loans to creditworthy 
local borrowers while still turning a profit. This can be used either 
to build up the bank’s capital base for more loans or to supplement 
the state’s revenues. The bank can also lend to its own government 
agencies that are short of funds due to the mandatory shutdown. 
The salubrious effect will be to jumpstart the local economy by 
putting new money into it. People can be put back to work, lo-
cal infrastructure can be restored and expanded, and the local tax 
base can be replenished. 
The coronavirus pandemic has demonstrated not only that the 
US needs to free itself from dependence on foreign markets by re-
building its manufacturing base, but that state and local govern-
ments need to free themselves from dependence on the federal 
government too. Some state economies are larger than those of en-
tire countries. Governor Gavin Newsom, whose state ranks as the 
world’s fifth largest economy, has called California a “nation-state.” 
A sovereign nation-state needs its own bank. 
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FINANCE: A RAPID REVIEW OF 
COOPERATION AND RESILIENCE 
TO FACE COVID-19
This chapter provides a “rapid review” of four major South-South public banks and public funds to give a flavour of how regional financial cooperation in the South is offering 
resilience in the face of Covid-19. It draws on the experiences of 
the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), the Asian Infrastructure In-
vestment Bank (AIIB), the New Development Bank (NDB) and the 
Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR) to show how South-South 
public banks and public funds responded quickly to the Covid-19 
crisis. These Southern-owned and Southern-led public financial 
institutions have not received the same attention as those from the 
world’s largest economies nor global public lenders like the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), but they are none-
theless making an important contribution to supporting countries 
in the South. Very quickly after the start of the pandemic, they 
upped their support to members, increasing the scale of finance 
available, broadening the scope of lending, adapting loan terms 
and conditions, and augmenting loan efficiency by facilitating 
country-to-country sharing of expertise, group procurement pol-
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icies and partnerships with other firms, banks and governments. 
They have changed the definition of what constitutes an emergency 
and reappraised the role of social and human capital with respect 
to infrastructure. Their response to Covid-19 suggests that even 
more can be achieved in the future, if they continue to strengthen 
the strategic partnerships at the heart of South-South cooperation 
and use their solidarity to support moves towards a more inclusive 
global financial architecture.
INTRODUCTION
South-South public banks and funds responded quickly to the 
Covid-19 crisis, scaling up the finances available and adapting 
their approach to help their members fight the economic and 
health impacts of Covid-19. The term South-South has come to 
denote forms of cooperation between developing countries such 
as regional or multilateral financial institutions where the major-
ity ownership lies with governments in the South, the motivation 
is often one of ‘solidarity’ and the orientation of services is firmly 
with countries in the South. These Southern-led public financial 
institutions have not received the same attention as those from 
the world’s largest economies nor the global public lenders, like 
the World Bank and IMF. They are, nonetheless, making an im-
portant contribution to supporting the South. Very quickly after 
the start of the pandemic, these institutions upped their support 
to members – increasing the scale of finance available, broaden-
ing the scope of lending considerably, adapting loan terms and 
conditions, and augmenting loan efficiency by facilitating coun-
try-to-country sharing of expertise, group procurement policies 
and partnerships with other firms, banks and governments. They 
have changed the definition of what constitutes an emergency 
and reappraised the role of social and human capital with re-
spect to infrastructure. 
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This chapter gives a brief “rapid review” of four major public 
banks and funds to give a flavour of how regional cooperation in 
the South is offering resilience in the face of Covid-19. This in-
cludes the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), the Asian Infra-
structure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank 
(NDB) as Southern-led public banks that are profoundly changing 
the nature of the development finance landscape. It also includes 
the Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR) as a foreign exchange 
reserve fund that helps its member countries withstand exchange 
rate fluctuations and balance of payments distress. It is not a 
bank, but it has many bank-like qualities. All these institutions 
have been part of the broader and most significant trend in the 
financial sector this century, whereby South-South banks, funds, 
credit swaps and bond issuances are bringing trillions of dollars 
and technical expertise to complement what is available through 
the Bretton Woods institutions, adding a new voice for the South 
that is more commensurate with its economic weight (Barrow-
clough et al. 2020). Their response to Covid-19 suggests that even 
more can be achieved in the future, if they continue to strengthen 
the strategic partnerships at the heart of South-South cooperation 
and use their solidarity to support moves towards a more inclusive 
global financial architecture (UNCTAD 2020a). 
SOUTHERN NEEDS AND THE IMPACT OF COVID-19 
Developing countries have been the hardest hit by Covid-19 (UNC-
TAD 2020a, 2020b). They are especially vulnerable to the economic 
shock waves caused by the rapid fall in commodity prices, the col-
lapse in trade, tourism revenues and remittances, and they typi-
cally lack the macroeconomic ‘automatic stabilizers’ of unemploy-
ment support and other social services found in richer countries. 
They also have under-resourced public health systems and limited 
provision of public water and sanitation, and less ability to pay the 
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rapidly rising prices of Covid-related medical supplies and equip-
ment. This is not to say they are doing nothing, but compared to 
the advanced economies, their governments have less fiscal space 
with which to boost expenditure and their central banks have few-
er options to boost liquidity without severely risking their curren-
cies. Public development banks in the South are playing a role, but 
with much less fire-power and while struggling to meet a multi-
plicity of needs with lower levels of capitalization and less ability 
to raise funds on international capital markets on long-term and 
favourable terms. 
Developing countries can of course turn to the legacy Bretton 
Woods institutions and these did quickly scale up their resources 
to meet the new Covid-19 needs. The IMF has pledged more than 
US$1 trillion and the World Bank more than US$27 billion (World 
Bank 2020a, 2020b). The major multilateral regional banks, such as 
the African Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank, 
have also announced special Covid support (while these banks 
may be Southern-oriented they are not described as South-South 
because they have a significant number of Northern countries as 
members and co-owners). 
Many developing countries have turned to these global funders 
of last resort. Yet these Bretton Woods institutions have not scaled 
up nearly as much as has been needed. According to the Over-
seas Development Institute (ODI), lending by the World Bank, the 
AfDB and the ADB increased by only 29% in response to Covid, 
which is a much smaller magnitude than their response during 
the global financial crisis. Moreover, this increase is planned for 
only one year, and most lending has gone to middle-income de-
veloping countries with only 5% directed to the lowest-income 
countries with the greatest needs. Finally, these loans come with 
the same conditionalities and structural adjustments that are 
typical of World Bank or IMF lending, and of which many devel-
oping countries are already wary. There is a demand for South-
ern-led alternatives. 
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RESPONSES OF SOUTHERN-LED PUBLIC BANKS 
AND FUNDS TO COVID-19 
The many individual initiatives launched by South-South public 
banks and funds are beyond the scope of this “rapid review”. The 
following pages aim rather to highlight some of the experiences of 
four public banks – the Islamic Development Bank, the New Devel-
opment Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment bank (AIIB) and 
the Latin American Reserve Fund. In doing so, it seeks to draw out 
elements that are particularly relevant for public banking in the 
Covid-19 context and beyond.
The Islamic Development Bank 
The Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) is a global Southern-led pub-
lic bank and all of its 57 member countries are potentially eligible 
for its Covid-19 support package geared towards health and liveli-
hood resilience. Announced in April, the package is worth US$2.3 
billion – just over a quarter of the bank’s average lending per an-
num. Arrangements were made quickly, and by May the IsDB had 
already made plans with 27 members, accounting for more than 
half of the total package, to cover loans, provide loan guarantees, 
support import finance, provide pre-export finances and to support 
health systems, food production and social safety nets. 
The rapid response was financed mostly by a re-allocation of 
committed reimbursements, in particular the Reverse Linkages 
programme, which was suspended for 2020 and its funds re-tooled 
for IsDB’s Covid-19 (IsDB 2020). Another US$1.5 billion was raised by 
the bank’s issuance of what it calls “the first ever Covid Sukuk” (an 
Islamic finance form of bond) and the rest arranged in partnership 
with other multilateral development banks. Notably, Sukuk bonds 
must have a tight integration between the funds raised and the real 
economic activities that underlie it, which in this case is healthcare, 
sanitation and making finance available for Islamic small- and me-
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dium-sized enterprises. This response thus constitutes a somewhat 
different profile from the bank’s usual lending, which is heavily ori-
ented towards energy projects and with a smaller proportion go-
ing to finance, transport and agriculture. Since its inception, health 
services have accounted for just 3% of total IsDB approvals, so 2020 
represents a big change. 
The IsDB’s Covid-19 package, called the Strategic Preparedness 
Response Programme, is divided into three pillars. The Response pil-
lar focuses on fast disbursement of finances to pay for healthcare 
and facilities, and for food. An example is the loan of US$36.6 mil-
lion to Yemen. Of this, US$20 million went to financing the setting 
up of 32 specialized Covid-19 treatment centres and to increasing 
laboratory testing capacity in two medical universities (including 
providing them with the medical equipment needed for treating 
severe cases of Covid-19 and providing personal protection equip-
ment for health workers). As is typical with South-South lending 
(Barrowclough et al. 2020), technical support is a feature and in this 
case the IsDB created a partnership for the first time with the World 
Health Organization to help coordinate and support activities. This 
cooperation is significant given the extra difficulties inherent in 
Yemen, which was suffering problems of conflict, hunger, disease, 
displacement and economic collapse even before the pandemic. 
The IsDB Respond pillar is further supported through the Reverse 
Linkages division of the bank, which facilitates country-to-country 
cooperation between members to share expertise. For example, 
ministries of health and medical experts from Turkey, Indonesia 
and Malaysia have shared knowledge with other IsDB members 
alongside the flows of finance. 
The second pillar, Restore, focuses more on medium-term invest-
ments to strengthen the health sector and economy more broadly, 
and in this case, IsDB interventions are directed to small- and me-
dium-sized enterprises, and to trade in an effort to restore strategic 
value chains that were interrupted or blocked by the pandemic fall-
out. Finally, the third pillar, Restart, has a long-term focus on cat-
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alyzing investment in infrastructure and enhancing value chains, 
notably aimed at attracting private sector partners.
In disbursing the loans, some IsDB funds fell under specific pil-
lars while others involved all three pillars and multiple partners. 
Such is the case, for example, with the US$30 million fund estab-
lished for Senegal formed in collaboration with a reverse linkage 
programme that included technical cooperation and exchange of 
knowledge, technology and other non-financial resources with the 
private sector, and cooperative agreements with the United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and other United Nations (UN) agencies 
to help with service delivery. Partnerships with governments are 
also on the table for IsDB Covid loans. The IsDB aims to provide 
Islamic financing instruments that can be coordinated and integrat-
ed with governments’ fiscal policies to form social safety nets and 
other pro-poor policies.
The New Development Bank 
The New Development Bank (NDB) – formerly known as the BRICS 
bank of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – had to be 
flexible when Covid-19 struck as their existing policy framework 
did not support the special needs the crisis provoked among its 
members. When established in 2014, its mandate was to mobi-
lize “resources for infrastructure and sustainable development 
projects in BRICS and other emerging economies and develop-
ing countries, complementing the existing efforts of multilateral 
and regional financial institutions for global growth and develop-
ment.” With an initial subscribed capital of US$50 billion, the NDB 
became operational in 2016 and swiftly started to build a robust 
and diversified infrastructure portfolio, making headlines be-
cause of its big and fast lending to projects in member countries. 
However, Covid-19 related urgent needs did not fit its usual pro-
file, requiring a change in approach.  
In February 2020, the NDB announced its readiness to support 
its members against Covid-19 and gave its first Covid-19 loan to Chi-
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na in March 2020 for CNY7 billion. This was financed in part by a 
special Coronavirus Bond issue, denominated in the local curren-
cy and was used to finance healthcare and local authority budgets 
for three regions of China. Because this loan did not fit the normal 
lending policy purpose, a special case waiver was needed. By April, 
a second special case waiver was needed to lend US$1 billion to In-
dia. By this time, it was obvious that the Covid-19 pandemic and 
the impact of lockdown measures were going global. On June 10, 
the NDB announced a new Fast Track Covid Emergency Assistance 
Response Facility with up to US$10 billion of financing available, 
divided into US$5 billion earmarked for health and social assistance 
and US$5 billion for economic recovery. A few weeks later it also an-
nounced a new emergency response protocol (see NDB 2020) so that 
subsequent loans to South Africa and Brazil did not need a waiver. 
The changes in policy are interesting because they denote a 
new way of looking at “emergencies.” In the past, emergency re-
ferred narrowly to natural disasters or, in some specific cases, to 
post-conflict settings – both of which typically still required infra-
structure-related project finance for physical reconstruction and 
restoring assets and reviving production. In the Covid-19 fallout, 
borrowers were needing assistance with relief and social assistance 
as well – needs that are usually part of government welfare or social 
support and for which the NDB was not primarily designed. As the 
Covid-19 disaster spread, the NDB had to change and adapt. 
The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
In the first days of March, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB) announced a US$5 billion Covid-19 Crisis Recovery Facility 
to help public and private sector clients manage through the pan-
demic. Like the NDB, the AIIB also widened the scope of its lending 
beyond the long-term infrastructure purpose for which it had been 
originally established in 2016. Within a month, requests from mem-
bers for funding were so high that the AIIB doubled its Covid-19 
facility to US$10 billion. 
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The AIIB was clear about the need for rapid action that went be-
yond its initial infrastructure profile because of the lessons learned 
during the Asian and global financial crises. In these crises, invest-
ment in public gross fixed capital plummeted to just 2% of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) from highs of 6%, and the AIIB feared this 
would happen again due to Covid-19, setting back development mo-
mentum and gains thus far. 
The AIIB saw a strong need to protect key infrastructure devel-
opment at a time when private sector risk aversion would be high 
and as public capacity for investment was increasingly constrained. 
Covid-19 would undoubtedly put added fiscal pressures on govern-
ment budgets. Based on its clients’ feedback, the AIIB felt it was 
imperative to broaden the scope of its response and noted three 
key areas where its members needed help immediately: to alleviate 
healthcare pressures, through providing health infrastructure and 
pandemic preparedness; to provide liquidity, through on-lending 
facilities and credit lines to address working capital and liquidity 
shortages; and to ensure governments received immediate fiscal 
and budgetary support so they could focus on addressing the hu-
man and financial impacts of Covid-19 (AIIB 2020). 
In order to meet these “urgent and extraordinary” needs, which 
are very different from the normal work of the AIIB, it was nec-
essary for the institution to adapt and to work closely with other 
international financial institutions to create a network of support 
options, especially for the most vulnerable economies. It approved 
a range of measures to make it easier to “seamlessly” partner with 
other development banks (AIIB 2020). It also identified some pri-
orities for future lending in the longer term, which in addition to 
the more conventional infrastructure and telecommunications ser-
vices, included the need for proper health infrastructure such as 
clean water and sanitation, which were seen as key parts of health 
security and epidemic preparedness. 
Without proper investments in public health infrastructure, 
developing countries will remain vulnerable to further outbreaks. 
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This was considered especially essential in the Asian context of 
megatrends towards urbanization and an ageing population. As is 
known, Covid-19 affects the elderly more than young people, and in 
Asia the number of senior citizens over 65 years old is projected to 
double within the next 20 years. According to the AIIB, “It is clear 
that health infrastructure needs to be expanded and the Covid-19 
crisis further underscores this” (AIIB 2020). To this end, the AIIB 
has approved, among other projects, financing for many water and 
sustainable cities projects across Asia, and AIIB-funded water, san-
itation and drainage infrastructure is already on track in Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, India and Egypt. 
The Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR)
Finally, the Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR) is also notable for 
its rapid response to the Covid-19 crisis. In April 2020, FLAR met with 
other regional financial institutions and the IMF to discuss responses 
to help its members in distress. Many countries in Latin America are 
dependent on commodity exports, for which prices had fallen sharp-
ly. Their economies were highly exposed to fluctuations in the US dol-
lar. On top of this, many members have large populations and high 
levels of poverty, as well as under-financed health systems. By May, 
FLAR had borrowed significantly on international capital markets to 
augment its capacity to support members in need by 60%, taking its 
lending potential up to US$6.8 billion without having to increase the 
subscribed capital of its members, as they had done in 2012. Com-
pared to the FLAR’s two previous experiments with bond issuances, 
which totalled just US$400 million, this is comparatively massive. It 
is also an important signal of solidarity, if only for the fact that, until 
now, the Fund historically carried zero debt (FLAR 2020). 
The FLAR also significantly changed its terms on offer, reflect-
ing the gravity of the pandemic and its impact. Before Covid-19, the 
rules were that Balance of Payments loans to members were lim-
ited to a maximum of three years with one additional year’s grace, 
and for a maximum amount of 2.5 times the paid-up capital of each 
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member (rising to 2.6 times in the special cases of member coun-
tries Bolivia and Ecuador). Since Covid-19 struck, FLAR has adjust-
ed these parameters and the maximum loan per member rose to 
five years plus three years’ grace – an extremely large change. This 
was made in recognition of the fact that the hit to productive ca-
pacity and to exchange rates throughout the region are not likely to 
recover quickly (FLAR 2020). Hence, the FLAR needed to enhance 
its support to member governments.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has very briefly touched on some of the ways in which 
Southern-led banks and funds are working together to face the 
Covid-19 pandemic. The public financial institutions have contrib-
uted to the creation of a broader and more diverse range of Covid-19 
relief options for Southern governments. In each case, the public 
banks and funds scaled up lending. Moreover, each institution pro-
vided the needed financing rapidly and on flexible and favourable 
terms. These public institutions notably lent directly to govern-
ments to provide essential breathing space in a time of crisis. In 
the process, the IsDB, NDB, AIIB and the FLAR showed the ability to 
adapt quickly and dynamically to changing needs and circumstanc-
es. Significantly, the scope of their lending shifted to include social 
support and non-physical infrastructure in ways that went beyond 
their conventional mandates. 
These Southern public banks and funds demonstrate the ca-
pacity to play a meaningful role in facing the Covid-19 emergency. 
This is a signal they could have play a central role in building for-
ward better for a green and just transition to sustainable develop-
ment. They will each face constraints and challenges in doing so. 
Still more finance is needed, and there is the continued paradox 
of a glut of surplus finance in some parts of the world and a short-
age in others. Another challenge is that, once the Covid-19 crisis 
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has passed, it will be important that their performance evaluators, 
their government owners and the public in general properly val-
ue the social and developmental lending these institutions have 
undertaken in response to the pandemic. Profitability or returns 
on assets in conventional terms will have little utility in building 
forward better. At the same time, as ever, these public institutions 
should not be idealized. Public banks can only be as good as their 
members and society makes them be. Substantive accountability 
and transparency will be important in the post-Covid reckoning 
that is sure to come. 
Finally, while South-South initiatives can do a lot to provide some 
relief and support for recovery, they cannot do it alone and cannot 
be expected to substitute for what else is needed – which continues 
to be a better financial system globally, and with true multilater-
al support. The experiences briefly described in this review hint 
at what could be done in terms of international coordination and 
cooperation for the future crises that are inevitable, and to help en-
sure a better recovery for the next time. 
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Association of African Development Finance Institutions
THE IMPACT OF COVID-19 
ON AADFI MEMBERS1
This chapter summarizes actions taken by the Association of African Development Finance Institutions (AADFI) to com-bat the economic impacts of Covid-19, as of April 2020. AAD-
FI has 60 member institutions throughout Africa. 
INTRODUCTION
Covid-19 has presented great health and socio-economic challenges 
across the globe. Its impact will be more precarious in emerging 
and developing countries, particularly in Africa, given the conti-
nent’s weak health infrastructure and poor development indices – 
high unemployment, fragility and social unrest. The Covid-19 pan-
demic will, therefore, constitute a big challenge towards achieving 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in Africa.
Unsurprisingly, the capacity of African Development Finance 
Institutions, particularly the National Development Finance Insti-
tutions (NDFIs), to provide solutions to the numerous development 
1  This is an edited version of a report originally published by the Association of 
African Development Finance Institutions (AADFI) in April 2020. It is available 
online at: http://www.adfi-ci.org/. Reproduced with the permission of the AADFI, 
Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire.
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challenges of the continent has been further weakened as the pan-
demic compounds their existing challenges.
It is on this premise that the Association of African Development 
Finance Institutions (AADFI) surveyed African NDFIs to ascertain 
the impact of the pandemic on their operation and what solutions 
could be provided.
CONSEQUENCES OF COVID-19 ON NATIONAL DFIS (NDFIS)
Macroeconomic effect
Most African countries will grapple with their financial positions 
as revenue earning nosedived in the wake of the pandemic. For in-
stance, the crash in oil price from over $60/barrel at the beginning 
of the year to under $30/barrel as a result of Covid-19, and the de-
cline in commodity prices, have both led to a huge shortfall in the 
revenue of commodity exporting countries. Generally, most mem-
ber countries would face revenue challenges to finance their budget 
and fight the pandemic.
Moreover, as these countries grapple with supply and demand 
shocks, decline in travel, investment and remittances, inflation 
is likely to spike in the short term, with a fall in the value of their 
currencies. This may result in the high cost of funds, liquidity con-
straints, challenges in mobilizing suitable financing and incapaci-
tation of National DFIs to lend or fund the completion of projects. 
Furthermore, there would be a stoppage in production, and a 
likely tendency of most economies to slip into recession, with the 
disappearance of several small businesses and the emergence of 
high levels of corporate debt. The consequences of these will mani-
fest in job losses and high unemployment, and worsened social un-
rest in most African countries.
Re-direction of funds meant for DFIs by the government
As countries contend with the huge financial resources required to 
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fight the Covid-19 pandemic in the face of a liquidity squeeze, most 
African governments are redirecting resources meant for develop-
ment projects to the health sector to help mitigate the pandemic. 
This further deprives the NDFIs of the funding that would have 
gone towards financing micro-, small- and medium-sized enter-
prise (MSME) projects and creating jobs.
Consequently, NDFIs will face higher business risks, a reduc-
tion in business opportunities and a decline in operation due to the 
shutdown of MSMEs’ business activities, a scaling back of business 
growth plans and lower profit margins, if not outright operating 
losses for the current financial year. Furthermore, NDFIs will wit-
ness drastic shrinking in their balance sheet and pressure to redirect 
their existing funding portfolio towards responding to Covid-19. 
Despite the above constraints, National DFIs would still be ex-
pected to play a countercyclical role and support their governments 
to develop effective fiscal and business stimulus packages.
CONSEQUENCES FOR NDFI’S LENDING ACTIVITIES
Lower-investment inflow
There will be a slowdown in business activities, thus reducing the 
level of investment inflow and leading to a contraction in NDFIs’ pro-
jected earnings. Nonetheless, a greater shift in DFIs’ financing priori-
ties to agriculture, medical and pharmaceutical products is expected.
A possible decrease in the number of requests for new credit 
will eventually hinder DFIs’ contribution to job creation. In addi-
tion, challenges related to restrictive measures, impacting directly 
on specific sectors funded by some national DFIs − such as catering, 
transport, hotels, trading and other small businesses − will all trans-
late to massive job cuts.
Funding and liquidity challenges
It is unlikely that governments will channel funds to DFIs for fi-
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nancing MSMEs in the near future, as governments’ priorities have 
shifted to fighting the pandemic. The level of funding from develop-
ment partners targeting job creation in Africa may shrink.
With the challenge of a funding shortages, most DFIs will be 
forced to scale down lending activities (credit rationing) and fund-
ing shortages for ongoing projects leading to time and cost over-
runs, as well as increased risk of project failure; and lower profit-
ability of operation due to a lower volume of lending activities and 
possible provisioning on classified loans.
As most businesses funded by NDFIs struggle for survival, sup-
porting these businesses may also increase the risk on DFIs’ liquidi-
ty – the prudential limit being breached with a significant constraint 
on the capacity to offer financial support on the scale that will likely 
be required to help economic recovery.  
It is expected that most DFIs providing guarantees may face a 
certain risk of cascading calls on guarantees for projects in prog-
ress and previously approved. Also, in a context of strict limitation 
on granting new credits at the level of lending banks, guarantee re-
quests addressed to guarantee institutions will be rare.
Deterioration in asset quality
As businesses and projects funded by DFIs get stressed, and in a 
good number of cases some projects will halt, it is envisioned that 
most DFIs will face the risk associated with cash flow cycle, decline 
in revenues and high default rates in loan re-payments in the com-
ing months, based on business analysis and payment deferment. 
Thus, the anticipated surge in Non-Performing Loans is projected 
to be about 60% arising from the MSME difficulties in servicing 
their loans.
Moreover, a decrease in return on DFIs’ assets, an increase in 
counterparty risk, an increase in the level of provisions induced by 
the outstanding payments recorded, resource scarcity (fewer op-
portunities to access resources at moderate cost) and poor project 
financing capacity will be evident. The impact of these will weaken 
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the viability of projects under implementation, and negatively af-
fect most DFIs’ profitability and financial sustainability. 
Business operation and business continuity
The risk of exposure of staff to Covid-19 and the need to adopt pro-
tective measures in line with the established protocol will redefine 
the way DFIs operate henceforth. Already, as in most institutions, 
there is a re-configuration of the approach to working in terms of 
flexibility and teleworking.  
The situation will also result in a change in client and staff en-
gagement models and possible delays in project evaluations and dil-
igences due to travel restrictions, especially for national DFIs with 
cross-border projects.
AFRICAN NATIONAL DFIS RESPONDING TO COVID-19
Therefore, African DFIs should take their response to the pandemic 
as a measure of their strengths and weaknesses in designing inno-
vative development products.
Business strategies and processes are being revised in most na-
tional DFIs in the wake of the disruptions brought by the pandemic. 
This includes a review of the contingency plan and re-engaging with 
stakeholders, including existing clients, to understand the expected 
impact of the pandemic on their activities. The result in most cases 
indicated that at least 40% of clients expect the current challeng-
es to impact their ability to meet upcoming debt obligations. Thus, 
NDFIs are reviewing their clients’ liquidity position and evolving a 
payment deferment for up to six months and above.
Some institutions have incorporated the impact of Covid-19 into 
their short- and medium-term strategy. They have created a dedicat-
ed fund for Covid-19 to support the financing of business in the health 
industry and to facilitate the procurement of essential supplies and 
finished goods specifically geared toward mitigating Covid-19.
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Protection of employees
All member DFIs took proactive measures to keep employees safe 
and have implemented a business continuity plan, as work is now 
mostly done remotely.
Downward revision of budget
The cut in business activities and expected negative impact on cash 
inflow have compelled most NDFIs to review their operating budget 
downward, with up to a 30% slash across the board; and to reduce 
their total expenditures by up to 25% in the first instance, with a 
view to adopt further cuts in other non-critical expenses depending 
on macroeconomic outlook over the next three to six months.
Portfolio review
Portfolios have also been revised to establish anticipated credit 
risks per sector and per client to devise survival strategy, activate 
contingency funding plans and explore the possibility of getting 
funds to absorb the effects of Covid-19.
Besides, projects are being prioritized with an emphasis on 
strong financial viability and, in some cases, on a less risky asset 
to optimize limited financial resources. Some projects may have to 
be sold off, according to some DFIs, to reduce financial stress and 
create the capacity to complete the most viable projects.
Review of credit term
Most institutions have revised credits terms to about a 180-day mor-
atorium on existing credit facilities for households (extendable to 
360 days) and other loan conditions relaxed to ease affordability 
challenges as a proactive measure to avoid loans going bad.
NDFIs are reengineering their balance sheet projections while 
also requesting their lenders to grant a moratorium to cushion the 
liquidity impact.
DFIs are, however, expected to apply the instruments of debt re-
lief selectively to reward their historically well performing clients 
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and thus to reduce the impact of the pandemic on the present and 
future NPL Ratios. As bad as the situation is, stronger DFIs may also 
be shaken, but the pandemic should not lead to the demise of DFIs.
The pandemic creates an opportunity for DFIs to prove their 
relevance to governments in Africa through strategic planning 
and the introduction of innovative approaches to the delivery of 
their mandates.
SUPPORT REQUIRED BY NDFIS IN 
ADDRESSING COVID-19 CHALLENGES
• Concessional debt funding, grants, provision of credit guar-
antee, liquidity support and a downward review of the term 
for credit lines obtained from multilateral banks in order to 
rescue businesses, support projects in the agricultural (trans-
port, production, storage, energy, seed distribution, road 
maintenance) and pharmaceutical sectors to save existing 
businesses and jobs.
• The need to engage with governments for capital injections 
into national DFIs, channel development funds and funds 
provided by development partners through the national 
DFIs to be directed to appropriate sectors to stimulate eco-
nomic activities.
• A waiver on limitations to the restructuring of credit facilities 
that may be at risk; temporary capital and liquidity relief to 
provide DFIs with enough time to build up capital buffers; 
and a postponement of compliance requirements such as 
single obligor limits for one year.
• The need for relevant technical assistance and capacity 
building in the following areas, among others, are required 
to reinforce capacity in member institutions:
 — Business Continuity Plan (BCP).
 — Stress testing framework covering finance, technology, 
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risk management etc.
 — Crisis management and risk assessment during crisis for 
DFIs.
 — Fintech, digital banking and management of remote teams.
• The need to share knowledge across institutions, during and 
after the crisis, on how DFIs are responding to ensure the 
survival of the funded MSMEs and institutions.
• National governments should take their DFIs into confidence 
by involving them in development policy formation, passing 
special financial support to businesses through them as part 
of measures to institutionalize such support and equip DFIs 
for future response to emergencies.
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Chapter 20
Association of Development Financing Institutions 
in Asia and the Pacific 
THE IMPACT OF COVID-19 
ON ADFIAP MEMBERS1
This chapter summarizes actions taken by the Association of Development Financing Institutions in Asia and the Pacific (ADFIAP) to combat the economic impacts of Covid-19, as of 
August 2020. 
ADFIAP is the focal point of all development banks and other 
financial institutions engaged in the financing of development in 
the Asia-Pacific region. Its mission is to advance sustainable devel-
opment through its members. Founded in 1976, ADFIAP currently 
has 87 member institutions in 36 countries.
INTRODUCTION
Like many organizations during this pandemic, the Association 
of Development Financing Institutions in Asia and the Pacific 
1  This is an edited version of a report prepared by the Association of Development 
Financing Institutions in Asia and the Pacific (ADFIAP) Secretariat’s Information 
Office in August 2020. Founded in 1976, ADFIAP currently has 87 member institu-
tions in 36 countries and territories with its permanent Secretariat in Makati City, 
Metro Manila, Philippines. Reproduced with the permission of ADFIAP.
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(ADFIAP) has been following and monitoring the evolving situ-
ation on the impact of Covid-19 on our members and their re-
spective countries. As an association, our approach to meeting 
the challenges brought about by this crisis was two-fold: (a) in-
ternally, to strengthen the capability of the Secretariat team; and 
(b) externally, to sustain our interaction with our members and 
the community we are in during these trying times.
ADFIAP INTERNAL INITIATIVES
Internally, the initiatives we have undertaken revolve around four 
Ps (4Ps), as follows:
1. Pivot to digital: We have beefed up our operational and mem-
ber communication capabilities. Operationally, we have 
accelerated using a cloud-based platform for membership 
engagement and events management. We took an inventory 
of our unique content with the intention of converting this 
into e-learning and certification programmes. For member 
communications, we used various platforms for our virtual 
events (e-meetings, webinars, e-conferences), e-newsletters, 
emails, surveys and technical support efforts.
2. Partner to hit the ground running: We quickly partnered with 
our members and other same-purposed organizations to de-
liver online training and knowledge-sharing programmes. 
This gave us a fast track to offer virtual events to our mem-
bers in a short time while we gain more experience and build 
our own capability in this regard. 
3. Pump-prime staff for up-skilling: We have provided our staff 
with the opportunity to add new skills alongside our move to 
digitalization. Our goal is to undertake staff training sessions 
on creativity, critical thinking and cognitive flexibility – disci-
plines that require an open mind and passionate determina-
tion to succeed in this ‘new normal’ environment.
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4. Plan for a turnaround: We have gone back to the basics of 
thinking of our members first – maintaining relevance, har-
nessing relationships and sustaining resources. Relevance is 
about sticking with our purpose, mission and unique value 
proposition. Relationship is about building and nurturing en-
gagement with our members. Resources (human and finan-
cial) are about pursuing new opportunities and generating 
revenues. As we say, we need to be ‘in the trenches’ with our 
members during this crisis.
ADFIAP EXTERNAL INITIATIVES
Externally, the initiatives we have undertaken are as follows: 
1. We have surveyed our members on what they are doing/have 
done during the pandemic, which we have compiled in two 
special edition e-newsletters on Covid-19 and which were dis-
seminated to members and other stakeholders.2 
2. We have organized and partnered with our members and in 
other networks for at least 20 virtual events to date (webinars, 
e-forums, etc.) for members on various relevant issues and 
topics revolving around Covid-19.
3. We have provided voice and visibility to the association and 
our members in various international forums regarding their 
work on Covid-19 responses as well as on their contributions 
to the achievement of the United Nations Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals (SDGs) and the climate agenda. 
4. We have communicated and worked regularly with our regional 
counterpart development finance institutions (DFI) associations 
covering Africa, Latin America and the Middle East under the 
World Federation of Development Finance Institutions (WFDFI) 
on information exchange and practice-sharing activities.
2  Available online at: https://www.adfiap.org/resource/publications/.
Association of Development Financing Institutions in Asia and the Pacific 
386 
NATIONAL DFIS’ RESPONSES TO CALLS FOR ACTION DURING THE 
PANDEMIC: THE ADFIAP EXPERIENCE
The Covid-19 pandemic has pushed the world economy towards re-
cession. As a stop-gap measure, national governments have intro-
duced liquidity measures to keep their economies moving. Since 
this was not enough to produce a sustained economic recovery, 
national development finance institutions (NDFIs) have stepped up 
efforts to help in the rebuilding and recovery process. Such is the 
experience of ADFIAP member NDFIs. 
The countercyclical role of NDFIs in financing development ini-
tiatives was apparent through the relief packages that they have 
undertaken. NDFIs also provided sector-specific financing stimu-
lus to micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), to lo-
cal governments, as well as to the health and education sectors. 
With business activities and employment rate on the decline, loan 
payment holidays and other relief measures were also instituted 
by NDFIs. Below we highlight what ADFIAP member NDFIs have 
undertaken to face the health and economic crisis upfront and pre-
pare for its aftermath. 
Stimulus assistance to micro, small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
The Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC) has mobilized up 
to US$40 billion in additional lending and guarantee programme 
support to help ease access to credit for entrepreneurs impacted 
by Covid-19. The BDC also provided additional relief measures for 
qualified businesses of up to $2 million working capital with flex-
ible terms and payment postponements for up to six months and 
reduced rates on new eligible loans.
Similarly, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LANDBANK) 
launched a loan programme for small and medium-sized enterpris-
es, microfinance institutions and cooperatives to recover from the 
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adverse effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. Through the ‘I-RESCUE’ 
(Interim Rehabilitation Support to Cushion Unfavorably-affected 
Enterprises by Covid-19) Lending Programme, LANDBANK pro-
vides assistance through credit and loan restructuring under more 
flexible terms and conditions.
In the Philippines, the Small Business Corporation (SB Corp) has 
set up a PHP 1 billion Enterprise Rehabilitation Financing facility 
for micro and small businesses.
For its part, the Small Industries Development Bank of India 
(SIDBI) provided liquidity support to MSMEs impacted by Covid-19 
through conduit microfinance institutions to ensure operational 
continuity and to promote onward lending to the MSME sector.
Tekun National Malaysia has crafted the ‘Tekun Business Reha-
bilitation Scheme’ (TBRS), a financing scheme offered to microen-
terprises whose businesses were affected by the Covid-19 pandemic.
Strengthening MSMEs
The DFCC Bank of Sri Lanka and the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce 
(CCC) jointly organized a webinar entitled ‘Banking Services and 
Solutions for Business Recovery Offered by DFCC Bank During and 
After Covid-19’ to financially guide small and medium-sized en-
terprises (SMEs) through the current pandemic, and to help SMEs 
identify relevant gaps and challenges. The Esquire Financing in the 
Philippines offered tips for small businesses to overcome Covid-19 
and suggested some strategies for SMEs to maintain financial health 
during the pandemic. 
Boost to the local economy
Indonesia’s PT Sarana Multi Infrastruktur has made a loan of IDR 1.4 
trillion available to the West Java Provincial Government in order to 
restore the West Java economy affected by the Covid-19 pandemic.
Support to the health sector
The China Development Bank has adopted a multi-pronged ap-
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proach to combatting Covid-19 by providing more than CNY 20 
billion in emergency loans for epidemic prevention and control, 
offering a special working capital loan facility to help epidemic-af-
fected enterprises resume work and production, and by supporting 
the country in combating the pandemic while bolstering economic 
and social development. 
Likewise, the Development Bank of the Republic of Belarus has 
provided financial assistance to the Republican Medical Response 
Organization Center for the purchase of medicines, medical devic-
es, medical equipment, personal protective equipment and so on. 
The Development Bank will continue to support healthcare organi-
zations to ensure a healthy environment for everyone.
The KfW of Germany has financed over 320,000 Covid-19 tests 
and the purchasing of other medical equipment for the Indian 
health system to a total sum of €15 million to help effectively con-
tain the pandemic on the subcontinent.
The Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) partnered with the United 
Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) to support IsDB mem-
ber countries in combatting Covid-19 through emergency procure-
ment services of medical supplies and equipment.  
The Royal Insurance Corporation of Bhutan Ltd. has offered life 
insurance of Nu 100,000 to those in the frontline who may lose their 
lives fighting Covid-19.
Assistance to the education sector
The Land Bank of the Philippines has offered a direct ‘study-
now-pay-later’ student loan programme for Covid-impacted 
families. Under the loan programme, parents and guardians/
benefactors of students enrolled for the upcoming school year 
can now directly apply for loans of up to PHP 300,000 to cover 
students’ tuition. On the other hand, the personnel of the Al-
Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines has extend-
ed assistance to stranded students for their food and other basic 
needs during the pandemic.  
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Relief on loan payments
Cognizant of the difficulty that their clients are faced with during 
the pandemic, the following NDFIs have provided a moratorium on 
loan payments and provided other relief measures:
Agrobank (Malaysia), Bhutan Development Bank, Bhutan Insur-
ance Limited, CARD (Philippines), Development Bank of the Phil-
ippines, Fiji Development Bank, National Pension and Provident 
Fund of Bhutan, North Eastern Development Finance Corporation 
(India) and Pag-IBIG Fund (Philippines).
Push for digital banking
The Land Bank of the Philippines has urged its clients to use the 
Land Bank’s electronic and digital platforms to serve banking needs 
while the country is under a state of calamity due to the pandemic. 
Convenient banking can be enjoyed through use of the Land Bank’s 
2,196 ATMs and 159 Cash Deposit Machines nationwide, including 
online and electronic banking services, and cashless payments 
through Land Bank Mastercard credit card and Visa Debit Card. 
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
Looking ahead to the ‘new normal’, NDFIs need to be prepared in 
crisis management with continuous development and updating of 
recovery options linked with their liquidity position to ensure sol-
vency. As the financing business shifts away from traditional con-
cepts, data and real-time information-driven analytics will now be 
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EAPB STATEMENT ON THE ROLE 
OF PUBLIC BANKS IN THE CONTEXT 
OF THE COVID-19 CRISIS1
The European Union (EU) has been quick to react, thanks to its experience with the 2008/09 financial crisis, by effectively loosening the rules on national spending. However, it must 
be ready to organize a long-term response to the Covid-19 crisis. 
After easing the lockdown restrictions and starting up the economy 
in most of the EU countries, economic activity is still low. In ad-
dition, many companies still need liquidity to start their business 
again. Others will need a re-capitalisation to maintain their busi-
ness. Once the first phase of the crisis is overcome, fiscal financial 
stimulus will also be required over the recovery phase. 
All EU resources of the Next Generation EU and the next Multi-
annual Financial Framework (MFF) need to be mobilized to ensure 
a quick recovery while putting the European economy on a sustain-
able path. Despite the huge costs stemming from the immediate 
need to recover from the Covid-19 crisis, the EU should be careful 
not to cut investments in those sectors, which are very important 
for the future of the EU. It is also crucial to provide local authorities 
1  This is a revised report written by the European Association of Public Banks 
(EAPB) on the Covid-19 crisis, first published in July 2020, and reproduced with the 
permission of EAPB. The EAPB has 91 member institutions in the region.
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and small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with the funding 
they need in a long-term perspective.
The network of European, national and regional promotional 
banks and municipal funding agencies has been an essential asset 
in dealing with the economic consequences of the Covid-19 pan-
demic. Because of the complexity of the situation and the different 
needs, National Promotional Banks (NPBs) are uniquely equipped 
to provide the necessary mix of financial products and associate 
the private sector. About €1 trillion of public support measures have 
been provided by public promotional banks. 
The unprecedented challenges that the European economy is 
facing must be tackled with all available means and tools at our dis-
posal, ranging from public grants, subsidized loans to guarantees, 
equity measures and moratoria on loans.
The European financial sector will emerge from the Covid-19 cri-
sis with more non-performing loans and weaker capital and liquidity 
positions. Consequently, the normal regulatory framework should 
not be reintroduced without appropriate transition periods in order 
to allow banks that have taken advantage of the capital relief to sup-
port the real economy sufficient time to rebuild their capital.
INTRODUCTION
The Covid-19 pandemic is a shock of unprecedented magnitude and 
uncertain duration. Many fear that the supply shock in a big part of 
the economy, coupled with a broader demand shock, could trigger 
a contractionary spiral. Financial relief to businesses is essential 
– both to allow them to cope during the period of lockdowns and 
social distancing, and to ensure that they recover afterwards.
This is why this emergency situation has called for unprecedent-
ed credit guarantees provided by governments to make sure banks 
keep lending. It is, however, clear that, due to the unusual nature 
of the shock, it will often irreparably damage small businesses and 
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other parts of the economy, e.g. the retail sector, cultural and cre-
ative industry, tourism and so on. Even subsidized loans may be too 
much of a future burden for small firms to maintain employment if 
they face the consequences that periods of (nearly) complete shut-
down bring about. In these cases, equity or grants are also neces-
sary, either to bridge the crisis or to restructure the company if it 
fails to limit social hardship through public aid.
IMMEDIATE EU RESPONSE AND NPB COORDINATION
While the main financial power remains at the level of national 
governments, especially those of the largest Member States, it is 
important to recognize the speed with which the European Com-
mission has reacted to mitigate the economic consequences, e.g. 
by quickly cutting down EU-level restrictions by activating the 
suspense clause of the Stability and Growth pact, by introducing a 
temporary state aid framework allowing for larger support of com-
panies with Member State coffers, and by introducing temporary 
changes in regulation to promote incentives for credit expansion 
via the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) quick fix.
To be able to react with such speed, the EU has benefited from its 
experience with the 2008 response to the financial crisis. The sec-
ond advantage compared to the 2008 financial crisis has been the 
well-established cooperation framework of European, national and 
regional promotional banks and funding agencies. Additionally, the 
Juncker Plan has been implemented to create growth and is to be 
followed by InvestEU, with a crucial participation of NPBs. All this 
has created synergies, joint procedures and (often digital) commu-
nication channels that can be used in the current crisis. Within days 
the EAPB organized multiple exchanges with all important actors 
and helped build and deploy the necessary instruments. 
Building on past experience, the European Investment Bank 
(EIB) Group has quickly mobilized available European Fund for 
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Strategic Investments (EFSI) funding, to be deployed in close co-
operation with NPBs. This was complemented by the re-direction 
of unused EU Structural Funds, taking up the advice of NPBs on 
how to cut administrative burden in record-speed legislative proce-
dures, together with the European Parliament and Member States. 
ROLE OF PUBLIC BANKS IN THE COVID-19 CRISIS
Because of the complexity of the situation and different needs, 
NPBs are uniquely equipped to provide the necessary mix of fi-
nancial products and assist the private sector. Benefiting from the 
quick adaptations of the EU, the national and regional promotion-
al banks and funding agency members of the EAPB have taken 
measures in response to the Covid-19 crisis, fulfilling their role as 
counter-cyclical state instruments. Their high-level intervention 
capacities have been fully available to participate actively in Eu-
rope's economic recovery. 
National governments and promotional banks, together with 
commercial banks, have worked hard within the joint on-lending 
system over the last months to ensure the supply of credit to the 
economy – from SMEs to large companies. All parties involved have 
also worked to ensure that self-employed persons would be able to 
benefit from aid. By considerably expanding certain well-established 
programmes and procedures, banks have rapidly made available 
support for the financing of enterprises in temporary difficulties. 
Investments – and above all working capital – can now be fi-
nanced by the intermediary banks in a speedy process, while pro-
motional banks were able to lower interest rates significantly. We 
believe the schemes are fulfilling their counter-cyclical function. In 
many cases, promotional banks disbursed funding directly to bene-
ficiaries. Many of our members have made use of the possibility of 
a 100% guarantee coverage for the immediate provision of working 
capital loans, in order to respond to the request by the intermediary 
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banking sector to minimize its risk exposure. Almost €1 trillion has 
been made available to be distributed by NPBs (a total of about 3 
trillion Euros of aid measures – all public support measures includ-
ed – has been notified to the European Commission (EC) as of end 
July 2020). That is, about a third of total public support measures 
have been provided by public promotional banks (see Annex 1 for 
specific individual NPB schemes notified).
All public bank members, be they promotional or commercial, 
have moreover played an important role by putting in place key 
measures: maintaining physical access by keeping large number 
of branches open; enabling online requests for payments and in-
terest deferrals; increasing account limits to maintain customers’ 
solvency; and finally, providing enterprises with in-depth advice on 
liquidity, financial planning and subsidies.
PHASE OF RECOVERY PRIORITIES – NEED FOR LONG-LASTING 
REGULATORY ADAPTATIONS AND TARGETED EU ACTION
Once the first phase of the crisis is overcome, financial stimulus 
will also be required over the recovery phase. After easing the lock-
down restrictions and starting up the economy in most of the EU 
countries, the economic activity is still low. And many companies 
still need liquidity to start their business again. Others will need a 
re-capitalization to maintain their business. Therefore, the EU and 
Member States will need to continue to stimulate employment and 
economic activity, without aggravating health-related risks.
Priority 1: New MFF/Next Generation EU Recovery instrument: 
Need for strong funding mechanisms for companies and public 
sector investment for the sustainable and digital agenda
EAPB members welcome the new EC proposal for the Multiannu-
al Financial Framework (MFF) and the agreement of the European 
Council from 21 July 2020. The agreement by Heads of State on the 
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creation of the Recovery Instrument, with a mix of loans and grants 
totalling €750 billion, is a historic move for the EU. However, de-
spite the huge costs stemming from the immediate need to recover 
from the Covid-19 crisis, the EU should be careful not to cut invest-
ments in those sectors that are very important for the future of the 
EU. We advocate a rapid conclusion of the negotiations on the MFF, 
the rules concerning Structural Funds/Cohesion policy and on an 
ambitious InvestEU Programme. It is essential to provide both le-
gal certainty and adequate funding for the 2021-2027 programming 
period – not only for promotional banks but also for the final bene-
ficiary. Due to the lockdown restrictions, many projects are delayed 
or more support is needed. 
In order to really be capable of supporting the recovery, the EU 
budget should be made more investment oriented. Now is the right 
time to do even more in the areas of, for example, infrastructure, 
energy, innovation and mobility. Promotional banks should be 
enabled to continue support programmes set up with the help of 
Structural Funds and EU guarantee facilities – under COSME, In-
novFin and EFSI – also after 2020 in order to ensure continuity 
and reliability in support. The InvestEU financial products should 
offer adequate flexibility (for example, in terms of risk assumption 
or scope) and allow for combination with other funds. This will 
enable intermediaries to offer tailor-made solutions in line with 
different needs of final beneficiaries following the crisis. 
The focus has been rightly put on SME financing (and in justified 
cases larger companies) as those were the first economic victims of 
the Covid-19 crisis. It was important for the EU to reallocate all avail-
able funding to short-term liquidity aid to European firms (e.g. work-
ing capital, credit lines). For the recovery fund now to be a success, the 
access to liquidity for SMEs must be maintained and operationalized in an 
unbureaucratic and timely manner, using proven cooperation partners 
and distribution networks. In this perspective, we have very much 
appreciated the intention to include national promotional banks in 
the envisaged pan-European guarantee fund operations. Any new 
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funding and EIB Group operations must be developed in close cooperation 
with the national and regional promotional banks and funding agencies 
in the respective Member States in order to ensure the highest possi-
ble impact and additionality. Moreover, the new products should be 
complementary to existing ones and avoid the crowding-out of finan-
cial support programmes at national/regional level. 
Also, while businesses, and in particular SMEs, have been a nat-
ural target for support measures during the first phase of the crisis, 
the public sector must be taken on board over the months to come in 
strategic recovery planning. In the medium to long term, keeping the 
public sector up to speed will be a crucial key to pushing the recovery 
forward. With the public sector going into a savings or even austerity 
mode, many of the positive dynamics may be lost. Therefore, find-
ing the right balance between the private and public sectors in the 
allocation of resources will be a very delicate task. If we do not get 
this right, the recovery will suffer. We now hear from a number of 
municipalities and regions across Europe that they would be happy 
to execute and even reinforce existing investment plans. Investment 
needs are immense and diverse: immigration, demographic change, 
urbanization and the green transformation are just a few examples. 
We expect lending to municipalities and regions to continue to in-
crease sharply over a number of years. However, if they were to get 
into financial difficulties – for example, if the national government 
does not compensate for Covid-19 related income losses (in partic-
ular due to the loss of business taxes) and added expenditures – the 
investment plans would quickly be delayed or even rendered unvi-
able. This would in turn be very negative for the economy as a whole. 
Therefore, quick compensatory injections into the budgets of municipali-
ties and regions are crucial at this point in time to ensure their contin-
ued investment capacity. Public banks and municipal funding agen-
cies will play their role in this area as well.
The funding priorities mentioned above will also require fur-
ther adaptations to State aid regulations. We welcome the EC ini-
tiatives to support equity measures in the temporary framework. 
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Many of these measures would be beneficial as part of a perma-
nent framework, such as the simplified rules for subordinated 
loans. State aid rules should also encourage the set-up and pro-
motion of tele-medicine as part of services of general economic 
interest. As we fear that the aftermath of the pandemic will be 
perceptible for some time, it should be also examined whether the 
measures of the Temporary Framework could be extended beyond 
December 31, 2020.
Priority 2: Proportionality for public development credit 
institutions and promotional loans in regulation
We highlight the importance of considering possible exit scenari-
os for all the relief measures. Banks will emerge from the Covid-19 
crisis with more non-performing loans and weaker capital and li-
quidity positions. Consequently, the normal regulatory framework 
should not be reintroduced without appropriate transition periods 
in order to allow banks that have taken advantage of the capital re-
lief to support the real economy sufficient time to rebuild their cap-
ital. This is particularly salient for public banks, since they cannot 
simply turn to the capital markets to raise capital but can only raise 
capital through retained earnings. 
Furthermore, it will be important to strengthen proportional-
ity for those promotional banks and municipal funding agencies, 
which are under European Central Bank (ECB) supervision and/or 
those directly and indirectly subject to EU regulation moving for-
ward. Last, but not least, future regulatory projects should also be 
reviewed as a matter of principle and accompanied by thorough, 
up-to-date impact analyses that adequately balance the benefits 
and costs of these projects. We would like to share our thoughts and 
further details on necessary quick fixes and future Capital Require-
ments Regulation (CRR) and other regulatory changes, i.e. beyond 
the current ‘quick fix’ that could mitigate the impact of the current 
Covid-19 pandemic. For this purpose, please see Annex 2 for a list 
of measures that would be crucial in our view.
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Priority 3: Sustainable finance
A third key priority of the financial services agenda for our mem-
bers is sustainable finance. As 80% of EAPB members provide 
funding to green projects, and many are leading issuers of green 
and sustainable bonds, the further progress of EU activities in this 
area, with the action plan on sustainable finance at the core, will be 
of great importance for us. Moreover, the challenge Covid-19 rep-
resents to our healthcare and social systems must be approached as 
the right opportunity to boost the social component of sustainable 
finance and concentrate on developing the concept of social bonds. 
Once again, some EAPB members already have solid experience as 
social bond issuers and stand ready to share their experience. 
Priority 4: An actively engaged European Central Bank
The role of the European Central Bank (ECB), already determinant 
during the 2008 crisis, has been of fundamental importance in the 
Covid-19 crisis. What types of assets central banks can/will buy 
within quantitative easing programmes can rather substantially 
alter the dynamics of key parts of the credit market – not least 
when it comes to the issuing of actors of, or linked to, the public 
sector. In this context, we look forward to continuing our excel-
lent dialogue with the ECB, both on supervisory but also monetary 
policy issues.
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ANNEX 1: NPB COVID-19 MEASURES NOTIFIED 
AND PUBLISHED (STATUS  JULY 22, 2020)
National Promotional Bank (and policies) Euros (bn) Source 
Altum SA.56722 Latvia, Covid-19: Loan guarantee 
scheme and subsidized loan scheme
0.25 EC
BGK: SA.56876 Poland, Polish anti-crisis 
measures – Covid-19 – guarantee scheme, Polish 
Development fund (with BGK): repayable advances 
for SMEs (SA.56996), large enterprise liquidity 
loans (SA.57306) + damage compensation and 
liquidity (SA.57054) + equity measures (SA.57055) + 
interest rate subsidies (farmers) (SA.57568)
44.14 EC
BPI France (Groupe CDC), SA.56709 – 
Covid-19: Plan de sécurisation du financement 
des entreprises, SA.56868: Garanties des 
préfinancements des entreprises exportatrices, + 
SA.57219 (cautions export)
311.1 EC
Bulgarian Development Bank Guarantee scheme 
(SA.56933)
0.255 EC
CDP, Italy 10 IMF
CMZRB, Czech Republic: loan guarantees 
(SA.57195)
5.5 EC
Finnvera, Finland, Scheme of state guarantees and 
subsidized interest rates
2 EC
HBOR, Croatia: Loan scheme (SA.56957) + 
support to the maritime, transport, transport 
infrastructure, tourism,  and  related  sector 
(SA.5771)
1.08 EC
Hungarian Development Bank (SA.57121 + 
amendment) + SA.57064
0.9 EC
ICO: SA.56803 Spain, Covid-19 - Guarantee scheme 
to companies and self-employed
20 EC
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INVEGA: Lithuania/Interest subsidy scheme + 
guarantee scheme + loans in road freight transport 
(SA.57066) + rent compensation (SA.57135) 
+ guarantees and loans for tour operators, 
accommodation and catering service provider 
(SA.57665)
0.736 EC
KfW and German Regional Promotional Banks: 
SA.56863, Federal framework for subsidized 
loans 2020, SA.56790 €45 bn, Federal Framework 
‘Small amounts of aid 2020’ - Covid-19, SA.56787, 
Covid-19: Bundesregelung Bürgschaften 2020, 
SA.56714 - Covid-19 measures, new measures 
approved on 11 April: 100% guarantees + R&D 
(SA.57100,€5 bn)
550 IMF, press
Kredex: SA.56804 Estonia, Loan guarantee scheme 
+ SA.57028
2.75 EC
Malta Development Bank: SA.56843, Covid-19 Loan 
guarantee scheme + interest rate subsidy scheme 
(SA.57163 ) + loan to Mediterranean Investments 
Holding (SA.57574)
0.77 EC
PMV, Belgium, loan guarantee + SA.57246 
(subordinated loans) + Credendo Bridge Guarantee 
(export, SA.57187), SOWALFIN and Co. (Walloon 
region guarantees, SA.57083)
4.28 EC
SID Bank (and others), Slovenia, SA.56999 
+SA.57143 + SA.57724
4.272 EC
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ANNEX 2: EAPB VIEWS ON NECESSARY 
REGULATORY ADAPTATIONS
With regard to regulatory aspects, EAPB generally welcomes the 
adaption of a number of regulatory and prudential rules to ensure 
a greater impact of private sector bank lending and public support 
instruments. In particular, the Capital Requirements Regulation 
(CRR) quick fix will lead to capital relief and help banks to provide 
more urgently needed loans. However, we see leeway for these rules 
to be supplemented by further regulatory changes that effectively 
curb the known crisis-intensifying effects of prudential regulation 
and provide administrative relief. 
No ‘punitive’ contribution to the resolution fund when 
participating in promotional loan programmes
When calculating the contribution to the resolution fund, partici-
pation in promotional loan programmes should not be ‘penalized’ 
with a higher bank levy. 
In order to fix this, EAPB would propose to amend Delegated 
Regulation (EU) 2015/63 on the calculation of the EU bank levy to 
the effect that: 
• Passing-though promotional loans to an end customer or of 
trustee loans has a contribution-neutral effect 
• Promotional loans from promotional banks, which have 
been excluded from the leverage ratio exposure measure 
in accordance with Art. 429a CRR 2, can also be deducted 
from the leverage ratio when the latter is used as a risk in-
dicator for calculating the contribution to the Single Res-
olution Fund 
More generally, EAPB would propose a BRRD Quick-Fix in order 
to bring forward relief measures already decided in BRRD 2 (remov-
al of the Combined Buffer Requirement (CBR) from MREL) similar 
as it has been done in the CRR quick fix.
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Avoid constraints through leverage ratio disclosures
The current leverage ratio disclosures requirements apply as a con-
straint to banks due to market scrutiny. We recommend bringing 
forward the date of application of the proportional calculation of 
the leverage ratio agreed under the CRR 2 (such as promotional 
loans by promotional banks in accordance with Art. 429a CRR 2) so 
that this applies not only starting in June 2021 but also in the cur-
rent disclosure requirements. Such a measure would increase the 
effectiveness of the policy responses to the Covid-19 crisis. 
Avoid pro-cyclical effects in banking regulation
Risk-sensitive capital requirements have pro-cyclical effects. This 
correlation has been known for a long time, but has so far only been 
tackled in banking regulation with regard to an advantageous eco-
nomic development. For example, the countercyclical capital buffer 
ensures that banks build up additional capital buffers in times of 
good economic development associated with high credit growth in 
order to be prepared for a downturn. However, risk-sensitive capital 
requirements also have the effect of compounding the cycle in bad 
times especially when capital buffers are not sufficiently above min-
imum capital requirements and raising new capital is difficult. This 
risk is particularly acute in the event of unexpected macroeconomic 
shocks that lead to a significant decline in overall economic produc-
tion or demand within a short period or that affect both supply and 
demand, as during the Covid-19 crisis. It is foreseeable that this crisis 
will – in spite of extensive government countermeasures and super-
visory flexibility – lead to rating downgrades and loan defaults even 
for companies that would have been considered economically sound 
under normal circumstances. This entails the risk of a corresponding 
increase in capital requirements and thus a reduction in the banks’ 
lending possibilities, which in turn could further intensify the eco-
nomic downturn and make it more difficult to grant urgently needed 
new loans during the economic recovery phase. A staged series of 
measures is proposed below, which, depending on the course of the 
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crisis, could be taken to address this problem. 
As the European Banking Authority (EBA) has rightly noted, Eu-
ropean banks are entering this crisis with sound capital ratios. It 
is of the utmost importance that this capitalisation is not reduced 
unnecessarily during the crisis. This is already in the banks’ own in-
terest. It is therefore important for us to stress that we do not argue 
in favour of reducing banks’ capital in absolute terms during the cri-
sis, but to introduce counter-cyclical measures that would offset a 
sharp undesirable increase in capital requirements due to their risk 
sensitivity, which would increase the scale of the crisis and hinder 
the subsequent economic recovery.
The EAPB believes that we need to create new powers for the 
Commission or competent authorities to be prepared for a possible 
intensification of the crisis. Whether these powers will ultimately 
be used is open at this stage. However, we think that they should be 
available in case of urgency. 
Empowerments for the Commission to adopt 
counter-cyclical measures (Art. 459 CRR)
Member States may impose additional Common Equity Tier 1 capital 
requirements on institutions in economic upturns with strong credit 
growth for loans extended in the country concerned in the form of 
a countercyclical capital buffer of up to 2.5% of RWA. This is intend-
ed to provide the banks with provisions in the event of an economic 
downturn. In the course of the relief granted in the Covid-19 crisis, 
numerous national supervisory authorities have reduced the respec-
tive countercyclical capital buffer. This is to be welcomed. 
However, it should also be possible to temporarily reduce 
prudential requirements in times of significant macroeconomic 
shocks. The EAPB would propose to entrust the Commission with a 
role in making temporary adjustments to the framework in excep-
tional situations that mirrors the mandate for a delegated act, laid 
down in Article 459 of the CRR. 
Article 459 empowers the Commission to impose stricter re-
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quirements than those in the CRR in clearly specified areas and for 
a period of one year. The exercise of this empowerment is backed 
by stricter accountability rules requiring the Commission to submit 
regular reports to the European Parliament and Council. 
The EAPB would propose to extend this empowerment in a 
well-framed manner in order to allow the Commission to adopt 
exceptional well-targeted relief measures. This would help to ad-
dress emergencies such as a potential credit crunch due to a sharp 
increase in capital requirements or a significant macroeconom-
ic shock triggered by a second infection wave. These exceptional 
relief measures should at the least include the prudential require-
ments explicitly mentioned in Article 459. 
Furthermore, the impact of credit defaults and deteriorated 
ratings on capital requirements could be mitigated in exceptional 
emergency situations and under the discretion of competent au-
thorities or the Commission. 
In the internal ratings-based approach (IRBA), rating down-
grades and defaults lead to an increase in capital requirements, pri-
marily via three channels:
1. Rating downgrades and the associated increase in the prob-
ability of default (PD) via the risk weight functions for expo-
sures to sovereigns, banks and corporates (Art. 153 CRR), and 
retail customers (Art. 155 CCR) affect the amount of capital to 
be held. However, this effect decreases as the PD increases, 
ultimately becoming negative. 
2. This is because institutions using the IRBA must form a sep-
arate, increasing provision for expected losses. Within the 
scope of the value adjustment comparison (Art. 159 CRR), 
banks must compare the expected losses with the value ad-
justments made and deduct any shortfalls from equity. In this 
way, an increase in PD or a default (leading to the highest 
possible PD of 100%) leads to a consumption of regulatory 
capital, either through the creation of additional value ad-
justments or the deduction of capital. 
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3. Finally, yet importantly, defaults also have an impact on the 
capital position of institutions via the provisions on the min-
imum coverage of non-performing exposures (so-called ‘NPL 
backstop’ (Art. 47a CRR). Accordingly, defaulted loans must 
be regarded as ‘non-performing’ in accordance with Art. 47a 
para. 3 part a CRR. For such loans, the banks may, over time, 
then have to set up additional risk provisions, depending on 
the collateralisation.
Therefore, the EAPB would propose the following measures:
1. Banks could be allowed to adjust their PD estimates to partial-
ly or fully offset the impact of a non-cyclical economic shock 
that negatively affects the risk factors of the PD estimate for 
a short period of time (no longer than two years). Such an 
adjustment of PD estimates should be permitted where the 
risk quantification would otherwise be inaccurate and dis-
proportionately conservative: for example, because the crisis 
is likely to be followed by a strong economic recovery. 
2. In this sense, it could also be considered to modify the re-
quirements in Art. 185 part E of the CRR for a certain period. 
According to this provision, banks must increase their PD es-
timates if the actual default rates differ so significantly from 
the estimated PD that the validity of the estimates is called 
into question. Institutions may be allowed to choose not to 
adjust PD estimates in the short term, but to base them on 
long-term experience and expectations. 
3. Finally, yet importantly, a countercyclical factor could also 
be included in the risk weighting function, which slows down 
the increase in capital requirements as PD increases in cer-
tain economic situations. 
Consideration could be given to repealing the NPL backstop re-
quirements in a severe non-cyclical crisis, or at least to extending 
the period within which provisions must be built up.
If, in view of the course of the crisis, the above-mentioned mea-
sures do not appear to be sufficient, the Commission should have 
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the discretion to suspend temporarily (e.g. three months): 
• The requirement of a timely review of ratings upon the dis-
closure of material information about the borrower (Art. 173 
para. b of CRR).
• And the default criteria:
 — “putting the credit obligation on non-accrued status” (Art. 
178 para. 3 part a of CRR).
 — “recognition of a significant specific credit adjustment” 
(Art. 178 para. 3 part b of CRR).
 — and “distressed restructuring” (Art. 178 para. 3 para. 3 part 
b of CRR). 
Alternatively, similar powers could be entrusted to competent 
authorities under the condition that they are applied in a uniform 
manner within the EU.
Postpone first-time application of the CRR II
In order to relieve the burden on institutions, the remaining first 
dates of application of the CRR II should also be postponed to a 
point in time when the economic recovery is already clearly notice-
able among companies, private households and banks. In our opin-
ion, the postponement should not only cover those new regulatory 
requirements that come into force on 28 June 2021, but should also 
apply to the new reporting requirements for market risk regulations 
(FRTB), which are to be applied for the first time from the reporting 
deadline of 31 December 2020. 
The implementation of the CRR II will not only lead to consider-
able administrative burdens in the institutions, but also to consid-
erable future capital burdens. This would have to be taken into ac-
count in the capital planning already at this point in time and could 
thus prevent the banks from providing loans during the crisis.
No negative impact of legacy instruments on the recognition 
of existing own funds instruments and eligible liabilities
In view of the discussions initiated by EBA on “legacy capital in-
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struments”, there is an urgent need for legislative clarification in 
the CRR (Articles 28, 52, 63 and 72b CRR). Legacy instruments held 
by the institutions should remain harmless to the recognition of ex-
isting own funds instruments and eligible liabilities after the end 
of the transitional provisions of Articles 484 ff. CRR. Legacy instru-
ments contribute to loss coverage in times of crisis. Institutions are 
often unable to call or redeem them and it would further reduce 
their capital base. If existing own funds instruments are no longer 
recognized because the institution continues to hold legacy instru-
ments, the banks’ scope for lending would be further reduced.
Recovery package
Targeted adjustments of MiFID/MiFIR and the Prospectus Regula-
tion can help to stimulate the capital market in the EU and generate 
additional funding for crisis management. In this respect, we sup-
port the planned proposals of the European Commission and the 
High-Level Forum on capital markets union.
Provisioning schedule for government-guaranteed NPEs
EAPB welcomes the new treatment for government-guaranteed 
NPEs that removes the build-up phase for the first seven years un-
der the CRR quick fix. However, the new prudential treatment has 
not removed our key concern, being that provisioning has to take 
place even if the guarantor is acting to its commitment, and pay-
ments are received according to schedule. 
First, the guarantee cannot be called upon as long as the borrow-
er is paying according to schedule. Nevertheless, such a loan might 
classify as an NPE, for instance, due to a pulling effect or when it 
is assumed unlikely that the borrower will repay. Hence, there can 
be a mismatch between when the guarantor has to act on its com-
mitment and when a loan classifies as an NPE. As such, the provi-
sioning schedule is applicable for exposures that are expected to be 
covered by the guarantor.
Second, a guarantor can either indemnify a lender by direct 
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payment of the covered amount (lump sum) or indemnify the lend-
er according to the original repayment schedule of the loan. The 
latter being a common occurrence among EAPB members. While 
in such an event, payments are received according to schedule, 
technically according to art. 47a of the CRR the exposure should 
be classified as NPE as the classification relates to the borrower 
and not to the guarantor. 
Given the long-term nature of the loans, the repayment sched-
ule will exceed the provisioning schedule and hence provisioning 
will be required though payments according to the schedule are re-
ceived and are expected to be received from the guarantor who is 
acting to its commitments.
As such, the need for a provision exists even if the cover is an 
unfunded credit protection and the issuer of the cover continues to 
perform its commitments. 
EAPB would recommend to exempt the covered part of a non-per-
forming exposure from prudential provisioning as long as the bor-
rower is paying on time or the cover is valid unfunded credit protec-
tion granted by the guarantor who is performing as scheduled.
Restrictions on dividends for public stakeholders 
EAPB would like to draw your attention to the special situation of 
certain promotional banks/funding agencies when it comes to the 
restriction of distributions during the Covid-19 pandemic and es-
pecially the recent ESRB advice to extend the dividend suspension 
period until the end of 2020. 
We feel that the rationale for the recommendation to not pay 
out dividends over 2019 does not hold for those promotional banks/
funding agencies that pay dividends to their public stakeholders. 
Promotional banks/funding agencies are generally well-capitalized 
banks and – where paid out – dividends are generally paid out of 
profits (and not reserves). Hence, in these cases the distribution of 
dividend does not deplete available capital, nor does the dividend 
payment stem from a relaxation in prudential requirements. 
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Secondly, the suspension of dividends is at odds with the aim to 
mitigate the economic impact of the pandemic on local authorities. 
These dividends are usually at the benefit of local public authorities, 
being the entities that are combatting the health and economic cri-
sis we are currently facing. It is part of the public mission of promo-
tional banks/funding agencies to support their public shareholders, 
especially in difficult times like these and therefore feel that given 
their public ownership the rationale for the recommendation does 
not hold for promotional banks/funding agencies.
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Chapter 22
Latin American Association of 
Development Financing Institutions
RESPONSES OF LATIN AMERICAN 
DEVELOPMENT BANKS TO THE ECONOMIC 
CRISIS PRECIPITATED BY COVID-191
This chapter summarizes actions taken by the Latin American Association of Development Financing Institutions (ALIDE) to combat the economic impacts of Covid-19, as of June 2020.
ALIDE is the international organization that represents Latin 
American and Caribbean development banking. It was created in 
1968 and represents 42 public banks in 22 countries in the region, 
with permanent headquarters in Lima, Peru. 
INTRODUCTION
Even with more knowledge of the economic effects, the interna-
tional crisis caused by the Covid-19 pandemic shows an uncertain 
1  This is an edited version of a report originally published by the Latin American 
Association of Development Financing Institutions (ALIDE), San Isidro, Peru, in June 
2020 and is available online at https://www.alide.org.pe/en/. Reproduced with the 
permission of the ALIDE. The original document was prepared by Romy Calderón, 
Head of the Economic Studies and Information Programme, and Javier Carbajal, 
Principal Economist, ALIDE. 
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picture. It is estimated that it will be much greater than the 2008 
crisis and a little less than the Great Depression of 1929. Although 
the latter depends, according to the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), on whether the base scenario is met – that is to say, that there 
is some control and the productive apparatus gradually begins to 
reactivate in the second half of the year.
In the April World Economic Outlook Report itself, the IMF main-
tains that, in the 1929 Depression, the world economy fell 10% and 
developed countries by 16%. In the 2008 financial crisis, the world 
economy went from a growth rate of 2.8% in 2008 to -0.6% in 2009. 
The Fund’s current estimates project a contraction of the world 
economy of -3% and -6% if the current situation continues through-
out the year, and an additional -6% if it goes until 2021. If the pic-
ture does not worsen, in 2021 there could be a jump in growth of 
5.8%. For Latin America and the Caribbean, it is estimated at -5.2% 
in 2020 and 3.4% in 2021.
MEASURES TAKEN BY THE DEVELOPMENT BANKS
The measures taken by the development banks are, for the most 
part, in line with government stipulations and focus on the smallest 
production units. However, given the nature of this unprecedented 
crisis, the health sector has been given significant attention, which 
has not been the case in past crises. This refers to the enterprises 
or institutions that provide health services and companies that pro-
duce health supplies, as well as technological solutions for monitor-
ing and controlling Covid-19.
This crisis constitutes a major challenge to economic poli-
cy-makers and particularly to our development finance institu-
tions, as the countries’ financial policy instruments. Development 
banks are revealing their unique importance to the countries in 
these difficult times, insofar as compliance with their three sig-
nificant roles is concerned: counter-cyclical measures; resource 
Public Banks and Covid-19
 413
decentralization and distribution; and support for the production 
system and employment.
It is in this context that the presence and actions of develop-
ment banks, as agents of public financing policy, take on even 
greater importance in the fulfilment of their counter-cyclical role, 
without losing sight of a longer-term vision and a continuous poli-
cy of income distribution.
In the immediate term, development banks have had to help 
countries mitigate the financial crisis by making larger amounts 
of resources available to the production and social sectors. In that 
way, the financial institutions have granted new credit lines to the 
industrial, agricultural, social housing, small- and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), foreign trade and infrastructure sectors, among 
others, drawing on their own resources and funds supplied by the 
state to do so. At the same time, they have implemented the follow-
ing measures: 
• Raised the borrowing limit of financial intermediaries to pro-
vide them with more plentiful resources.
• Granted guarantees for bonds issued by enterprises.
• Provided infrastructure funding.
• Renegotiated debts and extended debt terms.
• Offered loans at preferential rates to specific segments, such 
as to small urban and rural enterprises, and for the purchase 
of social housing, and operated with new enterprises like fi-
nancial technology companies (fintechs).
CROSS-CUTTING MEASURES TAKEN BY DEVELOPMENT BANKS 
The measures taken by the development banks, in keeping with 
government stipulations, are of two kinds: cross-cutting and sec-
tor-specific. As the crisis advanced, the focus was placed increas-
ingly on the latter. Examples of this are in health, services, social 
housing and agriculture.
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Foremost among the sector-specific measures taken are continu-
ous contact with customers plagued by potential problems arising 
from the impairment of their economic activity, namely in agricul-
ture, tourism, hotel services and trade, among others. Actions in-
clude revision and amendment of interest payment methods; cap-
ital extension and downward interest rate adjustment; valuation of 
new operations, with longer terms, lower rates and grace periods; 
and revision of credit guarantees and records in order to grant a 
working capital line on more favourable terms.  
Examples of the cross-cutting measures taken by development 
banks include the following:
• Assignment of new credit lines to their customers with terms 
of up to three years and a maximum of one year of grace. In 
these cases, the loan amounts are generally set in accordance 
with the size of the payroll and the working capital needing 
financing.
• Postponement and deferral of instalment due dates in the 
cases of personal loans and loans to independent workers 
and to micro- and small-sized enterprises (MSEs). The terms 
range up to three years and the interest rates are lower than 
those charged for the original loans. In some cases, the in-
terest is partially subsidized by the state on a temporary ba-
sis. The Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (BNCR) expected in 
March alone to readjust the repayments of 107,305 loans. In 
Paraguay, the Agencia Financiera de Desarrollo (AFD) hopes 
to provide assistance to some 50,000 MSEs, drawing for that 
purpose on funds of some US$93 million (for renegotiating 
operating capital and/or investment loans, with terms of up 
to seven years, including two years of grace). The Brazilian 
Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social 
(BNDES) announced the suspension of payments of up to 
US$6 billion in loan principal and interest in March alone.
• Temporary suspension of mortgage payments for home pur-
chases, together with the reduction of mortgage loan interest 
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rates. By way of example, the Caixa Económica Federal (CEF), 
Brazil’s foremost mortgage bank, has offered home building 
and development companies the possibility of pausing the 
payment of financing contracts by diluting the difference over 
the lifetime of the loan. In Ecuador, the Banco de la Seguri-
dad Social (Biess) has started to restructure and refinance its 
mortgage loans to allow for loan terms of up to 30 years with 
as much as 18 months of grace. Mexico’s Sociedad Hipotecar-
ia Federal (SHF) implemented a US$363 million programme, 
more or less, to stabilize construction loan portfolios, with a 
view to extending outstanding loan periods in order to mod-
erate the effects of the drop in sales. Bridge loans that have 
not been extended are granted an additional loan term of up 
to 12 months, while in the case of bridge loans that have been 
extended one or more times, the additional extension is six 
months. As for the Banco Hipotecario del Uruguay (BHU), the 
institution decided to reduce the May mortgage payments by 
50% for all of its customers with outstanding mortgage loans 
and promise to purchase agreements.
• Specific loans for acquiring new technology to equip people 
for teleworking. 
• Loan guarantees for MSEs covering up to 100% of the loan (in 
Argentina’s case and between 80-98% in that of Peru, depend-
ing on the size of the firm). Argentina offers 25% loan cover-
age to medium and large enterprises. Peru expects, through 
its Reactiva Perú guarantee programme – the largest in the 
country’s history, equivalent to 4% of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) – to assist some 350,000 companies. Costa Rican enter-
prises hold individual Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo (Fonade) 
guarantees covering 90% of their loans. Peru has also creat-
ed the Fondo de Apoyo Empresarial a las MYPE (FAE-MYPE) 
(MSE Support Fund), administered by Corporación Finan-
ciera de Desarrollo (Cofide), providing coverage ranging from 
90-98% of the loan amount. This can be applied to debt refi-
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nancing or reprogramming or to new working capital loan ap-
plications for terms of up to 36 months including a six-month 
grace period. The Fund started operating with resources to-
talling some US$88.2 million, from which some 50,000 MSEs 
were expected to benefit. The subsequent increase in its capi-
tal to US$265 million has tripled the Fund’s potential.
• Securities issuance guarantees for SME debt instrument is-
sues in the stock market.
• Loans for the tourism sector, inasmuch as tourism is one of 
the sectors most heavily impaired, governments have provid-
ed, as a contingency measure, for financial instruments to 
mitigate the effects in an effort to safeguard jobs. In Paraguay, 
Banco Nacional de Fomento (BNF) is authorized to grant each 
applicant up to 10 times its monthly payroll, which is to be re-
paid in a single capital and interest payment at the end of the 
loan term, with a grace period of 12 months.
• Loan guarantees to support entrepreneurs in the tourism and 
bars and restaurants industry, one of the sectors hardest hit, 
whose sales have dropped for the most part to almost zero. 
The financing is provided for working capital purposes, with 
maximum terms of up to three years, with six months of grace.
• Expansion of the credit available to micro-, small- and me-
dium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) through banking and 
non-banking financial intermediaries.
• Widening of the capital supply to cover the everyday needs of 
enterprises, by broadening the scope of existing credit lines. 
In March, Brazil’s BNDES announced a total capital injection 
of roughly US$11 billion).
• Freezing and opening of new financing lines for state, provin-
cial or municipal governments in order to give them liquid-
ity. Banco de Desarrollo del Ecuador (BDE) started restruc-
turing the debts of subnational governments by suspending 
loan obligations for a 90-day period. Similar measures have 
been taken in Brazil.
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In Colombia, Financiera del Desarrollo (Findeter) grants di-
rect credits with compensated lending rates to eligible territorial 
entities and sectors for use in financing projects and activities to 
fight the effects of the coronavirus and impede its spread. It is nec-
essary for the territorial entities obtaining those loans to comply 
with borrowing regulations. The resources are to be invested in 
transportation, health, housing, education, energy development, 
drinking water and basic sanitation, among other areas. The re-
discount credits enjoy long terms, grace periods and favourable 
interest rates. The funds are intended for use in financing invest-
ments and working capital in the public and private sectors at a 
moment when liquidity is paramount for facing up to the chal-
lenges and needs created by Covid-19.
• Increase in contractual values without any obligation to pro-
vide real guarantees but only personal ones. At the same 
time, loan operation rates and fees are reduced and maxi-
mum limits are set in accordance with the size of the enter-
prise or customer.
• Automatic extension of microloan payments, and only if a 
customer is not interested in extending their payments do 
they have to notify the bank. A case in point is Banco do Nor-
deste de Brasil (BNB)’s ‘Crediamigo’ Programme. The BNB 
currently serves about 200,000 microloan customers and 
5,000 microenterprises. Mexico’s Sociedad Hipotecaria Fed-
eral (SHF), in serving this same segment, allocated US$83 
million for home improvement microfinancing by non-bank 
financial intermediaries with a financial product for loans of 
up to US$1,032, which enjoy the guarantee of Fondo Nacional 
de Garantías a la Vivienda Popular.
• Relationships with national and international lenders, to 
make it possible to postpone debt payments and immedi-
ately increase outstanding credit lines, so that funds already 
available for financing can be increased and channelled to 
borrowers from banks.
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• Some national and international development institutions in 
Brazil and their association, the Brazilian Development As-
sociation (ABDE), are working with the federal and state gov-
ernments to create alternatives for the programmes to mitigate 
the effects of the coronavirus. Both seek to reduce the dam-
aging effects on public health and the negative consequences 
for the already impaired national economy.
• Provision of credit lines with special terms to help health sec-
tor enterprises of all sizes. Resources are made available for 
working capital and for investment in the purchase of raw 
materials with which to manufacture products in heavy de-
mand – face masks, alcohol gel, tissues – and to add to the 
existing stock, to prepare hospital beds and hire temporary 
staff, among other things.
In Chile, Corfo and the Ministry of Science, Technology, Knowl-
edge and Innovation, with the assistance of the Government Labo-
ratory, launched the “Covid-19 Innovation Challenge.” This contest 
aims to speed up the implementation of innovative solutions and/
or those involving scientific technology, in order to prevent the con-
tagion of health workers caring for patients suspected of being, or 
known to be, infected with Covid-19.
Bancóldex, for its part, can offer direct loans at compensated 
interest rates to finance projects for that purpose. Entities seeking 
to obtain such loans must also certify that these loans will be used 
to finance projects to fight Covid-19.
• Establishment of working groups and joint efforts with sec-
tor institutions and those serving entrepreneurs directly, to-
gether with public policy coordination, to protect enterprises 
so that the country can return to the economic development 
agenda as rapidly as possible.
• Assistance with the financing of professionals in the creative 
economy, who are among those most adversely affected by 
the necessary social distancing policy. The spaces where 
creative industries have operated have been closed since the 
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very beginning of the pandemic and persons working in ar-
eas like the performing and audiovisual arts, advertising, 
literature and heritage, among others, have lost their main 
source of livelihood.
• Credit lines at preferential rates for the undertakings of pop-
ulation segments like young people, women, senior citizens, 
native citizens, peoples of African descent, rural dwellers, 
immigrants and the disabled, among others. The Instituto 
Nacional de Fomento Cooperativo (Infocoop) in Costa Rica 
offers an example of this.
• Opening of savings accounts for all persons needing to re-
ceive government vouchers (bonos de ayuda) for families 
without any income, either because they are living in pover-
ty, have lost their jobs, or have been left without any earnings 
due to the situation.
• Assistance to export firms. The government of Costa Rica 
announced the start-up of the ‘Alivio’ (‘Relief ’) initiative that 
will provide roughly US$53.34 million in non-reimbursable 
funding. The recipients will be 200 SMEs with export poten-
tial that are working in the agricultural, food, industrial and 
service sectors. The support of technical personnel will be 
facilitated, so that the chosen enterprises can enjoy the fi-
nancial and commercial coaching of advisers to overcome 
the crisis and strengthen their operations. The non-reim-
bursable funds can be used to purchase production supplies, 
rent machinery and for the partial payment of wages and 
salaries. They cannot, however, be allocated for the payment 
of the salaries of management or legal representatives, the 
payment of debts, the purchase of machinery or the rental 
of buildings. The aim is to serve only those companies that 
are best equipped to survive despite the situation. In Peru, a 
transfer of some US$294 million was authorized to the ‘Cre-
cer’ Fund, which is being managed by Cofide. This fund of-
fers coverage for loans to MSMEs and export firms for fixed 
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capital investments or working capital.
• Progressive adaptation of Basle III implementation because 
of its pro-cyclical effect, with a view to limiting its negative 
impact on the delivery of short- and medium-term liquidity.
• Boosting of platform development and operation, in order to 
link up enterprises with the markets. In Chile, Corfo and Ser-
cotec created the web platform todosxlaspymes.cl to support 
the country’s entrepreneurs, as a direct channel of commu-
nication between SMEs and consumers. ‘Todosxlaspymes’ 
will have access to and highlight a venue for collaboration 
in which the smallest enterprises can promote their efforts 
and get in contact with all of their potential customers, in the 
expectation of increasing their sales.
• Funding of financial intermediaries. In Mexico, Nafin and 
Bancomext manage a programme of roughly US$2.523 billion 
through financial intermediaries to contribute to enterprise 
liquidity. This programme makes it possible to lengthen loan 
terms or provide longer grace periods to creditors. New loans 
are considered for the purpose of supporting working capital 
needs and providing stock market guarantees and loans to 
improve the liquidity situation of borrowers. These guaran-
tee, fully or in part, the payment of capital and interest on 
the issuance of commercial paper, stock market certificates 
or any other instrument used in national or foreign stock 
exchanges. Stock market guarantees make it possible to im-
prove the ratings given by rating companies to stock issued 
for financing equipment operations, technological develop-
ment projects, production and development of infrastruc-
ture, environmental improvements, liability restructurings 
and asset securitization (accounts receivable, promissory 
notes, remittances and mortgages, among others).   
• Coronavirus Fund. In Uruguay, the Banco República commit-
ted to allocating US$150 million to the Solidary Covid-19 fund 
created for that purpose, as part of the contribution from the 
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Bank’s profit in 2019.
• Fintech as new channels for resource intermediation to 
MSMEs. With the authorization of the National Monetary 
Council, Brazil’s BNDES began to transfer funds through 
financial technology service enterprises. The fintechs reg-
ister with the BNDES online credit application platform. 
They will start operating with bank resources, heating up 
the competition in this market and helping the money reach 
those in need. The benefits of this initiative, according to 
BNDES, are: the financial inclusion of enterprises that ex-
perience problems in obtaining loans; deconcentration of 
banks; competitiveness in the financial sector; innovation; 
entrepreneurial empowerment; and more efficient finan-
cial resource distribution.
ALIDE AND THE TRANSFER OF KNOWLEDGE 
ANDMSPECIALIZED INFORMATION
Governments in the region, together with their development fi-
nance institutions, are taking a series of measures to offset the ad-
verse effects of the crisis produced by the Covid-19 pandemic. All 
of the countries are working to develop tools and financial instru-
ments and to find out what other countries and institutions are do-
ing to help their customers.   
For that reason, we in ALIDE have been asking our members for 
information and have been processing data identified from other 
sources to create the most complete and up-to-date database possi-
ble and to make it available to interested parties at a single platform 
on our website. We also give weekly reports to our community of 
development finance institutions.
ALIDE is a participant in the SAFIN Network belonging to the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), both an 
international financial institution and a specialized United Nations 
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agency that reports and on occasion orients institutions toward bet-
ter study and financing of agricultural and rural development.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OBSERVATORY 
HELPS IN DEALING WITH CRISIS 
On ALIDE’s website, we have created THE OBSERVATORY of the 
specific efforts and measures of multilateral and regional organiza-
tions and development finance institutions to help the production 
and social sectors cope with this crisis (http://www.alide.org.pe/ac-
ciones-de-la-banca-de-desarrollo-frente-a-la-crisis/). Reports, notes 
and contributions of development banks are collected in this obser-
vatory with regard to actions being taken to mitigate the crisis.   
SMALLHOLDER AND AGRI-SME FINANCE 
AND INVESTMENT NETWORK  (SAFIN)
This is an inclusive partnership of actors operating in different 
parts of the ecosystem for purposes of investment in agri-food and 
rural SMEs, with a focus on access to financing and complementary 
services.
At present, the network is being coordinated by a team from 
the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and 
consists of more than 30 institutions from the private, public and 
philanthropic sectors. These include governments, different types 
of financial suppliers and intermediaries, development banks and 
farmers’ organizations.  
ALIDE participates actively in the SAFIN Network through its 
involvement in virtual forums and meetings and by exchanging 
viewpoints and providing information and occasionally guidance 
to institutions for better study and financing of the agricultural and 
rural sector.   
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LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
In short, these are but some of the measures carried out by devel-
opment banks, which, as is to be expected, will follow the course 
of economic and social events on a daily basis in order to take the 
measures that are deemed necessary, appropriate and effective in 
confronting the crisis. The final aim is to ensure the well-being of 
the enterprises and of Latin American society as a whole.
With this purpose in mind, and in order to help entrepreneurs, 
the development banks are committed to taking swift action in 
making resources available to both individuals and enterprises, 
particularly MSMEs and lower-income sectors. It is the role of de-
velopment banks during economic downturns to act counter-cycli-
cally by adopting simple, rapid and effective alternatives.
The immediate aim is to give families liquidity by transferring 
resources allocated by the government through social assistance 
programmes, to them and to the business sector. This will target 
above all the enterprises that are most vulnerable and have less eco-
nomic backing with which to weather a crisis as serious as the one 
we are confronting today.
The development banks cannot do this on an individual basis 
but must join with the other national financial institutions and re-
gional and multilateral lending institutions in coordinated efforts. 
In this way, it will be possible to complement the funding structure 
of existing financial intermediaries, both local and international, 
thus making it possible for them to execute short-, medium- and 
long-term programmes.
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Covid-19 has dealt a devastating economic blow around the world. From 
individuals who can no longer afford to pay for food, to SMEs unable to 
cover their rent, to national governments struggling with their balance of 
payments and skyrocketing health expenditures, the economic impacts of 
Covid-19 have been sweeping in scope and depth. Although little discussed 
in the mainstream media, public banks have been on the front lines of 
dealing with this economic and health crisis, playing a critical role in 
stemming financial collapse, supporting households and communities, 
and channeling resources towards essential health and public services. 
Public banks provide supportive credit, fiscal assistance, expert advice 
and macro-economic stability in ways that private financial institutions 
are often unable or unwilling to do. This book offers detailed case studies 
of public bank actions from around the world, critically examining their 
policy responses to Covid-19. We identify ‘best practices’ in dealing with 
the current crisis as well as highlighting the changes needed to make 
public banks more equitable, democratic and sustainable in the future.
